Headquarters, 1st Airborne Division

Abbreviations

119256

6-pdr

A/C

Adm

ADMS
ADOS

Adv

AFHQ

ALO

Amb

A/Tk

Bde

BOD

Bty

Comd

Coy

CRA

DADMS

DAQMG

Def

Div

GOC

GSO1

HQRE

i/c

Indep

Instr

LAD

LSI

Offr

Oyster

RAOC

RASC

Regt

REME

Rep

Sig

Sitrep

S/L

Sqn

Tac

TBF
TC

Trg

USAAC

Map Reference

6-pounder (Anti-Tank Gun)

Anti-Aircraft

Aircraft

Administrative
Assistant Director Medical Services

Assistant Director Ordnance Services

Advance

Airborne Forces Headquarters

Air Liaison Officer

Ambulance

Anti-Tank

Brigade

Battalion

Base Ordnance Depot

Battery

Commanding Officer

Commander

Company

Commander Royal Artillery

Deputy Assistant Director Medical Services

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General
Defence

Division / Divisional

Despatch Rider

Field

General Officer Commanding

Group

General Staff Officer 1

Headquarters Royal Engineers

Intelligence

In-Command

Independent

Instruction

Intelligence Officer

Landing Area

Light Aid Detachment

Landing Ship Infantry

Light

Motorcycle

Officer Commanding

Officer

Operation Order

2nd Parachute Brigade Exercise, 16th June

Park

Platoon

Royal Artillery

Royal Army Ordnance Corps

Royal Army Service Corps

Royal Engineers

Regiment

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Representative

Signals

Situation Report

Searchlight

Squadron

Tactical

Tactical Bomber Force

Troop Carrier

Training

United States Army Air Corps

War Establishment

Exercise Cactus IV. (Rehearsal for Operation). 1 Parachute Bde (Bde H.Q., 3 Bns, Para Fd Amb, and Para Sqn R.E.). Dropping was not as accurate as in the case of 'Oyster'. Amendment Lists Nos 1 and 2 to Operations Orders - HUSKY of 17 June issued.

Air Landing Bde Exercise 'EVE'. (Partial rehearsal). Approximately 90 gliders landed on Thiersville airfield by day and 12 in open country by night under closest possible approximation to operational conditions. Amended plan issued. Supplementary Note for Commander 13 Corps on employment of 1 Airborne Div. 1 Airborne Div Bigot Adm Instr No.1 issued.

Letter received from Lt. General Dempsey addressed to G.O.C. asking for neutralisation of battery 119256 during Air Landing Bde operation, in order to assist seaborne operation.

Meeting is held at Div H.Q. to discuss points arising out of the recent rehearsals for operation 'HUSKY'. 1 Airborne Div Operation Instruction No.1 issued.

Adv Div H.Q. moves from Cairo to El Shatt Camp, Suez. Lt.-Col. Goften-Salmond embarked on BULOLO with H.Q. 13 Corps.

Div H.Q. closes at Mascara and opens at new location (KAIROUAN area). G.O.C. arrives at new location. 2 Parachute Bde concentrates in KAIROUAN area. Trace issued showing unit locations in Div Area.

Visit from Major-General Browning and Lt.-Col. Walch. Adv Div H.Q. embarked at SUEZ on L.S.I. 'Dilwara'.

1 Parachute Bde concentrates in KAIROUAN AREA. Adv Div H.Q. left SUEZ for PORT SAID on L.S.I. 'Dilwara'.

Co-ordinating conference for 1 Air Landing Bde Operation. Visit by Major-General Browning, Major-General Swing (U.S. Airborne Forces), Lt.-Col. Walch, Lt.-Col. Grant (U.S.) and Major Bradish.

Co-ordinating conference on 2 Parachute Bde Operation held at H.Q. 51 Wing. Adv Div H.Q. established with H.Q. 51 T.C. Wing forming BASE OPERATIONS. Lt.-Cols. Goldsmith and Campbell visit 205 Bomber Group with reference to Bomber and Dummy support. Group's Wellingtons could not drop dummies and Group had heard nothing of their bombing role.

Co-ordinating conference on 1 Parachute Bde Operation held at BASE OPERATIONS. Adv Div H.Q. (in L.S.I. 'Dilwara' left Port Said in convoy, for Sicily.

Conference for Brigadiers and C.Os. of all units held by G.O.C. at Adv Div H.Q. Issue of all briefing material completed. Conference held at BASE OPERATIONS for Chief Airfield Control officers and A.L.Os. at which they were briefed to their tasks for all three operations. Lt.-Col. Goldsmith visits Tactical Bomber Force to arrange dummy dropping. (Trace of Dummy Dropping attached).

1 Air Landing Bde commences briefing. (Specimen enlargement of objectives attached). Air Commodore Sinclair and Commanders of his Wings visit F Strip and carry out dummy dropping trials. Instruction issued for Transport to Airfields.

Movement Table No.2 - 2 Para Bde issued. 2 Parachute Bde commences briefing. (Specimen enlargement of objectives attached). I.Os. of 4 Parachute Bde go round briefing huts. Lt. Green H.Q.R.E. attached T.B.F. for dummy dropping. Conference at Div H.Q. with Bde Reps and 205 Bomber Gp reps to agree on bombing plan. 205 Bomber Group still not informed of plan officially. General Montgomery accompanied by General Browning visits Division.

Lt.-Col. Goldsmith visits 205 Bomber Group and confirms final details of Air Landing Bde Support. 205 Bomber Group still not officially informed of their tasks. Message from the Divisional Commander issued to troops. Personal message from the Army Commander read to troops.

1920 to 1950 - 123 aircraft and 115 Wacos and 8 Horsas took off from strips A, B, C, D, E, F (trace attached).

1430 - Adv Div H.Q. established at 085222 (2 miles N. of CASSIBILE alongside 5 Div.) D.A.Q.M.G. is wounded on the beach and evacuated. G.O.C. and A.D.M.S. join Adv Div H.Q. both having spent the night in the sea.

1700 - G.O.C. intimates that SNOWBOOTS (2 Para Bde Operation) would be postponed 24 hours.

1930 - Informed by 5 Div that 17 Bde entering Syracuse; no news of Air Landing bde.

1900 - Air Landing Bde reported to have achieved 2nd objective (from 141 via 51 Wing). 1 Airborne News Summary No.1 issued to List 'C'.

0900 - Brigadier Down, Lt.-Col. Goldsmith and Col. Gardner (51 Wing) take off for Malta to tie up information and get position.

0230 - Report received from War Correspondent MacDonald on activities of Air Landing Bde.

1615 - Adv Div H.Q. reports MARSTON (1 Parachute Bde Operation) delayed 24 hours. 1 Airborne Div News Summary No.2 issued.

1900 - Adv Div H.Q. moved to a position alongside Tac H.Q., 13 Corps South of SYRACUSE and joined up with G.O.C. and G.S.O.1. Maj Wotton moved to a position south of LENTINI to establish W/T contact between 1 Para Bde and Adv Div H.Q. 1 Air Landing Bde were evacuated from SYRACUSE in the afternoon.

2020 - 1 Para Bde landed on FOC DEL SIMETO. No contact was established with 1 Para Bde during the night.

0645 - 1 Airborne Div Sitrep No.5 issued. 1 Airborne Div News Summary No.3 issued.

2059 - 1 Parachute Bde took off from airfield A, B, C, D, E, F in C.47 aircraft, Albemarles, and Halifax, with Gliders carrying 6-pdr being towed. During this operation Lt.-Col. C.H.P. Crawfurd, C.R.A. was killed.

1500 - Arrangements made with Base by G.O.C. to drop supplies from 6 aircraft on MARSTON if necessary.

1700 - W/T link with A.D.M.S., C.R.E. and Sig Offr, moving on road from SOLARINO - LENTINI.

1745 - Lt.-Col. Wright arrived from Malta and left at 1815 with Major Urquhart. He came with a general forecast of possible future operations. 1 Airborne Div News Summary No.4 issued.

1 Para Bde withdrawn to SYRACUSA and evacuated from there. G.O.C., G.S.O.2 and I.O. with a party of signallers left SICILY from PACHINO at 1700 hrs, for Div H.Q. Lt.-Col. Goften-Salmond left SICILY as Liaison offr to Army Commander.

Advance Base Area and Control closes in present area and returns to rear Div. Normal Div H.Q. opens in Divisional Area west of M'SAKEN. Air photographs received of glider landings during operation 'HUSKY'.

Maj. Dixon to H.Q. 8th Army as link with Div. 1 Airborne Div Sitrep No.10 issued.

('I' Battle Diary is attached as Appendix). Report by Major H.P. Maguire, G.S.O.2 (I) issued on the working on the Divisional Intelligence Section as a result of the planning and execution of Operation 'HUSKY'.

Conference on standardisation of equipment for dropping weapons, etc. on the man. 1 Airborne Div Sitrep No.11 issued.

G.O.C. goes to Algiers, and sees 1 and 4 Divs Planning Staffs (5 Corps). 1 Airborne Div Sitrep No.12 issued.

G.O.C. goes to Tripoli to see G.O.C. 10 Corps. First Div Para Course begins. 75 Students. 1 Airborne Div Sitrep No.13 issued.

1. The Airborne Division was first warned on February 11th 1943 that it might shortly be sent overseas with a view to taking part in operations in June or July.

2. The various problems that immediately confronted the Division as a result of this decision have been fully amplified in correspondence which passed between Airborne Division and the War Office during the months of February and March under reference MS/1058/G, and it is not proposed to go into details in this report. The most important matters requiring adjustment were:-

(a) War Establishments. The passing of all War Establishments and Gs.1098 for units of the Division without delay. Without this the Division could not mobilise. As a result of a years experience it had been found necessary to revise the War Establishment for almost every unit in the Division.

(b) Airborne Forces H.Q. The creation of an Airborne Force H.Q., to free the Divisional Staff of the work that would normally be carried out by such a Staff, and which in its absence fell necessarily on the Divisional Staff, to the detriment of its proper function. On arrival in North Africa Major General Browning pressed AFHQ to authorise an establishment of 1 G.S.O.1, 2 G.S.O.2s, 3 A.L.Os. within the Divisional H.Q. establishment for planning and liaison. This was agreed as a result of personal representation by General Eisenhower to the War Office, with the variation that the G.S.O.1 and one of the G.S.O.2's was borne on Force 141 establishment.

(c) Personnel. The provision of the necessary personnel to bring units to War Establishment. The situation was particularly bad in the case of 2 Para Bde, which had not only to find drafts for 1 Para Bde from its own resources, but had its own reinforcements prejudiced by the drain on the reinforcements pool imposed by the requirements of 1 Para Bde. All non parachuting Units were made up to W.E. before they sailed but owing to shortage of time they were not able to weed them out during the 21 days probationary period. This resulted in some men being in the Division who were not up to the required standard. This particularly applied to the Lt. Regt. and R.A.S.C. Units. When the 2nd Para Bde sailed in Mid-April it was 140 men down on W.E. less 1st reinforcements. At that time the exact number of reinforcements needed to complete 1 Para Bde was not known. In order to fill up both Bdes to W.E. exceptional measures were taken including cutting down the time of the HARDWICK and RINGWAY courses and the presentation of Parachute Wings after only 5 qualifying jumps. As a result a draft of 650 para reinforcements sailed Mid-May in the same convoy and 2nd part of the Division. Further delay was caused by the fact that these reinforcements were landed at ALGIERS instead of ORAN. By the end of May both Para Bdes were approx W.E. less 1st Reinforcements. 21 Indep Para Coy sailed from U.K. approx 60 short. This was fully realised but it was considered that the standard should not be lowered and that efforts would have to be made in this theatre. The Officer situation was never as straightened as the O.R. position. 2 Para Bde sailed with full W.E. of Officers and draft of 40 parachutist Officers accompanied the second party of the Division. This enabled both Bdes to be brought to W.E. and 1st reinforcements as well as creating a small reinforcement pool. The position of other units throughout the Division was satisfactory.

(d) Training of Glider Pilots. Owing to the lack of facilities for post G.T.U. training and exercising of Glider Pilots, it was difficult to see in what way sufficient pilots could be trained to operational standard in time. It was, therefore, decided that approx 50 crews would receive a concentrated programme of flying with squadrons of 38 Wing during March and April, while approx 60 crews, who had carried out little flying in recent months, should proceed to North Africa in the first convoy and receive concentrated training in North Africa with U.S.A.A.C. aircraft; being joined later by the trained crews from England. On arrival in North Africa it was discovered that the WACO gliders which were supposed to be there, had not in fact arrived and it was not until about three weeks later that sufficient gliders were available to permit training to commence, and those that were available were to a large extent uncrated and assembled by the Glider Pilots themselves. This delay in training resulted in the loss of valuable moon period for night landings and a consequent last minute rush in the operational training of the crews, as the first stage of their training naturally had to be conversion to the WACO glider. In early May a cable was sent to England requesting that those pilots undergoing training there should concentrate on night landings in moonlight without aids, on both WACO and HORSA gliders. This was necessary because it was apparent that there would not be time to train these pilots in North Africa before the operation. It was apparently not possible to carry out either of these vital items of training in England, and the pilots arrived in the middle of June without any night landing or WACO experience. As a result the pilots could not be used as first pilots as intended.

(e) Training of Troop Carrier Sqns, U.S.A.A.C. 51 Troop Carrier Wing, consisting of 60, 62 and 64 T.C. Groups, had been in North Africa since the opening of the North African campaign, during which each Group had dropped British parachute tps about once and some groups had occasionally dropped American parachute tps. This was the sole training they had had in dropping parachute troops. Not a single Group had ever done any glider towing. For Operation 'HUSKY' it was decided to form North African Troop Carrier Command to consist of 51 and 52 Troop Carrier Wings. 52 Troop Carrier Wing, which had been training in America with 82nd Airborne Div, U.S. Army, was due to arrive in North Africa on 15 April, but in point of fact did not arrive until 8 May. Both these wings had to be trained in the combined British and American methods of dropping parachute troops and towing gliders. To this end it was decided to open an Airborne Training Centre at OUDJDA under 5th Army U.S.A. through which each group should pass and receive its training. From the beginning of April every effort was made to have Groups of 51 Wing taken off their present duties of freight carrying, courier work and general transport duties in order that they might train for the operation. It was not until early in May that any useful, uninterrupted training could be carried out and even then one Group, 64 Group, was detailed to remain on Freight duties, but as this Group was not allotted to this Division for the operation it did not have any real consequence. Owing to the delay in relieving Groups of 51 T.C. Wing of their freight duties and the late arrival of 52 T.C. Wing, the system of training Groups at Airborne Training Centre did not materialise to any extent, and all training had to be carried out in the Divisional Training Area. On or about 6 May, 51 T.C. Wing consisting of 60 and 62 Groups, was allotted finally to the Division for training and operations. From this date onwards training was carried out in both parachute dropping and glider towing; but again, due to the delay in obtaining a firm allotment, all training had to be rushed. In the one moon period prior to the final rehearsals, the aircrew night training, night training of parachutists and night landings of gliders all had to be undertaken with the natural result that none could be concentrated sufficiently. One further problem faced 51 Troop Carrier Wing, that of increasing engine hours on all aircraft. Aircraft had been used continually prior to this training period for transport duties, and the sudden intensive training added an alarming increase to the hours on the engines, with the possibility of their requiring renewal just prior to the operation - a situation which it was doubtful if the supply could meet. It was, therefore, necessary for 51 Wing to conserve the engine hours and carry out the training as best they could. The allotment of A/C for training, therefore, had to be very carefully controlled.

(f) HORSA GLIDERS. The problem of the Horsa Gliders was how to get them to North Africa. Their construction does not lend itself to easy stowage on board ship, nor could it be expected that shipping space for such uneconomic loads would be made available. The most direct route to North Africa (PORTREATH to SALE Morocco) involved a ten-hour tow, by Halifax aircraft, and the only crews trained for the work were those in 295 Squadron. One of the flights of this Squadron, therefore, found itself charged with the task, not only of ferrying out Horsa gliders to the Airborne Base (almost the same distance again from SALE as the flight from PORTREATH, but also of being ready to carry out operations when the ferrying was completed. Ferrying started on 3 Jun and by 8 Jul there were 19 Horsas at the Airborne Base, out of 29 which had left England. Of the balance 3 came down in the sea en route from England (at least one as the result of enemy action), 3 forced landed in Africa and could not be recovered in time for the operation, 2 were under repair and 2 were written off as the result of crash landings at SALE. This intense ferrying by only ten aircraft left them little time to carry out much needed overhaul before the operation, and it is a great tribute to the Flight that they were able to put up the performance they actually achieved.

(g) Movement orders, governed by the state of readiness of units for embarkation, which were forecast as:-

Ready by 1st April

Adv Div H.Q.

1 & 2 Airlanding A/Tk Btys.

Airlanding Lt A.A. Bty

Fd Coy R.E.

Fd Pk Coy R.E.

1 Air Landing Bde.

(1 Border, 2 S.Staffs)

Airlanding Recce Sqn.

Airlanding Fd Amb.

Ready by 1st May

Div H.Q. and Def Pl.

Lt Regt R.A.

Div Sigs.

2 Para Bde.

Indep Para Coy.

R.A.S.C.

R.A.O.C.

In the case of the most important of these, 1 Air Landing Bde and 2 Para Bde, the dates of sailing were reversed by order of the War Office. R.A.S.C. units were not available for the 1st convoy owing to:-

(a) 250 Coy was converted from a Div Comp Coy to a Lt Coy, R.A.S.C. on Jeep Basis 3 weeks before they sailed in 2nd convoy. This conversion had been under discussion for several months and it would not have been possible to carry it out in this theatre.

(b) 253 Tp Carrying Coy was converted to a Div Comp Coy about the time that 1st convoy sailed.

(h) The release from the line in TUNISIA of 1 Para Bde at the earliest possible moment. This did not take place until 20 April.

3. Early in March Brigadier Hopkinson with a Staff Officer of 38 Wing R.A.F. went to North Africa as Major General Browning's representative to discuss the airborne aspects of the operation with the Planning Staff. The plan as then formulated envisaged a British landing in SICILY on a wide front from GELA to the west to Capo MURRO di PORCO in the east, to take place on D day, with an American landing on D + 3 day in the west of SICILY. This meant that all available troop carrier aircraft in the theatre (400 had been allotted) would be at the disposal of 1st Airborne Division on D day and these would all subsequently be transferred for the use of the American Airborne Division for the American operation. The Planning Staff attached the greatest importance to the action of the airborne forces operating against the beach defences from the rear to ease the task of the seaborne landings, and it was categorically stated that this was vital to the success of the operation. Initial planning was therefore based on this directif, and it was proposed to employ three parachute brigade for the operation, this being made possible by the decision to move 4 Para Bde (less one bn) from the Middle East to North Africa, where it would come under command of 1st Airborne Division. The plan necessarily involved a wide dispersal of the Division on landing and could only be justified by the importance attached by the Planning Staff to the weakening of the beach defences before the initial seaborne landings.

4. On 29 Mar Major General Browning, Air Commodore Sir Nigel Norman, Lt. Col. Campbell and S/Ldr Musgrave arrived in North Africa. The airborne plan was discussed in great detail in both its air and ground aspects and the aim of having everything ready for detailed planning as soon as the Division arrived in North Africa was achieved. In the middle of April Brigadier Hopkinson took over command of the Division and Major General Browning was appointed Airborne Adviser to General Eisenhower for the forthcoming operations.

5. Major General Browning and Air Commodore Norman returned to England at the end of April, and Lt. Col. Campbell and S/Ldr Musgrave remained and joined the Divisional H.Q. at MASCARA. Throughout April Major General Browning and Lt. Col. Campbell were much preoccupied in arranging for the reception of the Division in North Africa.

A.F.H.Q., which as supreme H.Q. in the theatre is responsible for initiating arrangements and issuing orders to the authorities concerned.

Fifth Army (US), with H.Q. at OUDJDA, in whose area of responsibility for training and operations the Division would be situated.

Services of Supply - North Africa Theatre of Operations U.S. Army (S.O.S. NATOUSA) ORAN. Responsible for all administration in the U.S. Zone.

Mediterranean Base Section (M.B.S.) ORAN. Responsible for detailed administration.

7. Arrangements for the reception of the Division were much complicated by the late date at which the authorities concerned became aware of the fact that the Division was arriving in North Africa and even when this was generally known there were inevitable delays while decisions were being taken regarding the allocation of responsibilities for issue of stores, transport, works services etc. Many of these decisions were still awaited when the first convoy arrived at ORAN on 26 April, and in consequence much had to be extemporised. The fact that it was not possible to include R.A.S.C., Ordnance and R.E.M.E. units in the first convoy greatly handicapped the ability of the Division to fend for itself, which further aggravated the situation. In these difficult circumstances the pains taken on the part of the Fifth Army and Mediterranean Base Section to do all in their power to assist the Division are worthy of the highest praise and recognition.

8. Another matter that had to be decided in advance was the location of the Division in North Africa. This depended mainly on the location of the American Army Air Corps squadrons of the Troop Carrier Command, with which the Division would train and operate. The Airborne Training Centre at OUDJDA was made responsible for any assistance required in training, requisition of land, and the provision of facilities to allow training to be carried out (e.g. communications, water supply, bathing). The MASCARA area was decided on as the most suitable location for the Division in view of the fact that 52 Wing of the Troop Carrier Command was to be located on the airfields at FROHA, THIERSVILLE and MATMORE. This was afterwards changed to 51 Wing.

9. As will be seen in more detail from the Diary, the convoy which included 2 Para Bde arrived at ORAN on 26 Apr, and by 29 Apr all troops were concentrated in the MASCARA area, though it took much longer for stores to be moved up by train, which involved a change of gauge at PERREGAUX. 1 Para Bde arrived in the area on 10 May from TUNISIA, having spent three weeks at BOU FARIK near ALGIERS en route. On the air side 51 Troop Carrier Wing established its Headquarters in MASCARA on 12 May, and although 38 Wing was not ready until the middle of June, combined training was able to start on 8 May. The Division was completed by the arrival of the second convoy at ORAN on 26 May, but owing to difficulties of transporting troops and stores to MASCARA 1 Air Landing Bde was not in a condition to start training until the end of the first week in June.

10. The planning organization as far as the Division was concerned consisted of Force 141 at ALGIERS, which afterwards became 15 Army Group, and Force 545 (Eighth Army) at CAIRO, under whose command the Division would operate. The position was further complicated by the fact that of the Divisions comprising Force 545, one (1 Canadian Div) was in England, one (51 Div) was in North Africa and two (5 and 50 Divs) were in the Middle East. The original airborne plan (action against beach defences) involved very close and careful co-ordination between airborne and seaborne assault troops, which could only be done by direct liaison by senior officers.

11. It did not seem practicable for commanders and senior staff officers to be away for lengthy periods during the time when they should be fully occupied with detailed planning, and a request was therefore made for Deputy Commanders of Parachute Brigades to be appointed, who would free Brigadiers from distraction during the planning stage, especially in carrying out liaison with co-operating formations, and be available during operations to take over command in the event of the Brigadier becoming a casualty. This duplication has been found very necessary in airborne operations. The appointment of Deputy Commanders was approved for the North African theatre only and was at once filled in 2 Para Bde. The appointment had to be left open in 1 and 4 Para Bdes owing to the temporary lack of suitable officers to fill it.

12. Liaison was maintained with Force 141 and Force 545 by means of G.S.O.1's appointed outside the Divisional establishment as airborne advisers. Over and above this, Major General Browning, as already stated, was appointed as Airborne Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief.

13. Little detailed planning could be begun without detailed intelligence information, and most of this, as it affected 1 Airborne Division, was being collected in CAIRO. It was also necessary to watch airborne interests from the point of view of intelligence at Force 141, and an officer from the Divisional H.Q. 'I' Section was attached at each. H.Q. Force 141 was the main source of photographic cover for the operation, and the G.3(I), who was attached to that H.Q., had access to the latest sorties for planning. He was also able to obtain direct from N.A.C.I.U. (North Africa Central Interpretation Unit) the negatives from which the Div M.P.E.S. (Mobile Photographic and Enlargement Section) produced over 200 6 foot enlargements of objectives and D.Z's for briefing.

14. Early in May the whole plan for the operation was changed. On the new plan greater concentration was obtained at the beaches by substituting for the original plan a combined assault by both British and American forces against the Southern and South Eastern coast of SICILY. This implied the simultaneous operation of both British and American Airborne Divisions, with consequent competing demands for the limited number of troop carrier aircraft available. It was finally agreed that of the 7 American troop carrier groups allotted, five should be used by the Americans and two by the British on the first operation, the resources of 38 Wing being also available for the British. The British allotment could be increased after the first operation. In fulfilment of this decision, 51 Wing with 60 and 62 Groups were allotted to the Division for training and operations. On this basis it was no longer possible to think in terms of a Divisional operation, and a series of Brigade group operations was the most that would be possible.

15. On 10 May the Divisional Commander saw General Montgomery in CAIRO and in the light of the new factors that had arisen made a new plan. This involved placing the Airborne Division under command 13 Corps, and while in CAIRO General Hopkinson and General Dempsey (G.O.C. 13 Corps) agreed on a plan in some detail the broad features of which were:-

(i) Seize and hold the crossings over the rivers and canal at PONTE GRANDE 127293 to assist the advance northwards of 5 Div.

(ii) Operate against the town and part of SYRACUSE by capturing successive objectives eastwards from incl power station 129312, such as would assist 5 Div in their subsequent attack against SYRACUSE.

(i) Seize and hold the river crossing at 041498 to facilitate the advance northwards of 5 Div.

(ii) Operate against the town and port of AUGUSTA by capturing objectives, the occupation of which would facilitate the subsequent attack of 5 Div.

(c) 1 Para Bde Gp on D+2/D+3 or later - Seize and hold the river crossing PONTE DI PRIMOSOLE 942675 to facilitate the advance northwards of 13 Corps.

A copy of the outline plan handed by the G.O.C. to Generals Montgomery and Dempsey is attached at Appendix 'B'.

16. Normally Troop Carrier Command was not prepared to carry out successive operations at a less interval than 48 hrs, owing to the difficulty of briefing pilots thoroughly in a shorter time. The two first operations only 24 hours apart were accepted because for the first operation (being a glider one and entailing release over the sea) there was less material for study than in the case of an operation over land.

17. In regard to the first operation the alternative of carrying out a parachute operation by 4 Para Bde had to be entertained until the middle of June, by which time it was clear that glider training and technique was sufficiently advanced to confirm the decision to employ 1 Air Landing Bde for the operation.

18. A conference was held at MASCARA on 23 May to co-ordinate the various groups and air aspects of the plan. The conference was attended by all airborne and troop carrying commanders concerned with the exception of Commander, 1 Air Landing Bde, who had not arrived in North Africa, and the decisions taken provided all necessary material for detailed planning. The chief points covered were:-

(a) An estimate of aircraft available. Planning was based on the following assumptions -

C.47

Albemarle

Halifax

WACO

Horsa

1 Air Landing Bde

104 (108)

25 (28)

8 (7)

127 (135)

10 (8)

2 Para Bde

80 (90)

18 (24)

5 (6)

(12)

5+ (6)

1 Para Bde

94 (105)

14 (23)

5 (7)

(8)

5+ (11)

(Note - The figures in parentheses show the numbers of aircraft actually allotted for the operation. The 2 Para Bde operation was cancelled at the last moment but all essential preliminaries were carried out. The allotment to 1 Para Bde benefited accordingly). Includes 30 A/C from 64 Group transferred after D+1 from allotment to 82 Airborne Division.

(b) Approximate time of drop. The aim, (particularly in the case of gliders) was to land as soon after evening twilight as considerations of an approach in semi-light would permit. Initially the glider landing was timed to take place 30 minutes after nautical twilight (i.e. at 2150 hrs) but Mediterranean Air Command having considered this decided that the approach would be too vulnerable to enemy interference, and recommended a postponement of 20 minutes which was complied with.

(d) Routing of aircraft. Later events showed that it is essential to avoid convoys and all areas being developed by friendly forces as beach heads and ports.

(e) Air support Requests were put up by Major General Browning to Mediterranean Air Command and the matter was then handled on that level. Certain difficulties arose which are the subject of a special report handed to Major General Browning. A copy is attached as Appendix 'C'.

(f) Dummy Plan The subsequent procedure was the same as in the case of air support. Further reference is made to dummy dropping in Appendix 'F'.

(g) Payload. A payload of 5,200 lbs was given for the C.47 carrying parachute troops. Later payloads for gliders were fixed at - WACO - 3,700 lbs, HORSA - 6,900 lbs. (Training - Paras 21 - 28).

19. The Divisional Commander, all Brigade Commanders and the C.O. Glider Pilot Regt all made reconnaissances over the part of SICILY connected with the airborne operations during the moon periods in May and June corresponding to that of the operation. These reconnaissances were made in Beaufighters and Mosquitos based on MALTA.

20. Brigade representatives and a signal detachment of 1 Air Landing Bde also attended the 13 Corps rehearsal in the GULF OF AQUABA on 12 and 13 June where invaluable contacts were made. Details of rehearsals within the Division are given in the section on Training (Sec 9).

21. GENERAL. The area selected for the training of the Division was dictated (a) by the fact that under the original HUSKY Plan all the resources of N.W.A. Troop Carrier Command were to be used on successive nights by both the British and American Airborne Divisions, and therefore the resources were to be pooled during training, (b) by the location of the airfields allotted to the various Troop Carrier Groups and the necessity of the Division being located close to these airfields on account of lack of troop carrying transport during the initial period of training. (c) by the fact that the battle was still in progress in Tunisia and therefore it was not possible to train from airfields near the Operational Base.

22. DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAINING AREA. The MASCARA area provided three single runway airfields without a radius of ten miles, and the Division was located with one bde near each airfield and Div H.Q. itself in MASCARA together with H.Q. 51 Troop Carrier Wing. The country consisted of a large plain on which were situated the airfields. All around this plain there was mountainous country providing rather indifferent training ground owing to the scarcity of cover, but providing ample range accommodation for all types of weapons. However, reasonable areas for ground training and parachute exercises existed some 20 - 30 miles away nearer the coast which was about 80 miles away. Difficulty was experienced in finding suitable areas for carrying out Bde rehearsals under realistic conditions such as crossing the coast the D.Zs. within 5 - 10 miles of the coast, owing to the fact that the country close to the coast was either mountainous or covered with vineyards. The rehearsals therefore had to be carried out without practicing air crews in making a landfall and then running in to a D.Z.

23. ALLOCATION OF A/C. 51 T.C. Wing consisting of 60 and 62 Troop Carrier Groups U.S.A.A.C. and 38 Wing R.A.F. under comd, consisting of 296 Sqn and one flight of HALIFAX A/C from 295 Sqn, were allotted to this Division for training and for the Operation. As the two groups were slightly under strength and 296 Sqn did not arrive until about 10 June, all the preliminary training had to be carried out with approx 90 C.47 A/C.

24. TRAINING TO BE CARRIED OUT. On arrival in N. Africa two bns of 2 Parachute Bde had never carried out a bn exercise by parachute, nor had any of the bde made jumps from D.C. A/C. The 1st Para Bde, on return from the TUNISIAN battle, had not jumped for about five months and a large percentage of the men were reinforcements who had never been trained. The Glider Pilots who came out with the Division had never flown Waco Gliders nor were they trained in landing gliders by moonlight. The Air Landing Bde, furthermore, had never carried out a large scale exercise, and the problems of such massed take off were still unsolved. The training which therefore had to be completed in approx 2 months consisted of:

(b) Conversion training of Glider Pilots to WACO Gliders followed by intensive training in moonlight landings.

25. INDIVIDUAL PARACHUTE TRAINING. The first parachute training with D.C. A/C took place on 8 May when one coy of 4 Para Bn carried out a coy drop at dusk. From then on units of 2 Para Bde gave men their first door jump by simple coy or pl exercises, this type of training lasted approx 8 - 20 May. 1 Para Bde were unable to commence their refresher jumps until 23 May and between 23 May and 1 June each bn were given refresher door jumps again in the form of simple coy exercises. During the period 30 May and 13 June two small courses in Initial Parachute Training were held at a Div Training Centre under the supervision of S.O.P.T. 50 Students attended each course which lasted one week and all students carried out 5 jumps one of which was made at night. The injuries incurred during these two courses were as follows:

FATAL

NIL

Injuries

NIL

NOTE Throughout this report injuries are classified as follows: A Injuries which would have prevented the man from carrying on fighting. B Injuries which would NOT have prevented the man from carrying on fighting.

(a) EXERCISE CONFIRMATION - 2 PARACHUTE BDE. This was the first large scale parachute exercise. It was carried out by 2 Para Bde Gp on night 27/28 May when Bde H.Q., 4, 5 Para Bns and one coy of 6 Para Bn together with dets of 2 Para Fd Sqn R.E. and 127 Para Fd Amb were dropped by 87 D.C. A/C. The exercise was designed to discover the problems arising out of launching a Parachute Bde, and furthermore to ascertain the conditions most favourable to aircrews dropping by night. Five D.Zs. in an area of approx 1 mile radius were used and A/C were to drop in pairs on two D.Zs. at a time. The assault coys were to drop 40 mins before the main body. The remainder of the Bde Gp was then to drop on 4 D.Zs. in 20 mins. No navigational aids were used and the moon was in its last quarter just rising at the time of the first drop. In an effort to give aircrews the experience of flak bursting in the air, also the effect of searchlights, it was arranged that S/Ls and 40mm Bofors would 'engage' the A/C. This had to be so carefully controlled that it is doubtful whether any real value was obtained. The Bde Group were dropped over a wide area and over a considerable period of time. Only approx 25% of the Bde were available for fighting on completion of the drop, however by 2 hrs later considerably more troops had joined up with their units. A summary of the injuries sustained through dropping is as follows:

FATAL

Injuries

1.617%

3.640%

Total Injuries 5.257%. The following lessons were learned as a result of this exercise:

(i) Where two or more D.Zs. are close together, dropping cannot take place on more than one at a time.

(ii) It is essential to have at least 30º moon to enable pilots to be able to locate a D.Z.

(iii) The final check points must be some clearly defined object within 10 miles of the D.Zs.

(iv) A standard altitude for dropping to be determined by all D.Zs. This was to be a safe height over the highest D.Z. in the group.

(b) EXERCISE CACTUS - 1 PARACHUTE BDE. This exercise consisted of four parts CACTUS I, II, III & IV. and was carried out by 1 Para Bde Gp. CACTUS IV was designed to be the final rehearsal for 1 Para Bde and each bn carried out its own task as a separate exercise in CACTUS I, II & III. It is not proposed to describe the bn exercises in detail, but the following is a summary:

EXERCISE	DATE	UNIT	AIR UNIT	NO OF A/C	INJURIES			REMARKS
					FATAL	A	B
CACTUS I	10 Jun	3 Para Bn	60 Gp	35	-	-	23	Fairly successful. 5 A/C failed to drop. 7 A/C dropped in wrong place.
CACTUS II	11 Jun	2 Para Bn	62 Gp	33	-	1	3	Apart from fact that A/C tended to lose their blocks it was a very successful drop.
CACTUS III	12 Jun	1 Para Bn & Bde HQ	60 Gp & 296 Sqn	38 & 9	-	1	28	Dropping of 60 Gp extremely good, 296 Sqn however dropped most inaccurately - this was their first drop in N. Africa.

CACTUS IV. This exercise was carried out on night 19 June in area just south of THIERSVILLE (South of the Div area). It consisted of dropping 1 Para Bde Gp complete onto 4 D.Zs. from 106 A/C provided as follows. D.C. A/C 90. Albemarle 16. The moon was at approx 30º but slight haze existed over the D.Zs. Each D.Z. was to be marked by lights to be put out by personnel of 21 Indep Para Coy who were also to use Eureka on the D.Z. on which the Albemarle A/C were to drop. Personnel marking D.Zs. were to drop in the leading C.47 A/C on each D.Z. approx 30 mins before the main drop. D.Zs. were to be marked in the standard form as shown below:-

The white signal light to flash the appropriate letter in MORSE slowly, but continuously. The letter flashed and the colour of the Identification Lights will denote the specific D.Z. or L.A. The dropping was so timed as to permit dropping on only one D.Z. at a time e.g. one Coy of 1 Bn on D.Z. A, followed by one Coy of 3 Bn on D.Z. D, followed by one Coy of 2 Bn on D.Z. C, and so on; the whole drop apart from the small parties dropped approx 20 mins early was to drop in one hour at intervals of 5 mins on each D.Z. The drop as carried out was not very successful partly owing to the fact that some of the parties to mark out the D.Zs. were not dropped accurately and therefore were not able to mark the D.Zs. by the time the A/C were due to drop. Too much reliance has been placed by pilots on these navigational aids despite strong warning given prior to the exercise. A summary of the dropping is as follows:-

UNIT

A/C dropped

on correct D.Z.

within 5 mins of

correct time

A/C dropped

on wrong D.Z.

A/C dropped

on no D.Z. or

at wrong time

A/C not dropped

for various

reasons

1 Para Bn

2 Para Bn

3 Para Bn

Fd Sqn R.E.

Para Fd Amb

Bde H.Q.

25+

FATAL

NIL

Injuries

1.283%

55 (largely due to being dropped off D.Z.)

2.402% Total 4.665%

The main lesson learned on this exercise was the same old one of pilots pinning too much faith on aids on the D.Z. This was very largely responsible for the considerable number of sticks of 3 Para Bn dropped wide - the pilots mistook other lights for those on the D.Z.

(c) EXERCISE "OYSTER" - 2 PARACHUTE BDE. This exercise was designed as the final rehearsal for 2 Para Bde Gp. It consisted of dropping on night 17 Jun 4 & 5 Para Bns with one coy of 6 Para Bn together with Bde H.Q. and dets of 2 Para Fd Sqn R.E. and 127 Para Fd Amb, the remainder of 6 Para Bn was to be dropped in a second lift, which actually never took off. 80 D.C. A/C, of which 3 were to be held as spare A/C and 16 Albemarles were allotted for this exercise. The five D.Zs. selected were easily definable by clears roads and rivers with a very suitable check point in the form of a town about 6 miles off the D.Z. The moon was in its first quarter and about 30º. All round, conditions were favourable. No aids were used except on one D.Z. where the 68 Wireless set was used, working to the C.47 radio compass, as a homing beacon (Note: On previous small scale trials this method had proved a successful means of homing at a range of 4 - 5 miles). The plan was to drop two assaulting coys on 2 D.Zs. 40 mins before the remainder of the Bde, which was to drop on 5 D.Zs. in 20 mins, using two well separated D.Zs. at a time. On the whole the drop was carried out successfully, only one or two A/C dropped wide and one or two dropped late, but the majority of A/C dropped correctly on or about the desired time. The Albemarle A/C dropped first owing to their differences in speed to the D.C. A/C. The 68 set as a beacon was unsuccessful owing to the frequency chosen being too close to the frequency used for the Air Corps intercomn. No new lessons were learned on this exercise, but it was again found that if it is intended that tps should drop on any particular D.Z. the D.Zs. must be well apart. In one case two D.Zs. were only separated by a road and troops were therefore dropped in the area of the two D.Zs., rather than on any specific D.Z. The casualties on this exercise were:

FATAL

NIL

Injuries

1.117%

3.538% Total Injuries 4.665%

27. TRAINING OF GLIDER PILOTS. Two squadrons of the Glider Pilot Regt., approximately 240 pilots, were sent to North Africa for training. Previously these squadrons had not flown for some considerable time owing to lack of facilities for flying in England. They had to be converted to flying the WACO Glider - which they had never seen before, and they had to be trained to a high standard of night landing, in strange country by moonlight. Once the problems of the provision of gliders were overcome, a training programme was worked out based on the above requirements. In arranging this training programme, the predominating factors were as follows:-

Certain trials were carried out to obtain the necessary data in the early stages. The following facts were thereby ascertained:-

(a) That moonlight landings were more simple than was thought at first, and that, with careful handling a glider could be put down in pitch darkness without difficulty.

(i) All map reading, pin pointing, and general navigation. (ii) Working the spoilers and trimmers. (iii) On the approach, reading alternately speed and height until touch down.

(c) That by using the spoilers and maintaining the aircraft in a semi stalled condition, the rate of sink of a lightly loaded glider could be increased without difficulty to 700 ft a minute - air speed 65 m.p.h. and land successfully. Its low landing speed would result in greater safety for all concerned. With all this data at hand, a training programme was devised, including the following types of training.

1. Dual. 2. Solo. 3. 3,000 feet release. 4. Remote release and spot landing. 5. Full load and spot landing by day. 6. Night dual. 7. Night Solo. 8. Solo, fully loaded landing with reduced flare path. 9. Advanced landing. 10. Moonlight landing, fully loaded.

This scheme was designed to give the pilot and crew approximately six hours concentrated flying. Owing to the fact that, in order to get satisfactory results from this training, the flying should not be interrupted by taking off and landing of other aircraft, it was therefore desirable that the programme should work on an airfield that was being used for no other purpose. Throughout the latter part of May and the early part of June, it was possible to run two courses concurrently, one on Relizane Airfield, No.3 Squadron, and one on Froha Airfield, No.2 Squadron. The programme at Relizane was commenced on the 21st May, and the programme at Froha was commenced on the 24th May. These programmes were based on using by day 3 tugs making 4 lifts an hour, i.e. in one 12 hour day, 48 lifts; by night 3 tows per hour, 6 hours, giving 18 lifts. A summary of the amount of flying carried out by Nos. 2 and 3 Sqns is as follows:-

One officer injured, suffering from shock, abrasions etc. 1 Sjt. pilot injured, broken leg.

Flying hours by night 130 hrs. 55 mins. ) 521 hrs. 45 mins.
No. of crews trained 116

From the above tables, it will be observed that remarkable results were achieved in a short space of time. The two sqns between them produced a total of approx 1900 lifts, giving an average of 75.5 lifts, day and night. It is interesting to note that some three months previously it had been stated that a pilot receiving 8 hours concentrated flying should be operationally fit, and there was no mention of moonlight landing. The result of training in North Africa has proved this statement, and given in addition the moonlight landing. This, of course, was only possible through experiments being carried out in North Africa before and during the training, by the C.O. of the Glider Pilot Regt. In addition to the above two courses, it was decided at the end of May to open an advanced flying course at Thiersville (French) Airfield. This course was designed to give further practice to trained crews in landing by night under possible operational conditions. The glider pilots training culminated in the following Exercises:-

(a) "Adam" - 14th June. This consisted of 56 gliders taking off from two airfields, Matmore and Thiersville, and landing by day in the area of Froha Airfield, carrying personnel of 1 Airborne Bde H.Q. and 2 S.Staffords. This Exercise was entirely successful from all aspects. The take-off was one hundred percent successful. The flight in formation of blocks of 4 staggered was excellent, with the possible exception of failure to bank formations on turns. Only one glider released after take-off, a second forced-landed after releasing owing to a tight turn and all the remainder landed successfully in the landing area. No tps were injured and only 5 gliders suffered minor damage.

(b) Exercise "Eve I" - 20th June. This Exercise consisted of taking off 72 gliders from 3 airfields, Matmore, Thiersville and Froha, and landing by day in the area of Thiersville Airfield. On this occasion the remainder of the Airborne Bde Group, i.e. 1 Border Regt, Fd Amb, Fd Coy, etc. were carried. The take-off was entirely successful, and the formation flying was excellent, also carried out in blocks of 4 aircraft. Of the 72 gliders which took off, 57 landed in the correct area, a few with minor damage, and the remainder landed some 4 miles away. No tps were injured. From this exercise it was learned that future briefing must be of a more detailed nature.

(c) Exercise "Eve II" - 21st June. This Exercise was designed to land 12 gliders by moonlight on a strange piece of country, under operation conditions. The tps carried were personnel from 1 Airborne Bde. The Exercise was entirely successful, and proved a good indication of the capabilities of the pilots to land successfully in the projected operation. Pilots selected were a cross section of the two Sqns of the Glider Pilot Regt. The coast line was represented by a row of flares, which was recognised by all but one pilot, who had to make a forced landing on route. The release was made at the correct point, at approx 0200 hrs, and at 700 ft. Ten of the eleven gliders landed successfully in the L.Z., the eleventh glider overshooting slightly. No tps were injured. Only slight damage to 4 gliders. The moon on this occasion was in exactly the same condition as it would be on Operation 'HUSKY' itself.

(d) Move of 1 Airlanding Bde to the Airborne Base. On the 27th June, part of the Airborne Bde (approx 1200 men) were moved in five hours some 700 miles across desert country and mountains, in 84 gliders. Two of these gliders made forced landings, and one suffered a fatal crash through structural failure, 81 gliders arriving safely. Each tug had sufficient petrol to return to base. It is significant to note that none of the pilots had previously experienced more than one hours continuous flight. Several gliders were ferried to the forward base on subsequent days, and the final figures for the move were as follows:-

Despite numerous obstacles and lack of sufficient time, the maximum possible amount of training was carried out by the Glider Pilot Regt, and of the 120 crews who arrived in North Africa originally, 110 crews were available fully-trained, after sickness and crashes. This figure was reinforced later by 28 crews, untrained. Thus the final position on arrival in the Base Area was:-

In order to meet this demand, a considerable amount of reshuffling to mix the untrained crews with the trained crews had to be undertaken, which was not a satisfactory state of affairs, and the balance had to be made up with American glider pilots, all of whom acted as 2nd Pilots, and whose performance on the operation was most commendable.

(a) Exercises on the bn level were held by all Bdes on country as similar as possible to that over which they would be required to operate in the operation. Roads and other features were given code names which were to be used on the operation. These exercises, although on security grounds they were known just as ordinary exercises, were in point of fact complete dress rehearsals. They proved of immense value and when troops were finally told the operational plan they found it easy to make a mental picture of the ground. The Airlanding Bde carried out an exercise for the Bde using 3 ton lorries to represent gliders on night 15/16 June.

(b) Signal exercises were held by all Bdes as frequently as possible, with a view to operating H.Q.s and putting comns to a thorough test.

(c) A very considerable amount of firing with live amn was carried out, this was only curtailed by the lack of trg amn - despite the fact that the allotment made to the Div was considerable. Ranges were readily available in the training area. An excellent demonstration shoot was given on 21 June for the benefit of 2 Para Bde and reps of other Bdes by the Lt Regt R.A. They demonstrated most successfully a barrage fired by the whole Regt on a frontage of 400 yds over our own troops. Troops of 2 Para Bde had the opportunity of advancing under this barrage. This was the first regimental shoot carried out by the Lt Regt R.A.

(a) Parachutes. The position regarding parachutes at the commencement of training was that No.1 M.P.S.U., which had been att to 1 Para Bde and had been moved into the trg area prior to the arrival of the Division, held some 2,000 parachutes already packed. Other parachutes arrived on W.S.29, but all had to be unpacked, dried and re-packed before use. No.1 M.P.S.U. established their packing and drying vehicles near MATMORE and had storage and supplementary packing facilities in the Cinema at MASCARA. No.2 M.P.S.U. came out and joined up with No.1 about 1 May, making one large parachute maintenance unit under control of Div H.Q. This system worked extremely well despite the late and incomplete arrival of the vehicles for No.2 M.P.S.U. Altogether during the period 8 May - 18 June, some 12,688 parachutes were used and re-packed. During the preparation of parachutes for Bde exercises, the combined units worked 16 packers in 3 shifts each of 6 hrs daily and at one time were packing about 500 parachutes a day. A great tribute can be paid to the activities of these two units during this training period. No.3 M.P.S.U. arrived later and moved direct to the operational base.

(b) Containers. Containers were held by units on a scale sufficient for one drop, and a large Divisional reserve was held under R.E.M.E. arrangements. Units were responsible for the maintenance of their own containers. There were however, a very large number of repairs which could not be carried out by units: to cope with this No.3 L.A.D. were made responsible for all repair work which could not be carried out by units, R.E.M.E. Workshops assisted in this work. The repair and maintenance of containers on the scale required for an Airborne Div in the field is an extremely large commitment to be placed on to R.E.M.E. as had to be done in this instance. The work included painting containers white, modifying and maintaining lighting sets, repairing catches and buffers and other smaller jobs, work not possible to do in a unit. As recommended elsewhere, it is essential that a small container maintenance unit should be att to an Airborne Division in the field and for training.

During the period 8 May to 30 Jun, the following number of parachute jumps were made with the injuries as stated:-

No. of Jumps

8913

Percentage of

total jumps made

No. of Fatal Injuries

0.0224

No. of A Injuries

1.1107

No. of B Injuries

202

2.2663

A injuries denote - Injuries which would have prevented the man from carrying on fighting.

B injuries denote - Injuries which would not have prevented the man from carrying on fighting.

Of the above total all jumps were made from D.C. A/C with the exception of approx 500 which were made from Albemarle A/C. It will be observed that these figures show a decrease on the casualty rate sustained during training in England. It is considered that the reasons for this may lie in:-

(a) The reduction of injuries sustained through contact with aperture when jumping.

(b) The apparent fact that when jumping from the door far fewer cases of twists and thrown lines occur. As far as can be ascertained no case of somersaulting has arisen.

As far as can be determined, the two fatal accidents occurred for the following reasons:-

1. Container dropping through the parachute of the man and thereby collapsing the parachute.

2. Parachute not developing correctly owing to twists. In this case it was a night drop and therefore hard to determine the actual cause.

It is interesting to note that although the long strops were not introduced until after the completion of training, there were no cases of parachutes being caught on the A/C.

29. While training was in progress at MASCARA arrangements had to be considered for the move of the Division to its operational base in the KAIROUAN area. The first conference was held at A.F.H.Q. on 10 May, but little could be done at that date except to present the nature of the problem to those concerned, for the following reasons:-

(a) There was no plan (at that date the Divisional Commander was in CAIRO discussing the new plan) and so priorities for the move could not be given.

(b) The location of airfields, most of which had yet to be constructed, had not yet been decided. Six were to be allotted for the use of the Division.

(c) The area had only been free from enemy occupation some six weeks previously and communications were still dislocated.

(d) The administration of the area was in process of being taken over by First Army from Eighth Army, but as yet there was no area organization.

A reconnaissance party from the Division visited the area on 17 May and obtained particulars about water supply, camp sites, incidence of malaria and made a general survey of the area that proved of great value when the more detailed reconnaissance was carried out. It was not until 4 June that sufficient details about the location of airfields were made available to justify a detailed reconnaissance. The airfields allotted to the Division covered a wide area, and in a Bde Group operation all six would be required. This factor made it desirable to locate the whole division in a central position, as far as possible equidistant from all airfields, but considerations of water supply and living conditions (shade) had to take first place. The recce party consisted of G.S.O.1, A.A.&Q.M.G., O.C. DIV SIGS, R.A.S.C. rep, D.A.D.M.S., A.D.O.S., and two Staff Officers (one G and one Q) who would remain in the area as liaison officers with Area H.Q. until the arrival of the Division. The newly formed KAIROUAN Area undertook all work in connection with preparation of camp sites which included erection of nissen huts for briefing and map storage, laying water pipe lines, building latrines and ablution benches and improvement of tracks. The final arrangements were finally co-ordinated at a conference held at H.Q. Tunisia District on 6 June, where it appeared that up to the present no authority had been given for the erection of the considerable signal communications that would be required. After rather lengthy negotiations this matter too was finally settled. By the time the Division arrived in the area all the above matters were well in hand, and were completed almost to schedule, which is a great tribute to those concerned, who were handicapped throughout by the tardy delivery of the necessary materials to get on with the work.

30. Concurrently with the above the detailed arrangements for the move of the division were being worked out. The following factors complicated the move:-

(a) Priorities of units had to be decided in the light of training commitments at MASCARA, which was not completed until 21 June, and also of the order in which formations would be required for operations, beginning on 9 Jul.

(b) The three transportation agencies that were to be used, air, road and rail. This meant that troops travelling by air would overtake by four or five days their heavier equipment moving by road and rail.

In view of the fact that units coming out in the second convoy were not completed with their heavy stores before about 7 June, and had to be prepared to move again on 17 June it was not worth while unpacking them, and as a consequence there was much waste of transport in moving them to MASCARA and then back again.

31. Although the final plan did not provide an opportunity for tactical control by Divisional H.Q., it was necessary to have a small H.Q. in close proximity to the battle, in order:-

(a) To establish a signal link with the Airborne Base in order to implement successive operations.

It was decided that this H.Q. should move by sea and land with H.Q. 5 Div, afterwards joining H.Q. 13 Corps. The implications of this, although on a small scale, were far-reaching:-

(a) The H.Q. party consisted of the following:- Divisional Commander (landing by glider). G.S.O.2. D.A.Q.M.G. Signals Officer. Intelligence Officer. 2 Clerks. 5 Signals personnel. 2 Cipher personnel. 2 D.Rs. with M/Cs. 2 Batmen. Two 5G wireless sets. Two No.22 Wireless Sets. Six jeeps.

(b) The vehicles had to be loaded on an M.T. ship at BEIRUT early in June. It was out of the question to provide these vehicles from Divisional Signals, (in fact these were only unloaded at ORAN on 30 May), and so they had to be provided by Middle East, without the necessary fittings for the wireless sets. Drivers for them had to be flown to BEIRUT early in June.

(c) The remainder of the party left MASCARA by air for embarkation at SUEZ on 21st June with the wireless sets, which had to be manhandled until contact could be made with the Jeeps in Sicily.

The narrative of events at Tac H.Q. during the operations are given in Appendix 'H'.

32. On 7 Jun the Divisional Commander saw General Dempsey in CAIRO and reached agreement over the final features of the plan. There was little variation from the original, but it was possible to define more exactly the tasks to be undertaken by 1 Air Landing Bde and 2 Para Bde in their operations against the towns of SYRACUSE and AUGUSTA respectively. A copy of the note handed to General Dempsey by the G.O.C. is attached at Appendix C. Subsequent to this meeting the plans remained unchanged, except for a request from General Dempsey received on 22 Jun for the neutralisation or capture of a coast defence battery at 118256 by 1 Air Landing Bde. The Bde plan was accordingly modified to permit of this being done, at the cost of the effort available for the attack on SYRACUSE.

33. Up to a late date there were one or two suggestions of subsidiary airborne operations on a small scale against R.D.F. stations in SICILY. These did not materialise and it is felt that such distractions which are bound to effect the main effort are undesirable. The Division was also requested to assist 2 S.A.S. Regt, which was carrying out deep operations against communications with small parties. The proviso in carrying out these operations was that they should not interfere in any way with the main operations carried out by the Division, and the small scale of effort required made it possible to supply parachutes and other equipment without difficulty. It is felt however that future requirements may not be on such a modest scale, and the Division should not be required to cater for airborne activities of a non-divisional nature for which no provision has been made in the scale of airborne and other equipment available to the Division. (Negotiations are now in hand for 2 S.A.S. Regiment to come under command of the Division).

34. There were a number of points of detail which had to be co-ordinated with Eighth Army, including recognition signals, code words, administration of airborne formations while in SICILY, signal frequencies etc, which were somewhat complicated by distance, but it was possible to issue final orders on these matters on 20 Jun, and little amendment was necessary. It was also arranged that two naval bombardment detachments should accompany each airborne operation, to direct naval gunfire in support of airborne operations. Detailed co-ordination was only effected at a late date, and on future occasions direct contact should be arranged between an officer from the bombardment detachments and the Artillery Commander or naval authority in executive control. In addition a F.O.O. was to accompany 1 Parachute Bde with the object of directing land Artillery in support of the operation. This again required careful co-ordination as arrangements had to be made in detail with both the divisions that might be operating in that sector at the time. An officer was sent to CAIRO on 22 Jun to make the necessary arrangements, but owing to delay, he was not in time to go into the matter thoroughly before the Divisions embarked.

35. A conference was held at MASCARA on 23 Jun to discuss points arising from training and rehearsals. The following were the principal decisions:-

(b) Payload of Horsa glider towed by Halifax - 6,900 lbs. Further trials were to be carried out with the Albemarle (as a result of these the same payload was accepted).

(c) Speed of tug aircraft towing the WACO glider - 120 m.p.h. The I.A.S. of the glider normally registered 20 m.p.h. more than the tug, so glider pilots should not be alarmed if their indicator registered 140 m.p.h.

(d) Aids in finding D.Z's and L.A's. There had been much controversy over the advantage of showing lights on D.Z's to guide in the main body of aircraft. The main advantage was that if the aids were successful troops would be dropped and landed in a far more concentrated manner than would be the case otherwise. The disadvantages were that if pilots expected aids they would be put off if for some reason they were missing; that where a number of D.Z's were close together aids would be more confusing than helpful and that the number of other lights in the area (burning buildings, searchlights, vehicle lights, A.A. fire etc) would make aids difficult to pick out. The disadvantages could at least in part be overcome by providing distinctive colours for each D.Z. It was finally decided that no aids would be used, except for gliders operating with Parachute Bdes, but 1 Air Landing Bde would provide a beacon to act as a turning point for the aircraft carrying 2 Parachute Bde to make their final run to the D.Z.

36. On 22 June the Divisional Commander despatched a final note to G.O.C. 13 Corps on the employment of the Division. A copy is attached at Appendix D.

37. The last week before the operation saw a good deal of time taken up in arranging the final details of Bomber support, which included a conference attended by A.O.C. 205 (B) Wing (Wellingtons) and all Brigadiers. Details of this conference, together with the story of the development of the Bomber plan, are given at Appendix 'E'.

38. The neutralisation of A.A. Btys and searchlights that might interfere in the neighbourhood of D.Z's was being carried out by Beaufighters based on MALTA, under the direction of Major General Browning.

39. 1 Airborne Division were charged with arranging for air supply by parachute for all British and R.A.F. forces, and common user stores for American forces. Details of the arrangements made are given in Appendix 'G'. The organisation was not tried out, because the need for it did not arise.

40. Preparation for the operation was complicated by the fact that the majority of the Divisional Signals did not reach N. Africa until the end of May with 1 Air Landing Bde, and some of Div Headquarters. 2 Para Bde had arrived with its Signal Section a month earlier, while 1 Para Bde had been in N. Africa for 6 months.

41. O.C. 1 Airborne Div Signals had to remain in England to reorganise the unit on a new establishment and equipment table which were not finally passed till mid April. Accordingly the 2nd in Command, was sent out by air in mid April in order to represent the unit on the planning staff of 15 Army Gp. (then Force 141). Major Wotton, in collaboration with the Airborne Advisor and the C.S.O., drew up the Signal plan in ALGIERS. He then visited Eighth Army (then Force 545) in CAIRO to arrange details of frequencies, ciphers and codes, but during the journey by air the plan was changed. Three days later, the Div Comd arrived in CAIRO, and after consultation with General Montgomery Comd 8 Army produced an outline plan for the employment of 1 Airborne Div in operation 'HUSKY'. On the basis of this new plan, a further outline Signal plan was drawn up. (See Appendix K). The new plan was approved by C.S.O. 15 Army Gp on the return of Major Wotton.

42. Major Wotton then visited the Div Trg Area at MASCARA, some 250 miles W. of ALGIERS, where Sig Offr, 2 Para Bde had arranged and 5th (U.S.) Army had executed the necessary fixed communications within the Division and to the airfields.

43. On arrival at ORAN on 26 May O.C. Div Signals found that the unit would have to remain in a staging camp near the coast for at least a week, move to MASCARA 60 miles inland for a fortnight and then move with the Division 700 miles to the KAIROUAN area. This produced considerable administrative difficulty as it was impossible to unpack stores in the staging camp and the stay in MASCARA was too short to allow for complete sorting. 600 accumulators required charging and no acid could be obtained at first, while considerable quantities of special wireless equipment had to be issued to the Parachute Bdes. The position was further complicated by shortage of transport, resulting in the use of the French railways with changes of gauge.

44. Meanwhile vehicles and heavy stores had reached the port of MOSTAGANEM and a party was sent there in the hope of picking out priority items which proved impossible. It was, however, discovered, that one Car 5 cwt had never left England. When the move from MASCARA to KAIROUAN began over 50 Unit packing cases were still missing, and during the move of 700 miles the French railway authorities contrived to uncouple 5 wagons from the Div Signals train in order to attach some others of their own. The uncoupled trucks contained most of the unit stock of 5 G wireless sets. A subaltern officer who was sent off to search TUNISIA eventually discovered them on a siding near TUNIS.

45. O.C. Div Signals had made a reconnaissance with the G.1, of the new base area travelling by air and all necessary lines and equipment were provided in time by the C.S.O. TUNISIA DISTRICT, and the C.S.O. AIR FORMATION SIGNALS for the airfield communications, in spite of the very short notice that it was possible to give. The recce, could not be done earlier because the allocation of airfields had not been decided.

46. Major Wotton and the small Tac Div party left MASCARA just before the move on 22 Jun. Having flown to CAIRO they finally embarked at SUEZ on 28 Jun.

47. The unit reached KAIROUAN area in several parties and the workshops and stores were hastily opened to deal with last minute requirements for Bdes. Final arrangements were also made for the Operational Base Headquarters.

48. Ordnance and R.E.M.E. problems were among the most difficult to resolve during the period of preparation in North Africa, as local resources were limited and in some areas absent, and there was therefore nothing to absorb delays in shipping and in transit. Moreover, long and poor communications made it difficult to meet emergency requirements in time for items to be of use. This was particularly the case in respect of certain R.A.F. stores which were shipped from U.K. as Ord Stores, not R.A.F., and were to be stored at 1 B.O.D. (at ALGIERS). The problem to be faced was that of the Division having to hold a large stock of containers etc. and the main reserves being held in an Ord Dump, where nobody would know which item was which. It was therefore agreed at A.F.H.Q. that once the stores arrived at 1 B.O.D. they would be transferred back to R.A.F. and stored in 164 M.U (at TUNIS). This was by far the most satisfactory arrangement, once the transaction was finally completed. Owing to the fact that Ord Personnel in 1 B.O.D. did not know the various items, coupled with the distance over which the stores, once demanded, had to be sent, the problem of collecting the equipment for Operation 'HUSKY' was no easy task. To quote one example, when container lighting sets were demanded, they were sent down without batteries or bulbs; the second effort produced the batteries and a very intensive last minute drive produced just sufficient bulbs.

49. Parachutes of all types were stored and maintained by Nos. 1, 2 and 3 M.P.S.Us., who undoubtedly carried out their task of packing parachutes for training and the operation, under difficult conditions, in a most efficient manner. The main problem facing this work was the complete lack of 8 and 100 lb cord for tying parachutes (despite repeated requests for reserves of this material over a period of three months, none arrived) and about ten days before the operation, packing was brought to a standstill. Despite a cable sent to England ordering these stores to be in the hands of M.P.S.U. by 4 July, they did not arrive until the 6th and 19th of July. It was only by the efforts made by Officer i/c No.1 M.P.S.U. in scouring all R.A.F. stores in Tunisia, that he was able to scrape together sufficient of this cord to pack the parachutes for the operations. An additional difficulty to be overcome by No.1 M.P.S.U. was that of engine spares; one of the vehicles used for drying parachutes broke down with valve and gasket trouble early in March, and spares were repeatedly requested from R.A.F. stores and by this H.Q. through A.F.H.Q., but they were not forthcoming and the drier could not be used. They have not yet been received at the time of writing this report, 28 July.

50. The base control organisation adopted for the operations was first devised as a result of discussion with Brigade Commanders and 51 Troop Carrier Wing. The instructions that were issued as a result of these discussions were tried out practically during the three rehearsal exercises and the organisation was found to work so satisfactorily that no change was necessary. A full description of the organisation and the way it worked during the operations, is given in PART 5.

11 Feb. Airborne Div warned verbally to be prepared to move overseas with a view to carrying out an operation in June or July.

7 - 20 Mar. Brigadier Hopkinson, Major Maguire (G.S.O.2. I) and W/Cdr Barton (38 Wing) visited North Africa and discussed the nature of the projected operations.

14 Mar. Warning order for certain units of Div to be prepared to embark after 6 April, drivers to be ready with vehicles from 25 Mar.

29 Mar. Major-General Browning and Lt-Col. Campbell (G.S.O.1) with Air Commodore Sir Nigel Norman arrived in North Africa for further planning. It was intended that Lt.-Col. Campbell should return with details of the plan, but the backward state of arrangements for the reception of the Division in North Africa made this impossible.

13 Apr. Following sailed from U.K. Adv Div H.Q. and Def Pl. F.S. Sec. Pro Coy. H.Q., R.A. 1 and 2 Airlanding A/Tk Btys. Lt A.A. Bty. No.4 L.A.D. H.Q., R.E. 9 Fd Coy, R.E. 2 Para Sqn, R.E. K Sec, Div Sigs. 2 Para Bde complete. Det Glider Pilots (120 approx). 127 Para Fd Amb. Adv R.E.M.E. Workshops. Adv Ord Fd Pk.

26 Apr. Arrival of convoy at ORAN. D.A.D.M.S., C.R.E., Major Maguire (G.S.O.2.I) Arrive by air.

27 Apr. Major General Hopkinson arrives ALGIERS from U.K. and after discussions with Major General Browning goes to MASCARA (arriving 30 Apr).

3 May. Major General Hopkinson and Lt.-Col. Marshall left MASCARA for CAIRO. Delayed at ALGIERS owing to change of operational plan.

6 May. Official date of assumption of Command of 1 Airborne Division by Major General Hopkinson. 51 Wing (60 and 62 Groups) allotted for training and operations.

10 May. G.O.C. sees General Montgomery in CAIRO and after discussions receives orders for Airborne Operations in Operation HUSKY. Airborne Division placed under command 13 Corps. Conference at A.F.H.Q. to decide on organisation of Airborne Base. 1 Para Bde concentrates at MATMORE.

15 May. G.O.C. asked by A.F.H.Q. to advise on use of airborne forces in connection with Operation CORKSCREW (capture of PANTELLERIA).

16 May. Second convoy sailed from U.K. Composition:- Div H.Q. Lt Regt, R.A. 261 Fd Pk Coy, R.E. 1 Air Landing Bde (1 Border. 2 S. Staffs). 21 Indep Para Coy. Glider Pilots (100 pilots). 1 Air Landing Recce Sqn. 181 Fd Amb. H.Q., R.A.S.C. 250 Lt Comp Coy, R.A.S.C. 93 Comp Coy, R.A.S.C. 253 Comp Coy, R.A.S.C. A.D.O.S. Ord Fd Pk. H.Q., R.E.M.E. R.E.M.E. Workshops. 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6 L.A.Ds. Mobile Photographic & Enlargement Unit. Army Film & Photo Sec. Rear Parties.

17 May. Conference at MASCARA in which G.O.C. discloses plans to Brigade Commanders. Recce of KAIROUAN area.

18 May. A.F.H.Q. ordered one parachute bn to be made available for Operation CORKSCREW. (This order was cancelled on 21 May).

20/21 May. Recce of SICILY by Comds 1 and 2 Para Bdes and O.C. Glider Pilot Regt. Recce carried out by Beaufighters from MALTA.

23 May. Conference at Div H.Q. MASCARA at which outline plans were agreed from both ground and air aspects. The decision taken at this conference formed the basis of all future planning.

26 May. Remainder of Div arrived by sea at ORAN, including Commander, 1 Air Landing Bde.

10 Jun. 4 Para Bde, ex Middle East, concentrated in KAIROUAN area. 296 Sqn., R.A.F. concentrated at FROHA.

12/13 Jun. 1 Para Bn exercise. 13 Corps rehearsal in GULF of AQUABA attended by:- Deputy Comd Air Landing Bde. Bde Major 1 Para Bde. Deputy Comd 2 Para Bde. Signal Det. Air Landing Bde.

3 Jul. Co-ordinating conference - 2 Para Bde operation. Div Control Staff established at H.Q. 51 Wing and Base Operations established.

5 Jul. Co-ordinating conference - 1 Para Bde operation. 295 Sqn (A Flight) concentrated on E Strip.

8 Jul. General Montgomery visits 1 Airborne Division. Conference on Bomber Support attended by Brigade Commanders, A.O.C. 205 (L) Group and Commanders of Bomber Wings in the Group.

9 Jul. 1900 - 2000 hrs. 1 Air Landing Bde Group, with Divisional Commander, took off to invade SICILY.

10 Jul. 1 Air Landing Bde operating in SICILY. 2 Para Bde ready to operate. Postponed at 1830 hrs.

11 Jul. G.S.O.1. visits MALTA to obtain information. 2 Para Bde operation cancelled at 1600 hrs.

(a) Night D-1/D. Operation against LADBROKE. (Code name for SYRACUSE). Accompanied by an intense air bombardment of LADBROKE, an airborne force will be landed west of the port during the night D-1/D with the object of:-

(i) Seizing and holding the crossings over the rivers and canal at PONTE GRANDE 127293 to assist the advance northwards of 5 Div.

(ii) Operating against the town and port of LADBROKE by capturing successive objectives eastwards from (incl) power station 129312, such as will assist 5 Div in their subsequent attack against LADBROKE, and by taking immediate advantage of any favourable opportunity created by the air bombardment of the town.

(b) Night D/D+1. Operation against GLUTTON. (Code name for AUGUSTA). (The Airborne Division must be prepared to postpone this operation 24 hours if required). Accompanied by an intense air bombardment of GLUTTON, an airborne force will be landed NW of the town during the night D/D+1, or any subsequent night, with the object of:-

(i) Seizing and holding the river crossing at 041498 to facilitate the advance northwards of 5 Div.

(ii) Operating against town and port of GLUTTON by capturing objectives, the occupation of which will facilitate the subsequent attack of 5 Div, and by taking immediate advantage of a favourable opportunity created by the air bombardment of the town.

(c) Night D+2/D+3. Operation against river crossings PONTE DI PRIMOSOLE 942675. (The Airborne Division must be prepared to postpone this operation if required.) An airborne force will be landed during the night D+2/D+3 or any subsequent night with the object of seizing and holding the river crossing PONTE DI PRIMOSOLE 942675 to facilitate the advance northwards of 5 Div, with which the airborne force must be prepared to co-operate.

(d) Night D-1/D. Dummy parachute operations. To be indicated by the Corps Commander.

2. COMMAND. Commander 13 Corps has directed that each airborne force will in turn come under command 5 Div (or any other division which may take its place) as soon as the advanced elements of 5 Div arrive in the area occupied by the airborne force. As soon as each airborne force has completed its task, it is the intention of Commander 13 Corps to withdraw it with a view to embarkation and return to Airborne Base in Tunisia.

3. PLAN. This situation as regards available aircraft and gliders is still obscure. The following airborne troops are allotted to each of the three tasks and the decision as to exact composition of each force will be taken by the commander concerned in accordance with the development of the aircraft situation:-

Task (a) LADBROKE. Brigadier P.W. Hicks, DSO, MC. Force to be selected from:- 1 Air Landing Brigade Group. 4 Parachute Brigade. 1 Independent Parachute Company. 9 Fd Coy, R.E. 181 Fd Amb, R.A.M.C.

Task (b) GLUTTON. Brigadier E.E. Down. Force to be selected from:- 2 Parachute Brigade Group. One Airborne Anti-Tank Battery.

Task (c) PONTE DI PRIMOSOLE. Brigadier G.W. Lathbury. Force to be selected from:- 1 Parachute Brigade Group. One Airborne Anti-Tank Battery.

Task (d) DUMMY PARACHUTE OPERATIONS. Dummies. Simulators rifle. Simulators machine gun. Other amusing devices.

4. METHOD. The landings in each case will be made in moonlight during the early part of the night. It is hoped also to carry out organization and moves prior to assaults during moonlight. Operations commenced in moonlight or darkness will be developed after dawn.

5. NOTE. This draft plan has not yet been discussed with the Allied Air Forces concerned in the operation and may have to be amended as a result of discussion which will be held at Algiers on 14 or 15 May.

This is a straightforward operation by glider-borne troops and in my opinion the following results will be achieved:

(a) The river crossing at PONTE GRANDE will be secured by midnight and held. Should the enemy succeed in destroying the bridge, every effort will be made to secure and hold an alternative crossing. Should this fail, the results of R.E. reconnaissance will be wirelessed to 5 Div.

(b) The approaches to LADBROKE from the direction of the above bridge will be cleared of enemy troops by 0800 hrs.

(c) The western outskirts of the town will be occupied by troops of 1 Air Landing Brigade by 0800 hrs. The following localities will be included: The Power Station. The Railway Station. The Seaplane Station.

(d) Should the results of the air action against LADBROKE be such that the enemy's power of resistance is materially reduced, it is possible that the Air Landing Brigade will have occupied the port as far as the swing bridge connecting the old town with the mainland. I have given orders that no attack is to be made on the old town; nor will any attempt be made to occupy the residential area to the north of the port.

(e) Every encouragement will be given to any inclination on the part of the garrison to surrender.

(a) Order to launch the operation. The first aircraft will take off at the Airborne Base at approximately 1800 hrs. The order, by code word, must therefore be received at Air Base Headquarters, for distribution to the various aerodromes, not later than 1700 hrs. I suggest that the Corps Commander should make his decision not later than 1615 hrs.

(b) Conditions under which the operation can be launched with a reasonable prospect of success. The operation is planned under the assumption that 103 aircraft (for parachute infantry and a few gliders) will be available from those used in the first operation. Information as to the numbers actually serviceable from time to time will be furnished to H.Q. 13 Corps by Airborne Base. Commander Airborne Division, or a senior staff officer at H.Q. 13 Corps will be able to indicate what effect any reduction in the number of aircraft will have on the operation. As regards the situation on the ground, I believe that the following conditions should obtain at the time fixed for the attack in order to justify its being launched;

(i) The landing area for the parachute and glider-borne force must be reasonably free from enemy troops.

(ii) The situation in regard to enemy A.A. defences, which is already a disturbing factor, shall not have deteriorated. The aircraft are not armoured and have to fly straight and level for a considerable distance at a height of 300 to 500 feet. They are thus vulnerable to all kinds of flak.

(i) The river crossing at 041498 should be captured and occupied by 0200 hrs. Should the bridge be destroyed, alternative crossing places will be found and information wirelessed to 5 Div.

(ii) By 0600 hrs the port of GLUTTON will be occupied as far south as the bridge linking the island with the mainland. The Commander 2 Parachute Brigade has orders not to attempt an attack on the island.

(b) Conditions under which the operation can be launched with a reasonable prospect of success. The operation is planned under the assumption that 83 of the aircraft employed on the two previous operations will be available and that a further 30 will be forthcoming from those used in the American attack. As in the second operation, information regarding the serviceability of aircraft will be available at H.Q. 13 Corps. The situation on the ground at the time contemplated for the airborne attack is likely to be complicated by the proximity of the defences of the FUSTIAN (Code Name for CATANIA) aerodrome and by the fact that the River SIMETO may be used by the enemy as part of the southern defences of the town of FUSTIAN. In my opinion the operation can be launched with every prospect of success provided that:

(i) The landing area for the parachute and glider-borne force must be reasonably free from enemy troops.

(ii) The opposition to be expected from enemy flak over the landing area has been largely neutralised by the measures provided for in the plan.

(i) A determined attempt to capture the bridge intact, by surprise, is to be made and the prospects of success are favourable.

(ii) As far as can be foreseen, the possibility of finding an alternative crossing for vehicles is not encouraging. R.E. reconnaissance will be carried out and information will be wirelessed to the formation concerned.

(iii) The occupation of the high ground to the south of the bridge has not been given to the airborne force as one of its objectives, but certain features must of necessity be occupied as part of the brigadier's plan for holding the crossing.

(iv) As opportunity offers, every effort will be made by the airborne troops to co-operate in the attack northwards of the leading formation of 13 Corps.

I understand that, on completion of its task, each of the three airborne brigade will be withdrawn from HORRIFIED (Code name for SICILY) by sea for return to the Airborne Base in TUNISIA where it will prepare all further operations under the orders of Force 141. The withdrawal, either over beaches or through ports, should present little difficulty, as the only vehicles will be a few jeeps and six-pounder guns; but in order that the Airborne Division shall be ready for further operations with the minimum of delay, it is desirable that each airborne brigade be sent to as close to SOUSSE as possible.

A revised Plan was forwarded to all concerned on 20 June. The only major change is the postponement of the first glider landing (P hour) on night D-1/D, which, on the recommendation of the Air Staff, will now take place at 2210 hrs instead of 2150.

With the assistance of 51 Troop Carrier Wing, Army Air Corps, training has been carried out according to plan and rehearsals for each operation have taken place. The Division is now moving to the Airborne Base. The conclusions reached during training in regard to the glider-borne operation on D-1/D, have confirmed the assumption on which the plan was made. The landing of gliders by moonlight is a perfectly feasible operation and the casualties from crash landings are unlikely to be excessive. The glider pilots will have little difficulty in locating the landing areas. The Air Landing Brigade, I consider, is adequately trained for the tasks it has been given to do. Full scale rehearsals have been held. Detailed briefing of junior commanders and men will be carried out later. The training of the two parachute brigades, for the second and third operations, has not resulted in a similar feeling of optimism. Notwithstanding the excellent training carried out by the American air crews, progress made in dropping parachutists with accuracy by moonlight has been disappointing, but not markedly so. The effects on the operation are discussed later. The ground training of these two brigades has produced good results and I am satisfied that, after detailed briefing, they will be well fitted for their respective tasks. The recent epidemic of scarlet fever was confined mainly to one company of the R.A.S.C. and has not affected the training of the Division.

The situation in regard to the American aircraft and gliders is most encouraging and there seems to be no doubt that our requests, (104 - DC3 aircraft and 200 Waco gliders) will be met in full. The remainder were to be provided by the R.A.F. (10 Halifax, 30 Albemarle and 40 Horsa gliders) and here the position is not a happy one. The reasons are to be found, not in any lack of effort on the part of the squadrons, but in belated and inadequate arrangements at home. All possible steps are being taken and my own view is that 6 Halifax, 20 Albemarle and 16 Horsas will be available at D - 1. This will entail a reduction in the Air Landing Brigade's effort of about a company of infantry. The number of aircraft available for the second operation is dependent on the casualties incurred on the first. The third operation, in addition to those remaining from the second, will have the survivors of an American Group (originally 52 aircraft) from the first American Operation.

I have little to add to my previous comments on this operation. The reported development of enemy dispositions and defences, has not necessitated any change in plan. The landing areas still appear to be reasonably free from enemy troops. I believe that, with average luck, the allotted tasks will be carried out.

The time of take-off from Base is now 1945 hrs. The despatch of the order to launch the operation can therefore be delayed if necessary until say, 1815 hrs, (allowing ½ hour for transmission to Airborne Base and 1 hour for distribution to the various airfields). My previous remarks as to the conditions under which the operation can be launched still holds good. The difficulties have been somewhat accentuated by the reported increase in enemy flak positions and requests have been made for these to be dealt with by air action. To these must be added the doubts which have arisen during training as to the ability of pilots accurately to locate dropping zones, which in this case are not easy to find. A combination of these two factors naturally reduces the probable number of parachute infantry who will be available for the assault. On the other hand, if the landing area is thought to be reasonably free from enemy troops and if the flak is considered to have been largely neutralized, there is no reason at all why the risks of inaccurate dropping should not be taken. Many of those dropped wide will become effective at a later stage in the operation.

Here again the time of take off has been postponed until 1945. The despatch of the order to launch the operation can, if necessary, be delayed until 1815 hrs. To my previous remarks I would add that the increases in anti aircraft positions in the area concerned are a little disturbing and there is also the reported arrival of the 104 Italian Division. On the other hand, the dropping zones alongside the river are far easier to locate than those in the GLUTTON Operation. The conditions under which I believe the operation might well be launched remain as before, but I feel myself that the chances of achieving these conditions have been reduced by the latest developments in the enemy's preparations for defence.

The arrival of more up-to-date information regarding the enemy's dispositions may necessitate minor changes, such as alternative dropping zones and landing areas. I am assuming that there will be no objection to such changes so long as they do not affect other troops. The timings of the various operations will not be changed, nor will the objective.

In the event of the premature surrender by any part of the Italian forces, an airborne force to consummate the event could be produced at quite short notice.

1. Certain bomber tasks in support of Airborne Operations were requested by 1 Airborne Division and submitted to Force 141 on 23 May.

2. A conference on the whole subject of air support for Airborne Operations was held at H.Q. Force 141 on 22 June, and the executed order was given by H.Q. N.A.A.F. in an instruction dated 5 July under the title "Diversionary Air Operations D - 4 to D + 3". It was clear from this that all requests in connection with the operations to be carried out by Air Landing Bde and 2 Para Bde had been accepted, but the request for the neutralisation by bombing of the southern A.A. defences of CATANIA airfield between 2215 and 2340 hrs on the night of 1 Para Bde operation was not incorporated, and Lt.-Col Walch stated verbally on 8 July that this task had not been accepted, and that it would be carried out by fighters.

3. Previous to the issue of the N.A.A.F. instruction, General Browning instructed us to get into touch with 205 Bomber Group, who would carry out the bombing. The first approach was accordingly made on 3 Jul, but at this time the Group had received no instructions on the matter from N.A.S.A.F., and little progress could, therefore, be made, though Group Captain Simpson, the S.A.S.O. of the Group, was most co-operative and helpful. He agreed to attend a conference at a later date, by which time it was hoped that he would be in possession of the necessary instructions from N.A.S.A.F.

4. On 7 Jul Lt.-Col Goldsmith again visited 205 Group to arrange for a conference. Group Captain Simpson was still without instructions, but agreed to attend a conference with the Wing Commander on the following day to discuss the details of the bombing plan in relation to the ground operations.

5. The conference was held on 8 Jul with most satisfactory results. The report of the decisions taken is attached. (The task under para 4 of this report is included because it was not then known that it had not been accepted.) It should be noted that Group Captain Simpson was still without official instructions to carry out these tasks.

6. On 9 Jul Lt.-Col Goldsmith visited 205 Bomber Group to confirm final details in connection with the night's operation. Air Commodore Simpson (now A.O.C.) had that morning received the first confirmation that the night's target would be as already agreed with us, but there was still no suggestion that this task had any connection with ground operations, nor was the information given the Group by N.A.S.A.F. at any later time. The task was eventually carried out according to plan by 70 aircraft.

7. On 10 Jul Lt.-Col Goldsmith again visited the Group in connection with 2 Para Bde operation and it was agreed to set up a wireless link with Airborne Base in order to pass back news of any postponement as quickly as possible. This arrangement functioned satisfactorily on the evening of 10 Jul, when the operation for that night was, in fact, postponed.

8. The possibility of postponement was not included in the minutes of the conference on 22 Jun, nor in the N.A.A.F. directif of 5 Jul, but was referred to in a letter from Force 141 to N.A.T.A.F., copy to N.A.A.F., dated 7 Jul (141F/7702/ATA).

9. On the morning of 11 Jul M.A.C. intimated Force 141 that in view of the risk of further postponement, they could not accept the possible loss of effort involved in standing by a larger bomber force for an operation that might not take place, and that accordingly the available sorties would be reduced to 30 and that definite information as to whether the operation would or would not take place must be received by 205 Group not later than 1700 hrs. As a result of this it was agreed by the Deputy Commander, 2 Para Bde, to allot the reduced effort in the proportion of 10 sorties divided between AUGUSTA and CATANIA between 2200 and 2330 hrs and 20 on AUGUSTA between 0330 and 0345 hrs. The operation was finally cancelled at 1707 hrs.

10. The 1 Para Bde operation was prepared on the assumption that there would be no diversionary bombing (see para 2) and troops and pilots were briefed accordingly. At 1800 hrs on 13 Jul Lt.-Col Wright (Force 141) rang up to say that there would now afterall be diversionary bombing on CATANIA airfield between 2305 and 2315 hrs. Lt.-Col Goldsmith then spoke to W/Cdr Mills (Ops, 205 Group) who expressed surprise at the news that this bombing task was connected with Airborne operations. The A.O.C. then spoke and stated that the bombing would be accompanied by flares, that as he was unaware of the Airborne aspect of the operation he had not got his more experienced crews on the tasks, and that with the proportion of inexperienced crews that would be carrying it out he was not at all happy that they would be able to keep within the bomb-line. In addition, a proportion of bombs 6 to 12 hrs delay had been ordered. All these factors were unfavourable from the Airborne aspect, nor was the bombing timed as had been originally requested. The A.O.C. expressed the view that to carry out the task as planned (and there was no time for changing it) would be hazardous to the Airborne operations and strongly recommended its substitution by an attack on CATANIA. In the absence of the Base Commander, Lt.-Col Goldsmith accepted this suggestion and airfields were informed of the change. Finally at 1915 hrs W/Cdr Mills rang up to say that the whole Group had been ordered at maximum effort against a priority target elsewhere.

11. The following conclusions are to be drawn from the above statement of facts:-

(a) Once the tasks asked for by Airborne Forces had been approved by the A.O.C. in C. no time should be lost in authorising direct contact between the Airborne formation and Bomber formation concerned. The Bomber formation must receive this authorisation through Air channels.

(b) A clear distinction must be drawn between diversionary and support bombing. The seeds of future difficulties were sown in the minutes of the meeting on 22 Jun which included under the heading "Diversionary Attacks" all bombing tasks irrespective of their true nature. There was, therefore, nothing to suggest to the Air Staff that any of the attacks were in close support of ground operations, unless the information was given in a document which had not reached this H.Q. If the Air Staff had realised that certain of the tasks involved close co-ordination between air and ground in such matters as bomb-line, time limits, detailed targets etc. it is impossible to believe that they would not have issued orders to the bomber formation concerned to hold conference with the Army.

(c) The tasks should be presented initially in the form of the subject to be attained rather than reference to the specific target. As an example the minutes of 22 Jun record the support asked for by 1 Para Bde in the form "A.A. Defences South side of CATANIA Airfield". If it had been put in the form "Neutralisation and distraction of A.A. Defences of CATANIA Airfield during the period of dropping" it seems at least possible that this task might have been accepted instead of refused.

(d) The possibility of postponement of an operation must be made clear from the start, and the effort allotted by the Air Staff must be made with this possibility in mind. This would avoid a sudden and arbitrary reduction of effort at a late hour on the grounds of possible postponement.

(e) In the case of all support bombing tasks there must be a conference on a formation level at which representatives of all concerned are present. If distances between Bomber H.Q. and Airborne H.Q. do not permit of easy direct contact (they did in this case), a Liaison Officer representing the Airborne Commander should be established at Bomber H.Q. There must also be direct wireless communication between the two H.Q.

A meeting was held at H.Q. 1 Airborne Division on 8 July to discuss the above. The following were present:-

Brigadier Hackett

Group-Captain Simpson

Commanders of Wings

Representatives

Lt.-Col. Goldsmith

Major Maguire

- S.A.S.Q. 205 (B) Group.

- 205 (B) Group.

- 1 Para Bde. 2 Para Bde. 1 Air Landing Bde. 51 Troop Carrier Wing.

- H.Q., 1 Airborne Division.

The relevant tasks detailed in N.A.A.F. directif dated 5 July were discussed as follows:-

It was agreed that the area of the bombing target should be within the area of SYRACUSE town, bounded on the north by a line running from excl seaplane base to PORTO PICCOLO, and on the south by bridge 148305, except that specially selected pilots would bomb the seaplane base and railway station. Group-Captain Simpson could not guarantee complete immunity to our own troops, but it was agreed that this need not affect the plan, that our troops would not cross the line CANALE PISIMATTA before 0245 hrs and that no bombing in the area above delineated would take place after 0245 hrs. Any aircraft over the target would drop their bombs on the old town (i.e. south of bridge or in the area of C. FARRUGIA across the bay south of SYRACUSE). 250 lb bombs would form the main armament of the attack.

One third available effort. This bombing is a diversion during the period of parachute dropping.

Two third available effort. Bombing should be restricted to east of the line of the 07 North-South Grid. Our troops will not cross the line junc 056503 - x rds 048518 before 0345 hrs. Any aircraft arriving after 0345 hrs should dump their bombs away from the target area. Armament will be based on 250 lb. bombs.

Object - to cover landing of para troops in area to south of CATANIA Airfield by neutralising A.A. defences. Bombline - southern edge of airfield. A further conference will be arranged in connection with this operation.

Dates. Tasks 2, 3 and 4 have no definite date assigned to them at present. 1 Airborne Division will inform 205 Bomber Group as early as possible on the dates at present planned whether or not the operation will take place on that date.

1. Dummy parachutists were dropped over the island of SICILY on the nights 9/10 and 13/14 Jul. The object was to confuse the defences and mislead them as to the landing and dropping zones actually used for the airborne attack on each of those nights.

3. The first type of dummy is a plain hessian dummy man about 20 ins high with legs filled with sand. A second type is similar to the first but with an attachment on the back of the dummy that fires detonators on landing to simulate rifle fire. Each dummy is attached to a small cotton parachute, and from a distance it is not easy to distinguish a dummy from a real parachutist. The parachutes are operated by a static line in the same way as a statichute. The proportion of simulators to plain dummies should be one simulator in every three dummies.

4. Pintail bombs are small metal bombs designed to fire a Verey light on hitting the ground. Four or five per aircraft appears enough.

5. There is no doubt that these dummies and pintail bombs are potentially a first class form of deception, though what effect they had in SICILY one cannot say at this stage.

R.A.F. Formation

326 Wing R.A.F.

114 Sqn.

18 Sqn.

3 South African Wing.

21 Sqn.

24 Sqn.

12 Sqn.

Night 9/10

4 Bostons.

Night 13/14

6 Bostons.

4 Baltimores.

7. (a) Details of Drop. All pilots reported having found the correct D.Z. The runs were made at approx. 180 m.p.h. and at a height of 1000 feet above ground level. The time of each run varied between 15 secs and 2 mins, the longer times were due to gunners throwing dummies out in the wrong order and so getting static lines tangled with each other.

(b) Reports of Failures. Two cases of the anchor cable breaking were reported. This can be counteracted by using a double piece of static line cord, or cord of equivalent strength. A number of pintails failed to fire. This was entirely due to the fact that the gunners were unable to remove the safety pins by hand. This difficulty can be overcome by splitting the pin in half and replacing it before loading into aircraft.

(c) Reports on Ground Activity. A number of pilots reported rifle fire; this may be due to the simulators or ground troops firing at the dummies. A great deal of confusion must have been caused by the large numbers of Verey lights, which in many cases lit up the chutes, and the firing caused by the simulators.

Twenty dummies are loaded into each aircraft, seven with simulators and thirteen without. They are arranged ten on either side of the fuselage in four separate piles (see sketch). The front two piles each consist of two with simulators and two without, the simulators being underneath. The port rear pile has two simulators on the bottom and 4 plain on the top; the starboard rear pile has one simulator on the bottom and 5 plain on top. The piles are arranged as close together as possible with the logs pointing aft. The front pile must be as close to the escape hatch as possible without fouling the door. The static line of each chute is threaded on to the anchor cable running along each side of the fuselage in the order in which they are thrown out; this order is shown by the numbers on the sketch. The aft end of the anchor cable is attached to the strong point holding the bottom gunner's safety belt. The forward end is attached to the bracket securing the top gunner's armour plate to the fuselage. When the dummies are in position, a cord is tied to the buckle of the safety belt and drawn over the top of the dummies so as to prevent them falling forward on take-off. The other end of the cord can be secured to any convenient strong point.

(a) The simulators are operated by the static line pulling a split pin out of a percussion igniter. Before loading the ends of the split pin must be closed and the pin partially withdrawn. Care must be taken to see that the pin and the cord are in straight line. For details see sketch in Appendix "A".

(b) Before loading pintail bombs withdraw the safety pin, split it in half and replace one half. For details see sketches 1 & 2, Appendix "B".

The dummies and pintails are thrown out through the escape hatch by the bottom gunner. The pilot should warn the bottom gunner 5 minutes before he reaches the D.Z. This will give him time to cut the cords holding the dummies in position and to make sure that nothing is fouling the static lines. When the plane is over the D.Z. the gunners will throw out 10 dummies and 2 pintails; the pilot then turns and makes another run, this time the gunner throws three pintails first, then the remainder of the dummies. The gunner should aim at dropping each stick in 12 seconds. NOTE. Before throwing pintails the safety pins must be removed.

The dummies were supplied by the War Office, the fire simulators were made partly by a Bomb Disposal Company in ALGIERS and partly by 261 Field Park Company R.E. (Airborne).

There appears no reason why dummies should not be thrown from any kind of aircraft. But the method of packing them in the aircraft may have to be altered to suit the type. Moreover it is preferable for the pilots to fly in a manner somewhat similar to those dropping real parachutists. Consequently, if it is decided to use dummies, the squadrons detailed to drop them should be detailed early so that preliminary arrangements between H.Q., 1 Airborne Division and the squadrons can be made in adequate time.

Having decided to drop dummies it is important not to disclose this fact prematurely to the enemy. At the same time many telephone conversations and administrative arrangements are necessary and dummies should therefore be given a code word early in the planning so that they can be referred to freely without prejudicing security. In this operation they were referred to by the R.A.F. Squadrons and R.E. Units concerned as "WHITE ELEPHANTS" and other appropriate code names are not beyond the wit of man.

A factor to be remembered in dropping these dummies from Boston and Baltimore aircraft is that the bottom gunner fire his gun until the dummies have been dropped and this may rule out certain areas which otherwise would be suitable D.Zs.

The following directive was received from Major-General Airborne Forces. It was dated 11 Jun. 43 and was agreed with H.Q., Force 141.

(b) Providing from Dump manned by R.A.S.C., 1 Airborne Div at KAIROUAN and from Dump manned by TUNISIA DISTRICT at SOUSSE all stores for Airborne Supply for British Forces (Army and R.A.F.) and American commun user stores and loading them on to aircraft in KAIROUAN area as ordered by 'Q' reps Force 141. All stores from SOUSSE dump will be conveyed to KAIROUAN area by TUNISIA DISTRICT as required. All stores at KAIROUAN area will be packed in containers and baskets before D day by 1 Airborne Div.

(d) Provide personnel in aircraft to drop stores by parachute, from KAIROUAN area.

2. 1 Airborne Div are NOT responsible for the actual dumps of airborne supply stores except those of 1 Airborne Div itself, and the dump in KAIROUAN area, nor are they responsible (except as above) for any American airborne supply. They are not responsible in any way for airborne supply except those despatched by air from KAIROUAN airfields.

3. All supplies to be dropped by parachute will be sent from KAIROUAN area, even if this means bringing them in from TUNIS, BONE etc."

4. An R.A.S.C. captain was attached to Force 141 in an advisory capacity. He worked out the requirements for Eighth Army.

5. A/Q and C.R.A.S.C. visited A.Q.M.G. Force 141 on 15 Jun and details of the commodities to be held were laid down in 141F/4465/1/Q dated 12 Jun addressed to A.F.H.Q. Details of the Supplies and Stores for Force 343 were to be worked out by the American staff concerned and were to be issued later. No details of American stores were subsequently received.

6. Arrangements were made with H.Q. 51 Wing for two supply airfields to be used for Emergency Sup Dropping.

7. C.R.A.S.C. arrived at KAIROUAN on 25 Jun and on 26 Jun inspected stores which had already been dumped by SOUSSE area in the Div area and approved in general the areas for Dumps of Sups, P.O.L. and Amn respectively. On 28 Jun C.R.A.S.C. visited SOUSSE area and discovered the existence of various important documents, copies of which had not been sent to 1 Airborne Div.

8. No rep of A.F.H.Q., TUNISIA DISTRICT or SOUSSE area visited 1 Airborne Div and owing to the distance it was not possible to visit any but the latter.

(ii) By units of Eighth Army and Seventh U.S. Army through Army H.Q. to H.Q. 15 Army Group, thence to Base Ops.

(b) A/Q and C.R.A.S.C. were among the officers at Base Operations. C.R.A.S.C. had a pool of M/Cs at Base Operations to duplicate demands sent by L/T to R.A.S.C. Coys responsible for staffing the prepacked pannier dumps and Res Dumps respectively and also to duplicate messages to Airfield Controls.

(c) Attached to Airfield Control at each of the two Supply Airfields were 2 R.A.S.C. officers (1 to relieve the other), and these officers had under their control 4 x 3-ton lorries with sets of roller conveyors, 4 aircrews for pushing out panniers (airborne) and 4 M/Cs at each airfield.

(d) At the prepacked pannier dumps were:- R.A.S.C. officer i/c with 3 N.C.Os and 30 men as loaders and Staff for Report Centre. 25 N.C.Os and men as guards. 18 x 3-ton lorries.

(e) One Composite Pl of one R.A.S.C. Coy was responsible for staffing the Res Dumps and additional labour was provided as required from Coys. 80 N.C.Os and men were also provided by R.A.S.C. Coys for guard duties. Spare panniers were kept with spare equipment so that they could be packed automatically to replace issued from prepacked pannier dump. Balance of roller conveyors were kept at Res Dumps, a proportion being 'on wheels'.

(f) The R.A.S.C. officer i/c Amn was located with a small number of men at 21 A.A.D. so that additional amn could be drawn quickly as required.

(g) 12 additional aircrews, each of 4 men, were 'standing to' at one hour's notice in Coys lines, out of a total of 60 aircrews detailed for the operation.

(h) Reps of R.E. Sigs and Med were attached to C.R.A.S.C. H.Q. for technical advice on specialist stores of their respective departments.

(j) Loading tables for complete A/C loads were to be prepared by C.R.A.S.C. at Base Operations including the distribution of commodities to A/C. These were to be despatched by M/C to Officer i/c Prepacked Dump. Manifests, giving nominal rolls of aircrews, were to be prepared by R.A.S.C. Officer i/c each Airfield on receipt of Loading Table from Officer i/c Prepacked Dump.

(a) 500 tons amn and 250 tons sups and stores for 1 Airborne Div were drawn and dumped in Div Res Dumps between 29 Jun and 5 Jul.

(b) The 220 tons amn and stores for the Eighth Army arrived by 1 Jul, but the amn was lost when the Dump, including about 900 prepacked panniers, was destroyed by fire on 6 July. The deficiencies were made up in three days.

11. By D + 1 day, 2,300 panniers containing stores of all types had been packed and harnessed. This represented approx just over 50% of amn and stores held for Eighth Army and Seventh U.S. Army and 20% for 1 Airborne Div and necessitated the employment of 250 packers for just under 4 days.

12. There was difficulty in getting adequate supply by air equipment. At the last minute a search had to be made in order to locate roller conveyors, 100 lb breaking strain cord and extensions to static lines. The rollers did not, in fact, arrive until D + 3 and in the meantime it was necessary to improvise sets of rollers from whatever material could be found, in case a demand for supply by air should have been received. In addition, parachutes, panniers and harnesses have been in short supply, the total having risen after great effort to only 4,000 for all purposes of supply. It is considered that in operations on a large scale, the Div should have immediate access to at least 10,000 of each of these articles of common use.

1. Tac H.Q. embarked on L.S.P. DILWARA at SUEZ on 28 Jun, with wireless sets and trolleys, which had been obtained in the Middle East to assist the transportation of sets until the vehicles should be forthcoming. These, with their drivers, had been embarked in an M.T. ship at BEIRUT early in Jun. The G.S.O.1 (Lt.-Col. Gofton-Salmond) who had been detached from Force 141 to Force 545 as airborne adviser, was on the 13 Corps H.Q. ship, H.M.S. BULOLO, to continue in that capacity until the arrival of the Divisional Commander, who was landing by glider with 1 Air Landing Bde.

2. At 0830 hrs on 10 Jul Tac H.Q. went ashore at Beach 44 and after much heavy work succeeded in getting the wireless panniers and trolleys off the beach to the R.V. At 1100 hrs one of the cars 5-cwt allotted was found in the vehicle park, and was used to ferry equipment to a location close to H.Q. 5 Div, which was now being established ashore. At 1230 hrs the Divisional Commander was met; he remained with G.O.C. 13 Corps until 13 Jul, when he joined Tac H.Q.

3. At 1700 hrs on 10 Jul the situation at Tac H.Q. was as follows:- There had been no news of 1 Air Landing Bde except from isolated detachments. Communication had been established with Base and with H.Q. ship, but none with 1 Air Landing Bde. D.A.Q.M.G. (Major Cowan) was missing. He had been severely injured by bomb blast on the beach, where he went to look for the remainder of the transport.

4. Transport consisted of 1 serviceable jeep, 2 jeeps rendered unserviceable by sea water and 1 jeep damaged by bomb and unserviceable. The lack of a driver mechanic in the party was felt here, as had there been one he could have repaired at least two of the damaged vehicles. The transport situation was relieved slightly when, on the morning of 11 Jul, a horse and cart was commandeered, and with its aid a part of the H.Q. with a 5 C set moved forward and established itself alongside H.Q. 1 Air Landing Bde in SYRACUSE, where it was later joined by the remainder of the H.Q. The H.Q. was instrumental in making a number of administrative arrangements for 1 Air Landing Bde, including rations and evacuation.

5. The A.D.M.S., who had landed by glider with 1 Air Landing Bde, made contact with A.D.M.S. 50 Div and 5 Div during 10 Jul, and arranged for the evacuation of casualties. Divisions were unable to render a great deal of assistance in the way of providing stretchers, blankets or medical comforts, owing to the acute shortage of medical stores, but finally three ambulances were loaned by 50 Div and with these and a captured Italian ambulance, evacuation of 1 Air Landing Bde casualties to 141 M.D.S. at CASSIBILE was completed by dawn on 11 Jul. The absence of any previous medical liaison was felt here, and it was apparent that a medical representative should have been included in Tac H.Q., who could have made contacts in the Middle East before embarkation.

6. On 13 Jul Tac H.Q. moved back to H.Q. 13 Corps where it was joined by the Divisional Commander. Its transport was by now augmented by a Fiat car, the late property of the Fascist leader in SYRACUSE.

7. It was now necessary to make arrangements for gaining touch with 1 Para Bde, whose operation was to take place that night (13/14 Jul). It was considered that the range from the present location of Tac H.Q. would be too great to establish reliable communication with a 22 set, and a step up therefore went forward to H.Q. 50 Div. Owing to the damage to the other 22 set it was necessary to take the only other available set to complete this link, which was then on the H.Q. ship with Lt.-Col. Gofton-Salmond, who had remained there in anticipation of the F.O.O. reports that would be received there when the naval F.O.Os accompanying 1 Para Bde opened up. The step up with 50 Div thus consisted of one 22 set and one 68 set, which was used by the C.R.E. for engineer intelligence.

8. In anticipation of 1 Para Bde's arrival on the battlefield, the A.D.M.S. had made arrangements with 50 Div for assistance, and liaised with the A.D.S. and R.A.P. closest to the previously decided position which 1 Para Bde Dressing Station would occupy. No contact was established with 1 Para Bde, but soon after midday on 14 Jul 4 Armd Bde reported that they were in touch, and that evening the Bde was relieved, having been forced by weight of numbers to withdraw to the South, but not before their main task of saving the bridge had been fulfilled.

9. Having made arrangements for the evacuation of 1 Para Bde, Tac H.Q. left by air for Airborne Base on 16 Jul with the Divisional Commander, leaving behind one officer with a wireless set as a direct link with H.Q., 1 Airborne Division.

10. Owing to restrictions on sea transport, the H.Q. was composed on a bare minimum of personnel, and there were no men available to give their attention to such matters as administration, sanitation and cooking. The H.Q. was not, therefore a self-contained unit and could not have functioned for a protracted period. The troops were fresh from England and had no experience of knowledge of how to make themselves comfortable in the field, or how to set about organising themselves.

11. The 22 sets were unsatisfactory throughout, as they were swamped by the high power sets at Corps H.Q., and though a trial was made of moving them to a distance from Corps H.Q., the interference was not markedly reduced.

12. The decision to land a Tac H.Q. by sea proved itself sound in principle. The private link it provided with Base Operations proved invaluable when, as was often the case, the Eighth Army net was congested with high priority messages.

1. The Division mobilized and proceeded overseas in stages. A.D.O.S. and Staff arrived with the last party, as it was not possible to detach an adv party while mobilization orders were still coming out, and G.1098s being published. An officer and Sec of Ord Fd Pk was, however, sent ahead to deal with Ord matters.

2. Units of the Division left England equipped with all essential items for operations, even if not 100% to G.1098. Stores and equipment to refit 1 Para Bde and to equip 4 Para Bde each to 100% were reported by War Office to have been shipped ahead. On arriving in North Africa approx one month after 2 Para Bde and units travelling in the first convoy, it was therefore assumed that the Div. could be virtually ready for war. The actual position on arrival, however, was found to be as follows:-

(a) Instead of having been refitted 1 Para Bde had, since coming out of the line, lost more equipment on exercises. They had received no Parachutist equipment since the 'Namble' shipments of October 1942.

(d) All units had lost a lot of their stores in transit and a lot had been damaged in transit. This appeared to have been due to the fact that:-

(i) Ships at Oran had been unloaded without any consideration as to handling and sorting of cases.

(ii) Units had not been allowed to collect their own trailers from docks, but had to collect any trailer, and sort out afterwards.

(iii) Owing to the necessity for every rail wagon to be unloaded between Oran and Mascara and re-loaded on to the narrow gauge, a great deal of equipment and stores were lost or damaged, due to careless handling by disinterested personnel and the inherent dishonesty of the local population.

3. The shipments of equipment and stores arranged by War Office under codename 'Sebastian' were consigned to Algiers - 260 miles East of our first location and 600 miles West of our concentration area, with very indifferent communication both ways. These could obviously not have been originally consigned further East, as the area was not then clear of enemy occupation. The convoys carrying these stores arrived at Algiers after the last party of the Div had arrived at Mascara. By the time that they had been discharged and sorted the Div was already moving to concentration area. Consequently all stores had to be conveyed forward to Sousse area, and could not be issued until they had finally arrived and been sorted out again there. After some discussion A.F.H.Q. arranged a Coastal Steamer to bring on to Sousse those items which were most urgently required. This boat was sent off from Algiers without any priority. She was consequently treated by the shipping authorities as any other coaster, and had it not been for the good offices of the Port Commandant at Sousse, who accepted an assurance of the urgency, the boat would, in fact, have docked on or about 'D' Day. No advice was received from the War Office as to what times and what quantities of each had been shipped under 'Sebastian'. A.D.O.S., therefore, had to wait until they were actually received at this end before the information could be obtained.

4. A good deal of wasted effort was expended in preparing the Division for overseas owing to contradictory orders from the War Office. As an example in the United Kingdom the whole division was equipped with 350 c.c. Matchless motor-cycles which were all modified to tropical specification. After this had been done instructions were received to hand in all motor-cycles, a reissue being promised overseas. All unit and Ord Fd Park spares were based on the Division's holding of Matchless motor-cycles. When, on arrival in North Africa, units were issued with B.S.A. motor-cycles up to 50% of War Establishment, no spares of any kind existed for them in the Division.

5. The effort expended in the desertization of all vehicles also appeared unnecessary, as it was found on arrival in the theatre that these modifications were not required in the theatre, and they have all since been removed.

Since arriving in this theatre, repair of containers has been made a R.E.M.E. responsibility. The following points should be brought to light, so that the new containers could be modified to units requirements before delivery to the Division:-

(ii) Simplified type of catch to be fitted (dispensing with spring locking lever).

(iii) The present types E and F are fitted with bolts which are welded in the bottom plate. These bolts are not long enough to allow for the lighting boards to be fitted. The bolts have to be cut off with a hammer and chisel and in some cases drilled out. The centre of the bottom of the container has also to be drilled to allow for the wiring.

There is approx 2 man hours work per container to make it in serviceable condition for the unit. A good stock of container spares must be held.

7. Since the Division arrived in the theatre vehicle equipments have received a thorough testing by virtue of the long distances covered, often over indifferent roads. The "Jeep" has shown its ability to tow trailers and guns over long distances with full reliability but the 10 cwt airborne trailer has not stood up satisfactorily to the conditions; the chief troubles arising from hubs, wheels and tyres.

1. The Scheme for the employment of 1 Airborne Div. in Operation HUSKY, to effect the capture of SICILY produced three separate plans, each employing a Bde. Gp. All three operations were very similar, covering the capture of an important bridge, and the subsequent attack on a sea port town to N.E. of the bridge. The three operations were successively against SYRACUSE, AUGUSTA and CATANIA. The Bdes. to carry out these operations were respectively 1 Air Landing Bde., 2 Para. Bde. Gp. and 1 Para. Bde. Gp. Each Para. Bde. had under command one 6 pdr. A.Tk. Bty. to be landed by glider. A small Adv. Airborne Div. Party was to land by sea.

2. The first operation was scheduled to take place on night D-1/D expected to be night 9/10 July 43. The second operation was to be at call of Comd 13 Corps for night D/D+1, and the third for night D+3/D+4.

3. Approximately five hours after the airborne attack, a large British and American force was to land by sea, on the S.E. corner of the island, and advance in a Northerly direction.

4. 13 Corps was to land on the right flank, and advance northwards with all speed to take over the three areas from the airborne troops.

5. The Signal organization for each operation was very similar, involving the normal Bde. Comd nets, an Airborne Div. Comd net to each Bde. long range rear links from each Bde. and Adv. Div. back to Airborne Base in TUNISIA, and finally a link from each Bde. to the attacking ground tps. In the first Airborne operation, which was to take place while the main forces were at sea, the lateral to the ground troops, was to work on Broadcast principles, to 13 Corps H.Q. Ship. Once wireless silence for the sea-borne forces, was broken on landing normal communications would follow. Two alternative means of lateral communication were provided, one to remain on to H.Q. 13 Corps, until Adv. Div. took over, the other to be transferred to the assault Bde. as soon as satisfactory communication was established on the former. For the other two operations, lateral communications was to be provided by the Airborne Div. 'A' wave, and by a fixed Airborne lateral frequency on which all leading Bdes. and Divs. were to listen, from the time at which Airborne troops were to land.

This diversity of equipment was far from ideal, especially the inclusion of No.22 Sets, but this was forced by the necessity of a range of about 15 miles plus an adequate frequency coverage.