Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4, Page 5
National Archives catalogue number WO 169/8666.
Abbreviations
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127293 AAC AD ADMS ADS Adv Amb A/Tank Bde Bn BP Bty CCS CMP CO Coy CRA CRASC DADMS DDMS Div DZ Fd Gals GOC i/c LST MDS MO OC P of W QM RA RAChD RAMC Rd RE Ref Reg Regt RMO Sect SMO |
Map Reference Army Air Corps Army Dental Assistant Director Medical Services Advanced Dressing Station Advanced Ambulance Anti-Tank Attached Brigade Battalion Blood Pressure Battery Casualty Clearing Station Corps of Military Police Commanding Officer Company Commander Royal Artillery Commander Royal Army Service Corps Deputy Assistant Director Medical Services Deputy Director Medical Services Division / Divisional Drop Zone Field Gallons General Officer Commanding In-Command Landing Ship Tank Main Dressing Station Medical Officer Officer Commanding Prisoner of War Quartermaster Royal Artillery Royal Army Chaplain's Department Royal Army Medical Corps Regimental Aid Post Royal Engineers Reference Regimental Regiment Regimental Medical Officer Section Senior Medical Officer |
REPORT ON THE MEDICAL SERVICES OF 1 AIRBORNE DIVISION IN THE OPERATION "HUSKY"
BY COLONEL A. AUSTIN EAGGER, O.B.E., A.D.M.S. 1 AIRBORNE DIVISION.
Reference Maps: Italy 1/100,000 - Sheets 270, 274, 277.
GENERAL MEDICAL PLAN.
In the original plan, three brigades of the Division were to be employed on separate tasks, but in the actual operation it was not found necessary to use 2 Parachute Brigade.
The main objective of 1 Airborne Brigade was the bridge (274/127293) South of SYRACUSE, and subsequent objectives were the Seaplane Base and port of Syracuse itself. In addition gun positions in the immediate area of the bridge were to be destroyed.
The number of subsidiary tasks which were allotted to this Brigade made it difficult to evolve a Medical Plan which would ensure the rapid collection and treatment of casualties in each area. It was decided that in the first instance Collecting Posts should be formed in various areas, a possible site for a Dressing Station was selected, but cases were to be held in the Collecting Posts until definite information as to the site of the Dressing Station was given by the S.M.O. of the Brigade, after he had carried out a reconnaissance of the area.
The under mentioned Units were employed:-
1. 1 Border Regt. - Reg.M.O. Capt. G.G. Black R.A.M.C.
2. 2 S.Staffords - Reg.M.O. Capt. J. Miller R.A.M.C.
3. Detachment - No.2 A/Tank Bty R.A., 9 Field Coy R.E.
4. 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance (less 2 Sections and 1 Surgical Team) (C.O., Lt.Col. G.M. Warrack R.A.M.C.)
The objectives of 1 Parachute Brigade was the bridge 270/942675 over the river SIMETO, South of CATANIA. After the capture of this bridge the Brigade was to take up a defensive position covering the approaches to the bridge. The Medical Plan for this operation was dominated by the fact that the defensive area was divided by the river SIMETO and it was therefore decided to place the main force of the Medical Services on the South side of the river as this was considered the safer and less vulnerable area. At the same time provision was made for troops on the North side of the river in the event of communication between the two areas being destroyed.
The under mentioned Units were employed:-
1 Bn The Parachute Regt Reg.M.O. Capt. M.H.K. Haggie R.A.M.C.
2 Bn The Parachute Regt Reg.M.O. Capt. R.R. Gordon R.A.M.C.
3 Bn The Parachute Regt Reg.M.O. Capt. J. Rutherford R.A.M.C.
Detachment - 1 A/Tank Bty R.A., 1 Parachute Squadron R.E.
16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance. (C.O. Lt.Col. P.R. Wheatley R.A.M.C.)
The following decisions were taken with regard to the general medical plan for both operations:-
1. R.A.M.C. personnel attached to Companies of Units should in every case be increased to a minimum of four.
2. That in the case of Companies with an individual isolated role this figure should be still further increased, and if considered necessary owing to the tactical situation a Medical Officer from the Field Ambulance to be attached to the Company.
3. The basic organisation by which a Section of a Field Ambulance is attached to each Battalion was to be adhered to.
4. That one Surgical Team would be attached to 1 Airborne Brigade, and two Surgical Teams with 1 Parachute Brigade.
5. Casualties would be collected at Company Collecting Posts and subsequently evacuated to Regimental Aid Posts or directly to Dressing Stations.
A Medical Administrative Instruction was issued by A.D.M.S. (Appendix "E"). S.M.Os. Brigade submitted their detailed Medical Plan to A.D.M.S. and when approved these were submitted to Brigade Commanders. A final conference of S.M.O. Brigades was held. The "G" Plan of each Brigade was given and the Medical Plan which was to be adopted in each case confirmed.
These final Medical Plans for the operation are contained in the reports submitted by S.M.Os. and issued as an Appendix to this report - Appendix "B" (181 Air Landing Field Ambulance), "C" (16 Parachute Field Ambulance).
INFORMATION FROM HIGHER FORMATIONS AND MEDICAL SERVICES OF SEA-BORNE FORCES.
A copy of 12 Army Medical Plan No.2 was received.
A Medical extract from 5 Division Administrative Instruction No.4 was received. This gave an outline of the Medical Plan of 5 Division in the initial phases of the operation, and stated that 5 Division would be responsible for the evacuation of casualties among Airborne Troops, and for the supply of Medical stores.
A letter was sent to D.D.M.S. 13 Corps requesting detailed information with regard to the arrangements which had been made for evacuation of casualties of 1 Airborne Division in each area, the probable location of advanced medical units and the supply of additional medical stores and equipment. A reply was received giving the information.
No personal contact was made with the Medical Services of the Sea-borne Forces prior to operations.
PERSONNEL.
Prior to this operation, R.A.M.C. deficiencies in the 1st, 2nd and 4th Parachute Brigades amounted to 1 Officer and 106 Other Ranks. This figure is inclusive of Battalion personnel and personnel of the three Parachute Field Ambulances, 16, 127 and 133.
Hence the resources of the Parachute Field Ambulances strained to provide the required numbers for all efficient Medical Services. It was found necessary to attach 9 Other Ranks from 133 (Parachute) Field Ambulance to 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance.
ESTIMATION OF CASUALTIES.
No estimation of the number of casualties was obtained from "G", but the following estimate was made by the A.D.M.S.
Estimated Total percentage number of casualties = 30%
Estimated Total percentage of this number Killed or Missing = 25%
Estimated Total percentage to be dealt with by Medical Services = 75%
This gave an approximate figure of 450 casualties to be dealt with by each Brigade.
LOADING LISTS.
The loading lists for both Air Landing and Parachute Field Ambulances were carefully revised. Several conferences were held before a final decision was made and particular attention was paid to the contents of the DON (Dressing) and SUGAR (Surgical) Packs - Appendix "D". It is considered that adequate provision was made for the efficient treatment, including surgical treatment, of the estimated number of casualties with a reserve of 25 per cent to cover loss in transit.
SECOND LINE SUPPLY BY AIR.
Provision was made on a battalion group basis for the Second Line supply of medical stores including Invalid Diet Packs. S.M.Os. of Brigades were responsible for packing these supplies in Airborne Panniers which were marked with a red cross. These panniers were handed over to C.R.A.S.C. and placed in Brigade Dumps. They were to be sent up automatically if supply by air was instituted. The principal contents of these panniers were Don and Sugar Packs, Blankets, Stretchers, Plasma, Plaster of Paris and Invalid Packs.
MEDICAL H.Q. AIRBORNE DIVISION.
A.D.M.S. Airborne Division applied for permission to be attached to Advanced Divisional Headquarters who were accompanying the Advanced Sea-Borne Forces. This application was refused. An application was then made to accompany H.Q. Air Landing Brigade and permission was obtained to do this. The A.D.M.S. was allotted a seat in a glider but no accommodation could be provided for any of the Medical H.Q. Staff.
The action which was taken by the A.D.M.S. in the subsequent operations is described in the Personal Report - Appendix "A".
1 AIRBORNE BRIGADE. - Ref. appendix "B".
181 (AIRLANDING) FIELD AMBULANCE.
The fact that only one of the six Medical gliders landed in SICILY completely disorganised the Medical Plan, but this was compensated to a certain extent by the fact that a similar proportion of gliders containing combatant troops also failed to land. The difficulties were increased by the fact that gliders had landed over a very wide area and in several cases had crashed and casualties had occurred. In spite of the lack of equipment and personnel, Lt.Col. Warrack organised an efficient service for the collection and treatment of casualties and with the co-operation of the officers and Other Ranks of his Unit overcame all difficulties in a manner which is worthy of the highest commendation. In the initial stage Capt. Rigby Jones showed great initiative in establishing a Collecting Post and acquiring transport for the evacuation of casualties.
As will be seen in my personal report, the two Reg.M.Os. Capt. G.G. Black and Capt. J. Miller and R.A.M.C. Other Rank personnel with battalions did excellent work in collecting and treating casualties in the immediate area of crashed gliders. The same high standard was shown by the Stretcher Bearers of the 1 Borders and 2 S.Staffords.
The number of gliders which crashed on landing indicates that provision will have to be made in future operations to ensure that adequate Medical facilities are available on Landing Areas to deal with casualties from this cause. Provision was made in this operation but if the number of gliders expected to land on the L.Zs. had actually done so, it is doubtful if the number of personnel allocated for this duty would have been sufficient to deal efficiently with the number of casualties.
Captain H. Greeve R.A.M.C. who is reported missing by 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance had served with the Airborne Division from its formation. He had been recommended for promotion and had proved himself to be an officer who by his quiet efficiency and devotion to duty has won the respect and complete confidence of both officers and men of the Unit. The Medical Services of the Airborne Division could ill afford to lose an officer of such outstanding ability and character.
I am unable to agree with the recommendation of S.M.O. Airborne Brigade that R.A.M.C. personnel should be armed with weapons for offensive use. It would appear that in this operation the enemy conformed to the Geneva Convention with regard to Medical Personnel and I have no evidence to suggest that Dressing Stations or Medical personnel were deliberately attacked, in fact the experience of 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance in this operation provides direct evidence to the contrary. I am in entire agreement with the remaining recommendations.
1 PARACHUTE BRIGADE. - Reference Appendix "C".
16 (PARACHUTE) FIELD AMBULANCE.
In spite of shortage of personnel and equipment owing to the failure of aircraft to arrive or to the fact that personnel were dropped at a considerable distance from the objective, Lt.Col. Wheatley established a Dressing Station and adhered as far as possible to the original Medical Plan. Full details of the work which was successfully accomplished at this Dressing Station is given in his report. The manner in which the personnel of this Unit carried out their duties in a Dressing Station which at various times was in the front line, was in the enemy's hands and eventually in front of our own line, is worthy of the highest traditions of the Corps. They were practically continually under enemy fire, and yet the standard of treatment, particularly surgical treatment, was maintained at the highest level. I was particularly impressed by the excellent layout of the Dressing Station, the smooth flow of casualties through the Operating Theatre, the rapid but efficient way in which all casualties were dealt with and the care which was taken to ensure that cases for evacuation were properly prepared. A.D.M.S. 50 Division who visited the Dressing Station shortly after I had left it has forwarded a special report in which he highly commends the work which had been done by Lt.Col. Wheatley. I have submitted a report to higher authority on the gallant and efficient way in which this officer carried out his duties which was entirely worthy of the high standard which the Unit he commands has attained in previous operations.
As an indication of the incidents which prevented R.A.M.C. personnel from arriving in the area, the reports of two officers, Capt. Percival and Capt. Lipmann Kessel are appended - Appendix "F".
I am unable to entirely agree with all the recommendations put forward by Lt.Col. Wheatley in his report. No final conclusions can yet be reached as to the ideal loading list and equipment to be carried. Loading tables have been worked out time and again as a result of experience in exercises and operations, and invariably it has been found necessary to make alterations. A basic loading list must of necessity be used for training purposes and I consider the one which was prepared and photographed in England is suitable for this purpose. The loading list for any particular operation must depend on the following factors:-
1. The nature of the operation.
2. The tactical situation.
3. The type of D.Z. and the nature of the surrounding country.
4. The distance from the D.Z. to the proposed site of the Dressing Station.
5. The number of R.A.M.C. personnel available.
6. The degree of opposition to be expected from the enemy.
7. The estimated number of casualties.
EQUIPMENT.
While trolleys were found to be of little use in this operation, this was due to the nature of the area which had to be traversed and it would be a mistake to say that trolleys are of no use, particularly in the light of the favourable report which was submitted by Colonel M. MacEwan on a previous operation. I agree however that the use of the trolley is definitely limited and that loading lists should be so prepared that essential equipment can be carried without depending on their use. It is unfortunate that there was no opportunity of trying out the wheeled stretcher carriage. The only one which arrived on the Island receive a direct hit and was completely destroyed. The folding Airborne Trestle was found to be entirely satisfactory and it is urgently requested that supplies to scale should be made available at the first opportunity as at present only fifteen pairs are held by the Division. The collapsible Primus Stoves were satisfactory but it is essential that they should be supplied with screw caps as originally requested in order that they may be dropped filled with paraffin. It is not considered that in this operation a proper trial of the new "Don" and "Sugar" packs could be carried out, but a certain modification of the contents would appear to be desirable and will be carried out. It would however be a mistake to completely omit all Anaesthetics particularly in the case of the "Don" packs which are being used for Second Line Supply.
Reports on the use of Benzedrine Tablets are scanty but certain individual cases have reported favourably, particularly personnel of the Glider Pilot Regiment.
It is evident that the structure of the Waco glider is such that sufficient protection is not provided for the pilots in the event of a crash landing. The injury that occurs is a double fracture of the tibia and fibula generally at the level of the juncture of the medial and lower third.
RATIONS.
I would stress the importance of obtaining a suitable ration for operations of this nature. The requirements are a ration of sufficiently high calorie value to maintain energy and endurance but of minimum bulk. I understand a ration which meets with these requirements has been produced in England and I would urge that steps be taken to obtain information and supplies. The 48-hour Mess Tin Ration is far too heavy and bulky for Airborne Troops.
CONCLUSIONS.
I consider it is essential that arrangements should be made by which the A.D.M.S. can personally contact the D.D.M.S. of the supporting force (or the A.D.M.S. of the Division which is responsible for evacuating casualties) prior to operations. I am convinced that this is the only way to ensure that full provision is made for the evacuation of casualties of Airborne Forces. It will further ensure that the detailed Medical Plan of the Airborne Forces is known to D.D.M.S. and that the A.D.M.S. of the Airborne Division is fully informed of the Medical Plan for the Supporting Force.
I consider that it is of vital importance that the A.D.M.S. or his representative should accompany the Advanced Medical Units of the Supporting Force to supervise the arrangements for the evacuation of Airborne casualties.
Medical transport and supplies solely for the use of Airborne Forces in the initial phase should accompany the advanced elements of the Supporting Force and should be under the direct command of the A.D.M.S. Airborne Division. In the actual operation owing to the fact that the glider landed in the sea and not by design the A.D.M.S. landed with the Supporting Force and was unable to organise the evacuation of casualties but no supplies of stretchers, blankets or medical stores were available from 5 Div. I would emphasise that in my experience if the casualties sustained by 5 and 50 Divisions had not been abnormally light the ambulances which were obtained from these formations would not have been available when required. Further, that three Italian ambulances were acquired and used to evacuate Airborne casualties. It is unlikely that against a more resolute and prepared enemy that transport of this nature will be available. I therefore suggest that a minimum of three 5-cwt trucks modified to take stretchers and loaded with essential stores and equipment under the direct Command of the A.D.M.S. Airborne Division should be attached to the advanced elements of the Supporting Force.
I should like to express my personal appreciation of the co-operation and help in the evacuation of cases which was given by the A.Ds.M.S. of 5 and 50 Divisions - Colonel Cameron and Colonel Melville. In spite of the limited amount of medical transport which was available in the initial phase of the operation these officers readily gave me transport when it was urgently required for Airborne troops and ensured that their advanced medical units gave every assistance in the collection and treatment of casualties and when available, supplied additional medical stores and equipment.
The basic organisation of the Medical Services of the Division was proved to be sound and the equipment entirely satisfactory.
Owing to the failure of personnel and equipment to reach the area and the nature of the operation, the difficulties which the Medical Services had to overcome were far greater than it was possible to foresee. The fact that these difficulties were overcome and that so many cases were successfully treated and evacuated reflects the greatest credit on the S.M.Os. and R.A.M.C. personnel of the two Brigades concerned.
It is hoped that in this operation the Medical Services have proved themselves worthy of the Division which they have the honour to serve, and of the Corps to which they belong.
[Signed A. Austin Eagger]
Colonel,
A.D.M.S.,
1 AIRBORNE DIVISION.
4 Aug 43.
Appendix A
PERSONAL REPORT BY A.D.M.S., 1 AIRBORNE DIVISION ON OPERATION "BIGOT HUSKY"
9 July 1943. D-1.
I emplaned in Glider No.18 on Strip "A" at 18.40 hours. It was found impossible to adjust seating straps owing to the quantity of stores which were being carried, with a resulting limitation of seating accommodation. We took off at 18.50 hours and the flight was uneventful until we landed in the sea approximately four miles off the coast due East of AVOLA.
With one exception all the occupants of this glider were picked up by a landing-craft at 05.00 hours and put aboard H.M.S. Mauritius.
10 July 1943. D.
At 09.00 hours a landing-craft was put at my sole disposal and I landed on Amber Beach at 09.30 hours and proceeded to the town of AVOLA where I reported to H.Q. 50 Division and met the A.D.M.S. of this Division. I told him that I considered that it was probable the gliders would be scattered over a large area and that the medical units should be requested to search for casualties and evacuate them to the nearest Dressing Station.
At 15.00 hours I obtained transport and went forward to H.Q. 5 Division which was situated about 1½ miles North of CASSIBILE. I there met A.D.M.S. 5 Division and gave him the probable position of the Dressing Station of Air Landing Brigade and requested that ambulance should be sent forward to evacuate casualties as soon as contact had been made. I obtained a Situation Report from 5 Division and was informed that personnel of Air Landing Brigade were holding the bridge which was the main objective, but that the enemy was still holding out South of the bridge and no direct contact had yet been obtained.
A detachment of Air Landing Brigade under Col. Jones was known to be three miles North of Div H.Q. and that casualties from this detachment had been left in a blockhouse on the Main Road. I obtained an ambulance from 186 Field Ambulance and these casualties were cleared.
An A.D.S. had now been established by 141 Field Ambulance at CASSIBILE and the Light Section of No.7 C.C.S. was opening up in the same area. A.D.M.S. 5 Division stressed the acute shortage of medical transport and was unable to provide additional stretchers, blankets or medical comforts. I then reported to Adv. H.Q. Airborne Division. As soon as transport was available, Major Wotton and myself went forward in a 5-cwt truck and made contact with Air Landing Bde H.Q. at 123286 (Sheet 274-11). Lieut.Col. Warrack, O.C. 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance had landed in the sea with H.Q. Air Landing Bde and had swum ashore. He had personally attended to several casualties and had accompanied Brigade H.Q. throughout.
I now discovered that of the six gliders which had contained medical personnel and equipment, only one could be accounted for. This contained Capt. Rigby Jones and the Surgical Team and four Nursing Orderlies. Capt. Rigby Jones, when he had appreciated the position, established a Collecting Post for casualties and acquired a large Italian ambulance. This ambulance proved to be of the greatest help both then and in the subsequent operations.
A Dressing Station was then established at a farm 186285 but owing to the lack of equipment, little more than essential first aid could be carried out. Approximately forty casualties had been collected here. I returned to H.Q. 50 Division and obtained three ambulances from the A.D.M.S. and with these and the Italian ambulance all casualties were cleared to M.D.S. 141 Field Ambulance, CASSIBILE by dawn on the following morning.
11 July 1943. D+1.
At the earliest opportunity a search for gliders was instituted and every effort was made to obtain information as to where gliders had landed and whether casualties had occurred as a result of crash landings or by enemy action. Ambulances were sent to various areas, a casualty sweep carried out and a considerable number of casualties were found and evacuated to the M.D.S. at CASSIBILE. The policy of increasing the number of R.A.M.C. personnel with Companies was fully justified by the results. In practically every case Nursing Orderlies had collected the casualties in groups and had carried out efficient first aid. The conditions of these casualties, some of whom were not discovered for forty-eight hours, was as a result of this efficient first aid remarkably good. Wounds had been dressed with Sulphanilamide powder, splints completely applied to fractures and morphia given where required.
Air Landing Brigade moved into SYRACUSE and the Casualty Collecting Post was moved to the Hospital at the Seaplane Base 138307. Capt. Rigby Jones and the Surgical Team were now attached to the M.D.S. of 141 Field Ambulance which had moved up from CASSIBILE to the Mental Hospital at SYRACUSE. This team dealt largely with cases from Air Landing Brigade. By evening of this day the under mentioned Medical Officers had reported in:-
Lt.Col. Warrack ... O.C. 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance.
Capt. Black ... Reg.M.O. 1 Bn The Border Regt.
Capt. Miller ... Reg.M.O. 2 Bn S.Staffords.
Capt. Rigby Jones ... Graded Surgeon, 181 (Air Landing) Fd Amb.
and sixteen Other Ranks of 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance. This left a total of three Officers - Capt. Graham Jones, Capt. H. Greaves and Capt. B. Brownscombe and forty-three Other Ranks missing. An additional light Italian ambulance had been obtained by now for our use. Lt.Col. Warrack and myself took an ambulance for yet another casualty sweep in the evening and discovered two gliders which had crashed with a total of eight casualties. These had been given first aid by a Nursing Orderly and with one exception were in surprisingly good condition in spite of the fact that five had sustained severe fractures of the lower limbs.
12 July 1943. D+2.
Capt. Graham Jones 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance, who had landed in the sea five miles due East of CAPA MURRO DI POREA reported in on the morning of this day and was attached to the Surgical Team as anaesthetist.
The collection and evacuation of casualties to the M.D.S. continued but the majority of casualties evacuated on this day were Italians. A total of thirteen Officers and 129 Other Ranks of Air Landing Brigade had by now been evacuated either to the M.D.S. or to 7 C.C.S. In the great majority of cases casualties were evacuated directly to the M.D.S. from where they were found and not passed through the Casualty Collecting Post which, as stated, had only a limited amount of medical supplies and equipment.
13 July 1943. D+3.
Personnel of Air Landing Brigade including R.A.M.C. personnel embarked for return to North Africa. Great majority of casualties had by now been embarked on Hospital Ships. Capt. Graham Jones and two Nursing Orderlies from 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance remained with me. I had obtained a 5-cwt truck from Adv. H.Q. Airborne Div. and still retained the larger Italian ambulance. G.O.C. Airborne Division informed me that 1 Parachute Brigade would drop that night.
14 July 1943. D+4.
I left SYRACUSE at 08.00 hours and proceeded via FLORIDIA and SALARINO to SORTINO where an M.D.S. was being established by 186 Field Ambulance (50 Division). Considerable difficulty was experienced in bring[ing?] the large ambulance from SALARINO to SORTINO owing to the state of the road and the steep gradients. Pte. Smith of 181 (Air Landing) Field Ambulance accomplished this and showed both determination and skill in overcoming all difficulties. I then reported to A.D.M.S. 50 Division - Col. Melville at Main H.Q. 50 Division. I informed him of the probable location of the Dressing Station which would be set up by 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance with 1 Parachute Brigade. This had previously been selected from photographs and was situated in a farm (937667). I requested that ambulances, stretchers, blankets and plasma should be sent up as soon as the forward troops were in touch with 1 Parachute Brigade. He informed me that the most advanced medical units in that area would be an A.D.S. established by 149 Field Ambulance under command of Major Jones and that this A.D.S. would be established as near the bridge as possible. I then reported to the Report Centre, H.Q. Airborne Division which was with H.Q. 50 Division. In the afternoon I went forward with the Italian ambulance to the A.D.S. of 186 Field Ambulance which had been established three miles South of CARLENTINI on the Sortino - Carlentini Road. A considerable number of casualties from 69 Brigade had been collected here and I temporarily attached the Italian ambulance to this A.D.S. to assist in the evacuation of casualties. I then went forward to the R.A.P. of the 6 and 7 Green Howards who were now moving into CARLENTINI after overcoming considerable opposition. LENTINI was still held by the enemy. An attack by fighter bombers caused a certain number of casualties at this juncture and delayed the advance. I then returned to Report Centre Airborne Division and brought up the Medical Party to A.D.S. of 186 Field Ambulance South of CARLENTINI. At 21.00 hours I went forward to H.Q. 151 Brigade. This Bde was passing through 69 Bde and continuing the advance on the LENTINI - CATANIA Road to relieve 1 Parachute Brigade. While at Brigade H.Q. the Brigade Major informed me that a message had just been received from the Brigade Commander who was with the forward troops to the effect that it had been found impossible to get through to 1 Parachute Brigade that night and an attack would be carried out in the early morning. I made contact with the Light Section of 149 Field Ambulance which was attached to 151 Brigade and agreed with Major Jones that I would meet him in the morning at the A.D.S. which I requested he should establish as far forward as possible in order to assist in the evacuation of casualties from 1 Parachute Brigade.
15 July 1943. D+5.
I moved up to LENTINI and the ambulance was left at the A.D.S. of 186 Field Ambulance which was now being established in the School at LENTINI. I went forward in the 5-cwt truck with Capt. Graham Jones and met personnel of 1 Parachute Brigade. I arranged with C.M.Ps. that all personnel of 1 Parachute Brigade should be ordered to report to H.Q. 69 Brigade which was now established in LENTINI and notices were put up to this effect. I visited the H.Q. 69 Brigade who agreed to provide rations and transport for personnel of 1 Parachute Brigade and evacuate them to SYRACUSE. At 11.00 hours the G.O.C. Airborne Division arrived in LENTINI and I reported what action had been taken. We then proceeded on the LENTINI - CATANIA Road and on arrival at the A.D.S. of 149 Field Ambulance four miles North of LENTINI were informed that a crashed glider was lying about half a mile East of this road. We proceeded to this area and found the glider. I examined the bodies of four dead two of whom were Lt.Col. C. Crawford, C.R.A. Airborne Division and Major Cooper, Glider Pilot Regt. Sgt. Willis R.A. was found to be alive with a fractured femur and Sgt. Kilgour was found within a mile of the crashed glider. An ambulance arrived from 186 Field Ambulance and the casualties after treatment were evacuated to LENTINI.
We then proceeded to the A.D.S. of 149 Field Ambulance which had now been established at 923647. The Officer i/c stated that he had not made contact with the Dressing Station of 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance. I had been informed that the bridge had been taken that morning and went forward to the bridge. A quarter of a mile South of the bridge a glider which had landed on the road was inspected but no casualties were found. I found the bridge had been blown and while three Sherman Tanks were holding the Southern end of the bridge, the enemy were still holding the Northern end. I could see no casualties in this area and as the enemy had opened fire I withdrew. I found the M.D.S. of 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance established at 937657. Lieut.Col. Wheatley, O.C. 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance with Major Longland and a Surgical Team and Capt. Wright and Capt. Ridler with twenty-three Other Ranks were at this Dressing Station. Contact had been made with the Reg.M.O. of the three Battalions and seventy-one casualties from 1 Parachute Brigade had been evacuated to this Dressing Station along with thirty-eight enemy casualties. Capt. Percival, Capt. Lipmann Kessel and Lieut. Kersey were missing and approximately thirty R.A.M.C. personnel.
The work carried out by 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance at this Dressing Station was of the very highest standard and reflects great credit on all concerned. In all, thirty-seven cases were operated on by Lt.Col. Wheatley and Major Longland. The value of this prompt and efficient surgical treatment under difficult conditions cannot be over estimated. It was fortunate that only one case was found to be a penetrating wound of the abdomen. This case was not operated on but was evacuated to the M.D.S. at LENTINI. A.D.M.S. 50 Division came forward to the Dressing Station. Evacuation of casualties in a truck which had been captured by 16 (Parachute) Field Ambulance and in the Italian Ambulance sent up from A.D.S. 149 Field Ambulance was commenced. All casualties were cleared by 16.00 hours and the Dressing Station closed. H.Q. 1 Parachute Brigade was visited and as the Brigade was remaining in the line that night, it was decided to establish a Collecting Post at Brigade H.Q. in the event of casualties occurring. The remaining R.A.M.C. personnel were withdrawn to M.D.S. at LENTINI.
16 July 1943. D+6.
All R.A.M.C. personnel of 1 Parachute Brigade were withdrawn to SYRACUSE and embarked with the exception of Capt. Ridler and eight Other Ranks who remained to clear the D.Z. areas of any casualties which might have been missed and to recover spare medical equipment which had been dropped. The Italian ambulance was handed over to Capt. Ridler for this purpose. I returned to SYRACUSE.
17 July 1943. D+7
I reported to D.D.M.S. 13 Corps. Capt. Graham Jones visited Medical Centre, SYRACUSE. Twenty-nine cases from Airborne Division were remaining but all were marked for evacuation by sea the following day. We embarked at 14.30 hours on L.S.T. 426 and sailed at 21.00 hours.
18 July 1943. D+8
Arrived Malta 09.10 hours. Sailed from Malta 11.30 hours.
19 July 1943. D+9
Arrived Tripoli 11.30 hours. Disembarked 16.00 hours. Reported to D.D.M.S. Tripolitanian Base. Party spent the night at Transit Camp Castel Benito.
20 July 1943. D+10
Emplaned Castel Benito Aerodrome 09.30 hours. Arrived Monastir Aerodrome 12.30 hours Reported to H.Q. Airborne Division at 14.00 hours.
[Signed A. Austin Eagger]
Colonel,
A.D.M.S.,
1 AIRBORNE DIVISION.
23 Jul 43.
Appendix B
181 AIR LANDING FIELD AMBULANCE
REPORT ON OPERATION "BIGOT" - 9 JULY 43
Plan - The Brigade had a primary task which was the capture of the Bridge PONTE GRANDE over the River NAPO and CHIANE. The second task was the capture of the town of SYRACUSE. Subsidiary tasks were the liquidation of enemy strong points and gun positions. The Brigade was to land on four landing areas - two small ones in the neighbourhood of WATERLOO and two larger ones about 4 miles away.
Medical Plan -
1. Landing areas - Two medical orderlies were found from the Field Ambulance to act as landing area orderlies on each of the larger landing areas.
2. Company Collecting Posts were to be established in each Company area. These were manned by Battalion RAMC personnel. Two extra RAMC orderlies were attached to each Company four weeks before the Operation and were trained in this duty.
3. The R.A.P. for each Battalion was to open in the same area as the Dressing Station. The R.M.O. was to be responsible for collection of casualties from Company Posts.
4. Each Battalion had 1 Section from the Field Ambulance attached. It was the object of these Sections to open up and receive casualties in their Battalion areas. Provisional sites were selected in advance.
5. Surgical Team - A surgical team with extra equipment was taken to carry out forward essential surgery. It was the intention that this team should operate in the Battalion area near the bridge in the first place and then move on to SYRACUSE to the second Dressing Station and carry out any essential surgery there.
6. S.M.O. Brigade, with 2 O.Rs., was with Brigade H.Q. to supervise the medical plan.
7. Evacuation behind the Dressing Stations was the responsibility of A.D.M.S., 5 Div.
RAMC Personnel employed -
1. Each Battalion - R.M.O. and 24 O.Rs. (4 per Company)
2. Each Section - Section Commander and 19 O.Rs.
3. Each Landing Area - 2 O.Rs.
4. Surgical Team - 2 Officers and 5 O.Rs.
5. Brigade H.Q. - S.M.O and 2 O.Rs.
Transport -
1. Gliders -
(a) 6 Gliders were allotted to the Field Ambulance for the transport of the 2 Sections and the surgical team.
(b) Distribution of glider loads - It was decided to make each glider as far as possible an independent unit which could, if necessary, function as a modified Dressing Station.
(c) Glider loads were as follows -
Borders' Section (1. Section Commander + 3 O.Rs. and blitz-buggy (66)
and Reserve (2. Anaesthetist with 10 O.Rs. and handcart (70)
(3. 1 S/Sjt. + 5 O.Rs. and stretcher trailer with reserve medical stores (62)
Staffords' Section (4. Section Commander + 3 O.Rs. and blitz-buggy (22)
and Reserve (5. S/Sjt. with 11 O.Rs. and hand-cart (30)
(6. Surgeon + 9 O.Rs. and hand-cart - including surgical team (26)
2. Wheeled - It was considered necessary to take 2 blitz-buggies, 1 stretcher trailer and 2 hand-carts to carry equipment and to evacuate casualties within the Brigade area.
Equipment - Each RAMC soldier carried his small kit and a pack or haversack containing essential medical stores for first aid work. In addition his pack was filled with medical and ordnance equipment for use in the Dressing Station. The stretcher trailer was filled with extra plasma, dressings, comforts and plaster. Benzedrine tablets were issued to Battalions for use as directed by M.Os. Morphine and mosquito cream were carried by each man in the Brigade. 2nd Line supplies were pre-packed and left with the Q.M. at the base. Each glider in the Bde. carried one blanket and 4 gals. drinking water.
The Operation -
1. 6 gliders became safely airborne by 1900 hours on 9 July and proceeded to SICILY - the journey was very bumpy. All gliders were cast off within a radius of 10 miles from the coast. One was close enough to make a safe landing - the remainder landed in the sea. The glider which landed safely was that containing the surgical team under Captain Rigby-Jones. He proceeded with his party to the pre-selected area and eventually, after a small battle with the enemy, succeeded in establishing a small Dressing Station and dealt with over 30 casualties. This was in the farm at 127295 and was open for about 20 hours until 1400 hours on D+1. Transport in the shape of an ass-cart was procured and Captain Rigby-Jones collected in a number of patients. These were treated and evacuated to 141 Field Ambulance in transport procured by A.D.M.S. Airborne Division from A.D.M.S. 5 Div. The surgical team opened up and operated in the M.D.S. 141 Field Ambulance in SYRACUSE from D+1 - D+2.
2. Battalion R.A.M.C. landed in gliders and did great work clearing casualties and carrying out primary life-saving first aid. They were widely distributed throughout Battalions and, as the whole force became separated off the island and landed in penny packets, it is as well that this was so. R.M.Os. both swam ashore without equipment.
3. S.M.O. Brigade joined the Dressing Station about 1900 hours on D. day. He contacted D.A.D.M.S. 5 Div. at about 2230 hours and asked for transport to clear casualties he had dealt with during the day.
4. A.D.M.S. Airborne Division had linked up with 5 Div. H.Q. about 12 hours earlier and already had this well in hand. Civilian ambulances were procured and used for the collection of casualties on D+1 and D+2 by A.D.M.S. and S.M.O. By the end of D+2 it was reckoned that all casualties had been cleared into the seaborne Medical Service. On D+3 day, the airlanding medical services left the island. 2 officers and 12 O.Rs. of the Field Ambulance embarked.
Casualties Sustained by the Field Ambulance -
Killed - Nil and 2
Wounded - Nil and 6
Missing - Captain Greaves and 15 O.Rs.
Types of Casualties -
It is thought that about 50% of the casualties found were the result of glider crashes - these mostly involved wounds of the lower limbs.
Conclusions -
1. It is not possible to comment on the general medical plan for the Brigade as it was impossible to carry it out with the forces which eventually arrived.
2. The decision to distribute R.A.M.C. as widely as possible throughout the Brigade proved itself.
3. The operation showed that the spirit and morale of the R.A.M.C. is good and that all ranks carried out their duties under difficulties in a completely unselfish manner.
4. It is felt that it is essential to have an officer from A.D.M.S. Airborne Division staff with the H.Q. of the seaborne forces. He should have a call on a small pool of ambulances to clear outlying casualties and Dressing Stations. A.D.M.S. Airborne Division achieved this and made the task of S.M.O. Brigade very much simpler by establishing a good liaison early on in the battle.
5. It is considered essential to arm each RAMC glider party with offensive weapons as well as pistols.
[Signed G.M. Warrack]
Lt.Col., RAMC.
Commanding 181 Air Landing Field Ambulance.
July '43.
Appendix C
16 Parachute Field Ambulance
Report on Operation HUSKY/FUSTIAN, 13/7/43
Map Ref: Naval Collation Map - CATANIA Sheet 4.
Note - The object of the operation was that the 1st Parachute Brigade should capture intact the important bridge 942675 over the River SIMETO to allow 13 Corps of the 8th Army to advance over it to CATANIA. The operation did not go according to plan, as less than 20% of the troops were dropped in the area, but the bridge was captured, the charges removed and the enemy were denied reinforcements for the high ground to the South of it.
A. PREPARATION
1. Training.
After a period of 5 months without any parachute training for Unit arrived at MATMORE Nr. MASCARA on 12 May 1943 for 6 weeks training. Training consisted of:-
i. Stick training with Container drill, trolley erection and marching by day and by night.
ii. Specialist training - Post operative nursing, resuscitation, water duties and sanitation.
iii. Jump in daylight followed by simple container drill and forming up.
iv. Exercise Cactus I - IV which were night drop exercises over ground similar to that of the operation. Cactus I - III were independent exercises by Units and Cactus IV a complete Brigade rehearsal over the same ground. Dummy equipment was used on these exercises. On 30 Jun the Brigade moved to its operational base in the SOUSSE Area.
2. Medical Plan.
No.3 Section under command 3 Para Bn was to drop on DZ 4 and set up an ADS on the North side of the bridge to clear casualties from 1st and 3rd Bns. No.4 Section and HQ including 2 Surgical teams was to drop on DZ 2 and set up a MDS at the farm 938666. They would clear all casualties from the South of the river, and cases selected for operations from the ADS on the North side. Captain Wright was to drop with R Coy 1 Bn on the South side of the bridge, set up an Aid Post from which casualties were to be evacuated to the MDS, after which Capt Wright would join the MDS to act as anaesthetist. S.M.O. to drop with Bde on DZ 2. Centre of D.Zs. :-
No.1. 935688. (1 Bn. The Parachute Regt.)
2. 923686. (R Coy. 1 Bn., Bde HQ., and Fd Amb.)
3. 903860. (2 Bn. The Parachute Regiment)
4. 914704. (3 Bn. and No.3 Sect. Fd Amb.)
Proposed Locations of RAP's and Dressing Stations:-
M.D.S. - Farm 938666
A.D.S. - Within area 500 yds North and West of Bridge.
RAP's - 1 Bn. - North bank of River 940676.
- 2 Bn. - Area Track junc 937662.
- 3 Bn. - 939681.
3. Personnel.
As Bns were under strength in RAMC personnel 18 NCO's and men were attached to them from the Field Ambulance before Cactus I, bringing the R.A.M.C. Strength to:-
1 Bn. - 1 M.O. and 19 Other Ranks.
2 Bn. - 1 M.O. and 16 Other Ranks.
3 Bn. - 1 M.O. and 16 Other Ranks.
Bde. HQ - S.M.O., 2 O.Rs. RAMC., 1 Bde Orderly.
Field Ambulance sticks of 17 each were organised as follows:-
No.3 Sec. 1 Officer (199991 Capt J.H. Keesey RAMC) 15 ORs RAMC, 1 OR RASC.
No.4 Sec. 1 Officer (223758 Capt. A. Percival RAMC) 15 ORs RAMC, 1 OR RASC.
HQ Sticks incl a Surgical Team in each, (a) 2 Officers (104446 Capt. D.H. Ridler A.D. Corps, 227647 Capt A.W. Lipman-Kessel RAMC Surgeon.) and 14 ORs incl. RSM and Sgt. Clerk, OR RASC 1. (b) 2 Officers (236049 Maj CJ Longland RAMC. Surgeon, Rev. R.T. Watkins. R.A.Ch.D. Chaplain) 11 ORs. RAMC, 1 OR A.D. Corps, 2 ORs RASC, and 1 AAC (Padre's Batman).
The capacity of the Fd Amb was strained to the limit and 9 men borrowed from 133 Fd Amb were used to make up the numbers required. Total RAMC taking part in Operation - 8 Officers 110 O.Rs.
4. Equipment.
Every man jumped with his small pack, two water-bottles, a liberal supply of dressings and spare tea for patients. In addition a few items of essential equipment e.g. Small Surgeon's Roll, Syringes, Morphia, Flags Directing were distributed amongst personnel of each stick. Section Equipment was as designed in January with minor alterations. Each section stick had six containers in which were included a trolley and a wheeled stretcher. No.4 Section carried half one surgical team equipment. Each Surgical Team stick carried 5 containers to be emptied and one spare to be left on the DZ. Other spare containers to be left on the DZ were carried by Bde HQ. The total number of these were 9, of which six contained comforts, plasma, standard expendable packs and fuel, and the remaining three contained stretchers. 2nd Line supplies in 10 baskets was prepared and sent to RASC.
5. Brigade Medical Instructions.
The taking of mepacrine normally before the operation was enforced. Each man carried:-
9 Mepacrine Tablets.
1 tin Mosquito cream.
1 Set Water Sterilizing Tablets.
3 Shell dressings.
Morphia tubonics and Benzedrine was distributed to Bns to be used as the discretion of C.Os. Denim trousers were worn by all ranks. Water was provided in each plane, and certain precautions were advised against Air-sickness e.g. fatless meal before flight and sandwiches in the plane.
B. TRANSPORTATION
1. The Flight.
The take off was between 1917 and 2020 hrs, and dropping was timed to take place between 2220 and 2315 hrs. Many planes went out of their allotted course. The plane containing No.4 Section was shot down into the sea by Merchant ships who mistook it for a torpedo carrying aircraft. Four Other Ranks from this plane are missing, the remainder were rescued by a destroyer. 'Flak' over the dropping area was considerable and contributed to scattering of sticks.
2. The Drop.
(a) No.3 Sec dropped in the area 8769, astride the river 5 miles West of the objective. S/Sgt Stevens and four ORs on the South side became detached from their Section and made their [way] to the objective. Another man from the stick joined them later. Capt Keesey with the remainder of the stick on the North side of the river collected the equipment from the containers. The wheeled stretcher was hit by flak and was useless. They joined up with a small party of 3 Bn men and moved along the North bank of the river with the trolley for 2 miles but the going became so bad that they had to discard the trolley and some of their equipment. They were forced to lay up all the next day and were unable to find any British troops the next night, the Bridge being then in enemy hands. They lay up for another day and did not report into Bde until the night of Jul 15.
(b) Captain Ridler's stick dropped on D.Z.3. Capt Lipman Kessel with three other ranks did not jump, being held up by one of the men fainting. The pilot would not make a second run over. The stick made their way to the farm selected as the M.D.S. and arrived there about 0445 hrs. It was occupied by Italian soldiers who were easily driven out and made prisoner by Capt Ridler and an R.A.S.C. Corporal. The R.S.M. proceeded to prepare the farm, and Capt Ridler tried to contact Bde HQ but was unable to do so, but contacted 2 Bn at the T-junction 936665.
(c) Major Longland's Stick dropped on DZ 3 and collected equipment from containers. They had great difficulty with the trolley which had to be man handled over irrigation canals. Eventually they got up to the road on the embankment and proceeded along it in full view of the enemy without mishap. They reached the M.D.S. shortly after Capt. Ridler.
(d) Captain D. Wright 218952. RAMC. dropped 12 miles south of the Bridge. He joined up with parties of R.Fs. and 3 Bn. Some casualties from these were evacuated to 50 Div on a Jeep. He did not reach the M.D.S. until the morning of the 15th.
(e) Lt.Col. P.R. Wheatley. RAMC (52033) Commanding the Field Ambulance dropped in a brigade stick on the high ground 5 miles S.W. of the objective. In moving to the bridge several casualties were treated and left as it was impossible to take them along. He arrived at the bridge at about 0545 hrs. More casualties, mostly from gliders, were found near the south embankment just West of the bridge. The bridge was then in our hands, and Bde HQ was established at 941674. Lt.Col. Wheatley then received a verbal message that the MDS was ready. He proceeded to it on a bicycle and took control of it while Major Longland and Capt Ridler prepared the theatre. The Rev. R.T. Watkins undertook the duties of liaison officer with Bde and proceeded to inform the Brigadier of the situation at the M.D.S.
3. The M.D.S.
(a) The Building and Layout. The farm was a one-storey building standing in grounds of its own and surrounded by trees. It was in a very dirty condition and resembled a badly kept requisitioned building rather than a farm. Including the two stables, it contained 7 rooms and a kitchen which were allotted as follows:
Reception in the Middle.
Pre-operative room, theatre and 2 post operative rooms on the west side.
Three wards on the east side:- i. Lying cases and cases awaiting operation. ii. Enemy wounded. iii. Sitting cases awaiting evacuation.
The small kitchen contained a large fireplace on which all cooking was done.
There was also a small room which was used as a rest room.
(b) Water. There was a well in the grounds which gave an adequate water supply. There was a tendency for other troops to come in to get water, but these were kept down to small parties at a time.
(c) Rations. There were stores of rations, mainly dried potatoes and macaroni, in the building and a small quantity of live-stock. One pig and several chickens were killed and stews were made to feed patients and personnel.
(d) Transport. There were several horses and carts in the farm. These were used for collecting casualties. A large Diesel engine lorry was brought in by one of the men. This was used to collect a dump of german Medical equipment from the bridge and afterwards for evacuation of patients. It was left behind with a salvage party who are bringing in dumped equipment. Several bicycles were found.
(e) Stretchers and Bedding. There was a great shortage of Stretchers in RAP's and the MDS. Probably not more than nine were available in the Brigade. This caused many difficulties in transporting patients from outside and in the MDS particularly in bringing patients into the theatre. These were overcome by making full use of the horses and carts and of Palliases of which about 20 were found and used in the MDS. 6 Camp and Hospital beds were brought in from the Bridge area.
(f) P. of W. About 20 Italian prisoners were used to do dirty work, such as cleaning out stables, transporting patients, fetching water etc. They were most useful. A Naval Petty Officer who spoke English was made foreman of the gang. An Italian MO arrived and was put in charge of enemy patients. He was of little use & disappeared after a while.
(g) Geneva Convention. Flags directing, Geneva Cross were placed at the entrance and at the back of the Building. Two were hoisted high up on the roof. Red crosses were painted on the walls and an Italian Red Cross was placed on the roof of the lorry. Signs were painted and placed on nearby rd. junctions (Red paint was taken as part of the equipment).
(h) Tentage. A tent was found and at one time erected in the grounds for walking patients. It was not very popular owing to its lack of cover from fire and splinters, and was afterwards removed owing to danger of fire spreading from a burning hedge across the road.
(i) Fire. Fire from small arms, mortars and shell was intense in the area around the MDS, which for a long time was between our own troops and the enemy, but only two Mortar bombs landed in the immediate vicinity. One Italian was wounded.
(j) Medical Equipment. Only half of one section stores was available, but there was adequate surgical equipment. Every man carried a considerable amount of dressings which were all pooled and sufficed for about 70 patients. Three 'Don' packs were broken into for odd items, such as Cranmer Wire Wool and tea. Three 'Sugar' packs were used for 35 cases in the theatre and proved satisfactory. Hot water bottles were not required. Blankets were adequate, a number being found in the building. There was some shortage of tea at the end. Plasma was adequate, 12 pints were given. None of the spare containers were recovered. No second line supplies were sent.
(k) Communications. No wireless sets were working in the brigade. The Rev. Watkins brought in information on the progress of the battle. Communications with the Bn. RMO were adequate by means of parties bringing in or collecting wounded. Returns could not be sent to higher formations.
(l) Records. A and D book was kept for British Patients. The interpreter made a list of enemy patients but this was subsequently lost.
(m) Organisation of Personnel. Lieut-Colonel Wheatley controlled reception and at intervals relieved Major Longland in the theatre, who then took over reception. Captain Ridler was fully employed giving anaesthetics. 7522897 RSM F.W. Brock RAMC ran the general organisation of patients and personnel. A S/Sgt and Sgt Clerk alternated in keeping the A and D Book. 9 Other ranks were employed in resuscitation, the theatre and post operative wards. The remainder 16 other ranks including the Dental Corporal, 3 RASC and the Padre's batman were employed in bringing in casualties, in reception and wards, in cooking and general duties.
(n) Casualties Admitted - See Appendix 'A'
(o) Surgical Statistics - See Appendix 'B'
4. The RAP's.
Captain R. Gordon RAMC, RMO of 2nd Bn. dropped on DZ 3. He moved up with his Bn to the area 937664 where he collected some Italian casualties. When the Bn took their first objective 'Johnny I' he set up his RAP at the far 937658. He took 29 British and several Italian casualties into his RAP. All were brought in by their comrades from the surrounding area during the first morning. Evacuation to the MDS by means of Italian prisoners and by the horse and cart sent out to him was satisfactory.
Captain M. Haggie RAMC, RMO of 1st Bn. dropped on DZ 1 an hour late and joined up with a party of about 40 of his Bn. He set up his RAP in the ditch at 940677 just before the attack on the bridge at 0400 hrs. He had only 2 stretchers and [?] men available. He collected a total of 15 cases.
Captain J. Rutherford RMO of 3rd Bn. dropped inside the outer defences of the aerodrome. He reached the bridge at dawn where he was joined by three of his RAMC NCOs. He set up his RAP in the bulrushes in the North bank of the river just West of the bridge, and at 1100 hrs moved to a pill-box where he was able to hold casualties under cover.
7373008 S/Sgt. Stevens E.G., R.A.M.C. and 4 Orderlies - the only available men from No.3 Sect arrived at the bridge at about 0430 hrs. They set up a post in a ditch at 943678 and collected walking and stretcher cases to it during the hours of darkness. They were under fire at this time from a pill-box. At daylight they saw Capt Rutherford and worked with him, moving with him to the pill-box. S/Sgt Stevens did excellent work in contacting Capt Haggie, Capt Rutherford and the MDS, in collecting casualties with his men under fire, and in arranging the evacuation of casualties from the North side of the river to the M.D.S. He was wounded in the head by a mortar splinter while he was working on the bridge at about 1600 hrs, and after that led wounded men to the M.D.S.
All the R.A.M.C. men in this area did excellent work under difficult conditions. They showed great initiative in being able to deal with a situation which was very different from the original plan. 7265240 Pte. Reid J. RAMC of the Fd Amb attd to 1 Bn was isolated at one time. He collected in casualties and treated them in an Aid Post of his own working under fire.
7538068 Cpl. Scott F.J. A.D. Corps did most of the collection of wounded from R.A.Ps. and Gliders with a horse and cart. He made altogether six journeys in broad daylight under sniper fire.
5. Diary of Events. (The times are approximate).
July 14.
0400 hrs. Bridge taken by 1st Bn.
0445 hrs. Capt Ridler arrived at MDS and captured the Italians occupying it.
0520 hrs. 3 patients arrived at the M.D.S.
0530 hrs. Maj Longland arrived with his stick at the M.D.S.
0545 hrs. Lt Col Wheatley reached Bde HQ at the bridge.
0630 hrs. Verbal message received at Bde HQ that the MDS was ready. Capt Gordon visited the MDS and reported that he had cases in his RAP. It was arranged that these should be collected in 2 hrs time.
0640 hrs. Lt. Col Wheatley arrived at MDS and took control. Rev. Watkins went to Bde to report the situation at the MDS.
0730 hrs. S/Sgt Stevens arrived at MDS. He reported that Capt. Keesey and all but 5 of the stick were missing, and that he himself was working with the RMOs near the bridge. He reported that there were casualties there. The horse and cart was sent down to the bridge with him. Cpl. Scott A.D. Corps took another horse and cart to the bridge, and collected the casualties on the South side which had been seen and treated by Lt.Col. Wheatley.
0830 hrs. Horse and cart sent to 2 Bn to collect casualties in RAP. 177091 CSM. Rowe. G.R., MM., RASC and Cpl Scott took a horse and cart to collect casualties from gliders to the west. They collected some from a Glider, seen by Maj Longland, 3 miles west of the bridge and attempted to reach those seen by Lt.Col. Wheatley in the area 910654 but were unable to approach nearer than 200 yds owing to intense M/G fire whenever they tried to get nearer. A Diesel engine 6-tonner lorry was brought into the MDS.
0900 hrs. The patients in the MDS were 7 British and 3 enemy. Operations began in the theatre.
1000 hrs. An Italian M.O. arrived and was put in charge of all Enemy Wounded.
1100 hrs. C.S.M. Rowe took 2 prisoners to bridge area to look for rations. He found a large quantity of medical equipment and some palliases which were brought up in the lorry.
1200 hrs. Patients in the M.D.S. - 37 British 19 Enemy.
1615 hrs. Rev. Watkins reported from Bde HQ that the situation was very grave, and that the Bde intended to withdraw from the bridge at dusk.
2000 hrs. Capt Haggie reported to the M.D.S. that the 1 Bn were moving away to the South east along the coast. He left RAMC personnel who wanted to stay with the Fd Amb at the M.D.S. and proceeded with his Bn.
2100 hrs. No further communication had been received from outside. It was evident that the MDS would be captured. Rev. Watkins and 13 other ranks including the R.S.M. and the 5 R.A.S.C. moved off in a party to make their escape southwards. They all arrived safely at SYRACUSE.
2200 hrs. Theatre closed for the night. All urgent cases had been operated on and the theatre staff who had been working all day without relief needed a rest. 21 operations had been completed in 13 hrs operating. Cases in M.D.S. - 62 British 29 Enemy.
15 July.
An uneventful night had passed during which most of the personnel were able to sleep. The Italian prisoners all disappeared thinking that the Germans were coming.
0545 hrs. An Italian Officer arrived and 'captured' the M.D.S. He looked around the building and seemed undecided what to do. He was able to speak French. He asked if he should evacuate everything to CATANIA, but it was finally agreed that the Italian and German wounded should be evacuated and that the M.D.S. should remain where it was and carry on working.
0615 hrs. A patrol of 2 Bn passed along the road and the Italians disappeared. The 2 Bn had remained on the high ground of Johnny I, 935657 all night but had been isolated there.
0730 hrs. Forward tps of 50 Div advanced past the M.D.S. The Italian prisoners returned to the M.D.S.
0830 hrs. Capt. Wright reported to the M.D.S. and was put in charge of Reception and Evacuation. Capt. Gordon and Capt Rutherford took horses and carts to look for wounded in surrounding areas.
0900 hrs. Theatre started to operate again.
0915 hrs. Brigadier G.W. LATHBURY, Cdg. 1 Parachute Brigade, was admitted to the MDS for wounds sustained the day before and was operated on by Major Longland.
1000 hrs. General C.F. Hopkinson, Commanding 1 Airborne Division, visited the M.D.S.
1330 hrs. The truck loaded with wounded was sent back to LENTINI to 186 Fd Amb M.D.S. ADMS 50 Div visited MDS and arranged for ambulances to be sent up.
1400 hrs. 1st Ambulance arrived. Colonel. A. Eagger O.B.E., R.A.M.C. visited M.D.S. and confirmed that all arrangements had been made for evacuation. Two civilian casualties were brought in from 2 Bn Area.
1715 hrs. Theatre closed. 14 cases had been operated on to-day in 8 hours. All cases requiring operation had been completed except one British abdominal which was evacuated and several Italians who needed operation.
1730 hrs. All patients cleared and M.D.S. Closed. Total casualties - 71 British, 38 Enemy.
1800 hrs. A.D.M.S. 1 Airborne Division again visited Unit and ordered it to move. Lt.Col. Wheatley and Capt Wright with 18 Other ranks with light equipment moved to high ground of Johnny I, where the remnants of the Bde had concentrated. Maj Longland and Capt Ridler with the Surgical Teams moved in the lorry to the M.D.S. 186 Fd Amb at LENTINI. The prisoners refused to move back down our line without an escort, so one Lance Corporal accompanied them on horses and carts.
16 July
A noisy but uneventful night was spent on Johnny I while a Bn. of D.L.I. put in an attack on the bridge.
0700 hrs. Bde marched to embussing point about 3 miles. One vehicle was allotted to the Fd Amb which joined the other party at LENTINI. A party consisting of Capt Ridler and 8 other ranks was detailed to remain as a salvage party to find lost equipment. Six of these remained at Lentini. The remainder proceeded to SYRACUSE on the two lorries. General MONTGOMERY stopped the lorries on the road and gave the troops cigarettes. The Bde embarked on an L.S.T. Capt Ridler returned to LENTINI with the lorry.
17 July
The ship had remained in harbour during the night. There was an air raid lasting about 2 hours.
1200 hrs. Ship sailed.
1800 hrs. Arrived MALTA and hove to outside harbour.
18 July
0530 hrs. Sailed.
19 July
0630 hrs. Arrived SOUSSE.
22 July
Capt Ridler with his salvage party disembarked as SOUSSE. They salvaged 12 containers 75 parachutes and some Medical equipment, but almost all the medical equipment on the D.Zs. has been looted.
6. R.A.M.C. Casualties
16 Parachute Field Ambulance
4 Other ranks Missing - shot down in sea.
1 Wounded and evacuated.
2 slightly wounded and remained with Unit.
133 Parachute Field Ambulance
1 Other rank Missing.
1 Bn The Parachute Regt:-
2 Other ranks Missing.
2 Bn The Parachute Regt:-
2 Other ranks Missing.
3 Bn The Parachute Regt:-
2 Other ranks Missing; 1 wounded and evacuated.
7. Lessons Learnt.
The following notes express an opinion of what has been learnt from the operation and of changes which should be made as a result of the experience.
1. Medical Tactics:- In this operation in which the Brigade was divided in two by a natural obstacle the general principle was to put a lightly equipped section on the most vulnerable side and to concentrate surgical teams on the safer side at the foot of the high ground, also to select sites for dressing stations conveniently near the battalions and within a defended perimeter yet not in the immediate proximity of any likely target for shelling. This policy was justified by what actually happened. The employment of surgical teams far forward is well worth while and it appears that against a civilized enemy a dressing station with surgical teams, can operate with reasonable chance of being unmolested in the front line and even in 'No Mans Land' provided that it advertises itself with the Geneva Cross and is not immediately adjacent to a military target.
2. Capacity of a Surgical Team. In this instance the majority of cases for operation were lightly wounded and in consequence more operations were done than was previously thought likely. 35 Cases were done on one table during a little less than 21 operating hours. Although two surgeons were operating only one table was used and the theatre work was done mainly by one team. For a short time the other team took over but they had been fully employed in the post operative work and had not been resting. If teams worked for 16 hrs on, and 8 hrs off, it seems reasonable to assume that one team could deal with 70 average cases in 3 days with the greatest of ease. In this operation as it turned out one team would have been sufficient as less than 20% of the Bde took part in the action, but if the action had gone according to plan two teams might easily have been required.
3. Unit Organisation: Each surgical team requires one man in its pre-operative and resuscitation room and two in the post operative ward. These men should know the surgeon's requirement and always work with the team. The team should therefore be increased from 5 to 8 other ranks and should have its own pre-operative nursing equipment quite independent of a section. Each team requires its own anaesthetist. In this organisation the tasks of a section within the Unit are:-
1. To set up an A.D.S. to collect from R.A.Ps and evacuate to an M.D.S. with a Surgical Team. Such an A.D.S. must be prepared to hold cases for a time if evacuation is impossible and should therefore have a certain amount of resuscitation material and Plasma.
2. To set up the reception part of an M.D.S. and to look after patients who do not require operation and those who have recovered from the anaesthetic and can be discharged from the post operative ward where skilled nursing is given. The section should be capable of providing food and tea for the whole dressing station.
The following duties which are essential in a busy M.D.S. can conveniently be done by M.O. personnel who drop in the Surgical Team stick:- A Warrant Officer or Senior N.C.O. generally to supervise personnel and movement of patients. Two clerks (working in shifts) to keep A and D Book and check Field Medical cards. One Cook. Two men (working in shifts) whose one job is to make and [?] distribution of tea. These men should be independent of the cook who cannot cope with making tea as well as cooking. RASC personnel are extremely useful for dealing with transport problems and for collecting patients. A carpenter is useful for doing odd jobs.
4. Equipment.
(a) The men this time were too heavily laden although the equipment and dressing they carried in their small packs were most useful. In future only one water bottle will be carried, the bully beef and one tin of cheese will be omitted from the ration and medical equipment carried by the men will be reduced.
(b) Trolleys proved to be extremely difficult over rough country and over dykes. They were suitable only on roads. No reliance can be placed on the trolley, so equipment must be cut down to what the men can carry.
(c) Section equipment should be cut down to a very minimum for the tasks detailed in para 2. By doing this the section on its own should be able to carry 9 or 10 stretchers. Working with a surgical team it must carry reserve surgical equipment at the expense of stretchers. Suitable loading tables are being worked out.
(d) Surgical equipment proved most satisfactory and need not be modified. The copper boiler was most useful. The problem of how to carry it remains to be solved. 10 bottles of plasma were packed in it. Two primus stoves were used in the theatre with very satisfactory results. 1½ gallons of paraffin were used in the 21 hours operating. The Tilley lamp and surgeons headlamp gave satisfactory lighting. Pentothal was used in nearly every case. Several tubes were broken. Three cases were given chloroform and two heads were done under local. The trestles made a most convenient operating table.
(e) 'Don' and 'Sugar' Packs: The 'Don' packs did not have a fair test as equipment carried by the men was mainly used for dressings. The shortage of tea was evident. Soup cubes were used in the stew. Three Sugar packs were used for the 35 cases and as there was a large proportion of light cases in this series the quantities appear to be adequate. After due consideration the following modifications of Don and Sugar packs are suggested:-
Don Pack:-
Omit Chloroform.
Ethyl Chloride
Pentothal
Many tailed bandage.
Lint
Outfit M.S.B.
Increase Sulphonilamide Tablets to 250.
Reduce Mepacrine tablets to 50.
Increase Tea, Sugar Milk powder to 12 tins (or equivalent of tea, sugar and milk separately).
Add Shell dressings - as many as possible.
Sugar Pack:
Omit 3" Bandages.
Compressed Gauze Packets 10.
Sulphonilamide Powder ozs. 2.
Chloroform Tubes 4.
Wool lbs. ½.
For Lysolats 1 tin, substitute - 1 tube.
Improve packing of Pentothal.
5. General Considerations: A water supply is essential for any dressing station. A building is essential for a surgical team to work in and it is desirable that all patients should be accommodated in a building. It is reasonable to assume that food will be available particularly if a farm is selected, and also that there will be some form of transport.
P.R. Wheatley
Lieut-Colonel. R.A.M.C.
Commanding, 16 Parachute Field Ambulance.
In the field.
23/7/43.
Appendix 'B'
Report on Operation HUSKY/FUSTIAN
Analysis of cases Operated on during 14th. and 15th. July.
Total No. of Cases... 35. Post Operative deaths... 2.
Total operating hours... 21 hours.
Types of Cases:-
Penetrating or thro' and thro' muscle wounds... 18
Compound fracture of long bones... 7
Open Wounds of Joints... 1
Compound fracture of skull... 2
Wounds of jaw and neck... 2
Wounds of chest... 1
Wounds of abdomen... 0
Wounds of hands... 1
Wounds of foot... 2
Incision of infected bursa... 1
Total 35
Amputations - Mid thigh... 2
(1) Compound fracture of femur with gross muscle and vascular damage.
(2) Gas gangrene of calf following penetrating muscle wound.
Gas Gangrene leg (see amputation)... 1
Post Operative Deaths... 2
(1) After mid thigh amputation for compound fracture of femur. Plasma used in resuscitation, B.P. 110/80 before operation. Plasma given during operation. Chloroform anaesthesia.
(2) After tracheotomy for wound of neck. Breathing satisfactory for 12 hours, became restless and died from pressure on structure of neck.
Anaesthetics.
Pentothal... 29 cases
Chloroform... 3 cases
Local... 3 cases
Time interval between wounding and operating:-
On the first cases operated on on 14th July the average interval was 5¾ hours
Maximum... 14½ hours
Minimum... 3 hours
Some cases operated on on the morning of 15th July had been wounded on the previous day.
Average interval... 25 hours
Maximum... 34 hours
Minimum... 17½ hours
The remaining cases operated on on the 15th July were wounded that day.
Average intervals... 5 hours
Maximum... 7 hours
Minimum... 1½ hours
