Headquarters, 1st Airborne Division

Abbreviations

042498

ADMS

Adv

ALO

Amb

A/Q

A/Tk

Bde

Bty

CLY

Comd

Coy
CRASC

CRE

CSO

Det
Div

DRLS

Fd
FOO

GOC

GSO

i/c

Incl

Junc

LAD

LCA

LCI

LMG

L of C

LSI

Ops

Posn

Pro

RAMC

RASC

Ref

Regt

REME

Rep

RLS

R/T

Sec

Sigs

Sqn

Sta

Tac

Trg

u/s

W/T

Map Reference

Anti-Aircraft

Assistant Director Medical Services

Advanced

Air Liaison Officer

Ambulance

Adjutant and Quartermaster Branch

Anti-Tank

Brigade

Battalion

Bridge

Battery

County of London Yeomanry

Command

Company

Commander Royal Army Service Corps

Commander Royal Engineers

Chief Signal Officer

Detachment

Division / Divisional

Despatch Rider

Despatch Rider Letter Service

Double Transposition

Drop Zone

Field

Forward Observation Officer

General Officer Commanding

Group

General Staff Officer

Heavy

In-Command

Include

Junction

Light Aid Detachment

Landing Craft Assault
Landing Craft Infantry

Light Machine Gun

Line of Communication

Landing Ship Infantry

Light

Landing Zone

Machine Gun

Motor Transport

Officer Commanding

Operations

Other Ranks

Platoon

Position

Provost

Royal Artillery

Royal Army Medical Corps

Royal Army Service Corps

Road

Royal Engineers

Reference

Regiment

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Representative

Runner Letter Service

Radio Telephony

Rendezvous

Railway

Section

Signals

Squadron

Station

Tactical
Troop Carrier

Troop

Training

Unserviceable

War Establishment

Wireless Telegraphy

Note Although all arrangements had been made for the launching of this operation and troops were actually on the airfields on the nights 10/11 July and 11/12 July, the operation never actually took place.

The Bde was to land by parachute and Glider on night 10/11 July with the task of capturing the rd bridge at 042498 S.W. of AUGUSTA, and afterwards operating against the town. The Bde Group was to land on 4 D.Zs. and 2 L.Zs. in the area close to the bridge. The outline plan was as follows:-

(i) One coy of 6 Para Bn with det R.E. drop on D.Z.3 at 2215 hrs with the object of seizing br 042498 by a coup-de-main and holding it.

(ii) One coy 4 Para Bn drops on D.Z.1 at 2215 hrs and neutralises Hy A.A. Bty at 012503 during the main drop. Rejoins 4 Bn on completion.

(iii) 4 Para Bn (less one coy) drops on D.Zs. 1 and 2 between 2230 and 2300 hrs. Capture br 042498, if not already accomplished by one coy 6 Bn and moves to R.V. at rd junc 066505 with object of supporting 5 Para Bn attack on AUGUSTA ry sta. Occupy defensive position facing west to incl: Spur 064505, Spur 065511, Spur 068514, Spur 069518.

(iv) 5 Para Bn drops on D.Zs. 4 and 5 between 2230 and 2300 hrs, moves to R.V. at 063513 and attacks AUGUSTA ry sta area (see para 1, objective 2) immediately at conclusion of bombing attack on town (0330 - 0345). After attack prevent movement out of AUGUSTA and occupy high ground area 077526.

(v) Bde H.Q. drops on D.Z.2, R.V. at house 029496, and then moves in rear of 4 Para Bn. Final posn 075508.

(vi) One tp A/Tk bty (3 guns) lands by glider at 2359 hrs on L.Z.6 and comes under comd 5 Para Bn. H.Q. and one tp (3 guns) land by glider at 2359 hrs on L.Z.7. Troop under comd 4 Para Bn, Bty H.Q. joins Bde H.Q.

(vii) Bombardment dets. One det drops and moves with Bde H.Q., one with 5 Para Bn.

(a) For the purpose of planning the Bde Gp were allotted the following number of aircraft and gliders, with the possibility of having to cater for an increase or reduction depending on the number of A/C returning and being serviceable after 1 Air Landing Bde Operation on night 9/10 July.

Parachute A/C. 80 A/C from 60 and 62 Troop Carrier Groups. 16 Albemarles from 296 Sqn R.A.F.

Gliders. 2 Albemarles towing WACO Gliders from 296 Sqn R.A.F. 1 Albemarle towing HORSA Glider from 296 Sqn R.A.F. 5 Halifax towing HORSA gliders from 295 Sqn R.A.F.

A total of 96 Parachute A/C. 2 WACO Gliders 6 HORSA Gliders ) for carriage of 2 Airborne A/Tk Bty.

(b) In the event of the total of serviceable aircraft falling short of the requirement it was proposed to cut out certain less important sticks but the number of A/C for glider towing was to remain. In the event of more A/C becoming available than planned on, the following was the priority for their use:- (a) First four A/C for towing additional WACOS. (b) Next three A/C for dropping M.G. Pl of 6 Bn. (c) Next six A/C for towing additional WACOS. (c) Next three A/C for dropping Mortar Pl of 6 Bn. Should the total of available parachuting aircraft fall below sixty, a completely new plan, to be carried out by 6 Para Bn, would come into force.

Owing to the fact that the Brigade desired to load containers on to A/C in the morning of 10 July, it was necessary to ascertain the number and allot the A/C as soon after their return as possible. The procedure was for Airfield Controls to report to Base Operations the return and serviceability of A/C as they returned. The last A/C were back by approx 0415 hrs and by 0530 hrs it was possible to notify Comd 2 Parachute Bde of the number of A/C available for his operation that night. As the number of serviceable A/C actually exceeded that planned on, the Para G 5s Part II were altered at Base Operations and passed out to all Airfield Controls by 0700 hrs. The Final allotment of A/C was as follows:-

Parachute A/C. 86 C.47 from 60 & 62 Troop Carrier Groups (Including 3 spare A/C). 16 Albemarle A/C from 296 Sqn R.A.F.

Gliders. 4 C.47 A/C towing WACOS from 62 T.C. Group. 8 Albemarle A/C towing WACOS from 296 Sqn R.A.F. 6 Halifax A/C towing HORSAS from 295 Sqn R.A.F.

A total of 102 Parachute A/C an increase of 6 A/C. 12 WACO Gliders an increase of 10 Gliders. 6 HORSA Gliders. It will be observed therefore that it was possible to take the additional loads stated in para 2 (b) above.

The issue of parachutes and containers together with movement of tps to the airfields was carried out on similar lines to that described fully in 1 Para Bde Operation. The only difference being that troops proceeded to airfields in the morning to commence container loading at 1100 hrs and then rested in areas in close proximity to the airfields throughout the day until the time to prepare for emplaning. Those gliders which were available were loaded the previous day, the additional WACOS were loaded on the morning of the operation once they had been allotted.

On the night 10/11 July the postponement was decided about one hours before time of take off, and this was immediately passed out to Airfield Controls by telephone. Troops then left containers on the A/C and parachutes inside the A/C and returned to their respective camps. On night 11/12 July the cancellation was received approx 2 hrs before take off. This was again passed to Airfield Controls by telephone and troops removed containers from A/C and returned in their respective lorries to camp.

The task of launching the various airborne assaults on Operation HUSKY with two Troop Carrier Groups U.S.A.A.C. each of 52 D.C. A/C, one squadron of Albemarles and one flight of Halifax A/C of 38 Wing, R.A.F. necessitated the use of six Airfields as follows:-

The distances to these Airfields by road from the centre of the Div area was as follows:- Airfield A 33 miles, Airfield B 43 miles, Airfield C 34 miles, Airfield D 16 miles, Airfield E 7½ miles, Airfield F 12½ miles. Control of these Airfields was carried out by a Combined Airborne and Air Corps H.Q. known as BASE OPERATIONS through an Airfield Control on each Airfield.

Base Operations was a combined H.Q. consisting of advance Airborne Div H.Q. and the operational H.Q. of 51 Troop Carrier Wing. The O.C. 51 T.C. Wing controlled the entire movement and the dispositions of A/C in accordance with the plan and requests of the Divisional Commander. The Airborne Div staff consisted of 'G' Staff (Ops and Air), Intelligence Staff, A/Q, C.R.A.S.C., dets of Div Sigs. A/Q and C.R.A.S.C. were present to undertake supply commitments. Comd 4 Para Bde acted as Base Controller in the absence of the Divisional Commander. A copy of his instructions are at Annexure 1. The G (Air) Staff worked in conjunction with the A.3 Staff and the Intelligence Staff was in close touch with Wing A.2 Section.

On each Airfield there was established an Airfield Control which consisted of a small det of Airborne Div personnel working with the Group or Wing Operation Staff under an Air Corps or R.A.F. Chief Controller (Operations Officer). Experience showed that in order to work these controls over a period of 5-6 days it was necessary to have the following staff from Airborne Div:-

1 Major or Capt

1 Captain

1 Subaltern

)

) Control Officers

)

1 Captain

2 Subalterns

)

) A.L.Os.

In addition a det of 28 O.Rs and 6 cars 5-cwt were provided for each Control to Marshal gliders for take off and man the Report Centres. One Sec of Pro Coy provided the personnel for routing and traffic control on each of two Airfields. All the above personnel worked directly under the orders of Airfield Control (See Annexure 'A'). The duties of Airfield Control were as follows:-

(a) Manning the Control Office at all times. This officer was either in the same hut or tent as the Air Corps Operations Room or just beside it.

(c) Manning a Report Centre for each of the two Aircraft Dispersal Areas. This report centre was in communications with the Control Office by telephone and any assistance could be obtained through this Centre. At the Report Centre troops met reps of their A/C or Gliders.

(d) Numbering of A/C in conjunction with Air Corps and preparation of a parking diagram.

(f) Generally making all arrangements for the reception of troops on the Airfield.

(g) Making last minute decisions in the event of A/C going u/s on take off in accordance with the priorities issued by Base Operations.

(h) Ensuring that last minute intelligence was delivered to troops before take-off.

(j) Inform troops on arrival of the exact time of emplaning and take-off of each block of A/C. This could not be stated by the Air Corps earlier on account of last minute weather conditions or alterations to route.

Control officers were used for duties in the Control Office, whilst A.L.Os. were employed in working around the Airfield. Each Airfield Control had one lorry of spare X-Type and Containers parachutes and one lorry of spare containers and spare parts with a small R.E.M.E. Repair Det standing by whilst troops were on the Airfields. In addition four 3-ton lorries were held by each Control for the purpose of collecting glider loads which came down soon after take-off and any parachute sticks which failed to drop. Medical arrangements were made by Air Corps and A.D.M.S. Ambulances were standing by on take-off and on return of A/C in case of any wounded personnel returning in the A/C. All Control staff lived in a separate camp on the Airfields to that of the Air Corps owing to limited messing facilities of the Air Corps.

Owing to shortage of personnel and transport the Air Corps were unable to undertake the marshalling of gliders. This was carried out by a det of Recce Sqn on each Airfield working under Airfield Control. Approx 28 men and six cars 5-cwt were required to marshal 25-30 gliders on the runway in one and a half to two hours providing the dispersal areas were not too far away. Gliders were loaded in dispersal areas the day previous to take-off. The glider pilots were present to check their loads. The gliders were then marshalled on the runway for take off approx one to one and a half hours before take off. Tug A/C were brought into position and hooked up about an hour - three quarters of an hour before take off. See Annexure 'B' for diagram of marshalling. When troops arrived they were taken in their lorries straight to their gliders, and emplaned approx 10 mins before take-off. Generally the plan was for troops to arrive at the Airfield ½ hour before the estimated time for take off. The take off was controlled by an Air Corps or R.A.F. Towmaster with an Assistant Towmaster provided by Airfield Control, who was responsible for all matters affecting the Airborne Troops.

The communication system at Airborne Base was provided by a combined British and American Message Centre, manned by Signal personnel of 1 Airborne Div Sigs and 51 T.C. Wing. Apart from essential communications to the Airfields and Airborne Div formations and units, communications existed to 15 Army Group, Eighth Army, 13 Corps and The Airborne Div in Sicily (See Annexure 'C'). The signal system included:-

British - 3 - No.33 Sets working on (i) Airborne Base wave. (ii) Eighth Army - 13 Corps wave. (iii) 15 Army Group wave.

British - Direct telephone and teleprinter circuit to 15 Army Group at Tunis. 3 telephone circuits to Div Area. 2 Fullerphone circuits to Div Area. The above area and switchboard was connected by telephone to all formations and units of Airborne Div. Fullerphone circuits were provided to [bd?].

American - Teleprinter and telephone circuits to H.Q. Troop Carrier Command. Telegraph circuits to each Airfield.

(c) D.R.L.S. - D.Rs from 1 Airborne Div were used on D.R.L.S. to Div area and all Airfields. The line system was built by 7 (British) Air Formations Signals in the case of Airfield lines; the 11th (British) L of C Signals, assisted by First Army Signals and 4th Div Sigs in the case of Div Lines. Airfield lines averaged 20 miles in length, and the circuits between Base Operations and Airborne Div were carried on an eight-wire air line route, 10 miles long.

Use of these communications. The combined Message Centre handled 1196 messages, many of which were over 100 groups, between D-2 and D+4. 30 messages a day had to be enciphered and deciphered. From the time of the arrival of troops at Airfields until take-off, the sole means of communications was through Airfield Control. On the nights of 10 11 Jul, when the 2 Bde operation was cancelled, the cancellation was passed to all Airfields within 15 minutes. Similarly, on 12 July, when 1 Para Bde operation was postponed, postponement was passed to Airfield Control in similar manner. On several occasions use was made of a "Conference Call" to the Control of each Airfield. By this means, an alternative in routing of A/C was passed to all air units in ten mins on one occasion. On the night of 9/10 July when A/C returned from 1 Air Landing Bde operation the number of A/C available for the operation on the night 10/11 had to be determined. Although the last A/C did not land until approx 0400 hours, 10 July, by 0530 hours it was possible at Base Operations to state the number of A/C serviceable and available for the next operation.

(a) General. Parachutes were issued the evening prior to take off to units in their own lines. One 3-ton lorry was provided for each stick on the morning of take off in unit lines. These lorries were then loaded with the stick, their containers and parachutes. Each lorry bore the corresponding number to the A/C which was to carry the stick. Lorries then proceeded to their respective Airfields according to a simple march table, the routes being policed by Div Pro Coy. On arrival at the Airfield all lorries reported to the R.V. from which time the troops became the responsibility of Airfield Control until they were airborne.

(b) Arrival at R.V. On arrival at the R.V. lorries were met by a rep of Airfield Control who was in possession of a parking diagram; lorries were then despatched to their respective Report Centre in accordance to their serial numbers.

(c) Arrival at Report Centres. On arrival at their respective Report Centres, each stick picked up a rep from their respective A/C or glider and were led to their A/C. On arrival at A/C lorries were unloaded and A/C were then loaded. Lorries remained by A/C until troops were emplaned, after which they were concentrated under the orders of Airfield Control.

(d) Provision of Spares. During the time of loading containers on A/C spares could be obtained by ringing up Control from the Report Centre.

7. ARRANGEMENTS MADE AT BASE OPERATIONS FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF SUPPLY DROPPING. To cater for the requirements of dropping of supplies in Sicily, for units of the Airborne Div and other formations, A/Q with C.R.A.S.C. and small staffs were situated at Base Operations. In additional, one R.A.S.C. officer, together with a small det of R.A.S.C. personnel, and roller conveyors loaded in 3-ton lorries, was attached to the Airfield Control on each of the two Airfields earmarked for supply dropping work. Although no supply dropping mission was undertaken, the procedure to be undertaken was as follows:- On receipt of requests for supplies, the Operations Room at Base would arrange for the requisite number of A/C to be available at the required Airfields. C.R.A.S.C. would then fill in a Supply Loading Table, one copy of which would be passed by him to the Supply Dumps, and one copy sent to the respective Airfield Controls by Base Operations. On arrival of A/C, Airfield Control arranged for the fixing of the roller conveyors in each A/C. Lorries containing supplies proceeded to the Airfield where they were marshalled under Airfield Control in the normal manner. Supplies were loaded into each A/C by the R.A.S.C. personnel who were also responsible for providing the despatching personnel travelling in the A/C.

8. PASSING OF 'LAST MINUTE' INTELLIGENCE. In one case a situation report and alteration of wireless call signs were received approx 1 hour before take off. This was passed straight out to Airfield Control Officers who were able to inform the troops of these alterations prior to take off.

9. PRO FORMA G.5. The necessary Pro Forma Para G.5 Part II covering the serial numbers of A/C taking off from each Airfield, times of troops arriving and times of troops loading containers etc, were prepared beforehand and held at Base Operations. These were then despatched to each Airfield in sufficient time for Airfield Control to prepare the lay-out and numbering of A/C before the arrival of troops.

10. CONCLUSIONS. It was apparent that for one operation Airfield Control staffs need not be so large as they were for this series of operations. It is considered that for an operation lasting 24 hours two Officers, 2 A.L.Os. with 6 O.Rs. and four cars 5-cwt on each Airfield should suffice to launch one parachute bde. An increase of 22 O.Rs. and 2 cars 5-cwt would be necessary however, if the responsibility of marshalling gliders remained with the Airborne Div. The Repair dets are considered essential. The provision of personnel and vehicles for marshalling duties in the Glider Pilot Regt is the subject of a separate recommendation. It has been proved beyond doubt that each A.L.O. on Establishment must have a car 5-cwt with driver, possibly a driver-batman. It is quite impossible for them to carry out their duties around the Airfield dispersal areas and the Divisional areas efficiently unless they have a car.

1. These instructions are designed to clarify the position at the Airborne Base - rendered somewhat complicated by the nature of the operations and by the fact that I must necessarily be with the Commander of the 13th Corps during the period of the three planned operations. The instructions are designed to enable Brigadier Down and Brigadier Lathbury to devote all their time to the tasks they have been given to do.

2. Brigadier Hackett is appointed as my representative at the Airborne Base and, with the assistance of the Divisional Staff, will deal with the following matters, on which he will make decisions and issue orders on my behalf.

(a) He will act as the sole channel of communications between 51st Wing and 1 Airborne Division. He will accept the decisions of O.C. 51st Wing regarding the availability of aircraft and gliders and regarding the air aspect of airborne operations.

(b) He will transmit such decisions to commanders concerned and, when called on to allocate aircraft, will be guided by the following principles:

(i) The maximum number of aircraft available for the GLUTTON operation will be placed at Brigadier Down's disposal, together with half the remaining Horsas (anticipated to be six or seven) and two Wacos, plus a further two for each deficient Horsa below six.

(ii) The maximum number of aircraft available for the FUSTIAN operation will be placed at Brigadier Lathbury's disposal, together with all remaining Horsas (anticipated to be six or seven) and five Wacos, plus an additional two for each deficient Horsa below six.

(iii) Should other considerations, such as availability of glider pilots, intervene, the principle to be followed will be the allotment of half the available gliders, remaining after the first operation, to each of the second and third operations.

(d) Brigadier Hackett will be responsible for issuing orders on my behalf in regard to supply dropping operations or in connection with the despatch of airborne artillery to the battle.

3. Minor modifications to the plans of 1st and 2nd Parachute Brigades may be requested by the higher command. Such modifications will almost certainly be asked for only after consultation with General Browning or myself. I have in mind such modifications as detailed alteration or dropping zones or minor changes in objectives. Such orders will be conveyed by Brigadier Hackett to the commander concerned and will be carried out.

4. On the other hand, the situation may demand what is in effect a new plan. In such event it is my intention that the operation shall be carried out by the 4th Parachute Brigade, reinforced if necessary by the units which have not already been employed. I intend to do this notwithstanding the possibility that the 2nd or 3rd operation may have been cancelled. I hope that I shall be able myself to issue the necessary orders. If not, then the decision will be taken by the senior Brigadier present at the Airborne Base.

5. Should Brigadier Hackett cease to be available to act as my representative at the Airborne Base, the senior Brigadier will decide who is to replace him.

7. For the purposes of command of troops and in the event of circumstances not foreseen in these instructions, the senior officer present at the Airborne Base will of course assume command in my absence.

1. General Conclusion. For the first time in history a force of 4,000 fully armed British soldiers, with anti-tank artillery, was launched into battle by air for an attack on enemy positions in Sicily, 400 miles away, by moonlight. The attack was carried out in a hastily improvised fleet of aircraft and gliders, largely American, from recently occupied territory in Africa. Aircraft crews of freight carrying aircraft had to be trained for their new role. Glider pilots had to be converted to a type of glider they had never seen before. The fighting troops had to be reorganised and adapted to the new types of aircraft. A combined airborne base, with six operational aerodromes was created in Tunisia. All this, and a great deal more, were accomplished in a period of two months, from the Airborne Division's arrival in Africa in May, to the launching of the attack on 9th July. The tasks given to the Airborne Division by the Control Officer Commanding 8th Army were carried out and an additional contribution to the success of the invasion of Sicily was made by numerous small detachments who landed wide of the target and created confusion and disruption in the enemy's defensive system. But the course of events was very different from that intended and the cost was considerable. In the first operation - a glider-borne attack at Syracuse - of the 140 gliders employed, 60 landed in the sea. The remainder were scattered over a wide area. The main objective was secured. The cost was about 500 men, killed, wounded or missing, out of a force of 2,100. There were no losses in aircraft. The second operation - a parachute and glider-borne attack on Augusta was cancelled owing to the weakness of the Italian opposition. The third operation - a parachute and glider-borne attack on a river crossing South of Catania - achieved results similar to the first. Of the 116 aircraft employed, 26 returned to base with their loads; 11 were missing; the remainder scattered their troops over a large area. Again, the objective was secured and chaos was caused in the enemy's lines. The cost was about 300 casualties out of a force of 1,800. 11 aircraft did not return, the crews of 6 were saved.

2. General Characteristics of the Operations carried out. The conclusions reached are influenced by the following factors which should be borne in mind when considering their application to airborne problems in general:-

(c) The efficiency of the air crews and their equipment lagged seriously behind that of the military forces, for the reason that hasty improvisation had to be adopted in default of adequate and timely provision.

(d) The radius of action - 400 miles - was greater than the maximum provided for in the War Office specifications.

(e) The role of the Airborne Division in Sicily was of an intimate tactical nature, rather than one of deep penetration into the enemy's territory.

(f) During the period of preparation the commanders concerned and the troops taking part were widely dispersed, making co-ordination difficult.

3. The failure to effect a concentrated landing. The primary reasons for the widely scattered landings of both gliders and parachute troops was that the air crews were insufficiently trained for the tasks they were called on to do and that they lacked experience of anti-aircraft fire. In the first operation the task of the air crews was to make a landfall by moonlight south of the objective; fly parallel to the coast 3,000 yards to seawards; indicate to the glider pilots that they had reached the release zone and then turn away. This the majority of them failed to do. The aircraft were not fired on over the sea; nor was there any flak nearer than Syracuse, some 5,000 yards away from the nearest point on the route. In the Catania operation their task was to make a landfall at a prominent river estuary and then locate dropping zones some 3,000 yards upstream by moonlight. Some aircraft were fired on by our own ships at sea. There was a moderate amount of flak in the area of the dropping zones and approaches. Many aircraft failed to make a correct landfall. Some crossed the coast to the north and came under the fire of the aerodrome defences at Catania. In some cases two or more attempts were made to find the correct area. Of the 116 parachute aircraft 30 dropped their sticks in the correct area. 9 dropped their sticks within half a mile of the target. 48 dropped over half a mile away, of which three dropped 20-25 miles away. Of the 16 gliders employed, 4 landed successfully in the correct area 7 landed some distance away and 5 are unaccounted for. Of those which landed 4 crashed on landing and sustained damage to a varying degree. The problem has been closely studied by the Air Staff and has been ventilated elsewhere. It is sufficient for the purpose of this report to say that a far too optimistic view was taken of the ability of the crews to locate landing zones by moonlight without navigational aids. There is no doubt also that the enemy flak had a disturbing influence on crews who were unaccustomed to it. All these difficulties can be mitigated by further training and the employment of suitable aids to navigation - a question which is now being closely studied. As regards the ability of glider pilots to land without aids by moonlight it is of interest to note that, of those released within the stipulated distance from the coast (3,000 yds), only four failed to land ashore and that a high percentage of these made successful landings notwithstanding the very unfavourable terrain. These results are the more striking in view of the limited amount of training it had been found possible to give the pilots. In the Catania operation, an attempt was made to provide landing lights for the gliders. These did not materialise, nor would they have assisted the pilots had they been there. There were too many other lights and fires in the landing area. No useful conclusion can be drawn from this attempt to provide landing lights. The problem is being closely investigated. The two operations serve to emphasise the difficulties of making an airborne landing in close proximity to the enemy's defences and conversely the desirability of choosing an area in which an undisturbed landing and assembly may be expected. Unfortunately, in Sicily, this was not possible.

4. The Glider and the Parachute. In my opinion, which is shared throughout the Division, the time has come to eliminate the arbitrary division between glider-borne troops and parachute troops. The two are complimentary and must be used in the closest co-operation under one commander as required by the task to be carried out, and by the aircraft and gliders available. The development of the glider has now reached the stage when the landing of gliders under suitable conditions in large numbers, in the enemy's territory by night is a perfectly sound and feasible operation of war. The employment of parachute troops in battle has demonstrated the grave difficulties of taking heavy equipment, such as mortars, ammunition, and wireless sets, to the battlefield in containers. Their recovery is most problematical. The glider provides the obvious alternative. The dropping of weapons, such as rifles and bren guns and wireless sets on the man has been shown to be perfectly feasible. It has now been adopted throughout the Division. Some degree of mobility - a jeep or motor cycle combination - is necessary for formation and unit commanders. These again require gliders. Anti-tank defence for parachute troops can only be provided by the employment of gliders. This was done in the operations in Sicily. The problem of carrying the assault infantryman to the battlefield by air is not so easily solved. The parachutist has the obvious advantage of being able to operate from aircraft of several types, easily modified, without the provision of gliders and glider pilots. The parachutists' aircraft is more manoeuvrable and better able to defend itself than the tug-glider combination. On the other hand, the parachute sub-unit is dispersed on landing. The glider-borne sub-unit lands complete and ready to fight at once. In an area defended by anti-aircraft weapons, the aircraft dropping parachutists will inevitably incur heavier losses than will aircraft tugging gliders. The problem of the relative capacity of aircraft and gliders needs consideration. The C.47 carries 18 parachutists and the Waco carries the same number of soldiers. On the other hand, the Albemarle pulls a Horsa with 32 passengers but carries only 10 parachutists. There is also, of course, the serious problem of the provision, on the one hand, of adequate numbers of trained parachutists and, on the other, of glider pilots. One last consideration is that of wind. The glider-borne brigade landed in a 35 m.p.h. wind, which would have involved parachutists in a high percentage of casualties on landing. The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the general tendency of airborne deployment will be towards the glider and away from the parachute. The eventual answer, I feel, will be found by carrying the bulk of the division in gliders, with a proportion of assault infantrymen in parachutes. Meanwhile it is necessary to recommend how best to adapt to future needs an organisation in which the parachute has been the predominating feature. As a first step I suggest leaving the airlanding brigade with three glider-borne battalions and introducing a glider element into the parachute brigades. I propose to submit recommendations as to how this can best be done.

5. Simplicity and Flexibility. The 1st Airborne Division was organised, I believe, primarily with the object of providing a flexible airborne force which could be readily adapted to meet any one of a series of possible conditions under which it might be called on to operate. By its very composition it is able to produce a force varying from a complete divisional organisation to a small raiding party; from a force demanding the maximum defensive fire power to a mobile assault force requiring large numbers of highly trained light infantry. To that extent the 1st Airborne Division has provided an ideal basis for experiment and research. But, of course, it is a large and expensive organisation and a complicated one. It is strong, perhaps unnecessarily strong, in fire power. As a basis for future organisation of airborne forces it is overcapitalised and can never pay a big dividend. As a result of the experience of the recent operations, I think the time has now come to develop a cheaper, smaller and more simple organisation, at the expense of some degree of flexibility. Later, when more airborne division are created, certain corps troops might well be added.

6. Fire Power. Faced with what appears to be the average type of airborne operation, I feel that the 1st Airborne Division is over-insured in anti-aircraft fire power. In the light of our growing air superiority and with the help of the tactics of dispersion, we can, I think, disregard some of it. Anti-tank defence will always remain an essential feature of any airborne force of greater strength than a raiding or sabotage detachment. The anti-tank gun should, I think, be an infantry weapon on the basis of six or eight guns per battalion. In regard to the light artillery, the provision of sufficient aircraft is a serious problem and there will doubtless be many airborne operations in which no light artillery will be used. Nevertheless I think it would be wise to retain the regiment of three batteries and to explore further the possibility of providing it with a more suitable weapon.

7. Tanks. I do not consider that the arrival of the present light tank on the battlefield will justify the effort required to get it there by air. On the other hand it is not possible to forecast future developments and I recommend that the Light Tank Squadron be retained as corps troops.

8. Reconnaissance Squadron. On occasion, a reconnaissance squadron as at present organised would be of great value, but it is an expensive unit and, if retained, should be simplified and its transport reduced.

9. Royal Engineers. The present establishments, I believe, are too big. Seldom will it be found possible to employ so many officers and men in their proper engineering role. The majority of R.E. personnel should travel in gliders.

10. Supply. The normal R.A.S.C. services necessary for a modified division will naturally be in proportion to the size of that division. The light company, I think, is far too big for its probable employment. Emergency supply by parachute or glider will be of added importance in the future.

11. R.E.M.E. The considerable reduction in the number of vehicles in the division, which I think is inevitable, will permit of a corresponding reduction in the R.E.M.E. services. One possibility is the elimination of all L.A.Ds. and the introduction of a larger divisional workshop.

12. R.A.M.C. Experience has amply vindicated the policy of making certain R.A.M.C. personnel an integral part of the infantry battalion. The R.A.M.C. units have functioned well and need only be modified to conform to other changes in the divisional organisation. I believe that the majority should travel by glider, a proportion of parachutists being maintained for work with parachute troops.

13. Signals. Good wireless communication in an airborne force is essential. But our present establishments are very expensive in personnel, equipment and vehicles. I believe that economies must be obtained by a drastic reduction in the number of links provided for within the formation. On the other hand experience has shown that the external wireless links have assumed added importance.

14. The Independent Parachute Company. This unit has proved its value in battle. It has many potential uses and I think it should be retained in its present form.

15. Commanders and Staffs. I strongly recommend that a Deputy Commander of the Division be provided, with the rank of Brigadier. From every point of view this appointment has been found to be necessary. The experiment of providing Parachute Brigades with deputy commanders has been an unqualified success and I strongly recommend that it be made a permanent feature of every brigade in the Division. The simplification of the organisation of the division would no doubt enable reductions to be made in certain appointments in the staffs and services.

16. The Strength of the Airlanding Brigade. The Airlanding Brigade badly needs a third and even a fourth battalion for the present campaign. In plans which are now being made the shortage of glider-borne infantry constitutes a serious handicap. In the future, a brigade of three or four battalions is required.

17. The Problem of the Glider Pilot. The Glider Pilot Regiment, even since its formation, has been faced with difficulties caused by the varying degree of encouragement and assistance it has received from the Royal Air Force. Its achievements in the face of such difficulties are quite remarkable. The greatest credit is due to the Commanding Officer and to all ranks of the Regiment for their energy and determination, which were based on their firm belief in the future of the glider. The experience gained in the recent operations and in the training leading up to them should go far towards providing the correct answer to this problem. In the first place I do not consider it necessary to have two fully trained pilots for each glider. The duties of the second pilot require him to be able to assist the first pilot and to relieve him during a long tow. I believe that the standard of training required of a second pilot can be reached after only a few hours flying instruction. The second pilot could be either a regimental officer or N.C.O., or he could be a member of the Glider Pilot Regiment and a potential first pilot. The latter, I think, would prove by far the better arrangements. The glider pilots employed in the two operations in Sicily did remarkably well, as pilots and as fighting troops. Through no fault of their own, however, they had had too little training, particularly in night landings, on the glider they were called on to fly into battle. Their subsequent performance on the ground was of a very high standard. The soundness of their military training and of the system of attaching pilots to fighting units during training was amply proved. The increasing employment of gliders, which appears inevitable, will demand a careful consideration of the methods of producing the numbers of pilots required. I believe myself that economies can be secured by a revision of the syllabus of training. This problem has been discussed but, so far as I am aware, the present syllabus is materially the same as that on which glider training was first commenced. The organisation of the Regiment requires immediate revision and separate recommendations have been submitted, the principle change suggested being the provision of personnel and vehicles for the movement and marshalling of gliders on the ground.

18. The Type of Glider. The only glider available in Africa in large numbers was the Waco. Within the limits of its capacity it has proved satisfactory. A total of 18 fully armed soldiers (including two pilots) was carried in each glider. This was three more than its approved load. But of course it is uneconomical and entails the splitting of tactical sub-units. The Horsa was far better from every point of view and there is no doubt that what is required is a glider similar in size and performance to the Horsa. Suggested modifications in design have been considered elsewhere and I have nothing useful to add as a result of the experiences with the twenty Horsas used in the operations.

19. Additional Pay. A matter on which I think there is no doubt at all is that of additional pay. The invidious distinction between the parachutist and the glider-borne soldier in the matter of pay should be removed once and for all. An all-round rate of 2/- a day is surely the least reward that can be offered to officers and men who accept all the implications of the duties of an airborne soldier.

20. Further Experiment. I attach at Appendix 'A' a suggested organisation intended merely to indicate the lines on which I think the airborne division of the future might be developed. I propose to experiment further, in the operations to come, with the inter-mixing of parachute and glider-borne troops.

The following notes on equipment are the result of experience gained in North Africa and on operations. They are based on the expressed opinions of the commanders in the Division.

1. Rifle No.4. Although there is still a preference for the Mk III rifle, owing to the bolt action of the rifle No.4 prejudicing rapid fire, I consider that owing to the production situation the rifle No.4 should be retained. In addition, the short bayonet for the rifle No.4 is definitely preferred.

2. Bren L.M.G. There is general approval of the Bren L.M.G. One suggestion has been made that the old extendable bipod is preferable to the new bipod, but I feel that the re-adoption of the old bipod would not be justified in view of the production difficulties involved.

3. Vickers M.M.G. Parachute Bdes favour the retention of Vickers M.M.Gs. on the present scale of four per battalion. Mk VIII Z ammunition will always be used in this theatre as it is the only ammunition available in stripless belts.

4. Pistols .45 Auto and Sten guns. The .45 mechanically is an excellent weapon but it is not an adequate weapon for officers in view of the possibility of their being dropped in isolated positions and having to fight their way back to their units. A possible final solution is the Carbine designed for American parachutists to replace both the .45 Automatic and the Sten. Although it only fires single shots, 40 rounds per minute can be fired, and it also has the advantage that it is more economical in ammunition than the Sten. I will submit recommendations on this point. For the present the Sten would be a perfectly suitable weapon if the present frequency of stoppages due to magazine failure can be overcome. A simple modification has been produced which is promising, but which has not yet been given sufficient trial to form any conclusions. If the present defects of the Sten cannot be overcome the T.S.M.G. might replace the Sten and .45 as an interim measure, but its weight and size are against it for permanent adoption. A proportion of Sten bayonets should be retained so long as the Sten is held. I consider that Sten Guns should no longer be considered expendable when rifles and L.M.Gs. are dropped on the man from C.47 aircraft.

5. Mortar 2-in. The modified 2-in mortar, now being issued, differs from the type originally produced and approved in that the spade is now fixed so that it lies along the line of sight. This results first in the flattening and ultimately in the bending of the spade. Although Div Workshops R.E.M.E. can undertake the modification of the spades of those mortars already in the Division, in future production of the weapon, the spade should be set at 90 degrees to its present position. An asbestos handle is required for the carriage of the mortar after rapid fire.

6. Mortar 3-in. The new secondary charges and range scale to increase the range from 1,600 to 2,500 yards is an immediate requirement. It is not yet known whether the modified or strengthened base plate for Parachute Units will stand up to the increased charge, as none of the new secondaries are yet available in North Africa.

7. P.I.A.T. It has been found that where the angle of impact is much less than 90 degrees the bomb is most unreliable. Trials are to be carried out to determine exactly the effective angle of impact. There is great confidence in the effect of the bomb when it does detonate. A suggested solution is the fitting of an Allway Fuse to the bomb.

8. Grenades. There is general approval of the following grenades which should be retained; Nos. 36, 75, 77 and 82 (Gammons). The No.69 Grenade is no longer required, and the No.74 Grenade has been found to be highly dangerous in this hot climate. It also is therefore not required in Africa.

9. 20 m.m. Hispano. I have sanctioned the withdrawal of these weapons from all units except the Light A.A. Battery. Experience has shown that the airborne mounting will not stand up to rough country and protracted firing, and a stronger mounting is required for those guns that are to be retained.

1. No.22 Set. The No.22 set is too heavy, particularly for parachute operations. The only possible method of carrying it is in a jeep or handcart. For parachute operations a set, which combines the range and frequency band of the No.22 set with the portability of the No.68 set, is required. It is believed that Messrs. Murphy are now working on such a set which is a most urgent requirement for this division.

2. No.68 Set. This set has been most useful as a "stop gap", but its frequency band has been found to be too narrow.

3. No.38 Set. It is generally agreed that this set is most unreliable, requires much maintenance, and is too heavy for airborne operations.

4. No.536 Set. This is a good and most suitable set. Its limitations are:- (a) That it is not on the British equipment list. (b) The number of frequencies available are limited by the number of crystals available. (c) At the moment, the frequency can only be changed by the Div Sigs maintenance section as there is only one S.Equipment IE/17/A instrument available. It is believed that the British equivalent of the No.536 set is now being experimented with, and that it will be a non-crystal set weighing 6 lbs. There is at present a small reserve of No.536 sets held by Div Sigs, but if the new British set is not soon forthcoming, a further issue of No.536 sets will be required.

5. No.76 Set (5G). This set has been found very reliable. Its great disadvantage is that the weight of a complete station is excessive for parachute operations. When carried in a glider a handcart may be used for its carriage and it is then satisfactory. A suitable suit-case set is what is required for parachute operations as the long range rear link set. This set does exist but, when the division was in England the quality produced was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the I.S.R.B. for who it was designed (This set is the B Mk II).

6. No.21 Set. The range of this set (5 miles) is not sufficient for the Lt Regt, R.A.

7. Listening Sets. I consider that the number of wireless terminals in the division should be reduced to an absolute minimum. This is being investigated. One way of achieving this would be the adoption of a small listening set. A very small Emerson listening set was used by Naval F.O.Os. in the recent operation, but it is not believed that this set has sufficient receptivity for this division.

8. Pigeons. In my opinion the possible uses of pigeons in airborne operations are not such as to justify the inclusion of any pigeon personnel, birds or equipment in the division.

1. Knee Pads. One set per parachutist is required in all units. They will always be worn on operations. Knee pads are left on D.Zs. and although they will be salvaged as far as possible, wastage will probably be high, both on operations and training.

2. Smocks Airborne. As a result of 1 Parachute Brigade's operation in North Africa, the following modifications were requested when the Division was in England:- (a) Straps instead of elastic around the wrists. (b) Additional waterproofing. (c) A detachable hood. (d) Press studs instead of the zip fastener. (a), (b) and (c) are now confirmed but I feel that (d) is a retrograde step and was originally proposed because jams sometimes occurred owing to mud. This is more acceptable than substitution of the press stud, which easily tears out.

4. Assault Jerkins. The principle of the Assault Jerkin is generally satisfactory, but owing to the very hot weather experienced since the division has been in this theatre, it has as yet not been much used. It is suggested that the pack should be made detachable so that when a man is in action but in a defensive position, the weight can be removed from his back. The jerkin should also be camouflaged in the same way as the smock. This modification is already incorporated in the prototype medical assault jerkin.

5. Handcart. The handcart is too weak and is easily damaged. A high scale of spares was requested when the division was in England, but so far these have not arrived in this theatre. A decrease of depth in 6 ins. can be accepted in order to offset the increase in weight which would result if the handcart is strengthened. Before the reduction in height is made, trials must be carried out to ensure that the handcart could still be modified for the carriage of a wireless set.

6. Trolleys. The trolley is unsatisfactory, as the wheels are not large enough. As the policy of carrying heavier weapons by glider develops, the trolley will gradually by replaced by the handcart or the jeep.

7. Hatbox. This is not required, as when ammunition is dropped in containers it can be packed in sandbags.

9. Toggle Ropes. These are still required, and are particularly useful as additional drag ropes on trolleys and handcarts. Any alterations in scale will be proposed in new A.Fs. G.1098.

10. Airborne Sleeping Bags. In view of the high cost of the present type, it is considered a pleasant but non-essential luxury. I suggest that either the cheaper type as used in the Middle East should be adopted for Parachute units, or else the idea of sleeping bags (except for medical units) be abandoned, and blankets used in lieu. They are definitely not required by Airborne Units.

11. Stereoscopes. The present scale is definitely required, except in the case of R.A. units where it can be reduced.

12. Thermos Flasks. The 1 gallon Container, in place of the Thermos Flask, is suitable for all units except the R.A.M.C., who should retain Thermos Flasks.

13. Containers, Type E. These are not required, and should be replaced by the Type F as soon as possible.

14. Pistols Signal. The Army type has been found perfectly satisfactory. The R.A.F. type is therefore no longer required.

15. P.I.A.T. Bomb Carrier. A carrier is required. The present type was made loosely as a "Stop-gap" measure, shortly before leaving England. It would be of interest to know whether an improved model has now been produced in England.

17. Rubber Dinghies. These are not required and the Divisional pool can be dispensed with.

18. Torches. The American Usalite torch is the only type of torch which is required throughout all units of the division. All other types of torch can be dispensed with.

19. Long strops for C.47 Aircraft. Burning of parachutists' arms has been prevalent since the adoption of the lengthened strop. This can, however, be obviated by tying the strop back over itself with elastic bands or thin thread. An opinion as to the necessity of the lengthened strop cannot be given until further experience of its use has been gained. It has definite advantages in a drop when the aircraft is not flying steady.

20. Ground Strips. The present ground strip is too heavy and in many cases issued on too high a scale. A lighter and larger ground strip is required, similar to that used by the Indep Para Coy. Particulars of this strip are as follows:- Material - Courtauld Rayon. Colour - Yellow. Dimensions - (a) 20 yds x 1 yd. (b) 15 yds by 1 yd.

21. Compasses, Binoculars and Watches. The scales of these items are excessive and they can all be materially reduced. Reduced scales will be submitted with proposals for amending A.F. G.1098.

22. Bicycles. The scales of bicycles in all units of the division, less Parachute Bns and A/Tk Btys, can be substantially reduced. After reduction, the bicycles still held by units, will be held in a unit pool for distribution on training and operations as required. Parachute Bns should retain their present scale of bicycles. A/Tk Btys R.A. at present have no bicycles on W.E., but require ten each.

GENERAL LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF 1 AIRBORNE DIVISION DURING OPERATION 'HUSKY'

The following is a summary of the principal lessons capable of general application. More detailed and particular references to lessons are contained in the text of the report and in the technical appendices (Part 7).

1. Rehearsals. Whenever possible full scale rehearsals, as far as possible under similar conditions of landfall, terrain and moon, should be carried out before every operation.

2. Training Casualties. The low figure for casualties on training in C.47 aircraft are attributable to the elimination of all "aperture casualties" and the greater freedom from twist in door jumping.

3. Personal Liaison. Before any operation it is most important to establish close liaison between glider pilots and the pilot of their tug aircraft and between jump-masters and the aircrews of their transport aircraft.

4. Use of foreign weapons and vehicles. Numerous enemy weapons, particularly A/Tk guns, were captured with quantities of ammunition, and used. The policy of training all ranks in the use of enemy weapons was fully justified and time spent on such training in the future should be increased and the training made more comprehensive. It is valuable to have a few men who can drive captured M.T. and horse-drawn vehicles.

5. Training of Glider Pilots. As soon as the nature of the operation was known it was clear that glider pilots would require as much night landing and WACO flying training as could be given them, and a valuable contribution towards this could have been made in England. This was put forward early in May, but it was not found possible to carry out any of this training.

6. Training in Infantry Role. All troops taking part in airborne operations (e.g. R.A., R.E., Sigs) must be thoroughly trained in an infantry role.

7. Maintenance of Objective. Although local action by small parties of airborne troops may have great cumulative effect, it is the duty of all troops, wherever they land, to move as rapidly as possible to the main objective, without allowing themselves to become involved in incidents en route. "Marching to the sound of the guns" is an apt principle for airborne troops.

8. Parachute Procedure. The agreed procedure contained in "Standing Orders for Parachuting" has worked extremely well, and with slight variations is equally applicable to American and British technique.

9. Liaison. Liaison officers are never a substitute for direct contact between commanders. In this operation the great distances involved (MASCARA to CAIRO) made such contact difficult and the provision of liaison officers was probably the only alternative; but it should be a principle of future operations that commanders should be sufficiently close together for contact to be possible at frequent intervals.

10. Change of Plan. Slight changes of plan at the last minute may be inevitable, and so long as they only affect action to be taken after landing, must be accepted, though they should be kept to a minimum. When they affect the air plan, e.g. allocation of aircraft, additional D.Zs, the matter presents much more of a problem and such changes must only be made after a full consideration of all the factors involved.

11. Liaison with Ground Forces. When Airborne forces are working tactically with ground forces, it is most desirable that there should be personal contact between the two before the operations commence, certainly on the Brigade level and whenever possible on the Battalion level.

12. Intelligence Material. The material provided for planning and briefing (overprinted maps, annotated photographs and models) was quite excellent and all commanders without exception after acquaintance with the ground, paid a tribute to the accuracy of the interpretation. It is a bad principle, but at present a necessary expedient, that an Intelligence Officer from the Division should be attached to the source of photographic intelligence. Reliance on the normal channels causes delay and the missing of important information, the value of which can only be appreciated by one well versed in airborne affairs.

13. Aids to finding D.Zs. The problem of finding D.Zs and the imperative need for aids in doing so has been referred to in the General Conclusions. The following lines of investigation (among others) are now proceeding:-

(a) Provision of lights at sea by submarines or other naval craft, to assist an accurate landfall.

(b) The use of the 68 P Set or the 5 G as a homing beacon for the radio compass in the C.47 aircraft.

14. Radius of Action. Airborne forces should not tie themselves down to any radius below that imposed on them by aircraft performance. To do so would be to sacrifice much of their characteristic of flexibility.

15. Formations. Close grouping of aircraft leads to 'jockeying' at the release point and over the D.Z., and in future more distance between blocks should be allowed.

16. Air Support. (See also Part 1, Appendix E) The provision of air support is an integral feature of airborne operations. It should take the following forms:-

(a) Neutralisation of enemy A.A. and searchlights, if any, in the dropping and landing areas at the time of landings.

(b) Planned concentrations against specific objectives in conjunction with subsequent ground operations.

(c) A reserve of 'fire-power' available at call (this calls for an Army Air Support tentacle or some similar means of communication).

(d) Dummy dropping. The effectiveness of the dummy dropping programme during the recent operations is not known, but it could hardly fail to have spread alarm and uncertainty.

(e) Diversionary bombing, which apart from its distracting effect, may help in finding of D.Zs.

17. Routeing. A very careful appreciation of the problems of routeing should be drawn up well before an operation, and the results co-ordinated on a high level, Army and Air Force level.

18. Altitude of Approach. The opinion of the Air Staff at Force 141, on which the altitude of approach was decided, was that the aircraft and gliders would inevitably suffer heavy casualties from night fighters and that the only hope lay in flying across at sea level, subsequently climbing to the minimum necessary height as late as possible. No night fighters were encountered and the opinion of several senior R.A.F. officers, expressed afterwards, was that the aircraft would be located by R.D.F. even at sea level. From this point of view, they said, the altitude was of little importance. Perhaps some definite opinion on this matter could be obtained.

19. Evasive action over D.Zs. Whatever the enemy fire may be pilots must be impressed with the necessity of flying a steady course once the red light has been switched on. Evasive action throws the men standing up waiting to jump into confusion and they often become tangled with their strops, thus preventing all jumping from that particular aircraft.

20. Container Lighting. Only a proportion of containers dropped were recovered. The problem of finding containers at night has still not be satisfactorily solved. It has recently been decided to drop rifles, bren guns, wireless sets and medical equipment on the man, in special holdalls and kit-bags, and this will lessen the dependence of a parachute force on its containers, but there will still be heavier weapons and material and ammunition reserve that can only be landed in containers or gliders. The problem, therefore, demands urgent investigation at home. Bright lights on containers draw enemy fire.

(a). WACOs with light loads (personnel and handcarts) can land safely in most types of country provided it is fairly level. WACOs with heavy loads (jeeps, guns, etc.) however need good landing areas.

(b). An alternative system of intercommunication is required between tug and glider.

(c). Both HORSA and WACO gliders have been proved to float with full loads of personnel for considerable periods. Rubber dinghies in gliders are not, therefore, considered necessary.

(d). One HORSA glider was set on fire when the Cordtex Net was used to blow off the tail. The reason for this is under examination. It is thought that some petrol from a jeep may have spilled out into the glider and became ignited by the explosion.

22. Liaison with relieving force. An airborne officer should accompany the forward units of the relieving force in order to make sure that its situation is fully appreciated by the commanders concerned. There should also be an airborne H.Q. element with the formation under whose command the airborne force has been placed, in order to make the necessary administrative and other arrangements pending and after the relief of the force. This H.Q. must include the A.D.M.S. or his representative.

23. Glider Pilots - tactical employment. In any operation using a number of gliders the total man-power represented by glider pilots is considerable. This can best be utilised by forming glider pilots into their own sub-units, and using them as a reserve of light infantry. For this purpose glider pilots require to take with them light weapons (including Bren Guns and P.I.A.Ts.) and bicycles.

24. Artillery (See also Part 3, Section B, Annexure 1). In any operation in which the main H.Q. arrives by parachute it is a great advantage for the commander and two or three O.Rs. from co-operating artillery to jump with the H.Q. He will then find himself well placed to direct the activities of his command as they arrive by glider. The value of having some means to call for artillery support, whether from ships or from artillery on shore, was amply proved. A special feature throughout the operation was the effectiveness of naval supporting fire. A naval bombardment detachment should be a normal component of any force operating within range of naval guns.

25. Recognition. The Army as a whole appears ignorant of the dress of British parachute troops, particularly of the parachutist's steel helmet. Several cases occurred of British parachute troops being mistaken for Germans.

(a). The Welbike has proved of no value and is no longer required as an item of parachute equipment.

(b). The fighting knife is not required for its original purpose, but it, or some other kind of knife, is of great value in cutting a way out of crashed gliders.

(c). Coloured torches proved most useful during reorganization of D.Zs. The American type is recommended for future issue in place of the 'Orilux'.

(e). Entrenching tools and picks and shovels are essential equipment on any airborne operation.

(f). The 75 Grenade proved most useful for establishing quick road blocks. These blocks must be removed on relief or their position indicated.

(g). Sten. This again proved unreliable. The gun is satisfactory, but the magazine spring is too weak and gets easily damaged and jammed. If this could be put right there is no reason why the gun should not be satisfactory.

(a) A standard medical equipment in the WACO glider is required. A.D.M.S. is preparing a list of equipment which should in future be included.

(b) A half section of a Field Ambulance should be detailed for duty on glider landing areas to deal with casualties caused on landing.

(c) The first aid training of regimental personnel and glider pilots is of a high standard but certain men should receive still further training, in order to ensure that at least one man in each glider is specially trained.

(e) The dispersal of medical personnel throughout the force rather than concentration in a few aircraft or gliders justified itself completely.

(f) The A.D.M.S. must be able to make arrangements for medical assistance with the relieving force before the operation, and he or his representative should be with the relieving force.

28. Resupply. There should be some pre-arranged and automatic plan for resupply on objectives on the night following the launching of parachute troops and perhaps of glider-borne troops too. The system of resupply only on demand is apt to break down.

29. Rations. The 48 hour ration, though good of its kind, is too bulky and too dry for troops engaged in continuous battle. Chocolate is unsatisfactory in tropical climates but the tea element is very highly appreciated.

30. Communication Aircraft. The lack of communication aircraft was severely felt. Whenever the Divisional Commander or small parties of staff officers had to travel by air on their duties, as was frequently the case, the only aircraft available was a C.47 from the resources of 51 Troop Carrier Wing. Not only was this grossly uneconomical in terms of petrol consumption and aircraft wear and tear, but it also took away operational aircraft from vital training. A few communication aircraft for the use of commanders and staff officers are an essential in any theatre of war, and would in practice be an economy.

31. The 22 Set. The 22 set is too cumbersome for parachuting. The battery has a life of only six hours and a man carried charging set has not yet been produced. A lighter set with the same characteristics is in production. Until its issue as much use as possible must be made of the 68 set. A condition of its use must however be that the lateral wave is within the 68 set wave band.

32. Codes. Within airborne plain language should be the rule. Other formations should also be encouraged to use plain language as far as possible in communicating with airborne formations.

33. Base Operations Organisation. No changes are proposed in the organisation which worked extremely satisfactorily.

34. Move of Airborne Base. The limiting time factor in moving the division rapidly to a new base in anticipation of operations is often the time taken to establish the necessary internal communications.

Appendix 'A' - Outline of Signal Plan. [Note: this line has been crossed out with "(See Appx K Part 1)" inserted]

2. Preparation for the operation was complicated by the fact that the majority of the Divisional Signals did not reach N.Africa until the end of May with 1 Air Landing Bde, and some of Div. Headquarters. 2 Para. Bde. had arrived with its Signal Section a month earlier, while 1 Para. Bde. had been in N.Africa for 6 months.

3. O.C. 1 Airborne Div. Signals had to remain in England to reorganise the unit on a new establishment and equipment table which were not finally passed till mid April. Accordingly the 2nd in Command, Major G.H. Wotton, was sent out by air in mid April in order to represent the unit on the planning staff of 15 Army Gp. (then Force 141.).

4. Major Wotton, in collaboration with the Airborne Advisor and the C.S.O., drew up the Signal plan at ALGIERS. Later he visited Eighth Army (then Force 545) in CAIRO to arrange details of frequencies, ciphers and codes, but unfortunately during the journey by air of 2000 miles, the original plan was completely changed.

5. Three days later, approximately 9 May 43, the Div. Comd. arrived in CAIRO, and after consultations with General Montgomery Comd. 8 Army, produced an outline plan for the employment of 1 Airborne Div. in operation HUSKY. On the basis of this new plan, a further outline Signal plan was drawn up.

6. Later the new plan was approved by C.S.O. 15 Army Gp on the return of Major Wotton.

7. Major Wotton then visited the Div. Trg. Area at MASCARA, some 250 miles W. of ALGIERS, where Major Deane-Drummond M.C. had arranged and 5th (U.S.) Army had executed the necessary fixed communications within the Division and to the Airfields.

8. On arrival at ORAN on 26 May O.C. Div. Signals found that the unit would have to remain in a staging camp near the coast for at least a week, move to MASCARA 60 miles inland for a fortnight and then move with the Division 700 miles to the KAIROUAN area.

9. This produced a very great administrative difficulty as it was impossible to unpack stores in the staging camp and the stay in MASCARA was too short to allow for complete sorting. 600 accumulators required charging and no acid could be obtained at first, while considerable quantities of special wireless equipment had to be issued to the Parachute Bdes. The position was further complicated by shortage of transport, resulting in the use of the French railways with changes of gauge.

10. Meanwhile vehicles and heavy stores had reached the port of MOSTAGNUM and a party was sent there in the hope of picking out priority items which proved impossible. It was, however, discovered that one Car 5 cwt had never left England.

11. When the move from MASCARA to KAIROUAN began over 50 Unit packing cases were still missing, and during the move of 700 miles the French railway authorities contrived to uncouple 5 wagons from the Div. Signals train in order to attach some others of their own. The uncoupled trucks contained most of the unit stock of 5G wireless sets. A subaltern officer who was sent off to search TUNISIA eventually discovered them on a siding near TUNIS.

12. Meanwhile O.C. Div. Signals had made a reconnaissance with the G.1, of the new base area travelling by air and all necessary lines and equipment were provided in time by the C.S.O. TUNISIA DISTRICT, and the C.S.O. AIR FORMATION SIGNALS for the airfield communications, in spite of the very short notice that it was possible to give. The recce. could not be done earlier because the allocation of airfields had not been decided.

13. Major Wotton and the small Adv. Div. party left MASCARA just before the move on 22 JUN. Having flown to CAIRO they finally embarked at SUEZ on 28 JUN.

14. The unit meanwhile reached KAIROUAN area in several parties and the workshops and stores were hastily opened to deal with last minute requirements for Bdes. Final arrangements were also made for the Operational base headquarters.

1. Of the 18 airfields available in the KAIROUAN area and allotted to N.A.T.C.C. 12 were made available for 82 (American) Airborne Div. and 6 for 1 (Br.) Airborne Division. Two thirds of the available transport aircraft were made available for 82 (American) Airborne Div., and one third for 1 (Br) Airborne Div.

2. Under the command of 51 Wing N.A.T.C.C., which worked with 1 (Br) Airborne Div., was placed certain element of 38 Wing, including some HORSA gliders and ALBEMARLE and HALIFAX aircraft. The HORSA gliders were towed out from ENGLAND to provide for the lifting of sub-units of artillery.

3. The six airfields allotted to 51 Wing for the use of 1 (Br) Airborne Div were situated around the EL HANI SALT LAKE which is on the WEST side of the MONASTIR GAP. Three airfields were S.E. of the lake two NORTH of it and one to the EAST.

4. A well concentrated Div bivouac area was selected N.E. of the lake near M'SAKEN (inland from SOUSSE), and at the same time a point was chosen EAST of the lake for a combined WING and DIV OPS Headquarters. This point was as central as possible for the six airfields.

5. It was decided that each airfield and each bde must be connected by line to this central point.

6. All formations and important units within the Div. area were connected by line to a 40 line switchboard in the Div. area. C.S.O. TUNISIA DISTRICT was responsible for the various lines some of which were laid by 4 Div. Sigs. and some by 11 L. of C. Signals. C.S.O. TUNISIA DISTRICT also provided an 8 wire multi-airline route 10 miles long connecting the Div. area switchboard, "LUTHER", to the Cps. board "GANGWAY". This route was built by First Army Signals.

7. As N.A.T.C.C. were unable to provide their own airfield lines these were built by 7 (Br.) Air Formation Signals. As lines averaged 20 miles in length spaced field cable and existing civilian overhead circuits were employed.

8. Meanwhile by agreement between O.C. 1 Airborne Div. Signals, C.S.O. N.A.T.C.C. and the Signal Officer of 51 Wing, it was decided to run a combined British and American Message Centre at GANGWAY. All British terminals were worked by 1 Airborne Div. Signals and all American terminals by 51 Wing. The message centre and cipher centre were combined American British. The switchboard was American and to it were connected all lines including those required by the Staff of 1 Airborne Div. at GANGWAY.

9. This arrangement worked well as a result of the very close co-operation and help given by Capt. L. Coulter U.S. Army Signal Corps, and his most efficient message centre Serjeant, Serjt. E. Anderson. All messages were handed in to the message centre whether American or British.

BRITISH WIRELESS. Three No.33 Sets working on Airborne Base Wave. Eighth Army 13 Corps Wave. 15 Army Gp. Wave.

BRITISH LINES. Direct teleprinter and telephone circuits to 15 Army Gp. Two fullerphone Circuits to the Div. area. Three telephone Circuits to the Div. area switchboard.

AMERICAN LINES. Teletype and telephone circuits to N.A.T.C.C. at SOUSSE. Telephone circuits to each airfield.

(b) Only the G. and I staffs moved to GANGWAY, A.A.Q.M.G., A.D.O.S., C.R.A.S.C. and C.R.E.M.E. remaining in the Div. area.

1. Communications on landing. All sets including spare sets, were to open up on landing. This gave duplicate W/T links in practically every case. Spare sets were to close down as soon as one link had been satisfactorily established to conserve batteries. This procedure was to be adopted even if it meant both links opening up on the same frequency. Some indication was to be given in call signs to indicate spare sets.

2. Charging Equipment. As handcarts were used for carriage of No.22 and No.76A Sets it was impossible to carry Charging Sets 300 watt. 80 watt charging sets were tried but as they appeared to be a doubtful quantity additional batteries were carried in lieu. It was anticipated that had charging equipment been necessary a demand for supplies of charging sets 300 watt could have been met and dropped as requested.

3. Coy. Detachments of Bn. Signal Platoons. Rifle Coy. No.18 Set detachments were equipped with handcarts and carried alternative means of communication, lamps S.R.D.S., flags signalling, assault cable, and telephones. Methods of communication were laid down in each Bn. in the following order:- 1 Wireless. 2. Lamp. 3. Flag. 4. Despatch Rider. 5. Runner. Lines were only to be laid in static positions on orders of Bn. Signal Officer. As a general rule lines would only be laid if the Bn. was to stay in any position for 6 hours or more.

4. Provision of Spare Batteries for No.18 and 38 Sets. Every handcart in the Bn., non signal handcarts included, were to carry spare batteries for No.18 and 38 Sets. Operators would then be able to obtain spare batteries as required whenever any handcart was contacted.

5. Pigeons. It is difficult to draw any lessons from the use of pigeons on this operation. If it was decided to supply each glider with pigeons and they were to be released in the event of the glider landing away from the L.Z. such information would be of little operational value to people back at base. It is felt that the only real value of pigeons is in the provision of an alternative means of communication should communication rearwards fail. In such a case each glider of Brigade H.Q. and Bn. H.Q. should carry two pigeons.

REPORT BY CAPT. R.S. ROBERTSON R.SIGNALS 'L' SECTION. 1 AIRBORNE DIVISIONAL SIGNALS

This report is not intended as a complete section report being confined entirely to my own personal experiences. The Section was at no time concentrated, a Brigade H.Q. as such was never established and personnel of the Section fought as infantrymen throughout. Other members of the Section are submitting individual reports.

At the outset, to my mind the most outstanding feature of the move from billets, take-off and flight was the extraordinary calmness displayed by all ranks. Everyone seemed to look upon it as just one more exercise and I personally found it difficult to convince myself that at long last 1st Air Landing Brigade was about to take part in active operations against the enemy.

After what now seems surprisingly little "flap" we embussed in the Unit lines and moved off to the Airfield, Strip A, at about 1600 hrs on Friday 9 July 43. The ride to the Airfield took in all some two hours. Organisation at the Airfield was good and on arrival we were quickly escorted to our appropriate glider by one of the Glider Pilots. Throughout this journey people sang and talked, ate boiled sweets and generally enjoyed themselves.

We were destined to travel in Glider No.10 the third aircraft in No.2 Lane on take-off. Co-passengers in the glider included Col. Jones, Deputy Brigade Commander, Lt.Col. Hennicker, Major Tompkins, Capt. Clarke, Capt. Hoorigan the R.C. Padre who was later to meet such a terrible death, and 7 O.Rs. including Sjt. Leaver, the Bde. Intelligence Serjeant and L/Sjt. Stockin of the Signal Section. After settling ourselves in, adjusting safety straps, fitting lifebelts etc. we took off at 1850 hrs and flew in the direction of Cane Bon. After a short time the gliders were flying in formation and I could see the remaining three gliders of our particular formation on either side.

We were by this time getting quite a bumpy ride but everyone confidently expected that as soon as we crossed the coast conditions would greatly improve. How wrong we all were. After crossing the coast after 30 minutes flying we soon discovered that bumps were still very evident and if anything more frequent. We flew on and passed over MALTA at approximately 2100 hrs and at this stage I began to realise for the first time that this was not just one more exercise. My fears were soon confirmed for in a short time we were flying along parallel with the Eastern edges of the Sicilian coast about 5 or 10 miles out to sea and 'flak' was already visible. It was now quite dark and as the severity of the bumps increased at the same time as their frequency increased. I was by this time beginning to feel very anxious to get my feet on dry land even if it was enemy soil. We were due to cast off at 1800 ft about 1500 yds from the shore and land about 2210 hrs but 2210 hrs came and went, 2300 hrs came and went and still we had not cast off. I was sitting in the rear of the glider by the door and so had very little idea of what was happening, truly a fool's paradise. I did see the co-pilot pick up the microphone of the "intercomn" at odd intervals but was unable to hear what he was saying above the noise of the glider. At long last the release lever was pushed home and we were free. I still had no idea of what was happening but the coast seemed a long way off and we hadn't got much height. However we did get on dry land but only just, we landed right on the beaches and finished up in the barbed wire defences. No one was hurt on landing thanks to the skill and coolness of our Glider Pilot. S/Sjt. Andrews. He told me later that we cast off at 2600 ft. about 6 miles out to sea and he just couldn't understand how we had made land at all. He apparently asked Col. Jones whether he should land in the sea or try to make the land although he didn't think he could. Luckily Col. Jones wouldn't hear of a sea landing and as it turned out we made the land by the "skin of our teeth". I should mention here that after release we were picked up by a searchlight as that undoubtedly assisted the Italian marines who later came up to the glider in finding our position. As far as I know we were not fired upon, at any rate no "flak" hit our glider.

On landing everyone took up a position to give all-round defence of the Glider while Col. Jones did a small recce. of the immediate surrounding. On the other side of the barbed wire there was an orchard of small trees and it was decided that we should move away from the glider in the opposite direction from which the Italians were advancing upon us. I gave orders for everyone near me to follow and pushed off. Unfortunately Cap. Hoorigan and 6 O.Rs. stayed where they were and as the Italians were by this time only a matter of yards away they got caught. When I discovered that they were not following I stayed near the glider for some time shouting and calling to them but by this time the Italians were very close and they had little chance of escape. I reported this to Col. Jones who was by now about 100 yds away from the glider with the remaining members of the party. I returned to the glider again still urging them to make a dash for it but apparently they were fairly well held. Sjt. Leaver however did manage to get away at this stage. Another sortie to the glider was made, this time with Lt. Col. Hennicker who shouted louder and longer than myself. He fired one shot with his revolver in the direction of the glider and this gave Pte. Bent a chance to get away. After questioning him as to the number of Italians there it was decided that everyone should approach the glider. Col. Jones should throw a 77 Grenade and order the remaining men to run towards the moon. This seemed to have no immediate results apart from setting the glider on fire, but I afterwards discovered that in the ensuing stampede 3 O.Rs. got away leaving only Capt. Hoorigan and Sjt. Stockin in the hands of the Italians. One No.22 Set and one 68 Set left near the glider were destroyed in the fire.

After waiting some time for anyone who escaped to link up with us the remainder of the Glider load moved off with the intention of reaching the bridge area as soon as possible. After a short time we came upon a single line railway and decided to follow it until we were sure of our bearings. We soon knew that we were going in the right direction when our bombers began to bomb SYRACUSE at about 0200 hrs. Even 10 miles away it looked impressive. After about an hour we came upon another glider which had landed in an orchard and had been pulled up by the stone wall running alongside the railway. From that glider we removed a container of tea and a pair of wire cutters. The latter were soon put to good effect for with their aid we soon had all the telephone lines cut. At about 0230 hrs we contacted a glider load of troops of 1 Border under Lt. Budgen. This chance meeting increased our numbers to about 20 and gave us two Bren L.M.Gs. We were now almost a platoon strong and everyone talked about attack. We soon had our first skirmish but what we thought to be a strong point under a railway arch turned out to be nothing more than an odd rifleman and two civilians. During this little "battle" Lt. Col. Hennicker was badly injured by a No.36 Grenade thrown by Col. Jones. Two of the prisoners captured were detailed to assist Lt. Col. Hennicker, one of them able to talk broken English later proved quite invaluable. He gave us warning of enemy strong points along our line of march. At about 0430 hrs we had reached S.Teresa station about 8 Kms. from Syracuse itself but as we knew the station was very strongly held we decided not to attack. Had we known just how well the Italians were going to fight in subsequent battles our decision may have been completely altered.

It was now obvious that we could not hope to reach the bridge before dawn and so Col. Jones decided to lie-up in a farm for the day and try to move up the next night. After very little trouble we found a suitable "hide-out" some distance from the road and in spite of all the weeping and gnashing of teeth of the civilians managed to get the place more or less organised for defence. It was soon fairly obvious that not far away from us were some pretty hefty guns firing in the direction of the beaches. Col. Jones set out to find them and returned an hour or so later with the news that they were no more than 1000 yds away from us. We were to attack the position and destroy as much equipment as we could. The story of the ensuing battle would take too long to describe in detail but with the aid of much shouting great leadership on the part of Col. Jones and a few No.77 Grenades we soon had the whole battery position and 60 Italian prisoners in our hands. We suffered not one casualty. We put all guns out of action, a battery of 6-9 guns, and generally made the whole position untenable. Attracted by the shooting, just as the battle finished the leading seaborne troops came up to the position and Col. Jones set out to contact their Bn. H.Q. The remainder of us returned to the farm in high spirits and just thirsting for more with the Italian prisoners and wounded. Unfortunately during the battle a British Glider Pilot was badly injured by one of our No.36 Grenades. He had been taken prisoner by the Italians that morning at 0900 hrs trying to make his way to the bridge.

It was now obvious that the seaborne forces were in front of us and so a small party ventured out to contact any of our troops we could find. We did in fact contact 17 Bde. H.Q. on the main road but they had even less news than we of just what was happening in the bridge area. The Signal Officer complained bitterly that he had 6 sets listening out for us but had heard nothing from us. Still thinking the main part of the Brigade had landed in the correct place I was a little concerned at such news. Surely all communications hadn't failed. As it turned out of course the No.22 Sets for working to them were in the drink and so was the Brigadier.

Shortly after this we moved into a house on the main road owned by an American Lady. Here we collected more stragglers our numbers rising to over 50 all ranks. The prisoners were sent off to the cages at CASSIBILE under escort, one man, and we prepared to move off to the bridge. The march to the bridge was uneventful except that on the way we met some of our lads from the bridge and they told us that it had been captured intact. Great was the joy with which such news was received.

Fighting on the high ground to the South of the bridge was still in progress when we arrived but as the Seaborne troops appeared to have it well in hand we were not engaged. At this stage I was told to set up a Bde. H.Q. and assume the duties of Bde. Signal Office. As I had only Pte. Bent of the Section and no W/T sets of any kind with me this sounded rather farcical. I set out to try and contact any other members of the Section I could find and soon met up with Col. Jones and his detachment still in possession of their handcart. Communications back to base was not a bad start anyway. I soon discovered however that both sender and receiver had bullet holes through them and I was back where I started. Col. Jones and I went off to search the bridge area for sets but found none. We did find a couple of chaps there, however, who had been left for dead but were still alive and managed to get them looked after. My next find was L/Cpl. Davidson and Sigmn. Reilly J. one of the 68 Set detachment with the S.Staffords but they had landed in the drink and of course had no set. With great initiative I set up R.L.S. that means runner instead of D.R. and continued my search but all to no avail.

The battle as far as we were concerned was now virtually over and after a night without incident we moved into SYRACUSE the following morning. After lazing around for a couple of days we were brought back to N.Africa by the Navy in Landing Craft and landed at SOUSSE about 2100 hrs on Wednesday evening. During those two days other members of the Section rolled in and we came back 17 strong. Since then 11 more have rolled in and the time of writing only 4 members of the Section are missing.

This is by no means a full story, many incidents have been left out but time and space will not allow more.

I end as I began, Communications throughout the Brigade were non-existent, every man of the Section fought as an infantry man.

The main lesson to be learnt, - In Airborne Operations every man must first be a soldier, secondly a tradesman.

1. Adv. Airborne Div. party consisted of a total of 5 officers and 16 O.Rs. joined later by G.O.C. 1 Airborne Division, who arrived in Sicily by glider with 1 Airlanding Bde. The party assembled in Egypt, 4 drivers and 2 D.Rs. at ALEXANDRIA where their vehicles were embarked, the remainder spent a week in CAIRO before embarking at SUEZ on L.S.I. DILWARA. The Airborne Advisor and one Signal Serjeant travelled on H.M.S. BULOLO, the 13 Corps H.Q. ship.

2. The Signal personnel consisted of Maj Wotton 2nd i/c Div. Signals, 2 cipher serjeants, 4 operator N.C.Os. 4 operators who could drive, 2 despatch riders and 1 instrument mechanic. One operating serjeant was with 13 Corps H.Q.

3. Having been confined to the ship for four days in Port Said, only being allowed off for a short march and bathe, the convoy finally sailed from PORT SAID, a total of 18 large L.S.Is. on 5 July 43. The voyage took until 10 Jul 43, on which day the assault was launched. During the voyage, the party was fully briefed on the operational plan, signal plan, action on shore and general information. Throughout the voyage, there was no indication whatsoever that the enemy knew of the move, no enemy forces, sea or air, appearing.

4. On evening, 9 Jul 43, at about 2000 hrs. Mt. Etna appeared over the horizon. The convoy, which had now grown to several hundred ships, sailed within sight of Italian soil without the enemy appearing aware of its arrival.

5. During night 9/10 Jul 43. 1 Airlanding Bde. were to land in an area just South of SYRACUSE. On landing they were to open wireless communications to:-

A watch was kept by Adv. Div. party on L.S.I. DILWARA using a ship's R.1100. on all three frequencies, but nothing was heard except 13 Corps calling 1 Air Landing Bde., and Base calling the Bde.

6. While ships were closing the shore at about 0800 hrs. a number of gliders were seen in the water, and men of 1 Air Landing Bde. were being picked up by L.C.As. and L.C.Ps. The ships closed to within ¾ mile of the shore, and disembarkation continued more rapidly. At 0930 hrs the Adv. Div. party proceeded to the correct beach in an L.C.I. complete with 5 trolleys and 5 panniers containing 2 No.22 sets, 2 No.76 sets and 2 300 watt charging sets. Each pannier weighed about 320-lbs and contained a set in a water-proof bag. The L.C.I. grounded about 30 yds. from the shore on a false beach, with water depth inside of about 3½ ft. Fortunately, a rubber aircraft dinghy was found on shore which was used to float the panniers on to the beach; without it, it is improbable that the panniers could have been got ashore without complete submersion, which would probably have swamped the waterproof bags. The beach consisted of a very soft sand through which it took 3 men to drag the trolleys with panniers. After an exceedingly heavy drag, the loads, in relays, were moved to the vehicle assembly park, about 1 mile from the beach. While on the beach the party was joined by two members of 1 Air Landing Bde. Signal Section who had landed by glider some distance from the objective. They remained with the party. Meanwhile, one No.22 Set was sent off in the only available car 5 cwt to set up near 5 Div. which was then 4 miles inland. It was hoped to work 13 Corps on the Corps 'B' Wave and through them obtain contact with 1 Air Landing Bde.

7. At the same time one No.76A Set was set up in the vehicle park to contact Base. This set opened up at about 1400 hrs. but nothing was heard.

8. During the afternoon 10 July 43. the equipment was ferried forward from the vehicle park to the location of Adv. Div. H.Q. at Map ref 085225 a short distance from CASSIBILE.

9. By night, two other cars 5 cwt had been landed, but both were badly water-logged and could not be started. They were towed to Adv. Div. H.Q. to get them off the beaches before the morning bombing started.

10. At the new location, communication was established with Base at about 2300 hrs. H.Q. 13 Corps had been contacted at about 2030 hrs. although there had been no difficulty in working 5 and 50 Div. for several hours beforehand.

11. This evening, physical contact was made with H.Q. 1 Air Landing Bde. and it was found that no sets had survived the trial by water, except one No.76A, which was badly damaged by small arms fire.

12. On the morning of 11 July a new H.Q. was set up just north of SYRACUSE at Map Ref.138321. Again by various means, including horse and cart, and jeeps towing dead jeeps towing trolleys, the H.Q. was moved complete to the new H.Q. By 1500 hrs the H.Q. was established and communication to 13 Corps and Base was satisfactory.

13. During 12 July H.Q. remained in the same location and communication was normal. Two further cars 5 cwt arrived in working condition, making a total of 3 working and 2 still out of commission. The sixth car 5 cwt had been borrowed by 13 Corps and was not returned until 16 July, and of the 3 available vehicles one was used by the Div. Comd. and one by the A.D.M.S. Only one working vehicle was therefore available for G. and Signals, although the original plan allowed one for the Div. Comd, one for G and four for Signals. On this day SNOWBOOTS. the 2 Para. Bde. operation was postponed 24 hrs.

14. On 13 July at 1530 hrs. 'MARSTON tonight' was sent back to Airborne Base in clear, ordering 1 Para. Bde. operation against road bridge over R.SIMETO. At same time, SNOWBOOTS was cancelled, as the rapid progress of ground troops now made it unnecessary. At approx. 1800 hrs. Adv. Div. H.Q. began moving back to area 123266 adjacent to Tac. H.Q. 13 Corps. Again waterlogged vehicles had to be towed by working ones. First pair of sets, a No.76A to Base and a No.22 to Main 13 Corps opened up and took over from other sets at 1900 hrs. At about 2015 hrs 13 July the Signal Officer with one car 5 cwt containing one No.22 set and the C.R.E. with a motor cycle combination with a No.68 Set went northward to join 50 Div. in area south of CARLETINI. The 68 Set was intended to work on the R.E. Report Wave to 1 Para Sqn. R.E., the former being used as a relay between 1 Para. Bde. and Adv. Div., the overall distance being approx 35 miles over very hilly country. Due to the small number of sets available it was not possible to provide any spare sets, or additional sets for working other groups.

15. The No.22 Set group was intended to be a 2 - 1 group with Adv. Div. as control, and the forward party and 1 Para. Bde. as out-stations, all on Div. 'A' Wave. The No.22 Set continued to work back to Adv. Div. and to endeavour to contact 1 Para. Bde. on all frequencies it was thought possible the Bdes. might use. No results were obtained. Physical contact was made with elements of 1 Para. Bde. on morning 15 July and it was discovered that only one No.22 Set had been recovered intact and with this, 1 Para. Bde. had contacted 3 C.L.Y., the advancing Armoured Bde, and had passed the vital message 'MARSTON ONE'. Later the batteries had run down.

16. On afternoon 16 July Forward Party's receiver broke down. An important message was got back by constant repetition, but it was not possible to know if this had been received. Communication failed after that, and both sets closed down.

17. While Adv. Div. was situated near Tac. H.Q. 13 Corps, considerable interference was experienced, especially from some R/T set, probably SCR.299's. In order to improve forward communication, the No.22 Set was moved about one mile from 13 Corps, where conditions were better, but the set was recalled by G staff, who wanted to use the vehicle. When Tac 8 Army arrived, working became practically impossible, the interference completely swamping the incoming signals.

18. The party left SICILY on 17 July by aircraft and ship, less one No.76A detachment left to provide a wireless link to Airborne Base for the Airborne representative left with 8 Army.

1. The Plan for the invasion of SICILY included three separate airborne plans each employing a Bde. Gp. All three operations were very similar covering the capture of an important bridge, and the subsequent attack on a set port town N.E. of the bridge. The three operations were successively against the areas of SYRACUSE, AUGUSTA and CATANIA.

2. The first operation was scheduled for night D-1/D by 1 Air Landing Bde. in gliders. The second operation was to be at the call of Comd. 13 Corps for night D/D+1 by 2 Para. Bde., and the third for night D+3/D+4 by 1 Para Bde.

3. A wireless watch was kept by 1 Air Landing Bde. from 2200 hrs 9 Jul. but no communication was ever obtained, as it afterwards turned out that one 5G. set landed in the sea and the other had been badly damaged by small arms fire.

4. Wireless silence for the seaborne forces was not broken until 0245 hrs on 10 Jul (H hour) and from that time a continuous watch was kept for Eighth Army and 13 Corps. Two-way communication with Eighth Army was not established until 1646 hrs 10 Jul and communication with 13 Corps was only established at 0910 hrs 11 Jul. Communication to Eighth Army was satisfactory but 13 Corps could not be worked on 14 and 15 Jul. Considerable difficulty was experienced in passing traffic because high priority messages were continually passing between Army and Corps. The main preoccupation during 10 Jul was the question as to whether 2 Para. Bde. would be required to operate according to plan on night 10/11 Jul. and if so, whether the necessary executive order from 13 Corps would be received in time to put it into effect. 13 Corps Comd had been asked to send the necessary message before 1715 hrs a timing based on the assumption that half an hour would be required for the message to reach Airborne Base and an hour for its retransmission to airfields.

5. Early on the afternoon of 10 Jul. Eighth Army was informed that if no executive order reached Airborne Base by 1800 hrs the operation would be automatically cancelled for that night, and this was, in fact, done, though the Base Controller waited until 1830 hrs before making his decision. The official order of postponement was received from Eighth Army (not 13 Corps) at 1945 hrs having been originated at 1730 hrs. Delay was probably due to the enciphering of the message which was unnecessary, as a code word had been agreed.

6. At 2230 hrs 10 Jul contact was established with Div. Tac. H.Q. and this was maintained without interruption as long as it was required.

7. 2 Para. Bde. were all prepared for the operation on the night 11/12 Jul. but the code word for final cancellation was received at 1707 hrs 11 Jul and 2 Para. Bde. accordingly stood down. As the events of the previous day had led to some distrust of the reliability of communications the G.S.O.1 with a Staff Officer of 51 Troop Carrier Wing flew to MALTA on the morning of 11 Jul. with a view to ascertaining the probability of the 2 Para. Bde. operation taking place that night. From this point of view the visit proved abortive, as Eighth Army had only very scanty information. It was, however, discovered that the prearranged route for the troop carrier aircraft, passing just south of SYRACUSE, passed through A.A. defence danger area, and rerouting had to be arranged.

8. With the cancellation of 2 Para. Bde. operation, 1 Para. Bde. were prepared for their operation on the night 12/13 Jul. but at 1745 hrs on 12 Jul. a message was received from 13 Corps saying that the operation was to be postponed 24 hrs. During 13 Jul. two messages were received from Adv. H.Q. saying that 1 Para. Bde. operation would probably be required, and this was confirmed officially in a message from Tac. H.Q. at 1540 hrs. 1 Para. Bde. were accordingly despatched and a continuous wireless watch was maintained. At 0010 hrs 14 Jul. the Bde. Base link was heard tuning in, but at 0045 hrs it went off the air and was never heard again.

9. Information was received at 1115 hrs that the 1 Para. Bde. objective had been captured, and that supply by air might be required the next night (14/15 Jul). Arrangements were made for supplies to be despatched if required, and an offer was also made to fly in reinforcements, but at 1615 hrs a message was received from Tac. H.Q. saying that neither were now required.

10. On the morning of 15 Jul. 1 Para. Bde. were relieved, and at 1900 hrs on 16 Jul. the Divisional Commander returned to Airborne Base with the information that further Airborne operations in connection with the SICILIAN operations would not be required. The Base Control organisation was therefore closed down.

11. Throughout the operations an alternative means of communication with Eighth Army was offered by the direct wireless and teleprinter link with 15 Army Group. The wireless worked well throughout, but the teleprinter was very uncertain, owing to the frequent development of faults in the circuit.

12. On each day that an operation was expected the Bde. concerned dispersed to the six allotted airfields to await confirmation or cancellation. The base line system provided communication to these troops via the airfield controls.

13. On the night of 10/11 July, when the 2 Para. Bde. operation was cancelled, the cancellation was passed to all airfields within 15 minutes. Similarly, on 12 July, when 1 Para. Bde. operation was postponed the information was rapidly passed to Airfield Controls.

14. On several occasions multiple calls were used to all airfield controls. By this means it was possible to change the actual operational routing of aircraft within 10 minutes.

15. On the night 9/10 Jul. after the 1 Air Landing Bde. operation, it was necessary to determine the number of tug aircraft which had returned, as these were to be used as parachute aircraft the following night. Although the last aircraft did not land until about 0400 hrs 10 Jul. full details of serviceable aircraft were known at Base Operations Headquarters by 0530 hrs.

16. Between D-2 and D+4 the combined British American Message Centre handled 1196 messages, many of which were over 100 groups. 30 messages a day had to be enciphered or deciphered.

(b) Planning requires a long time initially, and must include a strict drill to allow airborne operations to be laid on at short notice subsequently.

(c) The drill must include the passing of certain essential information about signals before a particular airborne operation both to and from the Airborne Division.

(d) Planning must not be so rigid as to prevent last minute changes when it is too late to inform all concerned. For example an Airborne Formation might be forced to call on a wireless net other than that originally arranged.

(e) A possible system for planning has been submitted to 15 Army Gp. for consideration.

(a) The number of wireless sets carried must be a minimum to save aircraft space.

(b) The minimum number of sets to give a reasonable assurance that a particular wireless net will work should be two dropped or landed at each terminal. These must never be carried in the same aircraft or glider.

(c) It follows from (a) and (b) that the number of wireless nets must be reduced to a minimum, but for those nets which are essential 100% spare sets must be carried.

(d) The number of sets requiring charging engines and accumulators must be reduced to a minimum. For this reason No.68P sets must be used when possible within both Parachute and Air Landing Bdes.

(e) All frequencies for use between Airborne Formations and ground troops should, as a rule, be within the No.68P set band (1.7 - 3 M.Cs.)

(f) Owing to the limited frequency band of the No.68 Set a few No.22 Sets must be retained pending the introduction of the new MURPHY set for Airborne Formations.

(g) The No.76 set is an excellent base rear link set (C.W. only) but it is too heavy and bulky for Parachute Bdes. Some form of suitcase set must be introduced to replace it. The most suitable set so far tried is the I.S.R.E. B Mk.I set, which is known to be suitable up to 300 miles at least.

(h) The No.33 Set is an excellent base set for distances up to 700 miles working to the No.76 set.

(a) ONE TIME TABLES are bulky and provide security which may be unnecessary in some cases. Their use should be limited to the Airborne Base Wave and then not necessarily for all messages. The code book cipher does not correspond in number of figures per word (4) to the number of figures per group in the reciphering table. (3). This makes deciphering unnecessarily slow.

(b) DOUBLE TRANSPOSITION. This should be used for working to ground troops as it is standard in this theatre. Airborne D.T. keys should be issued by the Corps or Army concerned to formations engaged in any operation which includes airborne formations.

(c) AIRBORNE SYLLABIC. Compared with D.T. this is quicker and more secure between Airborne Bdes. or from Airborne Bdes. to Adv. Airborne Div. D.T. should remain an alternate method.

(d) RESERVE KEYS. Although these are probably essential for ground troops in case of compromise it is doubtful whether reserve keys should be carried by air with Airborne troops.

(e) SECURITY. Staff officers must understand that O.T.T. gives very high security, D.T. about 72 hrs at the beginning of an operation deteriorating daily according to the amount of traffic, and SYLLABIC 72 hrs at the beginning of each day deteriorating throughout the 24 hrs. As a guide D.T. and SYLLABIC should be assumed to give 48 hrs and codes 12 hrs maximum.

(a) CODEX. Only the Airborne vocabulary and code strip should be taken by air. These must be distributed to all ground troops who may have to work with airborne troops by the Corps or Div. concerned. The Airborne Div. must distribute Key words. Reserve code strips should not be carried by air.

(b) MAP REFERENCE. Some of the fixed reference points only should be selected for use by the Airborne Div. to prevent compromise of the whole list.

(c) CODE SIGNS. A supply of master sheets must be held at Airborne Base for distribution to Corps and Divs. as required. Within Airborne Div. minimum extracts only must be issued.

(d) CODE WORDS. Code Words must be used with caution, especially on long range base links. "MARSTON TONIGHT" was sent back to Airborne Base in clear on D+3 at 1530 hrs. It is reasonable to assume the enemy had by then identified the Airborne base wave, with the result that the message probably gave warning of an event connected with airborne troops, even if the meaning of MARSTON was not known.

6. CONTAINERS. During Operation MARSTON a number of wireless sets were lost because containers could not be found. It is essential to develop methods of dropping equipment on the man, and where containers must be used, to improve the lighting system, and, if necessary, the method of dropping the containers.

(a) Ground troops must be prepared for the possible opening of airborne wireless sets on any net, in the event of failure on the pre-arranged links.

(b) Frequency lists and complex diagrams must not be carried by air. Each airborne wireless crew must carry the minimum of information.

(c) When ground troops are ordered to keep listening watch for airborne troops they must not be allowed to close before it is certain that communication will not be established. On operation MARSTON 1 Para. Bde. was unable to call on the Airborne lateral until 0900 - 0930 hrs on D+4. The leading Bde. of 50 Div. having listened during the night, closed down their set at about 0800 hrs, which was in fact before 1 Para. Bde. had called.

8. ADV. AIRBORNE DIV. HEADQUARTERS. The scale of communication allowed for did not provide a sufficient reserve in signal personnel, equipment and vehicles. After it became necessary to send the Signal Officer to contact 50 Div. with a wireless set, no spare sets remained and there was no Signal Officer to leave at Adv. Div. H.Q. When the party was ordered to return to base it was decided to leave a wireless det. behind. In the absence of any Signal Officer the staff were not advised to retain cipher personnel and there was some confusion over equipment to be taken or left behind. In future if communications have to be provided with such a reduced detachment better provision must be made for set maintenance by the inclusion of more workshops tradsemen.

9. AIRBORNE BASE. The War Establishment of Airborne Divisional Signals provided for two skeleton signal offices to be superimposed on existing airfield systems of communications. In fact during HUSKY two full scale signal offices had to be worked, and some line maintenance had to be carried out although no establishment existed for it. It is certain that Airborne Divisions cannot build the base line system, but it is considered that Div. Signals should have four line maintenance trucks, each with four linesmen, to build and maintain the many short local lines in the Div. and Bde. areas. It is also considered that the establishment of Signals at base should allow for one full scale Signal Office and extra personnel to keep the Div. Area exchange working. In this case the Staff must be prepared to accept one and not two Signal Offices. Such a reorganization of base signals would not entail much increase in personnel, but the provision of two offices would demand a large increase. During HUSKY it was necessary to make use of the Adv Div. Headquarters Sec. most of which was not taking part in the operation, to provide sufficient base personnel. It is also considered that the Divisional Signals should be organized in Headquarter Coy. and three, instead of two companies. The third Major already allowed for base, would command the base company. This would free O.C. 1 Coy. to train the Airborne part of the old 1 Coy. The system has already been tried and is a great improvement.

(a) Through circumstances beyond the control of 1 Airborne Divisional Signals communications were not satisfactory within 1 Air Landing Bde. and 1 Para. Bde. In the one case it may be attributed to gliders landing in the sea, and in the other to the loss of containers.

(b) The system for sending back confirmations and cancellations to Airborne Base was unsatisfactory at first. Eventually a drill was worked out to ensure that the necessary message was passed back by a fixed time each day on the highest priority.

(c) Communications from Airborne Base to Adv. Airborne Div. and 15 Army Gp. worked well. There was also no difficulty in working to Eighth Army, but in this case 13 Corps was on the same net and some difficulty was experienced owing to the volume of traffic passing between Army and Corps. On 14 and 15 July 13 Corps could not be worked direct from Airborne Base.

In the light of recent experience it is suggested that an instruction be circulated to all C.S.Os. explaining requirements for airborne operations. This matter is of some urgency and it is hoped to be able to arrange airborne operations at short notice in certain cases. In order to make this possible, a standard drill for Signals is essential. The instruction might include the following:-

1. All airborne communications, including rear link wireless sets are provided by the Airborne Division concerned, except in certain cases when F.O.Os. are attached. In these cases, special Signal instructions are essential for the F.O.Os.

(b) The standard rear link and lateral channels to be used by the Airborne Division.

(a) Airborne Lateral Wave to leading ground troops. This should be within the No.68 Set frequency band of 1.7 - 3 M.Cs.

(b) Airborne Base Waves the frequencies being selected according to distances involved from within the frequency band 2 - 12 M.Cs.

4. The method of sending back confirmations or cancellations of airborne operations must be the subject of special orders. Normally such messages must be passed on the highest priority during the afternoon of the particular day.

5. When it is known under which Corps the airborne operation will take place, the C.S.O. corps will decide the Corps of Div. Waves on which the Airborne formations are to work. It must also be clearly stated at what time ground sets on the Airborne Lateral Wave will open and close. Plenty of time must be allowed in case there is delay in the airborne operation.

6. Lateral cipher must be of the simplest possible, compatible with 12 hrs security. (A double transposition cipher, on a Corps basis to prevent compromise influencing other fronts appears most satisfactory. D.T. keys are issued by Army Gp to all concerned).

7. CODEX with a special Airborne vocabulary only, will be taken into action by airborne troops. All co-operating ground troops must be in possession of Airborne vocabularies, code strips and key word lists.

8. One Time Tables are normally used on base waves by Airborne formations, but to avoid cipher delays, code words are passed in clear whenever possible.

9. The following summaries show information required by the Airborne Division and ground troops concerned.

Frequencies for use by airborne forces. These should remain fixed throughout an operation, whatever formation Airborne Forces are supporting.

Frequencies in use by all formations of ground troops. (Information to be held at Airborne Base.)

Common lateral frequency for use Airborne Formations to Ground Forces. (To remain fixed throughout.)

Code Signs in use by all formations of ground troops. (Information to be held at Airborne Base.)

Earliest time at which sets on watch for airborne troops may close down if nothing heard.

10. When an airborne operation is long planned, an Airborne Div. Signal officer will visit all H.Qs. concerned, to work out details of the signal plan. If there is a large operation during which airborne troops are at call to drop wherever required, an Airborne Div. Signal officer will remain with the C.S.O. Corps on whose front the operation will occur, keeping Airborne Base fully informed as to the progress of the battle, especially concerning the communications situation. Immediately on the ordering of an operation, this Signals Officer will fix final details and return to Base to organise the lateral communication system. If it is not possible to have a Signals officer with the C.S.Os. Staff, or if the operation is ordered on an unexpected front, then that formation must pass back, by the quickest possible means, to Airborne Base, all the information given in para 9(b) above and information covering doubtful points in para 9(a). Information required in para 9(c) will be passed forward by Airborne Base to the Corps concerned by the quickest possible means with copies to C.S.O. Army and Army Group.

11. A list of wireless sets used by Airborne Divisions is attached at Appendix 'A'.

1. As the Airborne Pigeon Section had not arrived in time from England two mobile lofts from First Army were established at SOUSSE by arrangement of S.O.-in-C. A.F.H.Q.

2. When 1 Airborne Div. arrived in the SOUSSE area it was found that the birds had not been sea tossed and were therefore not trained to fly across the sea.

3. Accordingly Major Hutton, First Army Pigeon Officer, was asked to obtain birds from MALTA.

4. 18 birds were brought from MALTA by air and six were used by 1 Air Landing Bde. on the operation. Unfortunately the gliders landed in the sea and all the birds were drowned.

5. Meanwhile the remaining twelve were given to 2 Para. Bde. As their operation was cancelled, these birds were revived in SOUSSE and then taken by 1 Para. Bde. on operation MARSTON.

6. The pigeons were dropped in two 6 bird multi-containers, with separate parachutes, a method which makes the finding of the containers very difficult owing to drift and the absence of container lights. The more usual method of dropping single bird containers on the man was not adopted because the Bde. Signal Officer did not consider there was time to train for that method. One multi-container was never found, and the birds from the other were liberated, for some reason without messages. Whether or not any reached MALTA is not known.

7. (a) For Airborne Operations well established pigeons from fixed lofts within reasonable range of the operations are essential.

(d) Early information must be given to allow the establishment of the pigeon loft in any new Airborne Base Area. Otherwise pigeons from other, and well established lofts, must be used.

(e) The possibility of carrying two pigeons in each glider should be considered.