Headquarters, 1st Airborne Division

Abbreviations

A/C

ADS

Amb

Amn

A Tk

Bde

Bty

Comd

Comn

Coy

CRA

CREME

DAA&QMG

Det

Div

DLI

FOO

FUP

Indep

Inf

Junc

LMG

LST

m/c
MDS

Offr

RAMC

RASC

Rds

Regt

REME

rpg

SDR

Sec

Sig

S/L

SMO

Sqn

Tac

u/s
W/T

Anti-Aircraft

Aircraft

Advanced Dressing Station

Ambulance

Ammunition

Anti-Tank

Brigade

Brigade Major

Battalion

Bridge

Battery

Command

Communication

Company

Commander Royal Artillery

Commander Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General

Detachment

Division / Divisional

Durham Light Infantry

Drop Zone

Field

Farm

Forward Observation Officer

Forming Up Place

Group

High Explosive

Independent

Infantry

Intelligence Officer

Junction

Light Machine Gun

Landing Ship Tank

Light / Line Telegraphy (if upper case)

Landing Zone

Motorcycle

Main Dressing Station

Machine Gun

Motor Transport

Officer Commanding

Officer

Observation Post

Other Ranks

Photographic

Pounder

Royal Army Medical Corps

Royal Army Service Corps

Road

Rounds

Royal Engineers

Regiment

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Rounds per Gun

Rendezvous

Small Arms

Special Despatch Rider

Section

Signal

Searchlight

Senior Medical Officer

Square

Squadron

Tactical

Take-off

Unserviceable

Wireless Telegraphy

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS carried out by 1st. AIRBORNE DIVISION during the INVASION OF SICILY (OPERATION 'HUSKY')

This operation was planned to land 1 PARACHUTE BDE GP consisting of Bde H.Q. 1, 2 and 3 Bns Parachute Regt with under comd dets 1 Airborne A.Tk Bty, 1 Parachute Fd Sqn, R.E., 16 Parachute Fd Amb, R.A.M.C., 21 Indep Parachute Coy and 4 Army Film and Photographic Section by parachute and glider on night 12/13 July or any subsequent night to carry out task of capturing rd bridge over R. SIMETO on the main road AUGUSTA - CATANIA to assist the advance of Eighth Army northwards. The Bde Group was to land on 4 D.Zs and 2 L.Zs in the area close to the br. The Bde Group was prepared to depart on night 12/13 July, but the operation was postponed 24 hrs; it took place on night 13/14 July.

For this operation one additional Troop Carrier Group - 64 Group - was made available for 51 Wing. The whole Group was not used as such, but individual A/C were taken from the Group to replace deficiencies in the 60th and 62nd Groups. The following numbers of A/C were available for take off:-

Parachute A/C. -

Gliders. -

51 A/C from 60 Troop Carrier Group.

50 A/C from 62 Troop Carrier Group.

4 A/C from 64 Troop Carrier Group.

11 Albemarles from 296 Sqn., R.A.F.

8 Albemarles towing WACO Gliders

from 296 Sqn, R.A.F.

4 Albemarles towing HORSA Gliders

from 296 Sqn, R.A.F.

7 Halifax towing HORSA Gliders

from 295 Sqn, R.A.F.

)

) 1 Airborne

) A/Tk Bty

)

In addition to the above totals, spare A/C were available on each airfield in the event of any A/C going u/s. It was only possible to provide this large number of gliders owing to their not being used for 2 Para Bde operation. Had this operation taken place, approx 5 HORSA and 5 WACO Gliders would have been available for 1 Para Bde operation.

Containers were painted white and fitted with lighting sets by R.E.M.E. personnel and the direction of C.R.E.M.E. some 600 containers of various types were required. These containers were delivered to 1 Parachute Bde approx three days prior to the operation, and loaded in unit lines the day prior. Parachutes, both X Type and container chutes, were delivered to unit lines by the M.P.S.U. at 1800 hrs the evening prior to the operation.

One three-ton lorry was provided from Div R.A.S.C. on the morning of take off for each A/C load, each lorry bore the serial number or letter of the A/C. These lorries were loaded in unit lines with the stick, their own parachutes and containers. Lorries moved to Airfields according to a simple march table from 1345 hrs onwards. On arrival at Airfields lorries were routed direct to their respective A/C in their dispersal areas where container loading commenced at approx 1630 hrs. Containers were loaded on A/C in accordance with the standard procedure, i.e. by each stick themselves, under Air Corps and R.A.F. supervision. The Air side being responsible for the correct loading on the A/C. Glider loading was carried out the day prior to the operation, in the same manner as outlined for 1 Air Landing Bde operation.

Approx 1 hr before first take off a situation report and alteration to call signs was received at BASE OPERATIONS; this was passed immediately by telephone and S.D.R. to Airfield Controls on each Airfield, who arranged for this information to be passed to units before take off.

A. Airfield A (60 Troop Carrier Group) The first A/C was airborne at 1952 hrs and 29 A/C were airborne by 2005 hrs. Of the 29 A/C taking off, 3 were from 64th Group. No unusual incidents on take off.

B. Airfield B (60 Troop Carrier Group) The first A/C was airborne at 1955 hrs and 25 A/C were airborne by 2022 hrs. One A/C blew tyre on T.O. A/C returned and crew changed tyre in 8 minutes and took off again. No.99 returned at 2225 hrs with engine trouble and was unable to take off again.

C. Airfield C (62 Troop Carrier Group) The first A/C took off at 1901 hrs and 24 A/C were airborne at 1923 hrs. No.6 A/C went u/s before take off and spare A/C was used.

D. Airfield D (62 Troop Carrier Group) The first A/C took off at 1925 hrs and 27 A/C were airborne at 1948 hrs. Of the 27 A/C taking off, one was from 64th Group. No.51 returned after take off with engine trouble, stick and containers transferred to spare A/C and took off again, altogether 2 hrs late on final take off. No.38 returned with engine trouble at approx 2330 hrs and was unable to take off again.

E. Airfield E (295 Sqn, R.A.F.) - HORSA Gliders. The first A/C took off at 2145 hrs and 10 gliders were airborne by 2239 hrs. Of the 10 A/C which took off, 4 were Albemarles from 296 Sqn, R.A.F. These towed HORSA gliders at full pay load after jettisoning under-carriage. A/C No.124 had broken rope on T.O. this was replaced and glider took off slightly late. A/C No.129 took off without glider, was recalled, meanwhile tug No.125 was hitched to glider No.129 which took off. A/C No.129 landed and was hitched to glider No.125 but rope broke on T.O. and damaged front of glider, unable to be repaired in time.

F. Airfield F (296 Sqn, R.A.F.) Parachute A/C - The first A/C took off at 2045 hrs and 11 A/C were airborne at 2059 hrs. A/C No.107A returned at 2310 hrs with engine trouble - unable to take off again. Gliders - The first glider took off at 2143 hrs and 7 WACO were airborne by 2212 hrs. A/C towing glider No.115 crashed on T.O. at end of runway and caught fire, glider cast off and landed, but spare A/C not available on field to take off in time. Glider No.118 cast off near M'SAKEN, pilot found trimming bad.

Available

116 Parachute A/C

8 WACOS

11 HORSAS

Returned soon after take off

No. left for Sicily

113

A. Airfield A. First A/C returned 0043 hrs and by 0300 hrs 25 A/C had returned. One A/C reported later down at sea and 3 still missing. 3 A/C returned with full sticks on board and 6 A/C returned with part of stick on board.

B. Airfield B. First A/C returned 0045 hrs and by 0247 hrs 17 A/C had returned. 3 A/C returned later, 3 A/C reported later down at sea and 2 A/C still missing. 7 A/C returned with full sticks on board and 6 A/C returned with part of stick on board.

C. Airfield C. First A/C returned 2340 hrs and by 0129 hrs all 24 A/C had returned. 10 A/C returned with full sticks on board and 2 A/C returned with part of stick on board.

D. Airfield D. First A/C returned 0030 hrs and by 0327 hrs 25 A/C had returned - one A/C returned later and one A/C reported later shot down in sea. 4 A/C returned with full stick on board and 3 A/C returned with part of stick on board.

E. Airfield E. First A/C returned 0059 hrs and by 0402 hrs 8 A/C (5 Halifax and 3 Albemarles) had returned. 2 A/C (1 Halifax and 1 Albemarle) still missing. One glider No.119 released at 2,500 ft 2 miles from coast without warning to tug.

F. Airfield F. First A/C returned 0130 hrs and by 1000 hrs 18 A/C had returned - one A/C returned later, one A/C reported down in sea and one A/C still missing. (These figures include Glider tugs from this airfield). One A/C returned with stick on board.

A summary of the success of the dropping and parachute troops and the landing of gliders is given in Annexure B. Detailed reports on each A/C are given in Annexure C. These reports have been compiled from reports made by Pilots and Jumpmasters. The de-briefing of Jumpmasters was very carefully carried out in each case by an officer, and the exact position of landing was pointed out on a map by the Jumpmaster. The detailed reports on each glider are given in Annexure D. These have been compiled from glider pilots' reports and statements made by the troops landed in each case.

(a) Route. The route ordered for A/C was from R.V. over KURIATE Islands, to DELIMARE PT (MALTA) and thence 40º for 68 miles, thence 26° for 32 miles, thence 348° for 16 miles, thence 326° for 14 miles, then 271° for 13 miles to the area of D.Z. to make a landfall at the mouth of R. SIMETO. After dropping, A/C to make a left turn and fly a course of 93° for 23 miles, thence returning slightly to East and South of the outward route. The outward flight was to be made at 500 ft and the return flight at heights varying from 1,000 ft to 3,000 ft. Numerous variations from this route were made in attempts to take evasive action from A.A. fire. The detailed routes are shown on attached traces.

(b) Weather. Pilots reported the existence of haze over the coast and D.Z. area. Wind was W.N.W. at 14 m.p.h. from MALTA to D.Z. area.

(c) Contact with friendly Naval craft. Approx 70% of pilots reported that they experienced anti-aircraft fire from naval vessels directed at or near them. This action took place in some cases as much as 10 miles off shore, especially off CAPE PASSERO and in the CAPE MURRO DI PORCO area. The course to be flown was routed clear of the 5-mile danger zone around the coast, but it appears from reports that pilots found difficulty in maintaining this limit off shore. A considerable amount of damage was thus caused to A/C, forcing some to return to BASE before reaching the D.Z. Orders were issued to 51 Troop Carrier Wing NOT to display recognition signals even if fired on. Actually in some cases lights were displayed, in some of these cases firing stopped and in others it became more intense.

(d) Evasive Action. Evasive action taken by pilots to avoid flak and S/Ls appears to have made it hard for pilots to locate D.Z. The action also resulted in a considerable number of men not being able to jump owing to their being thrown on the floor of the A/C whilst standing up waiting to jump, and thus becoming tangled in their static lines.

(e) Summary of personnel, containers and heavy equipment carried, together with casualties sustained in the air and on landing is given in Annexure E.

AIRFIELD 'A' 60 Gp. 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79.

AIRFIELD 'B' 60 Gp. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, B (spare).

AIRFIELD 'C' 62 Gp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, C (spare).

AIRFIELD 'D' 62 Gp. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, D (spare).

AIRFIELD 'F' 296 Sqn. 105, 106, 107, 107A, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 113A, 114%, 115%, 116%, 117%, 118%, 118A%, 118B%, 118C%.

AIRFIELD 'E' 295 Sqn. 119+. 120+, 121+, 122+, 123+, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129.

Airfield (a)	No. of A/C available (b)	No. of A/C took off (c)	No. of A/C returned without dropping (d)	Serial Nos of A/C in coln (d). (e)	No. of A/C returned with part of stick (f)	Serial Nos of A/C in coln (f). NOTE all are incl in colns (j) (k) (l) (g)	No of A/C shot down (h)	Serial Nos of A/C in coln (h) (i)	No of A/C dropped on DZ (j)	No of A/C dropped within ½ mile of DZ (k)	No. of A/C dropped more than ½ mile of DZ (l)	No. of A/C fired on by ships (m)	No. of containers NOT dropped
A	29 + 1 spare	29	3	68x 78 56x	6	65 (8) 71 (1) 76 (14) 79 (1) 53 (1) 58 (1)	4	54* 77* 55* 59*	3	4	19	14	64 (1) 66 (1) 69 (2)
B	25 + 1 spare	25	7	96 99+ 101x 102 103 89 90	6	81 (1) 82 (1) 94 (9) 95 (10 97 (10 92 (4) Refusal - 92	5	80* 104 91 83 86*	2	1	12	10	93 (1)
C	24 + 1 spare	24 No.6 used spare A/C	10	1x 2x 3x 5x 7 8x 9x 24x 12 13x	2	4 (6) 14 (1) Refusal - 14	-	-	12	1	1	15	-
D	27 + 1 spare	27 No.51 used spare A/C	4	32 36x 38+ 51x	3	25 (3) 33 (1) 50 (2)	1	41*	9	2	12	13	37 (1) 50 (1)
F	11 + 1 spare	11	2	111x 107A	-	- Refusal - 109	1	106*	4	1	4	4	-

Other A/C in Coln (a) NOT marked as above returned owing to flak, having suffered certain damage.

Airfield

(a)

No. of Gliders available

(b)

No. of Gliders took off

(c)

No. released before leaving coast

(d)

No. landed successfully in area of L.Z.

(e)

No. landed successfully away from D.Z.

(f)

No. crashed on landing (incl in totals colns (c) (f)

(g)

No. released but unaccounted for

(h)

Tug A/C Missing

(i)

Remarks

(j)

8 WACO + 2 spares

No.118

Nos. 114, 118B

No.115 A/C crashed on take off. Glider made safe landing. No.118 released owing to bad trimming.

11 HORSAS

10-

Nos. 119, 121, 124

Nos. 121, 127

No.125 damaged on take off. No.119 released 2 miles off coast of SICILY, reason unknown.

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON SUCCESS OF DROP ON OPERATION 'FUSTIAN' - 1 PARACHUTE BRIGADE.

1. Returned with stick on board owing to flak, after four attempts to make 'run-in' - light flak from sea. Flares dropped around A/C. All containers returned.

2. Returned with stick on board owing to order from sqn comd not to drop - light flak from sea. All containers returned.

3. Landed in Malta with stick - unable to reach D.Z. owing to flak. All containers returned.

4. Dropped 2 miles N.E. of D.Z.2 at 2240 hrs. Tangled strops prevented six men out of eighteen from jumping. Pilot stopped jumping. No containers dropped. Troops came under fire on landing. A/C hit by flak.

5. Returned with stick on board owing to sqn comd's order not to drop. Flak from sea. Fired on at CAPE PASSERO, climbed and returned to base. All containers returned.

6. Spare A/C used as original went u/s on take off. Dropped at 934690, 400 yards North of D.Z.1 at 2235 hrs. 3 Mk.I and 1 Type E Container dropped, all except 1 Mk.I found. D.Z. lit by S/Ls. Accurate light flak North of D.Z. Static lines pounded elevators on return.

7. Returned with stick on board owing to flak, wing damaged by flak from sea 5 miles off CAPE PASSERO, reached target area but fired on each of three attempts to make D.Z. All containers returned.

8. Returned with stick on board owing to order from Sqn Comd not to drop. Flak from sea very intense 2 miles off CAPE MURRO DI PORCO. All containers returned.

9. Returned with stick on board owing to flak. Crew Chief wounded. Order from sqn comd not to jump. Flak from sea causing 3 ft hole in wing and damage to tail. All containers returned.

25. Dropped at 2240 hrs at 931580 5½ miles South of D.Z.2. 15 out of 18 only jumped owing to tangled static line of No.6 - caused by aircraft taking evasive action. Chutes from 7-16 opened in doorway. On dropping 2 concussed, one broken ankle owing to low altitude drop. All containers found. Pilot reported haze over D.Z.

26. Dropped at 2240 hrs 5½ miles South of D.Z.2 at 925580. All containers found - light flak North of D.Z.

27. Dropped at 2225 hrs on D.Z.2. Containers and casualties unknown. Only two of stick returned. Pilot reported light flak off coast.

28. Dropped on D.Z.2 at 2225 hrs. Three Mk.I containers and one trolley dropped, none found. One man got tangled in strops. Light flak South of D.Z.

29. Half stick dropped on D.Z.2, half dropped ½ mile East of D.Z. Three Mk.I containers dropped, one found. Light flak North of D.Z. and from ships at sea.

30. Dropped 4½ miles South of D.Z.2 at 2305 hrs. One man killed, one sprained ankle on landing due to drop at 200 ft. Four Mk.I, one Type F, two trolleys dropped. All found except one trolley. Other trolley smashed. Light inaccurate flak near CATANIA.

31. Dropped 6½ miles South of D.Z.2 at 0150 hrs. One man failed to jump - reason unknown. Five Mk.I containers dropped, four containers found of which one had "roman candled". A/C landed at MALTA on return.

32. Returned with stick on board owing to flak, damaged petrol tank and wing. Flak from sea.

33. Dropped on D.Z.1 at 2345 hrs. Evasive action caused confusion in A/C, all but one got out O.K. All containers (two Mk.I, one Type E) found. Lights did NOT work. Light flak from sea and coast.

34. Dropped on D.Z.1 at 2350 hrs. All containers except one Type E found. Crew had to make five runs over D.Z. Flak from sea and edge of D.Z. A/C hit.

35. Dropped on D.Z.1 at 2305 hrs (20 mins late). All containers found and all lights worked. One hurt ankle on dropping. Flak from two ships in bay. A/C not damaged.

36. Returned with stick on board owing to flak. Pilot tried to make 'run-in' 6 to 8 times, but got lost. Flak all from land. During evasive action tps got tangled up with strops.

37. Dropped on D.Z.1 at 2310 hrs. Three Mk.I and one Type E containers dropped of which one Mk.I did NOT drop. Light and heavy flak from sea and area D.Z.

38. Returned owing to engine trouble (motor on fire) without reaching D.Z. Flak from sea.

39. Dropped 2½ miles S.E. of D.Z.1 at 2310 hrs. Pilot could not locate D.Z.1. Two out of three Mk.I containers found. One injured foot, one bruised rib on landing. Stick fired on while coming down. Light flak around D.Z. and from ships in bay - A/C not damaged.

40. Dropped on D.Z.1 at 2225 hrs - all containers found. H.C. fire observed S of D.Z.

41. Dropped 2 miles N.W. of D.Z.1 (equals D.Z.4) at 915704 at 2220 hrs (50 minutes early). No containers found (three Mk.I, one trolley). A/C shot down on return - crew rescued.

62. Dropped at 2240 hrs 10,000 yards S. of D.Z.1. One Mk.I, one trolley and two baskets NOT found, one Mk.I two Type F found. One badly bruised elbow on landing. Some confusion with long strops. Light haze. Fired on by convoy S. of SYRACUSE.

63. Dropped at 2240 hrs 6 miles South of D.Z.1 at 935605. Two sprained ankles (due to drop from 200 ft). All containers except one trolley found. Pilot reported haze around D.Z., light flak North of river. Flak from sea damaged A/C.

64. Dropped at 2240 hrs 3 miles N.W. of D.Z.1 at 887716. One Mk.I container and one trolley did NOT drop. Pilot found difficulty in locating river mouth owing to haze. Fired on by convoy S.E. of CAPE PASSERO.

65. Dropped at 2240 hrs 3 miles N.W. of D.Z.1. Brought 8 back owing to being unable to drop when A/C taking evasive action due to being caught in searchlight beam. 'Rough' engine over D.Z. prevented further 'run-in'. Engine packed up 10 miles West of LAMPEDUSA on return. No containers found.

66. Dropped at 2315 hrs one mile West of D.Z.1 at 915685. Made two attempts to 'run-in'. Flak and haze at river mouth upset 'run-in'. No.5 container failed to drop owing to switch failure, one not found. One man slight concussion on landing.

67. Upset on 'run-in' by flak at river mouth, dropped at 2310 hrs 2½ miles South of D.Z.1 at 938653. All containers found.

68. Brought stick back, unable to drop owing to flak from land and warships in bay. Haze and flak prevented location of river mouth. Jumpmaster said "They would not jump unless over the D.Z. as they would be of little value."

69. Dropped at 2315 hrs 4½ miles South of D.Z.1 at 943626. Not easy to locate 'run-in' owing to haze. Two containers failed to come off, other two found. Heavy flak on coast and on 'run-in' to D.Z.

14. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2220 hrs. One man (No.17) failed to drop owing to legs being tangled in No.11's strop. All containers found but m/c damaged. Flak from sea and along shore.

15. Dropped on D.Z.3 2220 hrs. No containers found, but two panniers smashed. M.G. fire near D.Z. Fired on by ships - no damage.

16. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2215 hrs. No trouble. All containers found. Flak N. of river mouth.

17. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2220 hrs. No trouble. Doubtful if one Type E container was found. Pilot had to avoid flak from ships 20 miles off coast.

18. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2230 hrs. Light flak encountered around the D.Z. No trouble. All containers found.

20. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2215 hrs. All containers found. Light flak encountered N of D.Z.

21. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2243 hrs. Light and heavy inaccurate flak encountered area S. of D.Z.

22. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2205 hrs. All containers found. Light and inaccurate flak 5,000 ft E of coast from Navy.

23. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2230 hrs. All containers found. One slight dropping casualty due to rifle release wrenching arm. Inaccurate flak from Navy near coast.

24. Returned with stick on board owing to flak. Containers jettisoned. A/C damaged. 6 ft torn off wing. Flak from coast. Made two attempts to pass through flak on coastal area.

42. Pilots reported dropped on D.Z.3. Light flak in area of D.Z. Flak from ships in bay - slight damage. 17 men jumped, but are all missing.

43. Dropped at 2230 hrs 10½ miles N of D.Z.3. Flak from sea, M.G. fire near D.Z. A/C hit, but not badly damaged. Further details of stick unknown.

44. Dropped at 2250 hrs 9 miles off D.Z.3. Pilot unable to locate D.Z.3. Flak from convoy near SYRACUSE. Bullet through left tank. No further details of stick available.

45. Dropped at 2235 hrs 22 miles N of D.Z.3 at 847995. One serious back injury on dropping. Muddle over jumping lights. No containers found. Flak from convoy S of CATANIA.

46. Dropped at 2230 hrs near CATANIA Airfield 6 miles N of D.Z.3. Two men missing after drop, during which evasive action was taken. No containers found. Light and heavy flak from coast.

47. Dropped short of D.Z.3 to EAST. Pilot states requested to be dropped there. Heavy M.G. fire in area of D.Z. 12 missing after drop. S/L and small arms fire caught tps as they dropped.

48. Dropped at 2230 hrs 1 mile N.E. of D.Z.3. Slight flak from coast. A/C damaged on left wing by M.G. fire. One pannier NOT found. One man tangled by strops.

49. Dropped on WEST end of D.Z.2 at 2230 hrs. No containers found. Fired on from ground near coast. A/C not damaged.

50. Dropped at 2255 hrs 8½ miles NORTH of D.Z.3. 2 men failed to jump as one man (No.15) fainted and fell across No.16's strop. Four out of 6 containers found, two entangled together on way down, resulting in contents u/s. One container stayed on A/C. Stick was fired on on landing. Flak from sea.

51. Went u/s after take-off, spare A/C used. Took off two hrs late, finally returning with stick on board owing to flak. Made three attempts to go in. Flak from land.

70. Dropped at 2305 hrs 3 Miles South of D.Z.3. One basket NOT found. One wounded, one wrenched knee on landing.

71. Dropped at 2245 hrs 4 miles S.E. of D.Z.3. One wounded one hurt on landing. Flak to right of river mouth. [Flak?] round D.Z.

72. Pilot reported dropped ½ to 1 mile North of D.Z.3. but no details known of stick. One man unable to jump owing to sickness - verified by medical authorities. Owing to engine trouble doubtful whether could make it, but went in to D.Z. North of coast on one engine and the other 'popping'.

73. Dropped at 0030 hrs 8 miles South of D.Z.3 from 1000 ft. No containers but one stretcher found. Lost lead A/C. Circled for ½ hour and tried to pick up D.Z. Difficult owing to haze. Light and heavy flak on coast.

74. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2305 hrs. All containers found. Flak from sea but not hit.

75. Dropped on D.Z.3 at 2250 hrs. One pannier NOT found. Flak from coast and sea but none near.

76. Dropped one man on D.Z.3 at 2310 hrs. Returned with 14 men on board unable to drop owing to action due to flak and searchlights. Pilot did not consider a second 'run-in' wise owing to flak and searchlights in area of D.Z.

77. Dropped at 2315 hrs 1 mile South of D.Z.3 from 150 ft. A/C crashed in flames. 10 out of 16 believed to have jumped. All containers found.

78. Returned with stick on board - lost way through altering course to avoid flak from convoys. Jettisoned containers although crew were not aware of it, only one left on.

79. Followed lead A/C back to Malta, but turned round and then made back to Sicily and dropped 8 miles S.W. of D.Z.3. one hours 11 mins late. One man did not drop owing to sickness - verified by medical authorities. No further details of stick.

A. Could not locate D.Z. Came in North of CATANIA at 225° and dropped 6 miles ENE of Mt. ETNA. Flak heavy and got lost. Intense flak along coast. Nothing heard of this stick.

10. Dropped at 2225 hrs on D.Z.4. One container NOT found (not looked for). One man slightly injured on landing. Light but accurate flak from sea and in area of D.Z.

11. Dropped on D.Z.4 at 2225 hrs. All containers found. Light and heavy flak N.E. of D.Z.

12. Returned with stick on board owing to pilot being lost. [Fired?] on from sea S.E. of CAPE PASSERO. Altered course, came to AUGUSTA and got lost on smoke screen, was also met with [heavy?] fire. Pilot returned to base.

52. Dropped at 2305 hrs 1,000 yds EAST of D.Z.4. No containers found. M.G. fire and S/Ls in area of D.Z. Dropped stick whilst S/L was on A/C. One man wounded on landing. Flak from convoy S.E. of SYRACUSE.

53. Dropped at 2310 hrs 800 yds N of D.Z.4 from 100 ft. One man failed to jump owing to static line wrapped round him. Four serious dropping casualties, one killed by shrapnel. All containers found. Fired on by convoy S of SICILY.

54. Dropped at 2225 hrs 2 miles S.E. of D.Z.4. Five men did not jump and A/C shot down in sea - four men saved. No containers found.

55. Dropped at 2035 hrs ¼ miles W of D.Z.4. No containers found and believed NOT released. A/C shot down. Later reported burnt out.

56. Returned with stick on board owing to flak. Flew up coast but owing to flak took evasive action got lost, never able to locate 'run-in' point.

57. Dropped at 0045 hrs 25 miles N of D.Z.4. Seven of stick missing. All containers found. Light flak on coast and at sea.

58. Dropped at 2300 hrs 1 mile S.W. of D.Z.4. Jumpmaster wounded in arm by flak over D.Z. and did not jump. Heavy flak crossing coast and around D.Z. Fired at by ship. Three out of four containers NOT found.

59. Dropped at 2245 hrs 1 mile W of D.Z.4. One injured ankle (200 ft drop). One out of three containers found. A/C subsequently missing.

60. Dropped at 2320 hrs 6 miles S of D.Z.4. One broken ankle on landing. All containers found though none of lights worked. Pilot reports flak all along coast.

61. Dropped at 2304 hrs 4 miles S of D.Z.4. Dropped on third run up as red light did not work on first two runs. No containers found as dropped on wrong D.Z.

80. Dropped at 2300 hrs 2 miles N of D.Z.4. One trolley, two baskets NOT found. One broken leg on landing. A/C reported down at sea on return.

81. Dropped at 2300 hrs 1½ miles N of D.Z.4. One failed to jump, being unconscious. Two Type E and one Type F container NOT found. Heavy flak and M.G. fire on course up river and around D.Z.

82. Dropped but not on D.Z. Dropped at 655895. One casualty did not drop; due to evasive action unable to locate exact posn. Made two efforts along coast, eventually crossed at CORRIDORE DEL PERO 968614. All containers found.

83. Missing. Container blew up over D.Z. A/C on fire - pilot ordered 'ABANDON A/C'. When he thought all out he went aft, found four lying believed dead, two seriously injured. Pilot threw these out of door and then jumped.

84. Dropped at 2315 hrs 2 miles W of D.Z.4. Five out of six containers found. A/C landed at MALTA - tail and engine damage.

85. Dropped at 2315 hrs 9,000 yds W of D.Z.4. No containers found [assumed?] were released prematurely. Heavy M.G. all along area S.E. of D.Z. Fired on by ships S of SYRACUSE. Had to make two runs over D.Z.

86. Dropped at 2340 hrs 7 miles WEST of D.Z.4. One man did NOT jump due to injured ankle. One container NOT found and believed shot off over sea. A/C missing.

87. Dropped at 2315 hrs 10,000 yds WEST of D.Z.4. One man injured, four missing after drop. Two containers out of three NOT found. Heavy wall of flak along sea coast of CATANIA PLAIN. Fuselage and left wing damaged.

94. Dropped at 2335 hrs 1¼ miles E of D.Z.4. Only five out of 14 jumped, remainder prevented by evasive action. No containers found. Tps got tangled in strops. Flak from sea hit the A/C off SICILY.

95. Dropped at 2355 hrs 1,000 yds N of D.Z.4. Only 4 out of 14 jumped due to evasive action against S/L beams. No containers found. Troops got tangled in strops.

96. Returned to MALTA with stick on board. Pilot wounded - co-pilot killed by flak from 4-5 ships off CAPE PASSERO. Containers lost.

97. Only 4 out of 14 dropped. Ground details unknown. Five men injured in A/C by evasive action. Only one container returned on A/C. Troops got tangled in strops. Flak from sea.

98. Dropped at 2355 hrs 6½ miles S of D.Z.4. All containers except one Mk.I found. A/C hit by flak on 'run-in'.

99. Returned at 2225 hrs owing to engine trouble, one engine out and one running 'rough' 30 mins off coast.

100. Dropped 5½ miles S of D.Z.4 at 0031 hrs. All containers found, lights worked on only one. Hit by flak from river mouth. Engine out on return and A/C landed on MALTA.

101. Returned with stick on board - unable to locate D.Z. Pilot cruised up coast, but unable to identify the 'run-in' due to haze and smoke. Flak from sea.

102. Returned with stick on board owing to flak and did damage to wing by hitting another A/C during evasive action.

103. Returned with stick on board owing to being hit on tail by No.102 during evasive action. Flak from sea.

88. Dropped at 2300 hrs on D.Z.2. Two Mk.I containers and two trolleys NOT found. M.G. fire North of D.Z.2. Kept well East, thus avoiding convoys. Slight damage.

89. Returned with stick on board. A/C damaged - hit on [tail?] unable to locate 'run-in' - lost formation. Flak from [sea?].

90. Returned with stick on board owing to flak. Pilot wounded, co-pilot not dropped parachutists before. Flak from sea, damaging instruments. Containers jettisoned.

91. Down in sea - personnel picked up by British merchant vessel. 4 troops missing.

92. Dropped 2330 hrs 2 miles S.W. of D.Z.2. No.14 fainted, which prevented three men from jumping. Poor visibility and difficult to get location. All containers found.

93. Dropped at 2320 hrs 1½ miles West of D.Z.2. One man tangled in strops and wrenched shoulder. Haze around area. M.G. fire near D.Z. One container failed to come off, otherwise all found.

105. Dropped successfully on D.Z.2 32 mins late from 500 ft. No containers found. Battle seemed to be in progress on D.Z. Flak from Navy heavy.

106. Correct 'run-in' - navigator blinded by searchlight. Experienced intense light flak. Dropped 4 miles South of D.Z.2 but 40 mins late. Containers jettisoned after No.2 as flak was hitting bomb racks. A/C shot down in sea after drop, crew picked up by destroyer.

107. Dropped on D.Z.2 at 2338 hrs from 500 ft. Flak observed North of D.Z. Good fast stick, all containers went successfully and were found.

108. Dropped 1 mile South of D.Z.2 on steep escarpment. No.10 on edge of escarpment from 100 ft. Dropped containers on second run, smoke made observation difficult but stick failed to locate any containers.

109. Dropped on D.Z.2 3½ mins late from 500 ft. Dropped containers but they landed in river. Basket dropped but caught up by strops, dropped 7 secs later but not found. Light flak from shore.

110. Successful drop from 500 ft slightly S.E. of D.Z.2. - fast stick, 10 secs. Containers dropped O.K. but not found. 3 men still missing. A/C returned to GOZO, MALTA.

111. Returned with stick on board - unable to locate D.Z. Made 4 attempts to 'run-in'. Returned owing to shortage of petrol. Flak prevented a satisfactory run over D.Z.

112. Dropped on escarpment 2 miles South of D.Z.2 64 mins late. Containers went O.K. but only one found by stick. Flak from Navy S.E. of Sicilian coast. Heavy flak from shore, A/C hit.

113. Dropped from 800 ft approximately 3,000 yds S.E. of D.Z.2. Stick dropped close to D.Z.4. Containers dropped successfully but NOT found. Considerable flak in area.

113A. Dropped at 2330 hrs on D.Z.2. One man refused. Flak everywhere. No containers found.

115. WACO. B Troop - A/C crashed on take-off, glider cast off, successful landing - unable take off again in time.

116. WACO. B Troop - Successful tow, but inter-comn u/s from take off. Released at 0111 hrs at 500 ft over L.Z. Caught in S/L on release, starboard wing hit, side slipped and crash landed on outer defences of CATANIA Airfield where M.G. fire was experienced all round. Unable to unload gun owing to enemy activity.

117. WACO. B Troop - Good tow, inter-comn O.K. Successful release but late at 800 ft above L.Z. Successful landing N of LENTINI but undercarriage damaged - unable to release car 5 cwt which was jammed in. Glider landed within enemy Field Force.

118. WACO. B Troop - cast off 2101 hrs near M'SAKEN - pilot found A/C uncontrollable.

118A. WACO. D Troop H.Q. - Successful tow and release at 1000 ft above L.Z., but 87 mins late. Glider made heavy landing on beach (9666) no casualties, but unable to remove jeep owing to angle of landing preventing the opening of nose - unable to cut it out owing to being in enemy defences.

118B. WACO. Bty H.Q. - Released over L.Z.7 29½ mins late. Glider fired on on way down by light flak but no hit observed. Nothing more heard.

118C. WACO. Bde H.Q. - Released over L.Z.7 20 mins late. Crash landed area S.W. of L.Z. (9266) - all personnel injured nose jammed prevented removal of jeep. No pilot's report as yet.

119. HORSA & Albemarle. A Troop - released without warning to tug 2,500 ft 2 miles off coast. Nothing more heard.

120. HORSA & Albemarle. B Troop - Good tow. Tow rope broke when circling and looking for L.Z.7 at 0107 hrs at 1600 ft. Glider made successful landing 2000 ft W of L.Z.8. Landed on skid. Gun and Jeep O.K. unloaded in 3 hrs. Inter-comns O.K. up to coast but very weak after that.

122. HORSA & Albemarle. D Troop - Released over L.Z.7 at 1200 ft. Circled and landed N.E. of LENTINI (square 9358). Glider riddled with .303 and 20mm bullets, one casualty on landing. Successful landing on skid. Final posn of glider made door unloading impossible - attempt to blow tail with CORDTEX resulted in complete burning of glider.

123. HORSA & Albemarle. D Troop - successful tow, Inter-comns perfect, released at 0102 hrs approx 500 ft. Made successful landing in ravine 7 miles S.W. of L.Z.7. Gun and Jeep out in 30 mins.

124. HORSA. D Troop - rope broke on cable - released and took off again. Released over L.Z.8 at 700 ft. Nothing heard of glider.

125. HORSA. D Troop - did not take off owing to damage to glider on first attempted take-off.

126. HORSA. A Troop - Released slightly past L.Z.8 at 0045 hrs at 500 ft. Lights not visible. Perfect release. Made heavy landing on L.Z.8, one casualty. Load unloaded without much difficulty in one hour. Inter-comns O.K.

127. HORSA. H.Q., R.A. - Bty H.Q. - Tug missing. No pilot's report. Glider crashed N.E. of LENTINI (area 9159) complete write-off. 4 killed (incl pilots) 3 badly injured.

128. HORSA. A Troop - Released 500 ft over L.Z.8. L.Z. obscured by smoke and fire. Glider crashed in river by L.Z.8, 4 crew killed, 2 injured, 1 O.K. No information available as to gun and jeep.

129. HORSA. A Troop - Released over L.Z.8 at 1500 ft 27 mins late. Glider pilot reported he knew exact location, high release because of flak. Made successful landing on road 100 yds S of bridge over river. No casualties. Gun removed in 4 hrs and Jeep in 9 hrs. Inter-comns O.K.

The following glider crews took part in this operation:-

Glider No.

No.

Rank.

1st Pilot Name.

No.

Rank.

2nd Pilot Name.

114

116

117

118A

118B

118C

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

115

118

915054

161048

3326544

193471

6405541

129156

194356

138718

1785652

220201

5380230

949207

5254139

52601

153528

421356

3773634

3063025

Sgt

Sgt
Sgt

Lieut

S/St

Lieut

Sgt

Lieut

S.S.M.

Sgt

S/Sgt

Major

Lieut

S/Sgt

Sgt

Goodall, A.

Vanassche, R.C.A.

Wells, W.J.

Mockridge, J.B.

Montague, T.

Adams, N.V.M.

Gregg, D.P.

Barrie, W.N.

Craske, D.

Mills, G.T.

Thomas.

Preston, J.A.

Winkle, H.N.

Protheroe, H.G.

Cooper, A.J.

Wachli, R.O.

White, D.A.

Pattinson, J.S.A.

McKay, R.W.

74025

T/69359

T/120491

378110

860935

948083

5184407

1453465

1476761

1449953

965406

2698914

3315899

86752

6461242

917709

T/120236

T/60411

Lieut

F/O

S/Sgt

S.S.M.

Sgt

F/O

Kitching, A.H.

Martin, F.G.

Zeneby, R.R.

Bridge, J.

Atkinson, W.

Street, F.H.

Boddoes, R.

Williams, I.N.

Jackson, J.W.

Boland, O.

McCulloch.

Broadhead, J.M.

Holdron, C.R.

Kerr, A.M.

Morgan, C.P.

Mackenzie, W.

Webb, H.F.

Lockard, T.B.

Casella, C.A.

A. Parachute.

Unit

No. Started

No. Returned

No. Unaccounted for

No. dropped in Sicily

1 Para Bn

2 Para Bn

3 Para Bn

1 Para Sqn, R.E.

16 Para Fd Amb

1 Para Bde H.Q. incl

Sigs and Def Pl

TOTAL

600

501

541

109

1856

231

180

549

369

450

336

1278

B. Glider. - 1 Airborne A/Tk Bty., R.A.

No. Started

Cast off after T.O. or returned

No. Unaccounted for

No. landed in Sicily

1. Personnel

2. Equipment

38 pilots

18 cars 5 cwt,

12 6-pr guns

4 pilots

1 car 5 cwt,

2 6-pr guns

4 pilots

2 cars 5 cwt,

1 6-pr gun

30 pilots

15 cars,

9 guns

C. Casualties incurred in air and on landing.

Unit

In Aircraft

Fatal Major Minor

In Sea

Missing

On Landing

Fatal Major Minor

1 Para Bn

2 Para Bn

3 Para Bn

1 Para Sqn, R.E.

16 Para Fd Amb

1 Para Bde H.Q. incl

Sigs and Def Pl

TOTAL

- - -

- 1 2

- 2 6

- - -

- - 1

- - -

- 3 9

- 1 10

- 3 4

1 6 4

1 1 1

- - 1

- - 2

2 13 22

NOTE: The above figures are as near as can be stated at the moment. Certain sticks are missing and therefore casualties cannot be stated.

PART II - CONTAINERS

Containers all types

Trolleys

Panniers

1. Took off

2. Returned not dropped

3. On missing A/C

4. Found by sticks on ground

5. Dropped but not found

428

119

147

144

A. Loads carried by D.C.3 aircraft.

(1) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 4 S.A. containers

(2) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 4 S.A. containers, 1 trolley

(3) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 4 S.A. containers, 1 Type E container

(4) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 3 S.A. containers

(5) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 3 S.A. containers, 1 trolley

(6) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 4 S.A. containers, 2 trolleys, 1 Type F container

(7) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 3 S.A. containers, 1 Type E container

(8) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 1 S.A. container, 1 cycle, 1 Type E container, 1 stretcher

(9) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 1 Type E container, 2 Type F containers, 2 Panniers

(10) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 5 S.A. containers, 2 pigeon containers

(11) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 3 S.A. containers, 1 pigeon container

(12) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 4 S.A. containers, 1 Type F container, 2 pigeon containers

(13) Aircraft carrying 18 men, 6 S.A. containers

(14) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 4 S.A. containers

(15) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 6 S.A. containers

(16) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 3 S.A. containers, 1 Type E container

(17) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 6 S.A. containers, 2 trolleys

(18) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 2 S.A. containers, 1 Type E container, 1 Type F container

(19) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 3 S.A. containers

(20) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 2 Type E containers, 1 Type F container

(21) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 1 S.A. container, 1 Type E container

(22) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 2 S.A. containers, 1 Type F container, 2 Type E containers

(23) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 4 S.A. containers, 1 Type E container, 1 trolley

(24) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 2 S.A. containers, 1 Type E container

(25) Aircraft carrying 17 men, 5 S.A. containers

(26) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 6 S.A. containers

(27) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 4 S.A. containers

(28) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 1 Pannier

(29) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 1 S.A. container, 1 pannier

(30) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 1 Type E container, 1 pannier

(31) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 1 Type E container

(32) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 1 S.A. container

(33) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 1 S.A. container, 1 Type E container, 1 pannier

(34) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 5 S.A. containers

(35) Aircraft carrying 16 men, 3 S.A. containers

(36) Aircraft carrying 15 men, 5 S.A. containers

(37) Aircraft carrying 15 men, 1 Pannier

(38) Aircraft carrying 15 men, 1 Type E container, 1 pannier

(39) Aircraft carrying 15 men, 1 S.A. container, 1 Type E container, 1 pannier

(40) Aircraft carrying 14 men, 5 S.A. containers

(41) Aircraft carrying 15 men, 1 pannier

- 5

- 4

- 3

- 2

- 1

- 6

- 7

- 3

- 4

- 3

- 1

- 7

- [?]

- 1

- 2

- 3

- 2

- 3

- 2

B. Loads carried by ALBEMARLE aircraft.

(1) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 6 S.A. containers

(2) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 1 Type E container, 1 trolley, 1 pannier

(3) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 2 Type E containers, 1 trolley, 1 pannier

(4) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 3 Type E containers, 1 trolley, 1 pannier

(5) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 1 Type E container, 1 trolley, 1 welbike

(6) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 1 S.A. container, 2 Type E containers, 1 trolley, 1 cycle, 1 welbike

(7) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 3 Type E containers, 1 trolley, 1 pannier

(8) Aircraft carrying 10 men, 4 S.A. containers, 1 pannier

(9) Aircraft carrying 9 men, 6 S.A. containers

- 3

- 1

C. Loads carried in HORSA gliders towed by Halifax aircraft.

(1) Gliders carrying 5 men, 1 Jeep, 1 6-pr gun, 24 rounds 6-pr

(2) Gliders carrying 5 men, 1 Jeep, 1 6-pr gun, 24 rounds 6-pr, 1 stretcher

(3) Gliders carrying 5 men, 1 Jeep, 1 6-pr gun, 24 rounds 6-pr, 1 No.18 Set

(4) Gliders carrying 5 men, 1 Jeep, 1 6-pr gun, 20 rounds 6-pr, 1 No.22 Set

(5) Gliders carrying 5 men, 2 Jeeps, 1 Light M/C, 2 No.18 Sets, 1 No.22 Set

- 7

- 1

D. Loads carried in WACO gliders towed by ALBEMARLE aircraft.

(1) Gliders carrying 2 men, 1 6-pr gun, 8 rounds 6-pr

(2) Gliders carrying 3 men, 1 Jeep, 16 rounds 6-pr

(3) Gliders carrying 3 men, 1 Jeep, 16 rounds 6-pr, 2 No.18 Sets

(4) Gliders carrying 3 men, 1 Jeep

(5) Gliders carrying 3 men, 1 Jeeps, 20 rounds 6-pr

- 2

- 1

Unit

Comd.

Deputy Comd.

H.Q., 1 Para Bde, Sig Sec and Def Pl.

1 Para Bn

2 Para Bn

3 Para Bn

1 Airborne A/Tk Bty R.A. (less one tp)

1 Para Sqn R.E. (less one tp)

16 Para Fd Amb

Dets: 21 Indep Para Coy.

Glider Pilot Regt.

4 Army Film and Ph Sec.

Two Naval Bombardment Dets.

F.O.O. Lt. Regt R.A.

Brig. Lathbury

Lt. Col. Pearson

Lt. Col. Frost

Lt. Col. Yeldham

Major Arnold

Major Murray

Lt. Col. Wheatley

Lt. Col. Frost

Major Cleasby Thompson

Major Lane

Major Smith

Capt. McLeod

Capt. Livesey

Capt. Wright

(i) Two pls 1 Para Bn with R.E. det under comd to drop at 2220 hrs on D.Zs. 1 and 2, and seize objective by "coup de main".

(ii) Two pls 3 Para Bn to drop at 2225 hrs on D.Z.4 and neutralise the 4 gun A.A. Bty at 923706 during drop of main body.

(iii) (a) 1 Para Bn - on D.Z.1 and 2 to complete capture of br if necessary and hold until bridgehead to NORTH and SOUTH are established. It then comes into reserve. If bridge is found damaged, repair to be attempted, if this is impracticable an alternative crossing to be recced to the WEST.

(b) 2 Para Bn - on D.Z.3 to establish bridgehead on high ground SOUTH of br. All approaches from SOUTH to the blocked, all enemy posts which can fire onto br to be destroyed or neutralised. Bn also to be prepared to act vigorously southward to assist adv of 13 Corps.

(c) 3 Para Bn - on D.Z.4 to establish bridgehead in loop of river 1000 yds NORTH of br. Active patrolling to be maintained towards CATANIA airfield.

(b) One tp (4 guns) on L.Z.8 at 0110 hrs under comd 2 Para Bn. Bty H.Q. with 2 guns to join Bde H.Q.

(v) Bde H.Q. - On D.Z.2 and establish H.Q. at Fm 921668 moving later to area of br.

(vii) F.O.O. - Drops with Bde H.Q. and to establish comn with C.R.A. of forward div.

2. ACTION ON LANDING. For reasons which are set out in the Air Report, the action of 1 Parachute Brigade on landing was not as planned, and the setting up of any central control was much delayed. The account of the ground operations will therefore be given in two parts; the first dealing with the action up to the establishment of Bde H.Q. on the SOUTH bank of the river at 0615 hrs 14 Jul, and the second with subsequent developments.

13 Jul 2214 hrs: Leading aircraft ran in through considerable flak and dropped Commanding Officer and part of H.Q. 2 Parachute Battalion on D.Z.3. This party moved off to the R.V. at track junction 914665 at 2240 hrs and was joined by about 50 men of A Company, 2 Parachute Battalion. On arrival at the R.V., the party was increased by the Bde Signal Section, less their No.22 Set, Medical Section and part of the Support Company.

2305 hrs: One officer and 3 O.Rs. of 3 Parachute Battalion dropped on the wrong D.Z., and set out for the pre-arranged Bn H.Q. site. There they found no one except a member of 21 Independent Parachute Company, waiting to set out flares for gliders.

2332 hrs: The Brigade Commander dropped on the enemy position at 9264 and immediately moved NORTH across country to the Bde H.Q. R.V. where he met the B.M.

14 Jul 0130 hrs: The 3 Parachute Battalion party arrived in the area of the bridge where they met a party of 1 Parachute Battalion.

0200 hrs: 7 men of 1 Parachute Battalion were sent to recce the bridge and the Intelligence Sjt of 3 Parachute Battalion sent to contact Bde H.Q.

0215 hrs: 50 men of 1 Parachute Battalion under command of Capt. Rann attacked and secured the bridge without much difficulty from the NORTH.

0315 hrs: The Bde H.Q. party arrived at the SOUTH side of the bridge and prepared to attack it. The Brigade Commander went forward to reconnoitre, and found that elements of 1 and 3 Para Bns were on the br. Unfortunately he was then wounded by a grenade thrown by a stray Italian.

0330 hrs: By this time 50 Italians had been rounded up in the Brigade area, and were put into buildings to the NORTH of the bridge. The bridge was found to be prepared for demolition. The fuses were cut, and charges removed and thrown into the river by an R.E. stick of 1 Officer and 9 O.Rs.

0400 hrs: The bridge was consolidated by 120 men of 1 Parachute Battalion and two platoons of 3 Parachute Battalion. Force H.Q. was established at the bridge, but no wireless sets had yet arrived. The weapons available were:- Two 3-in Mortars. One Vickers M.G. Three P.I.A.Ts. In addition a No.22 set had arrived, but no contact could be made with either the seaborne force or Adv Div H.Q.

0630 hrs: By this time the enemy positions at the bridge had been improved for our use. Three 6-pdr A/Tk guns of 1 Airborne A/Tk Battery were sited, as well as one captured Italian A/Tk gun. Bde H.Q. was established on the SOUTH bank of the river.

0215 hrs: Commanding Officer and party of 2 Parachute Battalion moved off from their R.V. to the F.U.P. at 935665.

0330 hrs: Party arrived at F.U.P. and re-organised into one platoon of three sections each under command of an officer (about 45 all ranks in all), and attacked the enemy position on the high ground in area 9365 (henceforth referred to as J1). After a brief exchange of grenades and small arms fire, the objective was captured together with 100 prisoners.

0400 hrs: Main party of 2 Parachute Battalion arrived at their F.U.P. where they found a deserted pill-box.

0430 hrs: This party sent out a patrol, 50 strong to recce J1 objective. Here they contacted the composite platoon which had already taken it. Major Lonsdale then took over command of the combined parties on the position.

0500 hrs: Position J1 was consolidated and H.Q. 2 Parachute Battalion established. The force consisted of about 120 men including 20 signallers and some medical personnel. It had neither heavy weapons nor wireless.

(a) General Situation. At 0630 hrs a counter attack by German parachute tps supported by M.Gs and mortars developed against J1. At 0700 hrs a F.O.O. arrived in 2 Parachute Battalion's area, with W/T communication to a 6-in gun cruiser lying off shore. A M.D.S. was established by Lt Col. Wheatley at 939664. By 0900 hrs the situation at J1 had become difficult owing to lack of support weapons as the enemy, who were encircling the position, were out of L.M.G. range. Furthermore, casualties were being suffered owing to the difficulty of digging in under the continuous long range mortar and M.G. fire. At 1000 hrs the F.O.O. brought fire to bear from the 6-in gun cruiser onto the enemy who were now closing in, and forced them to withdraw. Enemy howitzers found on the J1 position were also brought to bear on enemy positions NORTH of the bridge. Meanwhile, at the bridge itself the situation was still fairly quiet. Soon after dawn further Italians had appeared out of hiding and surrendered. An enemy patrol which approached from the CATANIA direction was driven off at 0915 hrs by mortar fire. The B.M. subsequently visited 2 Parachute Battalion and informed them of the situation at the bridge. During the course of trying all wavelengths on the No.22 Set, a British unit was heard which from the conversation, appeared to be an armoured unit. At 0930 hrs B.M. spoke to this unit, informed them that the bridge had been captured intact and asked them for their identity. The unknown unit (which eventually proved to be 4 Armoured Brigade) replied that they could not yet get through to relieve 1 Parachute Brigade, and then continued the conversation in codes. Unfortunately the rest of their message could not be decoded correctly. At 1000 hrs they reported that the information about the bridge being captured intact had been passed back to their higher formation. Wireless contact was then lost and never regained.

(b) The fight for and withdrawal from the Bridge. At 1000 hrs, two enemy fighters strafed the bridge area. Shelling of the bridge, with a high proportion of "air bursts" took place from 1210 to 1300 hrs. The expected counter attack developed at 1310 hrs, with enemy infantry advancing down both sides of the road under cover of smoke, and with close support from enemy fighters. At 1320 hrs 3 Parachute Battalion, whose strength was now 5 officers and 35 O.Rs. reported the situation to be under control. At 1400 hrs, however, a second heavy attack developed estimated at Coy strength, mixed Germans and Italians. Bde H.Q. moved in closer to the bridge, and at 1500 hrs the force to the NORTH of the bridge closed in too. The attack was held. The enemy, having been reinforced by some lorry loads of infantry to estimated Bn strength, began preparations for a third attack. A concentration of S.P. guns, infantry support guns firing shrapnel, and A.A. guns, was now brought to bear on the bridge. At 1530 hrs the infantry began to close in on the NORTH end of the bridge. At 1600 hrs the artillery lifted onto the Southern end of the bridge and SOUTH bank of the river, whilst a determined attack was put in. By 1705 hrs, owing to increasing pressure on the flanks of our bridgehead, the troops to the NORTH of the bridge were withdrawn to pill boxes on the southern bank of the river. In spite of the fact that our fire had to be strictly limited owing to decreasing ammunition, the enemy were prevented from reaching the bridge. During this action, Breda machine guns captured on the bridge were used to good effect against the enemy. When the enemy realised that he could make no further progress frontally, he maintained extremely heavy M.G. and artillery fire at our positions across the river, and also brought up A/Tk guns to engage our pill boxes. Whilst this was going on enemy infantry were seen crossing the river 400 yards to the EAST of the bridge. The cornfields and rushes, which constituted the only cover in our position, were burned. By 1845 hrs enemy small arms and M.Gs. were firing into the bridge area from the high ground to the SOUTH. The situation at this time can be summarised as follows:- (a) Position exposed owing to burning of reeds and cornfields. (b) Enemy engaging the position heavily from the NORTH, EAST and SOUTH. (c) Ammunition running out. (d) Nothing was known of the situation in 2 Parachute Battalion area. (e) There was no sign of any relieving force. At 1935 hrs orders were given to the bridge force to withdraw SOUTH in small parties. The Brigade Commander did not contact O.C. 2 Parachute Battalion on the J1 position until 0600 hrs on the following morning.

14 Jul: At 1945 hrs the first tanks of 4 Armoured Brigade arrived in 2 Parachute Battalion's area. They reported that infantry were moving up fast behind them to relieve the Parachute Brigade. One troop of tanks were left to support 2 Parachute Battalion. At 2400 hrs further tanks and the infantry arrived, and one company 9 D.L.I. joined 2 Parachute Battalion on the J1 position.

15 Jul 0600 hrs: Commander 1 Parachute Brigade contacted 2 Parachute Battalion and 4 Armoured Brigade, and at 0915 hrs he was admitted to M.D.S. for an operation.

0800 hrs: 9 D.L.I. put in an attack on the bridge, supported by tanks, and Field and S.P. guns, but were driven back with heavy casualties.

1400 hrs: The evacuation of the M.D.S. established by 16 Parachute Field Ambulance, commenced.

2400 hrs: 9 D.L.I. were withdrawn from the area of the bridge and commenced taking over the positions at J1 from 2 Parachute Battalion.

16 Jul 0100 hrs: Artillery and M.G. preparation began for the attack of 6 D.L.I. on the bridge.

0600 hrs: 6 D.L.I. supported by tanks and guided across river by O.C., one other officer and one serjeant of 1 Parachute Battalion, captured the bridge.

0700: 1 Parachute Brigade was taken by M.T. to SYRACUSE where it embarked in an L.S.T. at 1600 hrs. The Brigade remained in SYRACUSE harbour during the night, when a heavy air raid took place but no damage was done to the L.S.T. 1 Parachute Brigade finally landed at SOUSSE at 0700 hrs 19 Jul.

1. Training. Rehearsals in the form of three Bn exercises and one Bde exercise, were carried out in the MASCARA training area. The ground chosen resembled that for the operation. The drill for emplaning and the proposed flight plans were thoroughly tried out. Where time allows, there is no better method of training than by having such full scale rehearsals. However, the standard of correct dropping on the Bde exercise was even then exceedingly low.

2. Briefing. Most thorough and careful briefing of all ranks was undertaken before the operation, emphasising especially (i) how to pick one's bearings on landing, from prominent features. (ii) necessity of immediately heading for one's own unit R.V. if dropped wide or alternatively making for the battle. In practice there were many shortcomings in putting this into effect. It must, therefore, be impressed even more upon all ranks that briefing is in fact the giving out of orders. The responsibility of every individual to get to the battle on landing must be clearly brought out and clear orders given on the subject.

3. Air Liaison. Before the operation it was repeatedly urged upon H.Q. 51 Wing, USAAF, that liaison between aircrews and jumpmasters should be established. The object of this was so that personal contacts could be established and the air force put into the army picture. This was not approved. Since the operation the results have been freely and frankly discussed with the operating groups in a real spirit of co-operation. It is apparent that the preliminary liaison would have been welcome by the aircrews. It would have served to impress upon the Air Force the determination of parachute troops to do their job at all costs. The return of complete sticks without dropping would probably have been substantially reduced thereby. 295 Sqn R.A.F., carrying eleven sticks of Bde H.Q., achieved this thorough liaison on their own initiative both before and after the operation, giving confidence to both sides.

4. Airfield Procedure. This proved highly satisfactory and preparations for take-off went smoothly.

5. Flight Plan. The operation was characterised by three main factors (a) Dropping of a large force at night. (b) Transport of the bulk of the force in unarmoured troop carrier A/C manned by crews who were inexperienced in flying over enemy territory against opposition. (c) Use of 4 D.Zs and 2 L.Zs in the most unsuitable country for airborne troops, directly on the axis of advance of the 8th Army. Less than 20% of the Brigade dropped at the right place and at the right time for the particular task in hand. The remaining troops of the Brigade who landed were scattered over a wide area, apparently on account of poor navigation by aircrews and A.A. opposition. Enemy small arms fire from the ground proved effective against parachute dropping A/C owing to the low height at which they had to approach. Many incomplete sticks were dropped on account of the confusion thus created within the aircraft and there was also a tendency to drop dangerously low. Nearly 30% of the force was returned to base without having dropped at all. The conclusions from this are as follows: (i) The primary requirement to a successful parachute operation is, as ever, the ability of the Air Force to drop a sufficiently large proportion of the troops on the correct D.Zs at the correct time. This condition was far from being fulfilled on this operation. (ii) C.47 A/C are so vulnerable and their pilots so lacking in operational experience that parachute dropping cannot successfully be undertaken in the face of much ground opposition. (iii) Fewer D.Zs should guarantee a greater concentration of troops on the ground. This is desirable, even though the difficulties of army reorganisation may be increased thereby. Two or three D.Zs would, it is believed, also simplify the air navigational problem mentioned at (a) above.

(a) Dropping of equipment. Nearly 50% of the containers that dropped were not found by troops after reaching the ground. Containers that did drop correctly and whose lights functioned gave indication of our D.Zs. to the enemy and drew their fire. In some cases equipment was dropped with the man from the C.47 aircraft. This proved very successful. When using C.47 or doored aircraft, equipment should always be dropped with the man where possible. The uncertainty of being able to link up with containers is dispensed with and no lights are necessary.

(b) Welbike. This motor cycle has never been regarded as a reliable machine and is not worth taking on parachute operations.

(a) Distractions. Many fires were blazing on the D.Zs. due to stacked crops having been ignited by enemy tracer. Searchlights also dazzled both aircrews and troops. Anti-parachute patrols, machine guns firing on fixed lines, and trip wires were found on some D.Zs. In an opposed drop troops should be warned of these likely elements of confusion. They must not be considered as obstacles to making the ground R.V. Also where parachute troops are expected to lay out flare paths and/or guiding signals or lamps, this should be taken into account.

(b) Coloured Torches. These were used for guiding in sticks from D.Z. to the R.V. and were a help to the sticks who were there.

(d) Dropping Wide. Many jumpmasters who dropped wide claim that had they been given some indication as to where they were before dropping they would have had more chance to join their own troops earlier. It should be impressed upon the Air Force that if they are going to drop wide and they know approximately where they are, the jumpmaster should be given this information.

8. Gliders. These proved very vulnerable to ground opposition and difficulty was experienced in extricating equipment. A full account is given in Section A, Annexure 'D'. It is suggested, therefore, that a legitimate use of parachute troops is to clear L.Zs. and assist in unloading of equipment before proceeding with the main task.

9. Training. Ground action was rehearsed in conjunction with the parachute exercises. Distances and timings were adhered to according to plan. When time allows, there is again no better method of training than this.

10. Plan. Although the effective force that dropped was very depleted and disorganised, the original plan was carried out as far as possible. By doing this, commanders and troops operated over the ground they had particularly studied. Stragglers also were able to join up and find our forces in most of the positions for which they had been briefed. The conclusion from this is that a commander is well advised to hold to his original plan on this type of operation under practically all circumstances.

11. Night operations. Enemy forces were unable to undertake counter measures against our force during the night and a substantial degree of consolidation was achieved by first light. At the bridge the first sign of counter attack was the recce detachment which did not appear till 0900 hrs. On the high ground to the SOUTH (Johnny I), the German parachutists were unwilling to counter attack until just after first light. This all goes to confirm the opinion gained in TUNISIA that operations at night are not welcomed by the enemy and give us the advantage. Tape will nearly always prove of use to parachute troops.

12. Support Weapons. 3" Mortars and Vickers M.Gs. were dropped with scant success. Even then only about 40 r.p.g. mortar and 4000 r.p.g. M.G. ammunition could be taken. This could only be done by the uneconomical use of man power as ammunition carriers. When holding our positions ammunition had to be carefully husbanded. These support weapons are very necessary but more ammunition is required to make them fully effective. The transport of this element of a Parachute Bn would appear to be best achieved by glider.

13. Concealment and Camouflage. This was important as expected in parachute operations. Ammunition shortage precluded offensive action against strafing enemy fighters. A wireless mast gave away the position of a H.Q. in one case. Crashed gliders were often selected by enemy aircraft for strafing targets. They cannot be regarded as giving effective cover and should, therefore, be avoided.

14. Digging-in. Tools for this were taken in baskets and proved useful. In some cases, however, time was too short for troops to get dug-in and good use was made of enemy defences, trenches and pillboxes. Pillboxes became untenable when enemy anti-tank guns were brought to bear on them. Use of these enemy defences ought always, therefore, to be anticipated.

15. Road Blocks. 75 Grenades were taken and strung together to form road blocks. 82 Grenade (Gammon Bomb) was used with effect against vehicles that had been held up. A liberal supply of 75 Grenades should be taken on operations. They can be landed by glider in large numbers, besides being dropped with parachute troops. The 82 is a most effective and compact grenade, most suitable for use by parachute troops.

16. Foreign Weapons. Breda guns were used with great effect from the captured enemy pillboxes; amn was plentiful. Teller mines were incorporated in road blocks. Captured artillery was fired and one enemy anti-tank gun was prepared for action. Time spent in training troops how to handle enemy weapons proved well spent. The plentiful supply of ammunition that usually accompanied enemy weapons adds greatly to their value. Training of infantry in the elements of gunnery is recommended.

17. Air Cover. An enemy recce plane was sent to spot 2 Para Bn's position as soon as it became light. Fighters were later brought up to strafe the bridge area. Strafing against deployed infantry proved of nil effect. Passive A.A. measures proved adequate in meeting any offensive enemy air action encountered.

18. Naval F.O.O. One det dropped successfully with 2 Para Bn complete with W/T link. Naval guns were directed from this F.O.O. continuously in daylight for 1 Para Bde and later thickened up support for 151 Inf Bde. The support provided by this means contributed greatly to 2 Para Bn's capacity to hold on to high ground SOUTH of the objective. A full report is contained in Annexure 1 (B).

19. Enemy Communications. Phone lines were cut wherever possible. As no serious artillery fire was directed against the J1 position by the enemy, it is thought that the cutting of wires may have neutralised any O.Ps. that did exist. The cutting of enemy phone wires should, therefore be routine and not a specialised task.

20. Relieving Force. As the narrative of the battle shows, there was some delay in the relieving force debouching from the hills on the night 14/15 Jul to relieve the bridge. A Staff Officer from the Parachute Brigade, fully conversant with our plan, should have accompanied the most advanced elements of the ground forces. The hiatus that did occur might thus have been avoided. An armoured recce car would be required for transport. On this operation the D.A.A. & Q.M.G. might well have been used for this task, especially so as he can at the same time safeguard the administrative requirements of the Brigade on relief.

21. Prisoners. The taking of large numbers of prisoners had not been very seriously considered in planning. Literally hundreds of Italian prisoners were taken and their disposal proved quite a problem. They were used to supplement unit stretcher bearers and also drove M.T. Provost personnel were taken but none arrived on the scene of action. When operating against Italians large numbers of prisoners must be anticipated and plans made to cope with them.

22. M.T. Drivers. Some were taken and proved useful in driving captured Italian transport. Others showed skill in horse management e.g. Fd Amb who evacuated sick and scoured D.Zs. with horses and carts.

23. Supply by Air. All preparations were made for this to be undertaken. Owing to the absence of a base W/T link nothing was called for. In retrospect, it might have been prudent for a resupply service to have been operated automatically, if after a certain time no W/T link had been established.

(i) W/T The wireless comns established were negligible owing to:- (a) Non-arrival of some aircraft. (b) Dispersion of sticks. (c) Enemy interference on D.Zs. No.22 set with its attendant charging apparatus dropped in baskets, appeared too cumbersome for manhandling in parachute operations, although its technical efficiency seems acknowledged. The one vital transmission was made to 4 Armd Bde on a 22 set belonging to 1 Para Bn operated by Bde Sigs Offr. Link went off net after an hour or so. Adv Div and relieving force frequencies were used by our Signals without effect. This may have been due to distances and screening by hills. However, more liaison personnel between affected parties during preparatory stages seems to be required. The 68 or some similar set is the largest that can reasonably be manhandled by parachute troops. 22 sets could be transported later in gliders with 'Jeeps' to carry them on ground; these would thus supplement and improve the facilities.

(ii) L/T Line was taken by one Bn and used to effect. Captured enemy equipment also enabled them to improve still further. Line, especially assault cable, should be considered for all parachute operations, especially if the principle of a main artery is implemented - see para (v) below.

(iii) Recognition Signs. Flares, yellow TR were carried and used to indicate our positions. However, our own aircraft were seldom seen below 10,000 ft and the indication appeared useless. Had the R planes been searching, these flares would have been seen. Airborne forces should either have their own Tac R aircraft for operations or have allocated a number of sorties by the ground forces they are supporting.

(iv) Codes. Codex was used by 4 Armd Bde in giving us their location. Deciphered the reply made no sense. Instruction in the use of Codex and ME map reference code was only available in the last few days before the operation. It was too late for real proficiency to be achieved, and delayed the holding of the final Bde Sigs exercise. In future all codes and recognition signs being used by relieving forces need very careful study before an operation, with personal liaison between the affected parties, if possible. A certain scepticism prevailed within the Bde on the use of codes, before the operation. This has now been dispelled.

(v) Main Artery. It is suggested that when planning an operation a main artery is laid down, following a neutral feature if possible, as follows:- (a) from Bn D.Zs. to final H.Qs. (b) connecting all H.Qs. within the Bde area. Where no natural feature is apparent, then tape can be substituted.

(vi) Pyrotechnics. Success signals for the capture of the bridge were arranged and used. One was fired by the assault party from the NORTH side of the bridge, just in time to stop the assault party from the SOUTH going in and shooting up their own troops. Verey pistols, therefore, still have their use especially for the isolated type of operation when many enemy light signals are unlikely to be used.

25. R.E. One detachment of R.Es. succeeded in getting to the bridge and performed the important task of removing the charges. Infantry should also be trained in this work to meet future emergencies.

26. Medical. A full report is given in Annexure 4, but four main points stand out:- (a) A surgical team was used in the middle of the battle with great success. (b) A building, preferably a farm is required for the M.D.S.; supplies of water, food, and tpt may thus accrue from enemy sources. (c) Siting of the M.D.S. should be within a defended perimeter, adjacent to, but not alongside, a military objective. Combatant troops should keep clear of the M.D.S. at all times. (d) The Geneva Red Cross appeared to be respected. These points should be born in mind by commanders when making plans.

27. After the operation. Before the operation it had not seriously been considered how the interrogation of sticks should proceed. Now that one operation has been performed according to plan, i.e., the airborne forces have been withdrawn to base on completion of their task, a technique should be worked out for this interrogation or de-briefing if the Air Force term be used. Unit I.Os. must also be trained in how to carry out this task. A questionnaire was hurriedly devised for the interrogation of jumpmasters which met the case. However, the whole aspect of staff duties in connection with parachute operations could now well be sifted and simplified, if possible, in the light of experience.

28. Conclusion. There is one point for this operation that surpasses all others in importance. The Air Force must be able to drop a substantial proportion of the parachute force at the right place and at the right time if such operations are going to be justified. The method by which this standard is achieved form primarily an air problem. At the same time liaison between the army and air forces who actually participate in these operations can never be too close. Such contact will greatly contribute to the solving of this problem.

Troop

N.C.O. i/c

Sjt. Anderson

L/Sjt. Atkinson

Sjt. Doig

Location

939675

936665

936663

(b) One gun landed in outer defences of CATANIA Airfield. The gun was immobilised by the detachment, which then withdrew to the bridge where it manned a captured 88mm gun.

(c) An officer of the Bty instructed glider pilots on the bridges as to how to fire two further enemy A.Tk guns there. These guns were subsequently manned by the glider pilots.

(d) Recce Parties:- Three Recce parties were dropped, and scattered over a wide area. The Bty commander's recce party dropped in sq 9363 and arrived at the bridge at 1030 hrs, 14 Jul. It then established Bty H.Q. at Track junc 936665.

(e) Withdrawal:- Orders for withdrawal were received at approx 1945 hrs, 14 Jul. Sjt. Anderson's gun was left in position south of the river to cover the withdrawal, and succeeded in neutralising an enemy pill box. The remaining personnel and two guns were withdrawn to area 925590 where the leading troops of EIGHTH ARMY were contacted. Sjt. Anderson's detachment, gun, and jeep were later withdrawn under fire, and joined the remainder of the Bty.

(f) In addition to their normal duties, personnel of the Bty carried out the following tasks:- (i). Instructed parachutists and glider pilots in use of enemy A.Tk guns. (ii). Evacuated casualties for the Bde on jeeps fitted with the stretcher attachment. (iii). Distributed amn to the Bde, in jeeps. (iv). Fought as infantry.

(i) Four F.O.O. dets were despatched on operation as follows:-

Det	Method of despatch	Arty to be at call	Remarks
Army (C.R.A.)	Glider	Fd Regt of relieving force	Did not get into action as glider crashed.
Army (Capt Walker Lt Regt. R.A.)	Parachute A/C	Fd Regt of relieving force	Did not get into action. A/C returned without dropping.
Naval (Capt Hodge Lt Regt. R.A.)	Parachute A/C	One 6" Cruiser	)
Naval (Capt Bolland Combined Operations Bombardment Unit	Parachute A/C	One 6" Cruiser	) Both landed, but only one set up O.P. Details below.

(ii) Action after landing:- Capt Hodge's det joined H.Q., 2 Parachute Battalion and proceeded to high ground in area 9365. Two O.Ps. were established and the following targets engaged:-

(d) Coastal Bty area 9470 - Result: two guns put out of action, amn set on fire, buildings destroyed.

(e) Field or Medium Bty area 9173 - Result: unknown as action stopped owing to bad visibility.

In addition this detachment endeavoured to get a captured 4" Italian Field Gun into action, but owing to its weight it could not be drawn up the hill within voice control range. A line was laid, but only one DV telephone could be found. The other Naval det is known to have dropped, but failed to join up with H.Q., 1 Para Bde.

(ii) All units should be trained in the use of enemy arty in addition to small arms weapons.

(iii) It is for consideration as to whether "Walkie Talkie" sets should not be liberally distributed as spare sets to meet unforeseen eventualities. If the Naval Bombardment Det had had two sets, it could have controlled the fire of the captured Italian Fd Gun.

(iv) A proportion of H.E. amn for 6-pdr guns should always be carried, the exact proportion to be decided before each operation, and will be dependent on the probability of meeting A.F.Vs.

(v) The F.O.O. party was completely successful in dropping, and in bringing the fire of a 6" gun cruiser on to targets in the vicinity of 1 Para Bde. Communications (No.66 set) worked satisfactorily, and response was good. The targets, on the whole, were not suitable for naval fire, but all shoots had an excellent effect on the morale of our troops who were, at that time, unsupported by any artillery other than anti-tank.

Unit	Weapon or Vehicle	Left N Africa	In action	Amn taken	Amn available	Targets engaged	Remarks
1 A/Tk Bty	6-pdr A/Tk gun	10	3	24 r.p.g. with gun. 10 r.p.g. to be dropped in container	24 r.p.g. for each gun in action. Plus 24 rds from damaged gun	(i) No enemy A.F.Vs. seen. (ii) Pill Box engaged and fire silenced.	(i) Four guns landed in area of br, but one was smashed on landing.
	Cars, 5-cwt	15	3
1 Para Bde	3" Mortar	12	3	24 r.p.g. H.E.	Not checked
	P.I.A.T.	27	3	18 r.p.g.	Not checked
	M.M.G.	12	3	6000 r.p.g.	Not checked
	Rifle	-	-	(ii) 105 r.p.g.	Not checked		(ii) 12 reserve rifles plus 105 r.p.g. were taken by coy.
	Bren L.M.G.	-	-	(iii) 21 magazines each of 21 rds per gun	Not checked		(iii) 3 reserve Brens each with 21 magazines were taken per coy.
	Sten	-	-	4 magazine per gun each containing 32 rds. In addition 128 r.p.g. loose.	Not checked
	No.35 Gren	-	-	4 per Rifleman. 2 per Sten gunner or specialist.	Not checked
	82 Grenades (Gammon)	-	-	2 per sec	Not checked
	.45 Auto	-	-	28 r.p.g.	Not checked
	Pistol Signal	-	-	6 red r.p.g. 6 green r.p.g.	Not checked
	2" Mortar	-	-	6 r.p.g. smoke	Not checked

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE BATTLE AT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE FROM THE TIME OF DROP TO TIME OF RELIEF.

Bde Strength

Killed

Wounded

Missing (up to 28 Jul 43)

Officers

O.Rs.

283

16 Parachute Field Ambulance, total strength 8 officers and 110 O.Rs. were to be dropped in four sticks as follows; (a) No.3 Section under command 3 Parachute Battalion to drop on D.Z.4 and set up an A.D.S. on NORTH side of bridge to clear casualties from 1 and 3 Parachute Battalions. (b) No.4 Section and H.Q., including two surgical teams, were to drop at D.Z.2 and set up a M.D.S. at the farm 938666 with tasks of clearing all casualties from the SOUTH side of the river, and cases requiring operations from the A.D.S. on the NORTH side. The S.M.O. was to drop with Bde H.Q. on D.Z.2. The remaining personnel, not mentioned above, were attached to Bns and Bde H.Q.

(a) No.3 Section dropped 5 miles WEST of the bridge and failed to join up with the Brigade until night 15/16 Jul.

(b) One of the H.Q. sticks dropped on D.Z.3 and reached the farm selected as a M.D.S. at 0445 hrs, 14 Jul. They drove out Italian soldiers who were in occupation, prepared the dressing station and contacted 2 Parachute Battalion. The second H.Q. stick arrived at the M.D.S. a little later. Lt. Col. Wheatley dropped with Bde H.Q. and took over command of the M.D.S. at 0600 hrs.

(c) Casualties were brought to the M.D.S. by horse and cart, Diesel lorry, and stretcher. Italian prisoners were used as orderlies, and captured livestock and poultry were killed and used to feed patients. The M.D.S. was, for a long time, between our own troops and the enemy, with a result that small arms, mortar and shell fire was intense in the area. Although only half of the section's medical stores, supplemented by German medical stores, was available, the surgical equipment was found to be adequate. As no wireless sets were available, the Rev Watkins acted as Liaison Officer with Bde H.Q. The commanding officer and Major Longland took turns in the operating theatre. Capt. Pilcher was fully employed giving anaesthetics. The M.D.S. finally closed at 1730 hrs, 15 Jul.

(d) Bn R.A.Ps. were set up and functioned, including that of 3 Parachute Battalion, whose Medical Officer Capt. Rutherford, dropped inside the defences of CATANIA Airfield and succeeded in joining his battalion at dawn.

4. CASUALTIES TREATED.

British

German

Italian

Civilians

Admitted

5 )

31 )

2 )

Evacuated

Returned to unit

Died

(a) The employment of surgical teams well forward is well worthwhile. They can operate reasonably unmolested in the front line, and even in "No Man's Land", provided that a civilised enemy is being fought, and that the M.D.S. is clearly marked with Geneva crosses and is not adjacent to a military target.

(b) One surgical team would have been sufficient in this operation where only 20% of the Bde took part in ground operations, but two would be necessary for the whole Bde.

(d) Trolleys were unreliable and difficult to handle. Equipment should be confined to what can be carried on the man.