Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4

National Archives catalogue reference WO 171/392 and 393

Abbreviations

2 i/c 753793 AA AB A/BM Adjt ADMS ADS Adv A/L Amb Amn APO Armd Arty A/Tk Bde Bdy BLA BM Bn Br BRASCO Bty Cas CCP Ch CO Coln Comd Comn Conc Coy CRA CRASC DCLI Def Det Div DR DS DZ Est Fd FOO FOU FSO Fwd Gds GOC Gp GPR GSO Hosp Hvy i/c Indep Inf Infm IO JLO Junc KOSB LA Ldg LMG LO L of C Lt LZ Maint MDS MG MMG MO OC Offr O Gp Org Pl Pr Pro Pt RAP RASC Rd RE Regt Rep Res Resp Rly Rptd RT RV Ry SA Sec Sig Sitrep SMO SP Sqn Tac Tk Tp Tpt Veh Warof Wef WT Xrd

Second-in-Command Map Reference Anti-Aircraft Airborne Acting Brigade Major Adjutant Assistant Director Medical Services Advanced Dressing Station Advance Airlanding Ambulance Ammunition Army Post Office Armoured Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade Boundary British Liberation Army Brigade Major Battalion Bridge Brigade Royal Army Service Corps Officer Battery Casualties Casualty Collection Point Church Commanding Officer Column Command Communication Concentration Company Commander Royal Artillery Commander Royal Army Service Corps Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry Defence Detachment Division / Divisional Despatch Rider Dressing Station Drop Zone Establish Field Forward Observation Officer Forward Observation Unit Field Security Officer Forward Guards General Officer Commanding Group / Glider Pilots (if upper case) Glider Pilot Regiment General Staff Officer Hospital Heavy In-Command Independent Infantry Information Intelligence Officer Junior Liaison Officer Junction King's Own Scottish Borderers Light Automatics Landing Light Machine Gun Liaison Officer Line of Communication Light Landing Zone Maintenance Main Dressing Station Machine Gun Medium Machine Gun Medical Officer Officer Commanding Officer Orders Group Organisation Platoon Pounder Provost Point Regimental Aid Post Royal Army Service Corps Road Royal Engineers Regiment Representative Reserve Responsibility Railway Reported Radio Telephony / Right (if lower case) Rendezvous Railway Small Arms Section Signal Situation Report Senior Medical Officer Self-Propelled / Support (if lower case) Squadron Tactical Tank Troop Transport Vehicle War Office With Effect Wireless Telegraphy Crossroad

ANNEXURE 'L'

OPERATION "MARKET"

1 AIRBORNE DIVISION.

MEDICAL OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO.1.

Maps 1/25,000 GSGS 4427, GINKEL 388, ARNHEM 6NW

        I.  INFORMATION.  Issued verbally at Bde 'O' Gps.  No supporting medical units under command.

        II.  INTENTION.  To collect treat and hold wounded and sick of the Division until such times that they can be evacuated by air or rd.

        III.  METHOD.  Fd Ambs under comd Bdes.

                1st LIFT - 1 Para Bde and 1 Airlanding Bde.  (1)  181 (Airlanding) Fd Amb est a D.S. in area WOLFHEZEN 6680.  To remain open until evening of D+1 when Airlanding Bde withdraw to ARNHEM.  This D.S. will deal with cas from all D.Zs. and L.Zs. and from Airlanding Bde and 1 Para Bde in their initial tasks.  Surgery to be kept to absolute minimum as D.S. is only open for 36 hours.  (2)  16 (Para) Fd. Amb. establish C.C.Ps as required.  Evacuate to 181 (Air Ldg) Fd. Amb. D.S. at WOLFHEZEN in early stages.  Establish D.S. at ARNHEM when town is captured.  St. Elisabeth Hospital may be recced and used if suitable.

                2nd LIFT - 4 Para Bde and 1 Air Ldg Bde.  (1)  L.Z. and D.Z. casualties to D.S. at WOLFHEZEN in early stages.  (2) C.C.Ps. established as required.  (3) 133 (Para) Fd Amb D.S. to be established in 4 Bde Area in ARNHEM.  (Municipal hospital may be used if suitable).  (4) 181 (Air Ldg) Fd. Amb. D.S. to close at WOLFHEZEN as soon as possible after casualties have been evacuated to 16 (Para) Fd. Amb. D.S. at ARNHEM.  A small medical party may have to be left to deal with serious cas. unfit for moving.  D.S. re-opens Air Ldg Bde area ARNHEM (Deaconess Hospital may be used if suitable.

                3rd LIFT - Polish Para Bde.  C.C.Ps to be established as required.  D.S. opened in Bde Area.  A.D.M.S. will recce area in advance and meet S.M.O. on arrival in ARNHEM.

                RESERVE SECTION.  Report to D.S. at WOLFHEZEN and move with this unit into ARNHEM.

                EVACUATION.  May be by air or road not before D+3.  POW will NOT be evacuated from the area.

        IV.  SPECIAL TREATMENT.

                SURGERY  Life saving operations will only be performed in the initial stages, otherwise casualties will be prepared for evacuation.

                EXHAUSTION CASES  Will be evacuated to D.Ss in early stages and later to Corps Exhaustion Centres if necessary.

                V.D.  Will be treated in unit lines.

                BLOOD  Whole blood may be available on D+3.  It must be used within 36 hours of receipt.  It is hoped to establish a small Divisional Blood Bank in the local Refrigerated Store.

        V.  MEDICAL SUPPLIES.  As for previous planned operation.  There will be no medical re-supply on D day.

        VI.  AIR EVACUATION - TRANSPORT - HYGIENE.  Same arrangements as for Operation 'LINNET'.

        VII.  SIGN POSTING.  D.Ss will be clearly marked as soon as they are est.  Main crossings and entrances to the town should be suitably marked.  Pro will assist.

        VIII.  LIAISON WITH CIVIL MEDICAL AUTHORITIES.  Full co-operation must pertain between British and Dutch.  If hospitals are full, alternative accommodation must be found.

        IX.  INTERCOMN.  A.D.M.S. at Div. H.Q. ARTILLERIE PARK 7378.  Communication by D.R. from Fd. Ambs. at 0800 and 1800 hrs daily.

        X.  ACK.

(sgd) G.A. Warrack

Colonel, A.D.M.S., 1 AIRBORNE DIVISION.

APO England

14 Sep 44

ANNEXURE 'M'

1 AIRBORNE DIV WAR DIARY

[See Page 1 for a copy of the same]

ANNEXURE 'N'

OPERATION 'MARKET'

STORY OF 1 PARACHUTE BRIGADE

OUTLINE GROUND PLAN.

        1.  TASK.  The task of 1 Para Bde was to seize the main Rhine Br at ARNHEM and to hold it until the arrival of the remainder of 1 Airborne Div expected in the afternoon or evening of D+1.  The Bde would then continue to hold the inner perimeter of the bridge with one Bn as Div reserve.  Relief by 30 Corps was expected any time after 24 hrs.  In the event of the main bridge being blown, the Bde was to seize the Rly Br intact.

        2.  TROOPS.

                1 Para Bde with under comd - 1 Para Sqn R.E., 16 Para Fd Amb., 1 Airlanding A/Tk Bty (12 6-prs and 4 17-prs)., Sec Pro., Pl. R.A.S.C., 1 Airlanding Recce Sqn (less one Tp).

                In Support - 3 Air Landing Lt Bty (8 75 m.m.).

        3.  PLAN.  D.Z. and L.Z. NORTH of HEELSUM.  Time of landings.  Gliders 1330 hrs.  Paratps 1350 - 1410 hrs.  In general terms the plan was for 2 Para Bn to capture the Bridge moving by HEELSUM and thence along the rd running close to the NORTH bank of the RHINE.  This Bn then to hold the South end of the Br and the NORTH end facing WEST and N.W.  3 Para Bn to move at the same time by the main HEELSUM - ARNHEM Rd and to assist 2 Para Bn by approaching the Br from the NORTH, then to hold end of the Br facing N.E. and EAST.  1 Para Bn to move on orders of Bde H.Q., when it was clear that 2 and 3 Para Bns were satisfactorily launched, and to occupy the high ground just NORTH of ARNHEM to deny the enemy observation of the inner defensive perimeter and to control the approaches to the town from NORTH and N.W. from APELDOORN and EDE.  This Bn to retain One coy in Bde res about 753793.  Each Bn had under comd - One Tp A/Tk guns, Tp or Det R.E., Sec. Fd Amb, Two F.O.Os.  Bde H.Q. and remaining attached troops to follow 2 Para Bn.  16 Para Fd Amb to set up D.S. at ELIZABETH HOSP 727779.  1 Airlanding Recce Sqn less one tp was to land first and attempt a "coup de main" against the Bridge.  2 Para Bn route to be called 'LION'.  3 Para Bn route to be called 'TIGER'.  Rd EDE - ARNHEM to be called 'LEOPARD'.  1 Para Bn to move N.E. from D.Z. over Rly and then follow LEOPARD to edge of town.  1 Airlanding Bde would remain to protect DZ & LZ area for 2nd lift on D+1 and would deny approaches from WEST between LION and LEOPARD.

STORY OF WHAT HAPPENED.

        4.  The flight was excellent.  No flak until just before the drop which was perfect; dead accurate both for time and place.

        5.  R.V. arrangements worked satisfactorily and coloured smokes showed up well.  Bns were in touch with Bde H.Q. by wireless and L.O. within ½ hr.  Bns were about 100 per cent strength except for a few 3" mortars and P.I.A.Ts.  O.C. A/Tk Bty reported 11 out of 12 6-prs.  I do not know how many 17-prs arrived but the majority of Bren carriers landed safely.  There was no opposition on D.Z. or L.Z. but 2 Bn ambushed a number of German vehicles at HEELSUM - their R.V. - and took about 20 prisoners.  Dutch contacted on D.Z. said that there were very few Germans in ARNHEM.  2 and 3 Bns moved off soon after 1500 hours by which time they had their A/Tk guns and most of their tpt.  Slight delay in arrival of Bde H.Q. tpt.  In view of satisfactory drop and reports, I ordered 1 Bn to move about 1530 hrs.  My wireless Jeep arrived about then and I moved off via 'LION' with my I.O. - Capt. Taylor, telling B.M. to follow along with Bde H.Q. directly tpt arrived.  Before moving I heard that Recce Sqn had lost most of their tpt.  This meant that they could not carry out "coup de main" task and I ordered 2 and 3 Bns to move with all speed and, if necessary or possible, not to hesitate to send one Coy forward in Jeeps in view of probable light opposition.

        6.  About 1600 hrs I met C.O. 2 Bn about 666770.  His leading Coy 'A' - Major Tatham Warter - was in contact about 673772.  I told C.O. to by-pass opposition to avoid delay.  He said he thought it could be cleared easily.

        7.  Owing to reports of enemy in woods between LION and TIGER I returned via HEELSUM thence along TIGER.  There were a number of destroyed German cars on both routes and several dead Germans.

        8.  I contacted O.C. 3 Para Bn about 683785 at about 1630 hrs.  His leading Coy was also in contact just EAST of that point - B Coy, Major Waddy.  The Bn was rather strung out as the heavy weapons could not keep up.  Soon after I arrived two armd cars caused some trouble coming in from a side rd and knocking out two jeeps.  The 6 pr could not get into action quick enough.  The ground was excellent for delaying, with thick woods, well rided, and solid houses.

        9.  I decided to wait and watch events here and soon after my B.M. came up on the set and said the G.O.C. was not satisfied with the speed of our progress.  I, myself, was determined that we should not be delayed by minor opposition on the roads; I had already spoken to C.O. 2 Bn and now did so to C.O. 3 Bn in person and to Adjt 1 Bn on wireless.  I learned from Adjt 1 Bn that they were in contact with enemy forces estimated a Bn with four tanks about 675820 where their tanks had just reached LEOPARD.

        10.  Communications with 1 Para Bn were bad and from this time I had practically no more information from them.  In fact, their leading Coy "R" - Major Timothy - had run into very stiff opposition about this point and had suffered about 50 per cent casualties.  The remainder of the Bn had by-passed moving South and parallel to 'LEOPARD' and by 1900 hrs had reached Rd junc 690809.  They were about to push North on to LEOPARD when 5 tanks and 15 half-track vehicles passed x-rd 691811 moving West, while infantry were located digging in Wood 694809.

        11.  It was obvious that the enemy were now in the process of occupying the high ground astride LEOPARD in strength and Lt. Col. Dobie sent back for R Coy before bypassing to SOUTH again.  As 'R' Coy did not appear and were out of wireless touch, the 2 i/c was sent back while the Bn occupied a posn of all-round defence.

        12.  From now till 2200 hrs, spasmodic fighting went on and at that time 2 i/c returned to say that R Coy had 50 per cent casualties and could not get them out.  The C.O. sent all available tpt to help and 2 i/c was ordered to bring R Coy along.  At 0100 hrs R Coy still had not arrived and we will leave 1 Para Bn for the moment.

        13.  Meanwhile about 1730 hrs with 3 Para Bn, I had decided to return to my H.Q. when the enemy opened automatic fire on the road from the woods about BILDERBERG 679786.  C Coy - Major Lewis - was just moving up with orders to by-pass the enemy frontal opposition to the NORTH, moving to the railway and thence back to the main TIGER route further EAST.  The enemy appeared to be withdrawing in front of 'B' Coy while the rest of the Bn closed up to about 682787.

        14.  The enemy were still firing on a portion of the road about here from the NORTH and 'A' Coy - who had arrived about 1800 hrs, were ordered to send a patrol to investigate the thick country just NORTH of the rd.  About this time, the Div Comd appeared in a jeep and was shot at at the same point.  He said he was expecting Major Gough and part of the Recce Sqn to move up that rd and it was decided we should both wait till he arrived.  The enemy was still troublesome from NORTH of the rd and eventually about 1830 hrs Major Dennison took two Pls of 'A' Coy to deal with the opposition.

        15.  About 1800 hrs the enemy brought some heavy and most accurate mortar fire on the remains of 3 Para Bn in this area 680785.  There were a number of casualties and I decided to move this party - consisting of 'A' Coy less two pls, Tp R.E. and part of H.Q. Coy - out of this area and close up on the rest of the Bn who had moved East down the road.  At the same time Major Dennison and his two pls were ordered to rejoin us.  It was obvious that the enemy had an O.P. in the house or trees near the road and shortly after we left the area, very heavy mortar and Nebelwerfer fire came down.  We closed up on Bn HQ ¼ mile down the rd.  Among the casualties were Capt. Thesiger 2 i/c A Coy and the G.O.C's driver and operator.

        16.  It was now about 1930 hrs and dusk.  I decided with the C.O. that the Bn less C Coy should take up and all-round defensive position where they were about 690784.  C Coy to do the same wherever they were.  The G.O.C. was not in touch with Div H.Q. but I spoke to the B.M. on my set and told him that the Div Comd and myself would remain with 3 Bn for the night.  He told me that 2 Bn were progressing well and had reached the Rly Br 707765.  Their route - "LION" appeared to be the best approach to the Bridge.  Both of us were out of touch with 1 Bn, last heard of about 691811.  I ordered Bde H.Q. to follow on after 2 Para Bn.

        17.  At last light on D. Day I was not worried about the situation.  The enemy had certainly reacted quickly and were holding the two main rds from the WEST, TIGER AND LEOPARD, but 2 Bn were now making good progress after overcoming early opposition.  Owing to bad communications with 1 Bn I had not got a true picture of the scale of opposition confronting them.

        18.  Soon after dark, Major Dennison returned with two pls of A Coy; they had encountered a strong enemy position of about one bn in the area of the BILDERBERG.  Before receiving orders to withdraw they had overrun three M.G. posts killing about 9 Germans and taking 20 prisoners.  They had had about 20 wounded themselves.  3 Bn casualties now amounted to 4 killed and 35 wounded - several seriously.  The serious cases required immediate evacuation but, as patrols sent out later in the night found enemy both East and West of us on TIGER, it was impossible to evacuate them either back to 1 Air Landing Bde D.S. and WOLFHEZEN or forward to the ELIZABETH HOSP 726779 where the Bde D.S. was established.  This latter was, incidentally, confirmed by the Bn M.O. Capt. Rutherford, who telephoned the hospital on the civil line.  All casualties had, therefore, to be kept.

        19.  From now onwards, for the rest of the night, wireless ceased to function.  The 2 i/c Major Bush was sent to contact 'C' Coy, this he was unable to do, though he found a number of dead Germans and burnt and burning German ammunition lorries in their wake just short of the railway.  In fact this coy moved via the railway to the Bridge where it came under command 2 Para Bn.

        20.  About 2130 hrs, just before wireless finally failed, information came from the B.M. that 2 Bn were on the main Br which was intact.

        21.  The C.O. and I agreed during the night and as a result of patrolling, to disengage the Bn before first light and move South through OOSTERBEEK and thence via 'LION' to the bridge.

        22.  Meanwhile 2 Para Bn followed by Bde H.Q. and some attached tps including 16 Fd Amb, had progressed well.  The initial opposition had soon been outflanked.  An armoured car had caused some delay and casualties from the railway onwards.  C Coy moved South to the Rly Br, but it was blown before they could cross.  The C.O. expected opposition from DEN BRINK 7178 which overlooked the road and B Coy were ordered to occupy it - this they did in face of considerable opposition and after suffering casualties.

        23.  'A' Coy were able to move South of this feature and entered the town keeping close to the river.  Small parties of enemy were quickly dealt with and about 40 prisoners taken.  About 2000 hrs they arrived at the North end of the Br to find enemy tpt crossing from South North.  At 2045 an assault to seize the South end by one Pl of 'A' Coy - Lieut. Grayburn - was launched, but had to be abandoned in face of fire from a flak gun in a pillbox on the Br and from an armd car.

        24.  Meanwhile, wireless comn between Bn HQ and 'B' and 'C' Coys had broken down and the North end of the Br was consolidated by 'A' Coy, Bn H.Q. & H.Q. Coy & Bde H.Q.

        25.  A patrol was dispatched to contact 'B' Coy who had been ordered to the Pontoon Br 738775 to order them to cross the river by barge and seize the South end of the Br.  No contact was made and R.E. recce revealed the fact that there were no barges.  Actually, B Coy - less one platoon lost - arrived about 0500 hrs D+1 having met strong resistance at the Pontoon Br and suffered casualties.

        26.  During the night also, about one half 'C' Coy 3 Bn arrived.  It is not clear what happened to the rest of the Coy, but it is believed that the leading platoon were ambushed whilst approaching the bridge from the North in the dark.

        27.  The situation with 2 Para Bn at first light D+1 was that they were holding the North end of the bridge with a mixed force of approximately Para Bn strength and including one of their 6-pr A/Tk guns.  They were finally established in the strong buildings round the bridge and had already repulsed a determined counter-attack from the South of the bridge.

        28.  At 0430 D+1 3 Para Bn was successfully disengaged and moved S.E. through OOSTERBEEK to route 'LION'.  Considerable firing was heard to the North and N.W. but no resistance was encountered until after crossing the railway where there was some sniping from the South.  Finally 'B' Coy leading reached a point about 300 yards West of ELIZABETH Hospital 729779 before coming under fire from the A.A. positions South of the river and an armoured car on the road.

        29.  At this point - about 0630 hrs - the unwelcome discovery was made that the Bn had become split in half and that 'A' Coy, H.Q. Coy and all the transport including three out of four A/Tk guns and the G.O.C's. and my own wireless jeeps, were not following.  The reason for this serious mistake was that the move had begun in pitch darkness and that the C.O. had led the Bn very fast and by a somewhat circuitous route.  His Bn staff were very blameworthy that this occurred as I had personally sent several messages forward during the move to find out whether my jeep was following.

        30.  There was no wireless touch with the straying Coys and an effort was made to push on.  The A.A. fire was, to a certain extent, neutralized by 3" mortar and L.M.G. fire, though the only 6 Pr was lost by a direct hit from a 88 m.m. Flak gun.  'B' Coy infiltrated forward and by about 0830 hrs reported contact with some men from 2 Bn about 400 yards East of ELIZABETH Hospital.  This was probably their lost Coy - 'C' Coy.  My I.O. had, with the aid of a friendly Dutchman, spoken to the Div F.S.O. on the bridge.  He reported it held by one Coy of 2 Para Bn but was vague as to how much of 2 Bn was there.  Soon afterwards, an enemy counter-attack was reported coming from the town and consisting of infantry with one or two tanks.  As a result of this, 'B' Coy was concentrated and the Bn, consisting of Bn H.Q., 'B' Coy, Tp R.E. occupied some strong houses each side of the main rd just West of ELIZABETH Hosp.  Here we will leave them for the moment and return to 1 Para Bn.

        31.  At 0100 hrs D+1, since 'R' Coy had not arrived, guides were left and the Bn moved South with the object of reaching their objective via the town; they had heard that the bridge was in our hands, but had no comns to Bde H.Q.  Going through the woods was very difficult with A/Tk guns and transport.  An enemy post at X tracks about 697797 was driven out with casualties and at 0430 hrs, the Bn reached Rd junc 709783 and the leading Coy 'S' - Major Stark - encountered strong enemy resistance from astride the road 713782.  It will be remembered that at this time, 3 Para Bn was moving South from this same rd - route 'TIGER' - only about 1½ miles to the West.

        32.  Enemy resistance included armoured cars, M.Gs, 20 m.m. and mortars, 'S' Coy attacked round left flank and gained Northern part of enemy positions, inflicting casualties.  'S' Coy had 30 casualties.

        33.  At 0530 hrs, the C.O. received information through his F.O.O. that 2 Bn was in urgent need of reinforcements.  He decided to disengage and to by-pass via South and so to Bridge.

        34.  About 0700 hrs, 1 Para Bn picked up H.Q. Coy, 3 Para Bn which, it will be remembered, had become separated together with 'A' Coy from 3 Para Bn.  Soon afterwards the Bn ran into mortar and shell fire about Rly Br 712775.  The enemy were in strength astride the road at Houses 712226, in Factory 720774, and area Rly Br 715780.  Four armd cars and one tank were seen at this Br but moved to high ground 718778 which was strongly held.  It would appear from this that the enemy, having initially blocked the two main rds, TIGER and LEOPARD and inadvertently allowed 2 Bn and part of 3 Bn to get into the town, had now closed the last gap just after 3 Bn had passed and were holding in strength DEN BRINK and the houses and factory covering the route LION to the South of it.  Possibly the occupation of DEN BRINK by 'B' Coy 2 Bn on the previous evening had caused the enemy to withdraw from it and allow 3 Bn to slip through.

        35.  At 0830 hrs, 1 Bn less 'R' Coy and most of H.Q. Coy which was with 'R' Coy, plus H.Q. Coy 3 Bn, were held up by strong enemy resistance on the line of the rly.  The Bn had been moving and fighting almost continuously for 15 hours and 'S' Coy had about 30 per cent casualties - here we will leave them and return to 2 Bn on the Bridge.

        36.  At first light, Major Murray - O.C. 1 Para Sqn R.E. - did a careful recce of the bridge and found that it was not prepared for demolition.  During the morning, armd cars attempted to cross from the South, but ten armd cars and half tracks were destroyed by 6 prs and P.I.A.Ts.  Throughout this and succeeding days, the Bn position was heavily and continuously mortared, with little effect on the strongly built houses.  There was also a good deal of light flak from South of the river.

        37.  During the afternoon and evening a strong attack developed along the river bank from the EAST.  This attack was held until dark and two tanks were destroyed, one by 6-pr and one by P.I.A.T.  Just before dark the Germans burnt down four of the houses, Bde HQ only narrowly escaping a 'martyrs pyre'.

        38.  By last light on D+1, it was reported that 1 and 3 Bns could not get through, but there were reports in the evening that 11 Bn and 2 S. Staffs were on their way.

        39.  During the night some adjustments were made to the position and the Eastern flank strengthened.  Another counter-attack from the SOUTH was repulsed and Major Wallis 2 i/c killed.

        40.  We will return to 3 Para Bn just West of ELIZABETH Hosp.  The expected counter-attack developed about 0900 hrs and from then until about 1600 hrs the Bn was attacked at frequent intervals by infantry supported by mortars and a Mk IV tank and armd car.  The attacks were not pressed home and casualties were light.  Mortaring was ineffective except that Major Waddy - O.C. 'B' Coy - was killed in the open.  The Mk IV tank narrowly escaped destruction from Gammon bombs and, from then onwards, kept its distance.

        41.  Information received through the F.O.O. showed what was happening on the bridge and that they were receiving artillery support.  It was obvious that, although they were holding their own, they would soon need more information.  3 Bn F.O.O. was not in wireless comn with Control and could get no artillery support throughout.

        42.  Wireless communication to 'A' Coy was very bad but the Coy was understood to be just EAST of the rly - or a mile to our EAST - about 0900 hrs.

        43.  I would emphasise here that I still saw no cause for alarm in the situation.  The Bridge was ours.  The opposition ahead of us did not seem serious and we were only waiting for the rest of the Bn when we would be strong enough to continue the advance.  No news had been received from 1 Bn since the night before and I felt that they would soon begin to influence the situation in our favour.

        44.  As the morning wore on, I began to get rather worried and impatient at the delay and strenuous efforts were made to regain touch with 'A' Coy.  This was done about 1230 hrs and it was discovered that they were not across the railway but, together with two Coys of 1 Bn, were staging an attack on the area DEN BRINK and South of it at 1315 hrs.  It will be recalled that 1 Bn less 'R' Coy were still held up by strong opposition in this area about 0530 hrs, but this was the first information I had received of it and it came as something of a shock to find that the enemy was so strong just West of us.  Lt. Col. Fitch emphasised to Major Dennison - OC 'A' Coy - that it was vital he should reach us as he had with him two carrier loads of reserve ammunition badly needed at the bridge.  We now awaited with impatience the arrival of this force and I made a tentative plan with Lt. Col. Fitch for our further advance to the bridge.

        45.  At 1430 hrs the remains of 'A' Coy and the Bn Defence Platoon arrived under Lt. Burwash.  They totalled no more than 30-40 men with only one officer.  They had suffered considerable casualties in breaking through a very strong enemy position and Major Dennison had been badly wounded.  About 10 men from 1 Bn also arrived.  They had become separated from the Bn.  I could get no coherent information as to what had happened to the rest of 1 Para Bn, except that they had had very heavy casualties.

        46.  It was decided to push on as soon as more ammunition could be distributed.  The main road was under heavy fire so I agreed with Lt. Col. Fitch that we should move North through the gardens and houses till we struck the railway and then try that approach.  Meanwhile we had just heard from a Dutch Liaison Officer who had arrived from Div H.Q. in a carrier that the 2nd lift was not landing till 1500 hrs.  The G.O.C. was able to get a message through to Div H.Q. on this officers set.  He had put up a very fine effort in reaching us at all and had made an unsuccessful effort to get ammunition to the bridge.  He said he would renew the attempt after dark.

        47.  We moved off at about 1600 hrs - our total strength must have been about 130-140 all ranks.  Progress was slow and difficult owing to high walls between the gardens.  There was some sniping and we were very bunched and vulnerable.  There was a long delay after crossing the street parallel to LION / TIGER and half way between it and the railway.  Here I decided with the G.O.C. and my I.O. to take a short cut to the ELIZABETH Hospital.  I was wounded and had to be left in a cellar in a small house about 100 yards West of the hospital.

        48.  3 Bn were unable to make any progress and the Bn came under heavy mortar and MG fire from the railway embankment North and N.W. of the hospital.  Before it got dark they again took up a defensive position in the houses little more than 300 yards North of where we had fought all that day.  Here we will leave them and return to 1 Para Bn.

        49.  At 0900 hrs T Coy 1 Para Bn - Major Perrin-Brown - put in a most determined attack astride 'LION' and gained the houses at 717776.  The attack was supported by Lt arty and 3 Para Bn Mortars and M.M.Gs. which had arrived with their H.Q. Coy.  A further attack on the factory on the right of the road at 720774 failed largely owing to 20 m.m. fire from flak positions on the river bank.

        50.  Meanwhile, 'A' Coy 3 Bn - Major Dennison - had arrived and Lt. Col. Dobie planned another co-ordinated attack.  'A' Coy 3 Bn was to seize the high ground North of the rd - DEN BRINK - and 'T' Coy was to attack astride the road on to the factory.  The attack was supported by 3 Bn Mortars & M.M.Gs. and the Lt Artillery.  Lt. Col. Thompson (C.O. Lt Regt) was there throughout and he and the F.O.O. gave excellent support.  This was the attack of which I had been informed and went in about 1400 hrs.  It was successful and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy.  A 6 pr was used to destroy a pillbox in the Factory area, and an armd car was destroyed.  Meanwhile 'S' Coy 1 Bn were attacked from the rear.  They held this and received 6 minor casualties.  Fighting had been extremely bitter and 'T' Coy who had carried out three attacks since 0800 hrs were reduced to 22 men.

        51.  About 1300 hrs 1 Bn reached just West of rd junc 726778 and came under heavy fire from 88 m.m., M.G. and mortars from directly ahead.  The rd junc was gained after a short battle supported by 3" mortar fire.  1 Bn must therefore have arrived 100 yards West of 3 Bn positions just as the latter were forming up to move off to the North and it was a pity that no contact was made.

        52.  1 Bn continued to advance East down the South side of the main rd but could not get past rd junc 728779 owing to tanks.  In fact, as 3 Bn moved off, 1 Bn came up against the same resistance that had held 3 Bn.  At this point, however, Lt Arty and MMGs destroyed or neutralised two more A.A. guns on the South bank of the river.

        53.  About 1700 hrs the Bn crossed the rd under cover of smoke and tried the North side moving by the gardens of the houses just vacated by 3 Bn.  They came under heavy fire just West of ELIZABETH Hospital and it was impossible to get any vehicles forward.  Here they were held and there was no doubt that this advance of 1 Bn astride the main rd, allowed 3 Bn to disengage with so little difficulty and so few casualties.

        54.  At 1830 hrs D+1 Lt. Col. Dobie received a message from the bridge - presumably from B.M. or Lt. Col. Frost - that he must get through.  He had left only about 100 men and any further advance by daylight was out of the question.

        55.  At 2000 hrs, the S Staffs arrived bringing with them 'R' Coy 1 Bn and the portion of H.Q. Coy which had been with 'R' Coy.  'R' Coy had about 40 men.  A plan was made between the two C.Os. for a further advance on the bridge starting at 2100 hrs.  More ammunition was issued.

        56.  Information then came that the bridge had been over-run and the attack was put off.

        57.  At 2300 hrs 1 Bn F.O.O. heard 2 Bn F.O.O. on br calling for fire.  Lt. Col. Dobie therefore decided to get to the bridge and sent a runner to Div H.Q. to say this.  About that time 11 Bn arrived and Lt. Col. Lea, the C.O. was brought into the plan.

        58.  At 0100 hrs D+2, orders were received to withdraw to OOSTERBEEK.

        59.  At 0230 hrs D+2, these orders were cancelled and Lt. Col. Dobie made a fresh plan.  1 Bn to advance on RIGHT by river bank.  S. Staffs LEFT by main rd with HQ Coy and tpt of 1 Bn.  11 Bn to follow 1 Bn axis.  Start time 0330 hrs.  S. Staffs were ½ hr late.

        60.  1 Bn crossed start line about 0400 hrs and reached the rd at river bank 730779 just beyond ELIZABETH Hospital.  Here, Capt. Dorrien-Smith, 3 Bn, met the C.O. and warned him that the bank was impossible owing to heavy opposition.

        61.  The advance continued and at 0430 hrs very heavy opposition was encountered - mortars, shelling and M.G. fire.  Also enemy armour and half tracks on high ground to the left.  Heavy casualties were inflicted on enemy infantry with bayonet and grenades and the way was cleared as far as rd junc 739778 just beyond Pontoon bridge.  Remainder of enemy infantry ran or surrendered.

        62.  At 0500, 1 Bn was attacked by tanks, from the town just above them.  These kept on coming to the edge and firing and dropping grenades down the bank.  'R' Coy retaliated with Gammon bombs.  Opposition ahead was growing more intense.  A number of German prisoners were accompanying the Bn.

        63.  By 0600 hrs the position was becoming desperate.  The S. Staffs on the left flank appeared to have withdrawn and, as a result, the Bn was enfiladed and overlooked from the river front.  Tanks were engaging them at point blank range.  At this time the C.O. made his last check up on numbers which were - R Coy. 6 men, S Coy. 15 men, T Coy. 8 men, Bn H.Q. 10 men, H.Q. Coy was moving with S. Staffs.  Wireless communication had gone but a final effort was made to get into buildings on the high ground.  At about 0630 hrs the C.O. was wounded and it is probable that the survivors were overrun by 0700 hrs D+2 day.  Nothing is known of 11 Para Bn who were not seen again.  It is possible that they were attacked from the rear whilst moving behind 1 Bn.

        64.  3 Para Bn had a very similar experience on the early morning of D+2.  The Bn had no difficulty in maintaining its position in the houses N.W. of ELIZABETH Hospital during the night.  Capt. Dorrien-Smith took out a patrol during the night to try the river bank.  It was probably on his way back from this patrol that he met Lt. Col. Dobie, C.O. 1 Bn.  In any case, Lt. Col. Fitch decided to attempt this way and he followed on the heels of 1 Para Bn.  They suffered a similar fate.  Lt. Col. Fitch himself was killed and there were three of the few remaining officers wounded in ELIZABETH Hospital.

        65.  We now return to 2 Para Bn on the bridge.  It is certain that the gallant though fruitless efforts of 1 and 3 Bns to reach the bridge drew off much of the enemy opposition and, inflicting as it did, heavy casualties, allowed the defenders of the bridge a little more breathing space.

        66.  German attacks from the East were resumed early on D+2 and continued throughout the morning.  About mid-day, three tanks got into positions near the river and shelled one of the key houses just East of the bridge.  The house had to be evacuated, but Capt. Frank - Comd 'A' Coy - took two PIATs and scored three hits on the tanks, driving them and two more away.  Lt. McDermott's platoon of 'A' Coy then counter-attacked the house and re-occupied it, although Lt. McDermott was mortally wounded.

        67.  A heavy gun South of the river now caused serious trouble, demolishing the top storeys of two houses just West of the bridge and causing 'B' Coy some casualties.  Two armd cars, also from the West penetrated along the river bank but one was destroyed with a PIAT by Major Murray R.E. and the other withdrew.

        68.  Pressure continued until dark and some more burning houses had to be evacuated.  A Tiger or Panther tank caused much trouble by running down our line of houses and putting a shell into each.  Major Tatham-Warter - acting C.O. 2 Bn - was injured by the blast and Major Gough took over command of 2 Bn temporarily.  The 6 pr positions were now under intense small arms fire and could not be manned.  Capt Frank - OC 'A' Coy - had also been wounded and Capt. Hoyer-Millar took his place.

        69.  The position had now deteriorated.  Many houses had been burnt down and casualties had reached alarming proportions.  These were in the cellar of Bde H.Q. where Capt. Logan - M.O. 2 Para Bn - and Capt. Wright - M.O. Bde H.Q. did magnificent work.

        70.  On D+3 day, pressure from the East continued all morning.  A party of Bde Sigs and RASC under the Staff Captain - Captain Briggs - who had been attacked incessantly, were burnt out of the houses one by one and gradually the troops holding the East perimeter were forced out and finally beyond the end of the bridge.  Ammunition was getting short and it must be remembered that no supplies of any sort had reached the Bn.

        71.  Lt. Col. Frost - OC Force - and Major Crawley - OC 'B' Coy - were both wounded during the day.  Major Gough took over command, referring matters of importance to Lt. Col. Frost.  Major Tate took over 2 Bn but Major Tatham-Warter was able to resume command later.

        72.  The remnants of the force were now holding 6 houses just to the N.W. and controlling the end of the bridge.  Alternative positions had been dug in the gardens anticipating the firing of the houses.  During the afternoon, 4 or 5 German tanks were able to cross the bridge from the North as the 6 pr positions could no longer be manned.  News also arrived that 30 Corps would attack the South end of the br at 1700 hrs and the Bn were confident of holding out for one more day.

        73.  An 88 m.m. gun was then brought up to close range and shelling the remaining houses.  It was silenced for a time by 3" mortar fire but resumed just before dark and then three important houses of the last 6 were set on fire by phosphorous bombs.  Bde H.Q. caught on fire and no sooner were the wounded now numbering about 280, moved to another house, than that too caught fire.

        74.  The order was now given to surrender the wounded.  The enemy got them out of the building in time, but took advantage of the confused situation to infiltrate into the gardens.

        75.  The force was now split into several parties and had to withdraw from the gardens of the burning houses.  An attempt to re-occupy them early on the morning of D+4 was not successful and organized resistance was at its end.  The survivors, probably numbering about 100 - 150 attempted to make their way back through the town to rejoin the Div, but were probably nearly all rounded up.

        76.  The men fought magnificently, particularly 'A' Coy and Bde Sigs & RASC party under Capt. Briggs.

        77.  No mention has been made of 16 Para Fd Amb which set up in ELIZABETH Hospital on the evening of D day.  Later that night, the Germans re-occupied that area and, despite every protest, insisted on taking prisoners and marching off the whole party except the Surgical teams.  It was only by the firmness and tact shown by Major Longland that these teams were not also taken, leaving the wounded unattended.  Continuous operating by the two surgeons forestalled several attempts by the Germans to do this.

        78.  It is understood that about 150 all ranks of the Brigade fought under Major Lonsdale, and survivors of 11 Para Bn for 6 days with the rest of the Div OOSTERBEEK.  This party was mostly 1 and 3 Para Bns.

        79.  So ended a very gallant and bitter struggle.  Officers and men fought magnificently against superior numbers of first-class S.S. Troops well supplied with tanks and S.P. guns.  The ARNHEM Br was captured and held for over three days and that was their task.

ANNEXURE O.1.

Copy of Diary by Brigadier J.W. Hackett, DSO, MBE, MC.

Commander, 4 Parachute Brigade.

Note.  This diary was written by Brig. Hackett in hospital and is compiled purely from memory.

Reference Maps.  HOLLAND GSGS 4427 1/25,000 - Sheets GINKEL & ARNHEM.

Monday, 18 September.

        Drop about 6 minutes late.  Rivers MAAS, WAAL and NEDER RIJN quite clearly seen during run in.  Some flak, and own aircraft hit several times by SA fire and once (just behind exit) by something larger in fuselage.  Aircraft swinging and sun shining on to and off green and red lights made it difficult to tell when the green went on.  I did not jump in any case until we were well up DZ towards road ARNHEM - EDE (i.e. towards Bde HQ RV).  Considerable SA fire on DZ and apparently an engagement proceeding on S or SW and possibly on SE and E as well as mortar fire occasionally.  Had some difficulty in collecting myself and the members of Bde HQ, all of whom scattered and rather confused.  No sign of Advance Group and no blue smoke in view.  After 10 minutes or so saw 10 Bn's green smoke south of main road.  Found Captain TEMPLE, G3 and told him to set up blue smoke at about 627838 and RV there.  House just to north occupied by enemy.  Was joined by Captain BOOTY (Staff Captain), Captain JAMES (att Staff Officer), Lt. Col. HEATHCOAT AMORY (attached to the Bde from A.M. Leigh Mallory's staff), War Correspondent J. SMYTH and then the Brigade Major.  He had been with 7 KOSB trying to clear DZ which they had achieved (in part only) by an attack on the new road embankment on its S end just as we ran in.

        By about 1515 hours all Bns were on the air, but 4 Para Sqn not and no contact with 133 Field Ambulance, although Captain HARKESS found them at house 627840 (now clear of enemy), where they had set up DZ Dressing Station.

        156 Bn were well organised west of DZ commanding road ARNHEM - EDE.  10 Bn's RV had been occupied by enemy, but they set up an alternative to the south and had then made good their original one.  11 Bn were organising at their RV 634823.  Bde HQ Group was turning up satisfactorily and adequate control was established (forward only).  4 Para Sqn RE located in Sanatorium 631833.  By 1530 hours Bde was a going concern, 75 to 80% strong.

        About then GSO1 Div arrived and reported that 1 Bde's push to the bridge had been checked.  Brigadier Hicks was commanding Div and I was to change our plan to allow of 11 Bn going straight off after S Staffords to push in to bridge.  I issued orders roughly as follows:- (i). 11 Bn to move off at once to come under command 1 Para Bde on arrival RV HARTESTEIN 1815 (exact time and place I have now forgotten).  (ii). 156 Bn move now to 11 Bn's RV area and prepared to lead advance of Bde less 11 Bn along line of railway.  (iii). 10 Bn hold hard area 624842.  (iv). 133 Para Fd Ambulance move off south when casualty situation permitted and warn me when this was likely to be possible.  (v). Bde HQ move soonest to old Advance Group Report Centre by Bn HQ of KOSB south east corner of DZ (634823).

        Meanwhile Bde HQ Defence Platoon and detachment from RASC Pl and other Bde HQ personnel had been securing some sort of defensive area round Bde HQ with spasmodic fighting against disorganised elements.  A score odd of prisoners were brought in, together with two vehicles and a 37mm Anti Tank gun, 81mm Mortar etc. and a couple of vehicles.

        Bde HQ moved about 1700 hrs and met HQ 7 KOSB at 634822.  It found its own Advance Group (including Lt. F.R. LOCKE, OC Pro Sec) and set up.  Drew up before dark.  4 Para Sqn RE had been picked up on the way.

        KOSB were released now to return under comd 1 A/L Bde and thanked for their job before and during our arrival, which would have been much harder going without them.

        10 Bn were firm and were ordered to move south behind 133 Field Ambulance when latter was able to move.  Meanwhile they were to detach a Coy to take over from KOSB in area track junction which arrived shortly after.  10 Bn were being attacked from time to time in a desultory manner and incurred casualties.  Lt. MACKIE was killed here - a great loss to the Bde.

        156 were on the move, skirting DZ on southwest directed on area 663806.  Axis track north of and parallel to railway.

        My intention was to move the Bde less 11 Bn towards the centre of Div activity as quickly as was compatible with the retention of its coherence.  133 Fd Amb was a conditioning factor now.

        About 1800 hrs transport arrived with Lt. LOCKE, who had been sent off to guide it in.  Major HAYNES reported 2 Airlanding Anti Tank Bty complete less one gun recoverable next day - we hoped (i.e. 11 x 6 prs, 3 x 17 prs).  All unit tpt pretty complete.

        Major PAGE guided off 156 Bn transport.  10 Bn was sent off to join up behind it on its move forward.  Other units were put in touch.

        At about dusk 156 were ordered to halt and reorganise and push on down axis of railway before first light.  133 were now clear of DZ and I met CO at my HQ.  10 Bn was behind and was deployed at my orders in area road and track junction 634823 with orders to rest and move along Bde axis at 0300.  133 were to move on to join up with 181 area sanatorium WOLFHEZEN 662802.  Bde HQ was only awaiting disposal of these units to move as planned along Bde axis to house just east of WOLFHEZEN railway crossing.  Main HQ had already gone leaving normal Tac HQ (Commander, Brigade Major, two rear links DRs all mobile).

        4 Para Sqn RE was meanwhile moving to cross tracks 637814 (on Bde axis at west end of Bde area) and was to consolidate in an infantry role there.

        2 Para Pl RASC was forming firm base on rd (Bde axis) in Bde HQ 646812.

        About 1845 hours (just dark) Bde Tac HQ with 133 clear and KOSB out of the way moved to area Hotel 647813 and joined Main HQ.

        About 2300 hours Major LINTON OC 2 Airlanding Light Bty RA arrived from Div HQ and brought further instructions.  I then went to Div HQ, saw Brigadier HICKS and arranged the following task for 19 Sep:- Advance between including road ARNHEM - EDE including railway to secure high ground KOEPEL 712793 with firm left flank on road.

Tuesday, 19 September.

        Returned own HQ about 0130 hours.

        Hostile bombing during night with flares, intermittent and annoying no damage.

        Orders sent to units in conformity with task.  156 to secure KOEPEL, 10 Bn to occupy firm base, road, area 693811.  4 Para Sqn remain in position as back stop area 638814 plus Troop Anti Tank, Para Platoon Bde reserve.  133 WOLFHEZEN.  Bde axis including track north of railway.  Bde HQ moved to 668805 about 0730 before brew up.

        Flak train at WOLFHEZEN Station destroyed by own air sp, indicated threat to Bdes arrival happily averted.  Prisoners now about 50, sent to Div during previous night.  About 12 more in hand.  Last location Bde HQ had been asked for.  Platoon enemy very hurriedly evacuated.

        Visited 156 area JOHANNA HOEVE about 0900.  Coy attack was making good feature 565 696796, successful few casualties.

        Their plan was then to make good the LICHTEN BEEK WOODS about 705795 and use that as a firm base for attack on KOEPEL.  On their left were 7 KOSB, in 4 Bde area but status undetermined.  HQ at Farm 693798.  Task later to protect arrival of 1 Polish Glider Group.

        10 Bn had met heavy opposition area 694806 and asked and received permission to disengage and try a bolder west flanking movement.  I wanted to draw up Bde tail, but medical factors again important.  A small party was still looking after DZ casualties unable to be moved to 133 first location.  Main body 133 was to move from WOLFHEZEN sanatorium; when it did so (about mid-morning).  I closed up to 4 Para Sqn RE to WOLFHEZEN railway crossing and ordered move of Bde HQ to rd track junction 684799 at 1100 hours.

        At 1030 hours on my return to Bde HQ from 156 Bn I met GSO1 and CRA just arriving.  GOC had got out of ARNHEM and returned to Div HQ.  He requested my presence, if I was not pressed and otherwise would come to see me later.  KOSB came under my command with task of protecting landing of Polish glider transport same afternoon area 6880.  Things were now looking tidier.  Visited KOSB and ordered them to stay put, and to be prepared to take over 156's LICHTENBEEK objective when captured, with one coy as firm base for 156's next advance.  One Coy KOSB was committed to glider landing zone for protection, remainder of Bn firm base.  Bde HQ set up new location (road track junction 684799) about midday.  Badly strafed by hostile LFB; no Bde HQ casualties but 7 of KOSB caught in open moving towards Bde HQ on LZ patrol.

        Closed 4 Para Sqn RE up to 672804.

        10 Bn were now engaged at 690810 from north and east - a few casualties - but holding their own and consolidating.

        Major PERKINS RE, OC 4 Para Sqn now reported in person.  Sqn concentration new location and confirmed offensive task (W of Bde area).

        OC 156 reported two successive attempts to capture LICHTENBEEK feature one coy up.  Both had been repelled and casualties suffered.  Bn had now for the moment shot its bolt.  Bosche apparently very sensitive to any threat to that high ground.  I ordered him to consolidate point 565 and informed him what I just heard from Div HQ that A/L Bde was about to launch an attack to open crossing road railway 699792 and he was to give main support.  Time of attack 1500 hrs.

        About 1420 GOC arrived at my HQ and gave me account of his adventures in ARNHEM.  Little or no news of my 11 Bn.

        We discussed possible retrenchment and I advised cutting losses north of railway in case we were caught by counter attack troops (which we undoubtedly now gathering) too spread out.  Difficulty for my Bde area was railway.  No longer commanding WOLFHEZEN crossing which might any moment by occupied by enemy unless we controlled HALTE OOSTERBEEK HOOG crossing (699792).  Bde area was cut in half by obstacles which tpt could not at present pass and considerable RE work only could enable it to do so.  I favoured moving all S of ry and improvising posn eastward taking rd ARNHEM - UTRECHT as Bde axis.  This was plan 2 and would involve withdrawing 10 Bn pretty soon to secure the WOLFHEZEN crossing to provide passage for Bde tps.

        Brig. HICKS arrived at my HQ and confirmed his arrangements for attack on ry crossing 699792 and asked for sp from 156 which I confirmed had been laid on.  He then left.

        10 Bn reported enemy attacks from NE by some inf and normal SP.

        156 and 10 reported continuation of fire by one or two SP guns which had been intermittent since about 0830.

        10 Bn reported 5 tracked vehs probably SP guns.  156 reported further tracked vehs possibly tks.

        Bde HQ by now well dug in tree area 684799 and quite capable of resisting attack unsupported.  Men the better for digging.

        GOC left ? 1440 hrs.  I believe he walked back over the ry to jeep due S of Bde HQ.

        Information received from Div about 1500 hrs indicated some reverse or at least threats of such in area south of ry (probably, I conjectured, from force of enemy reported at river during day through RENKUM - HEELSUM) together with situation noticeably satisfactory E towards ARNHEM.  I therefore ordered 10 Bn to disengage forthwith and make for WOLFHEZEN crossing, seize and hold it for Bde to cross if necessary.

        Reports from 10 Bn then became confused and intermittent and it was clear a difficult posn was developing for them.  I subsequently learned their first RV on disengaging had been found held by enemy, which caused some disorganization and I understand their second too, which disorganized them more.

        Order to implement plan 2 came through from Div now, with confirmation that posn of remainder of Div was giving rise to a little anxiety.  Order already passed on to units already now briefed.

        At about 1600 hrs Polish Gliders began to land in area 6880.  Enemy reaction was instantaneous and violent.  Pressure was put on rear of withdrawing 10 Bn across whose path the gliders were landing (i.e. exactly between them and Bde HQ and their next bound).

        As 10 Bn deployed by coys and in very fair order through the landing gliders great difficulty was experienced in persuading the Bde tps and unit tpt in Bde tps area that they were not enemy especially as there was now a fair volume of small arms fire coming from the enemy from the same direction (all high and doing no harm).  Tpt got rather jammed up and rd leading past Bde HQ to WOLFHEZEN and tps in some cases opened fire.  Great energy and violence was needed by the officers of Bde HQ to prevent some confusion.

        Poles landing from gliders engaged anything in sight and were themselves engaged in return which did little to help.

        RE had reported tunnel suitable for putting tpt across ry at 668804 and were ordered to defend from North and West until all was over.

        156 were away and moving South of Bde HQ to a RV S of ry (?679796).  KOSB were away and doing the same, their orders were to RV area 205 - 672794 and revert to command A/L Bde.

        Bde HQ Gp was now prepared to operate as an inf det and was despatched to Pt 232 - 682797.  I stayed at old location with Capt. BLUNDELL and Capt. JAMES commanding a det of Def Pl to get all tpt clear and see that tps were out.

        WOLFHEZEN crossing was partly occupied when 10 Bn arrived but they crossed in fair order and got into posn just South about 1800 hrs.

        4 Para Sqn RE passed most of Bde tpt through the tunnel and some (I understand) over the level crossing at WOLFHEZEN.  Some was utterly bogged in heavy sand plans made to recover it next day, which in some cases could not be carried out owing to enemy encroachment and in others (e.g. Bde HQ recce jeep) only resulted in the loss of further tpt trying to tow it out next morning.

        The Germans to the North of the ry quickly overran the Polish Gliders and pressed on to the line of the ry when we held them at dusk.  They were not many (2 pls to a coy) but active and strong in automatics.  Bde HQ det largely from Def Pl under Capt. JAMES and Lt. Col. HEATHCOTE-AMORY (att from AM Leigh Mallory's staff) were responsible and inflicted cas, suffering some too.  A spirited counter attack led by the BM just before dusk gave some breathing space.

        Posn at dark 19 Sep.  Bde HQ Gp dug in as a def locality area pt 232.  156 Bn about 270 strong holding the perimeter about 678799 to the South and up to about 674797.  10 Bn about 250 strong 200 yards South of WOLFHEZEN crossing.  I wanted to pull them in but they were rather disorganized and received permission to reorganize there during the dark.  4 Sqn RE between tunnel and level crossing on South of ry.

        A POW announced that an attack was impending between 0300 and 0400 from about two coys North of the ry with SP guns and he thought a few tks.

        There was some harassing shellfire during darkness and a fair amount of movement with hostile SA fire together with much movement of a very small number of tracked vehs quite close; all ranks stood to but no attack developed.

        I discussed at some length with Div by RT advisability of moving during the night towards our final location.  I wanted to get integrated into the Div area.  I was quite happy to stay but would have preferred to move to a villa near final location at say 2300 hrs; by then 10 Bn would be fit to do so in good order.  Div deprecated a move but said I was to send recce parties in by night and follow at first light.  I saw nothing to be gained out of recce parties in the dark and it was agreed in the end that I should move the Bde at first light.

Wednesday, 20 September.

        Route for the move was to be area 232 thence track to last 'N' in hotel WOLFHEZEN - BREEDE LAN - to junc with main rd ARNHEM - UTRECHT.  Order of march - 156, Bde HQ Gp and Bde Tps, 10 Bn.

        An advance group with small protective element was made up from all units to precede 156 if possible.  Situation regarding enemy, fluid and very uncertain.  Country: woodland intersected by roads and ridges.  Locations and situation in rest of Division hardly known at all.  My intention was to get on axis main rd ARNHEM - UTRECHT and take up a posn facing Eastwards astride it East of HARTESTEIN near which I believed Div HQ still to be.

        Comns not good rear back to Div intermittent.  Btys low and no opportunity so far to charge.  Capt. KENNET, OC Bde Sigs was still with me.

        Bde under way about 0615, still needing a little space to move out from night disposition and assume order of march.  Adv Gp under Capt. TEMPLE proceeding along first part of Bde axis as above comes under fire about 682785 almost at once.  TEMPLE wounded right arm.  Disposed some form of protective screen in the reshuffle with Bde HQ personnel under Capt. JAMES and moved Adv Gp and Bde tps back and in behind 156 down other tracks; some sporadic shooting which I believe to be caused by German patrols rather lost.

        Bde got under way satisfactorily in designed order of march and on to BREEDE LAAN axis moving Southwards; some more A tk guns seemed to get left behind.

        About 0715 hrs (fairly precisely) 156 were fired on by MG42 and 34 right front area 678786.  They made strenuous efforts to clear it but as their outflanking movements revealed more and more opposition and a second coy was drawn in extent of enemy disposition was indicated was not the odd patrol I had thought but a force moving East along axis either WOLFHEZEN - main rd - or HEELSUM main rd, whose left or left rear our Adv Gp must have bumped on first moving off.  I now deployed 10 Bn to protect right rear and continued trying to push along original axis.  Enemy now in action with mortars and A tk guns against any buildings we used.

        Div Comd came up on blower at about 0740 ordering me to Div HQ at 0700 hrs.  I gave him situation.  We were completely engaged and free movement from us to him was impossible.  Brisk probing all round revealed a weakness to our East where I took charge myself to exploit.  B.M. led several small exploiting attacks and we killed a number of Boche (one at least to Bde Comd's rifle).

        Everything well in hand and control adequate though our movements were a little constricted.  Announced change of plans to Unit Comds.  156 no longer to try to push fwd on old axis, but hold there while 10 Bn took over adv and pushed along new axis (from track junc 682787 to rd track junc 687789.  10 Bn were slower than I would have liked starting org was not over strong.  Lt. Col. SMYTHE had been wounded by a bullet in the right arm afternoon and Major WARR in comd.  Comns bad and when they did start they pushed on without much regard to the rest of the coln which lost touch with them and ultimately got divided in two.

        Fire was now heavy on S & SW and there was frequent LA fire from N.  Good progress was made clearing Eastwards but much sporadic fighting cropped up clearing small parties of Boche in wood.

        As soon as 156 could get clear of BREEDE LAAN I asked through Maj de Gex (2 i/c Lt Regt - since 1200? hrs day before with me) and got a troop stalk along it either side of new Bde axis to discourage pursuit.  Repeated.  Good results - presume these relieved but OC 156 reported movement track vehicles.

        Firing all round growing in intensity asked for A tk guns.  OC 2 A Tk Bty said had none left, some had been hopelessly stuck day before, others abandoned owing to lack of tractors but am not yet in posn to know why there were none at all left in Bty.

        About midday BM wounded bullet rt shoulder continued to function most gallantly.  Lt. Col. HEATHCOTE AMORY wounded shoulder and leg.  Other casualties.

        10 Bn now reported on rd VALKENBERG LAAN moving S but gap between Bde HQ and them we were slowing up.

        About 1215 tank appeared re-engaged at 400 yds on rt, but volume of SA fire discouraged it about 1225 another came to within 300 yds of tpt on left before blowing track off on 75 grenade.  Only A tk weapon one PIAT with one bomb.

        Enemy had now closed in around Bde HQ I.O. killed (Capt Blundell) OC 156 reported 2 i/c and Adj 156 missing.

        I direct Major POWELL 156 to clear a cup shaped depression containing up to 30 Germans right in our path.  Tanks had now closed in and set some of our transport alight.  Had some difficulty in getting Lt. Col. HEATHCOTE AMORY out, strapped to stretcher on jeep next to blazing amn.  BM was mortally wounded by bullet in head.

        Major POWELL gathered handful of his coy, rushed the depression driving out the Boche.  I moved around trying to rally remnants of it, but by now two or three tanks and German infantry moving freely through the coln and scattering it and all coherence lost.

        In the depression I mustered Staff Capt. BOOTY, Major POWELL, Major PAGE and about 30 156, about 12 10 Bn about 12 Bde HQ, etc. and a score or so others.  I appd Maj DE GEX A/BM.  There was no water or food insufficient weapons little amn.  Many of us were using German rifles.

        Capt. BARRON (A tk) Lt. St. AUBYN (156) and Capt. TEMPLE (though wounded) all most useful and gallant officers here.

        Throughout the afternoon the enemy made frequent and determined infantry attacks with one tank to destroy us.  We made frequent counter attacks to widen scope and recover freedom of movement.

        Tank never pressed this attack to within range of our 82 grenade and repeated attempts to stalk it failed as inf were always close round it.  They frequently pressed to within grenade range of us on NW & S but were always held off.

        Major PAGE was wounded, fought on and was then killed.  Capt. BARRON was wounded: bullet in hand and shoulder (I then took his British rifle in exchange for my German one).  Other cas.

        Radius of posn about 30 yds roughly circular.

        Towards nightfall I had decided after consultation with Major DE GEX break through in direction of Div HQ with whom we had no contact since 1000 hrs.  Enemy apparently determined to liquidate posn before dark and now pressing in more than ever.  We had a dash for it Major DE GEX and self leading and got through with few cas to posn Coy Borders at 687786 (I think).

        There I organized in to 156 det and Bde HQ det and disposing in def positions met OC 4 Para Sqn RE with half his unit intact and remained believed nearly K.Od. elsewhere.  Reported to Div HQ.

        Div Comd ordered me to take over wef next morning comd of East side of Div perimeter from about 695785 round to river in the neighbourhood of church 697774.

        Major DE GEX reverted to Lt Regt to my regret.

        Capt. HARKNESS, BRASCO, was at Div HQ with an assortment of men and Lt. Col. Smythe with about 40 10 Bn later increased to about 70.  156 det (about 50 strong, Major POWELL in comd) were lodged immediately in the area it was proposed they should defend (houses 694786).  I visited them before they moved in and Bde HQ det at SONNERBERG and then slept at Div HQ which was in its same location (693784).

Thursday, 21 September.

        Asked for and obtained Major MADDEN RA (GII (Air), 1 Air Div) as BM.

        Established HQ at 696784.

        Comns problem.  Line laid to Div HQ and subsequently to 10 Bn and 156 as 68 sets became available they were passed out.  We had none in the Bde by now.

        Order of Battle, 4 Bde.

        MDS occupying hotels on either side of x rds 697784 on the East and one or two houses on either side running East from crossroads had been in enemy hands but 10 Bn had occupied 4 houses just to the east of them on the afternoon of 21st September and they were now ours.

        11 Bn det which had got separated from the main body of the Bn on 19 September was well organised under Major LONSDALE, who was also the channel of comd for the 1 Bde and S Stafford det.

        Locations and areas of resp.

                11 Bn church 696773 - W, S & E.  S Staff E of ch from east rd 697774 to river 1 Bde from rd track junc 696774 to indeterminate bdy with 10 Bn.  10 Bn astride main rd 6784.  Glider Pilot det from x rds at 697784 (hence forward known as MDS x rds) to rather indeterminate boundary with 156 Bn in area 694787 on whose left were Recce Sqn and KOSB.  Some Recce Sqn appeared to be also on 156 Bn right.

        I went round this area morning 21 September and made some adjustments.  Hvy mortar fire on church in 11 Bn area and Major MADDEN acting BM was killed about 1000 hrs while assisting Lt. Col. THOMPSON, OC Lt Regt just wounded by another bomb.  My driver, Pte. Ward, received slight splinters from another and my jeep was wrecked.  Continued rounds to S Staffs, Lt Regt 2 Bty (Major LINTON) and Div HQ on foot.

        During afternoon organization of Bde was continued.  I was not happy about the gap between 10 Bn and the 1 Bde dets on their right.

        156 Bn were attacked in their houses during afternoon by small parties of infantry from North but saw them off.  Glider Pilots reported movement in wood at 697787 and patrols 10 Bn were also attacked.  10 Bn were also attacked in their houses but held firm during the morning and early afternoon.  During the late afternoon a heavy attack with at least one SP gun developed on these houses (10 Bn) which were pressed home.  L of C was cut and a patrol from Bde HQ Def Pl which went up after dark rptd free German movement round these houses.  It was assumed they had been lost and reported so to Div but no one had come back and they were not the surrendering sort.  I still had hope.  During the day fire was obtained from a Fd Regt in 30 Corps and useful shoots put down on main rd E of 10 Bn houses and wood to NE of MDS where there was much movement.  Safety factor a severe restriction here owing to long range of shooting.

        A further shoot against a map target from information given by Dutch civilian about activity round a large isolated hotel near ARNHEM contributed to an attempt to regain some offensive initiative.

        During the evening Div Comd held a conference and announced retrenchment on N of Div area.  21 Indep Coy would come under my comd as a result at 0200 hrs and a party of RASC under Capt. CRANMER BYNG at 0300 hrs.

Friday, 22 September.

        21 Indep Coy 160 strong under Major WILSON moved in during early hours to occupy from rd junc 695780 to incl MDS x rds.  Task was to hold defence position and work forward.  Det from Div RASC under Capt. BYNG was put in same time from incl track junc 695779 to incl rd junc 695780 with orders to make every effort to move forward and take in next N to S parallel rd about 250 yds eastwards.

        Half of 4 Para Sqn RE under Lt. BROWN who had been fighting hard with 21 Indep Coy outside Bde area came under comd about 0200 hrs and was given Bde res role with counter attack task from Bde HQ posn westwards across the green in front of Div HQ.

        After light on Sept 22 it became evident that 10 Bn had retained two of their houses east of the MDS.  The later afternoon attack had resulted in the almost complete collapse of all of them from the SP gun and fire from an A tk gun at short range.  Houses all round had been set on fire.  The house in which Lt. Col. SMYTHE in spite of his wounded arm and Major WARR had been holding out had then been stormed.  Both were severely wounded.  (I have since seen SMYTHE in hospital in ARNHEM paralysed from the waist down and Major WARR who has had one arm amputated).

        Lt. SAUNDERS of 10 Bn had been killed.

        The occupants of the other houses had however come to the surface again and re-established themselves.  There were now no 10 Bn officers and 10 Bn remnants were comd by Capt. BARRON (2 A Tk Bty) wounded in hand and shoulder on 20 Sep, see above, and FOO Lt. WHITE.

        Line comn re-established to 10 Bn and after frequent cuts to 156.

        I visited 21 Coy, MDS (saw Lt. Col. MARABLE), RASC det (who were rather far back for my intention and whom I ordered forward), 11 Bn, 1 Bde, Lt Regt and Recce Sqn during morning 22 Sep.  Major POWELL came in.

        Met hvy mortar fire on church area (11 Bn) and on Recce Sqn HQ and own HQ a great deal from mortar and what seemed 105 or 75 possibly from SP.

        Visited Glider Pilots in their houses at 697787.  German infiltration had been taking place and sniping was free.

        Attacks on 10 Bn and 156 were almost constant during this day, 22 Sep, and use of the SP guns got bolder during the day.

        A message was received from the MDS that a German officer had appeared in a SP gun with a red cross on it and said that unless we evacuated MDS area entirely it would be fired upon.  I referred this to Div Comd and for the moment it appeared unjustified to evacuate which I communicated to Lt. Col. MARABLE.

        Heavy mortar fire on my HQ during the morning and growing intensity of attack on 10, 156 and Glider Pilots with considerable volume of SA, A tk gun and SP fire all over the area made situation unpromising.  Rain during part of the day made it downright miserable.

        No ground however was lost though resources by nightfall had grown thin, particularly in automatic weapons and amn and PIATs.  Frequent destruction of houses meant frequent breakage of weapons and there were no replacements.  No rations during the day and water scarce.  Own cas during day about 30.  1 Bde were attacked during the afternoon while a short lull was enjoyed on the northern end.  One or two tks and one or more SP guns supported inf.  The AFVs apparently moved North to South along houses at 697784 to 786 blowing holes in them.  Inf following them were held by our own.  At least one SP gun remained in the neighbourhood and improved its posn during dusk.

        During the day 21 Indep Coy claimed one SP gun with a PIAT.  Lonsdale Force claimed one (both flamers), 156 winged one.

        To unify 21 Coy front I decided to relieve 10 Bn remnants with them.  Relief carried out by 230200 and remains of 10 Bn 50 strong with no officers of their own, under Lts. BARRON and WHITE were given some sleep in Bde HQ area after some very grim battling.

        Throughout the night it appeared that SP guns were working forward many blazing houses on N, NE and E front gave plenty of light.  I organized several PIAT stalking parties but ???? (undecipherable).

Saturday, 23 September.

        Shortly after first light 21 Coy were attacked in 10 Bn houses on heavy scale, similar to that of the previous day, with SP guns reducing houses to rubble and inf then infiltrating.  They were driven out.  Bde front line to East was then overrun.  Bde HQ personnel in splendid order.

        I visited 21 Coy and Glider Pilots.  Lt. GROSE recalled from JLO at Division, though of 11 Bn, and was put in charge of remnants of 10, who were put in defensive posn in house 696786 just N of main rd.  Mortar and shellfire on Bde HQ locality developed about 0830 and continued with varying degrees of intensity and some lulls during the day.  Volume of SA fire from N, NE and E greater and from closer in.  Attacks on 156 and GP with their small intermingled det of Recce Sqn were indicated by mid-morning.  There had been much movement during the night in wood NE of MDS and built up area West of it.  Infiltrations between houses on our Northern front became an established fact by midday, but strong pts still grim.  In common with most dets defending houses against SPs & A tk guns nearly every strong point had left its house and dug in the garden nearby.  Houses are a snare unless you can keep the SP and A tk guns at arms length and round the corner.

        10 Bn proved this and 156 did so again and Glider Pilots and Recce Sqn support it.

        Supply drop p.m. 22 total failures.  Still no rations, water scarcity serious in some dets; weapons strained all round and amn far from plentiful.

        Mid morning GOC ordered me to establish comd post inside Div HQ perimeter.  I extracted the minimum personnel from def posns in front line and set up 200 yds further back.

        Lt. BOSWORTH from Div Sigs now functioning as Bde Sigs Offr in place of L/Cpl RADEMAYER and then Sgt. PATTERSON borrowed from 21 Coy (original members 4 Bde Sigs Sec).  Doing very well competing with extreme shortage of equipment and frequent cutting of line by shell and mortar fire.

        Demands of tps for infm about relieving forces now long overdue increasingly hard to satisfy.  It was clearly only a case now for sticking it and this was apparent to everybody.  Spirit of men beyond praise but some (e.g. 156) near the limit from strain, cumulative lack of sleep and food.  Major POWELL's handling of this body deserves high recognition.

        During afternoon arrange a force from Lonsdale force 40 strong with a PIAT and at least 4 automatics to be at call for reinforcement or counter attack and discussed with Major POWELL its use in his area.  He professed his ability to hold on if sent 2 PIATs.  I detached 2 from L force and sent them with 20 rounds.

        Most of the afternoon I spent improving and helping to man Bde HQ def locality against which an even heavier volume of fire was developing.  RASC def in centre had a slight reverse but recovered and I was now pretty confident about the line from incl MDS cross rds southwards.  From there round to our western bdy on the N it was giving more cause for anxiety.

        About 1700 hrs a Red Cross emissary came from the MDS to say that the Germans had now about 30-40 fighting tps in the MDS itself (about 80 yds fwd of the Bde HQ locality) and a German Major had delivered an ultimatum:- Unless we evacuate the Bde HQ plantation up to inclusive a small building used as an RAP, the whole MDS and Bde area would be subject to a series of mortar concentrations.  I had till 1930 hrs.  I ordered its evacuation by 1900 and doubled up the defenders from the E and on those in the W or upper end.

        Discussed in the evening with GOC and CRA privately (on GOC's invitation) the possibility of withdrawal from N and NE.  I expressed doubts in view of poverty of comns and slight degree of control of my ability to withdraw anything from there at the stage at which my Div Comd might require it but hoped to pull in part at least of Bde HQ det from their locality to cover a withdrawal on to more solid elements further South in Bde area.  I briefed Capt. HARKNESS now comd Bde HQ locality and Capt. BOOTY, A/BM accordingly, but no one else.

        Major POWELL came in after dark and Major WILSON, and I arranged with them and Lt. Col. MURRAY, OC 1 Wing G.P. Regt a shortening of line and giving up NE corner and holding further back among houses to N of the rd.  As these houses were partly Boche-held the issue was not straight forward as could be desired.  A LO from G.P. det came in about 2000 hrs and was given a "Walkie-Talkie" by OGILVIE, one of two produced by MURRAY.

        Owing to casualties from tree bursts had now dug new comd post and sig exchange in open, 200 yds South in Div Maint Area.  Occupied it about 1900 hrs with Chief Clerk, fwd line operator, one exchange operator, A/BM and 2 orderlies, leaving the remainder of Bde HQ personnel in their weapon pits.  During night secured two shoots from 30 Corps 25 prs on wood NE of MDS and believe they may have relieved pressure.

        A small proportion of the Polish Bde had been ferried over the river during the previous night and more had followed under mist during the day.  Div Comd agreed to make 200 available to me to take over my Northern sector.  It was arranged that adv reps from them would meet me at 0830 at my comd post.

        About 2200 hrs I parted from Major POWELL who was returning to his sector and guided Major WILSON down through old Bde HQ locality to where his sector began, saw Capt. HARKNESS, returned to CRA's shelter which was a few yds from my comd post and relieved congestion there besides being roomier.  All was relatively quiet during remainder of night though a good deal of German movement was evident.

Sunday, 24 September.

        Visited Recce Sqn and discussed with Capt. ALLSOPP guiding of Poles into sector.  He gave me a runner to send back when their reps arrived at my comd post, not many hundred yds from Recce Sqn HQ.  Shelling and mortaring now heavy while returning to my HQ.  I was hit by splinters from a close burst in stomach and left thigh about 100 yds from Div HQ.  Runners leg broken.  At first lull walked to Div RAP and sent out party for runner, and then had GOC warned of my mishap.  Handed over as best I could to Lt. Col. MURRAY (1 Wing GPR) in Div HQ RAP about 1400 hrs.

        I was put on a jeep and driven with others into ARNHEM where I am now.

(Signed) J.W. Hackett

St. Elizabeth's Hospital.

2 Oct 44.

ANNEXURE O.2.

1 AIR LANDING BRIGADE.

Operation 'MARKET' 17th - 26th September 1944

17th September

        1330 - The Brigade Group first lift consisting of the following landed after a quiet flight with virtually no opposition or flak:-

                Of the above the following failed to arrive:-

                        7 KOSB         8 Gliders, 6 of which were sp arms

                        1 Border         6 Gliders including the Commanding Officer's

                        2 S Staffords   2 Gliders, including B Coy HQ

                                Landing Zone was the open ground North and North West of WOLFHEZEN 6680.

        1500 - Units had by this time passed through their RV and moved to take up dispositions as under:-

                (f) Platoon 9 Fd Coy were ordered to form a stop on road running South East from WOLFHEZEN to main road at 679785 to catch any birds flushed out of WOLFHEZEN by 2 S Staffords.  No contact was made with this platoon on landing, but they arrived at their RV and judging by the number of German dead, including a general, this project must have been entirely successful.  Recce Sqn also claim this general.

                (g) Platoon RASC.  They received conflicting orders from CRASC and from this Brigade.  Their orders from CRASC were to go straight into the town and take over certain German petrol installations, etc East of the main road bridge.  Their orders from this Brigade, under whose command they were and whose reserve ammunition they were carrying, were to RV at wood at 654807 and there to await further orders, the intention being to take over the ammunition and to release this platoon as soon as it was known that the road into the town was clear.  The platoon did not appear at the RV and neither it nor the reserve ammunition was seen again.

                (h) The Provost Section came to the Brigade RV.

        1630 - GOC visited Brigade HQ on way to 1 Para Bde.

        1830 - Commander Div Recce Squadron visited Brigade Headquarters and explained that he had lost most of his transport and was unable to proceed into the town with his whole squadron.  One troop was left under command of the Brigade and ordered to watch the roads at 672804 and REIJERSHEIDE 6781.  One battalion of Glider Pilots under Lieutenant Colonel J. Place had concentrated by this time and were given the task of holding WOLFHEZEN facing East and South East with a detachment at wood 672804.  During the evening the MDS was established in the vicinity of Brigade HQ and casualties from all LZs and DZs were brought in.  They amounted to about 100 by nightfall.  There was little enemy activity during the night except for some slight mortaring of the railway crossing at WOLFHEZEN and movement North of main ARNHEM - EDE road.

        Night 17/18 - No news of operations in the town and no real contact on the Brigade front.  Some prisoners were taken during the evening, mostly from the Artillery and SS transit personnel.  One German WAAF was found by 7 KOSB in civilian clothing.  She refused food until it had first been tasted by British troops.  There were only minor incidents during the night.  Once the forward platoon of A Coy, 7 KOSB was attacked by enemy with an armoured car with a searchlight.  This attack was held.  The second incident was that B Coy, 1 Border occupied RENKUM unknown to the enemy who were billeted in the town.  When they paraded next morning they were thoroughly shot up.  Patrolling was carried out during the night by all units.  Those from 7 KOSB penetrated to the barracks at EDE without meeting any opposition.

18th September

        0700 - Quiet night.  B Coy 1 Border reported that they had enemy all round but were not in difficulties.  Support by 1 Light Battery was offered them and accepted.

        0730 - Brigade Commander to Division, the GOC being reported missing.  Col Barlow, Deputy Commander, assumed command of the Brigade.

        0900 - About one platoon SS were reported by the Dutch to be in HEELSUM 6477.  This and other similar parties were reported periodically and were always said to be SS.  They constituted a permanent threat to Div HQ and to the withdrawal of B Coy 1 Border when the time came.

        0905 - Platoon 9 Fd Coy [line unreadable].  They, with the Brigade RASC Officer, were given the task of carrying out a thorough recce of WOLFHEZEN for enemy stores and transport.  A large amount of transport was discovered but it had all been immobilized by the Germans and only a bus and an old ambulance could be made to work.  These were handed over to the MDS.  A German gun park of 21 105mm guns, new and still labelled and in grease was found.  They were all spiked.

        0945 - Information received that 1 Para Brigade were in difficulties in their advance on the bridge.  2 S Staffords were given orders to move to their assistance down route WOLFHEZEN - KOUDE HERBERG 6878 - DEN BRINK 7277 and the lower road running along the river, remainder 2 S Staffords to join up as soon as possible after landing with the second lift.  2 S Staffords therefore passed to Comd 1 Para Bde.

        1000 - Second lift due and situation well in hand on all LZs and DZs.  The only serious opposition was felt by one platoon of D Coy 7 KOSB who were cut off at the settlement 631833.  D Coy tried to go to their assistance but failed and became involved in wood fighting for the remainder of their time in the first position.  This enemy opposition arrived from the North and was strongest in the wood West of Z GINKEL 6284.

        1100 - LZs strafed by ME 109s, some gliders set on fire.

        1400 - B Coy 1 Border at RENKUM were now completely surrounded and being heavily mortared.  All their transport had been destroyed.  They were ordered to withdraw as far as HEELSUM.  With great difficulty they fought their way back along the bank of the NEDER RIJN having had to abandon most of their support arms through lack of transport.  Only the MMGs were saved by being carried out.  D Coy 1 Border was mortared and attacked throughout the day but all attacks were driven off.

        1500 - Second lift gliders started coming in: this included remainder of 2 S Staffords and 181 Fd Amb, transport platoon and carriers of 7 KOSB and 1 Border, any gliders which failed to arrive on the first lift.  OC 1 Border took off with second lift but again failed to arrive.  At the time of the arrival of the second lift the position on the LZs and DZs was as follows:-

                (a) 7 KOSB were closely engaged all round but succeeded in keeping the enemy so busy that 4 Para Bde had an almost unopposed drop.  As the drop took place Bn HQ and HQ Sp Coy charged along the edge of the wood led by the CO.  This ensured an unopposed landing and Commander 4 Para Bde thanked 7 KOSB for their efforts.  Major Hill, OC Sp Coy was killed in this operation.

                (b) 2 S Staffords had moved off and left their LZ unguarded.  There was no opposition here.  A JLO from Brigade met the second in command on landing and gave him instructions to move into the town with all speed to join up with the advance elements of the battalion.

                (c) 1 Border.  In the South the enemy were kept busily engaged by the gradual withdrawal of B Coy.  In the centre some machine gun fire came on to the LZ from LAURA 6378.  This was dealt with by mortar fire but some casualties must have been caused during the unloading of the gliders.

        1515 - Orders were issued for the move towards the town for Phase II.  These could not go according to original plan on account of the absence of 2 S Staffords:- The orders were issued as follows:-

                (a) 7 KOSB to co-ordinate the time of his withdrawal with Commander 4 Parachute Brigade, but H hour to be 1900 hrs if agreed to by the latter.  New position was to be astride the road at 710801 on the high ground running from NE to SW through that point from HOOG ERF 7180 to the railway in 6979.

                (b) Battalion Glider Pilots to hold point 63.5 in 6878 up to excluding the railway.

                (c) 1 Border to hold from the Glider Pilots left to HEVEADORF 6877.

                (d) Three separate routes were given, time to move to be 1900 hrs.  7 KOSB North of the railway through JOHANNA HOEVE 6980.  Glider Pilots SE through WOLFHEZEN.  1 Border East along the main RENKUM - ARNHEM road.

                (e) The MDS during the course of the afternoon had overflowed from the houses near Bde HQ and all patients were being concentrated gradually in an empty factory in WOLFHEZEN.  A party was ordered to make a recce for a building in the area of the cross roads at 696784 and ferrying was to start immediately, only those wounded who were too serious to move to be left with a few orderlies.  Ferrying started at 1500 hrs and continued throughout the night and next morning, no patients being left behind.

                (f) Brigade HQ Group and 9 Field Coy were to move off at 1900 hrs to a new HQ in the area of KOUDE HEBERG 6878 to be reconnoitred by the GSO III in advance.

                (g) Troop Recce Sqn was to cover the rear during the move and then revert to command own Squadron.

                        The orders were issued verbally to the battalions and in message form to the small units.  2 i/c 7 KOSB received them on behalf of his battalion and must have partially misunderstood them because the coy at PLANKEN WAMBUIS started moving immediately and was through REIJERSHEIDE before it was discovered.  It was finally halted beyond SCHWEIZERHOHE 6881.  The remainder of the battalion moved according to plan at 2000 hours to conform with 4 Parachute Brigade.  1 Border was given their orders direct by the Acting Brigade Commander who visited their HQ.  A plan was laid on for an attack by A Coy on to LAURA to extricate D Coy if required and subsequently for the same Coy to make a demonstration to the South from there to extricate B Coy from the RENKUM - HEELSUM area, B Coy having said that they did not expect to be able to move in daylight.  In point of fact the move went according to plan and these attacks were not necessary.

        1700 - After the early withdrawal of A Coy 7 KOSB from the North flank had been left open and the enemy occupied REIJERS HEIDE and part of the wood to the South of the main road.  The Recce tp was ordered up there to watch them.

        1800 - At various times about now reports were received chiefly from RA sources of parties of SS up to 250 strong moving up from HEELSUM and up to 50 strong moving East along the railway line in the vicinity of point 29.4 (6980).  These never came to anything though fire was opened on some figures on the railway in the vicinity of Brigade HQ without result.

        1815 - Recce Tp reports that the Southern edge of the wood South of REIJERSHEIDE was free of the enemy but that considerable numbers were now in the Northern half.  The Tp Comd reported that one of his recce patrols had been captured and that they must have been murdered as they were all found dead, shot through the head, at some distance from their weapons.

        1900 - Brigade HQ Group moved off in order of march:- Glider Pilots, Brigade HQ, Pl 9 Fd Coy, Tp Recce Sqn.

        2000 - Brigade HQ established at BILDERBERG HOTEL 683787.  This had the disadvantage of being:- (a) An obvious artillery or mortar target.  (b) In the front line.  (c) Almost entirely composed of glass.  but it was in the true Airlanding Brigade tradition of being the most luxurious building in the area.  The Dutch proprietors were most hospitable to us and seemed to have been the same to the Germans as they produced a number of chits signed by individual German officers.  It was decided to leave this HQ at dawn the following morning.

        2100 - No communication with 7 KOSB owing to screening by the woods.  7 KOSB passed to command 4 Parachute Brigade.  1 Border reported occupation of new position.

        Night 18/19 - quiet for units under command.  2 S Staffords second lift party rejoined own unit by first light.  7 KOSB moved in front of 4 Parachute Brigade along road to JOHANNA HOEVE with C Coy directed on point 56.6 (6979) and B Coy on to 54.2 (7080).  The main axis followed B Coy.  It was found that these positions were strongly held with prepared MG posts which were difficult to locate in the dark.  It was therefore decided to occupy a position based on JOHANNA HOEVE until first light.  A Coy remained in area 686813.

19th September.

        The Brigade task this day was to hold the approaches to ARNHEM from the West and to cover the landing of the third lift gliders in the area North West of JOHANNA HOEVE.  The former task was carried out by the Glider Pilots and 1 Border: the latter by 7 KOSB now passed to command 4 Parachute Brigade.  The plan for the latter task was for 7 KOSB to stand fast in their present positions while 4 Parachute Brigade passed through them.  OC 7 KOSB adjusted his dispositions accordingly expecting the gliders in not later than 1000 hrs.

        0445 - 2 S Staffords resumed their advance into the town.

        0500 - GSO III left to recce new HQ in the area of VALKENBURG 685782.

        0730 - The GOC having returned, the Brigade Commander reassumed command and decided to move Brigade HQ to the houses at 694779.

        0800 - Brigade HQ already on transport ready for the move was strafed Messerschmidts.  No casualties or damage.  Col Barlow left to take command of operations in the town and was not heard of again.  Lt Comd Walters, RDN, left for Div HQ.

        0900 - Brigade HQ established in new location.  The dispositions of units under command at this time were:-

                One squadron Glider Pilots under Major A.J. Dale DFC was in reserve disposed for the local protection of Brigade HQ from the East.

        0930 - Major Simonds reported that he had a small detached party of 2 S Staffords under command in area Point 55.1 (6917 5).  This party requested permission to rejoin own unit and consisted of:- A/Tk guns under Capt Woodward, BB Mortar Pl under Lieut Withers MC, One rifle pl under command Lieut Edwards.  Div HQ decided to keep this party in reserve for the present and they remained in former location except for the A/Tk guns with two 17 prs were ordered to join 1 Border.

        0945 - Various reports received from civilian sources that enemy in large numbers had passed through HEELSUM 6477 and NOERDBERG 6476 and were crossing the river from the South at DOORSWERTH 6676.  1 Border informed.

        1100 - Information received that 4 Parachute Brigade held up in woods East and North East of JOHANNA HOEVE with main area of resistance along the line of the road running parallel to grid line 70.  A sgt of 156 Parachute Bn arrived at this HQ having been pinned to the ground near the railway crossing at 699791 for some hours.  He reported an SP gun and an Armoured Car in the orchard at 699791 which ran along the road from 698795 to 699793 and fired either West or South as required.  This sgt was sufficiently close to watch the gun in action and hear the words of command.  The sgt was sent on to Div HQ.

        1115 - 2 S Staffords now working direct under Div asked for their A tk guns: all except two were sent up, the two being kept at Brigade HQ as a reserve.  For the remainder of story of 2 S Staffords see their narrative attached at Appendix 'C'.

        1500 - A plan was laid on for a small party from 1 Border under Major Montgomery to stalk the tracked vehicles notified by the Para Bn Sgt as being in the orchard 698794.

        1515 - It was decided by Div that it would now be impossible for 4 Para Bde to move East north of the railway.  They were therefore to withdraw South leaving 7 KOSB to cover the Landing Zone for the landing of the Polish transport and the crossing of the railway by 4 Para Bde.  7 KOSB were then to rejoin this Brigade in the area 679793.  This Brigade was not informed of this decision as regards 7 KOSB.  At this time the third lift gliders started arriving, preceded by a resupply drop.  In spite of heavy flak the gliders made good landings and were unopposed on the ground, 7 KOSB providing part of B Coy to assist the Poles in unloading.  A few minor incidents occurred with the Poles firing at the KOSB protecting force and they attacked Major Montgomery's stalking party as they approached the orchard.  This stalk had then to be called off.

        1530 - The Dutch Commander, Colonel Barlow and the whole of 2 S Staffords HQ were reported missing.

        1700 - 7 KOSB complete except for part of B Coy, which had gone astray and the whole of A Coy Group which got cut off, crossed the railway.  The transport went via WOLFHEZEN less certain vehicles which crossed with the troops and some of which got stuck.

        1900 - Just after 7 KOSB were clear of 1 Border, all Coys 1 Border were attacked lightly, the attacks being driven off without difficulty.  Coy positions were readjusted as a result of a decision by Div to hold a perimeter West of ARNHEM.  During the course of the day 2 S Staffords, with elements of 1, 3 and 11 Bns had finally been driven out of the town by weight of gunfire and tanks, and the party had to be reformed in the area of OOSTERBEEK station 703774 under Major Cain.  Major Simmond's party less the rifle platoon was ordered to join them and the defence of the South-East part of the perimeter was re-organised under Lt. Col. Thomson, 1 Lt Regt RA with its HQ at the Church 696773.  A 22 set was provided by this HQ under whose command the party was placed, and a party of Glider Pilots under Major Dale given the task of finding a standing patrol with orders to fight a delaying action between the railway bridge at 711774 and OOSTERBEEK station.  This patrol was withdrawn after dark.

        1930 - 7 KOSB arrived in Div HQ area.  GSO II ordered them to hold the Northern flank of the perimeter between on the right with the Sqn and on the left 21 Indep Para Coy in OMMERSHOL 6979.  The area selected by the CO was that of the woods at 696791.

        2245 - Coy positions of 1 Border were adjusted as follows:- B Coy to area of cross roads 688772 with one platoon in houses at 685770.  C Coy in area of KOUDE HERBERG cross roads.  D Coy on the road at 686775.

        2300 - Major Cain reported the strength of his force as:-

        2400 - 7 KOSB reached new location and started digging in; no communication with them.

20th September.

        0230 - Liaison Officer arrived from Div with 4 Para Bde plan for following day.

        0445 - Div informed this Brigade that 7 KOSB had reverted to our command.

        0730 - Heavy mortaring on all positions including Brigade HQ.

        0800 - Strength return from 7 KOSB gave battalion as about 270.

        0830 - Direct hit on Brigade HQ caused the death of:-

                A number of men were wounded at the same time.

        1000 - Attacks on a small scale developed along the main road against 1 Border and intense activity in the woods North of the railway reported by 7 KOSB also developed into infiltration attacks.  All these attacks were supported by tanks and SP guns, a number of each being destroyed by each battalion.

        1100 - The perimeter defence at OOSTERBEEK station was reorganised with 11 Para Bn holding the coast road area with the A tk guns and MMGs belonging to 2 S. Staffords.  All Staffords were withdrawn and occupied the area of the Laundry at 697775.

        1330 - Information received that the follow up troops were held up South of NIJMEGEN bridge and that they were putting in an attack immediately.

        1430 - GSO III accidentally wounded in the arm and taken to the ADS.

        1445 - Visit from Lt. Col. Marrable, Comd 181 Fd Amb, and Major Rigby Jones who said that the MDS had been captured that morning but that the wounded and medical staff were not being molested and that the doctors had free access.

        1550 - C Coy 1 Border on main road was attacked by flame throwing tanks and SP guns.  They were forced to withdraw somewhat but counter-attacked and regained all former positions.  The Brigade Commander visited 1 Border.

        1530 - Lieut Colthard, 1 Border arrived as replacement Brigade IO and Lieut Schwartz 2 S Staffords as GSO III.

        1730 - Resupply dropped all over Brigade area.  Panniers were collected by units of the Brigade and reported to CRASC for collection.

        1800 - Two carriers from 7 KOSB sent to Div to rush ammunition to bridge and distribute supplies.  Position in hand on all fronts.

        1815 - 11 Para Bn ordered to establish post at bend in road 697777 and patrol between there and OOSTERBEEK station.

        1830 - Major Winchester, Comd 9 Fd Coy, arrives at Brigade HQ to enquire whether the ferry at 6876 was still under our control.  On being informed that it was he went down to recce it.

        1920 - Brigade Commander visited Glider Pilots, 7 KOSB and Div HQ.  He told Div that he was not confident of the OOSTERBEEK area as 11 Para Bn are in a very nervous state.

        2330 - KOSB reported intense enemy activity with tracked vehicles on their front.  A conc from the Lt Regt was brought down in the area an hour later.

        2400 - Report received that NIJMEGEN bridge had been captured intact and that the armour was pouring across with a view to making a flat out rush for ARNHEM bridges.

21st September.

        0350 - Carrier patrol to try and get ammunition to the 1 Para Bde party on the bridge failed to get through.  Ammunition was therefore handed over to 11 Para Bn.

        0545 - 11 Para Bn were ordered to send patrols East to the railway-road bridge.

        0600 - Various attacks developed against 1 Border right and centre: all were broken up or driven off with the help of 1 Lt Regt.

        0730 - Div O Group held and the perimeter divided between 1 Air Landing Bde and 4 Para Bde.  Our area of responsibility was from the east of the road at 699790 round to HEVEADORP and included in order of position from right to left:- Recce Sqn, 7 KOSB, 21 Indep Para Coy, Div RE, Glider Pilot Bn, 1 Border.

        0900 - Advanced platoon of B Coy 1 Border at HEVEADORP attacked by a number of Tiger tanks and overrun.  A counter-attack put in by the coy destroyed three tanks but failed and the force temporarily disintegrated, having lost its commander, Major Armstrong.  Stragglers without arms came back to Brigade HQ where they were reformed under Major Stewart and Capt Reese and ordered to hold the line of the wood at 692774.  Later this party was reinforced by the platoon of 2 S Staffords under Lieut. Edwards which had remained in reserve in the area of Div HQ.  Major Breese took over command of this force, Major Stewart having been wounded.

        1000 - The mortaring which had been intense all the morning died down and work was completed by 9 Fd Coy platoon on slit trench command post.  These slits were occupied during the day while a cellar in an outhouse was being prepared for occupation.

        1030 - GOC and CRA visited Brigade HQ and said that FOU was now in touch with Medium Regts of Gds Armd Div.  We were told to select targets for the time when they would be in range.

        1100 - Lieut Clark, JLO, sent to Cainforce with a message escorted by a DR.  He ran into an ambush and was reported by the escort killed.  (Later reported wounded).

        1217 - Two mortars offered by Recce Regt were sent to Lieut Withers who was commanding mortars of 2 S Staffords in area of Div HQ.

        1235 - Information received that 43 Div would be directed on HEVEADORP ferry and might be expected to pass one battalion and ammunition across the river in the evening.  Slidex for today reported compromised.

        1445 - Resupply drop in Brigade area badly shot up by flak and ME 109s.  One container of 6 pr ammunition dropped free and landed on Brigade HQ exploding and wounding some of the Provost Section.

        1515 - Recce reported SP gun had broken into their area and that 156 Para Bn had amalgamated with them.  21 Indep Para Coy reported that heavy attacks were starting on their front supported by SP guns.  At their request Scale 3 was put down by the Lt Regt on 689794.

        1615 - 30 Corps were reported at ELST.

        1630 - A determined attack at coy strength preceded by heavy mortaring was put in against 7 KOSB right on the White House at 697791.  The attack was broken up and a counter-attack with a bayonet charge led by Lt Col Payton Reid cleared the enemy from the vicinity except for a large number of dead.  This battle was reported by 21 Indep Para Coy who said that 7 KOSB had been liquidated and that only a few stragglers were left in their area.  This alarmist report was probably caused by the fact that there was a 400 yds gap between 7 KOSB left and them.  As touch was temporarily lost with 7 KOSB by wireless, the Recce Sqn on their right were asked the situation.  They confirmed that 7 KOSB were still in position.

        1800 - KOSB decided to close the gap between them and 21 Ind Para Coy by side-stepping and to shorten the line owing to the large number of casualties caused in the White House battle.  Preparations were put under way and the RAP was moved, the MO and all walking wounded, including the second in command, falling into enemy hands.  A new MO was asked for and 7 KOSB were told to send a carrier down to the ADS to collect him.

        1905 - A heavy attack developed along the main road against A and C Coy positions.  A safe area for shelling was notified and the medium guns of 30 Corps brought down with great success.  This was continued for about an hour and the enemy finally withdrew.  This fire was brought down and observed entirely by the infantry.  Observers were put out by 1 Border to watch and report on the drop of the shells.  Observations and calls for repetitions were passed over the Brigade command net and relayed over the Brigade A wave to the G staff at Div.

        2058 - A series of crumps were put down on HEVEADORP culminating in Scale 5 from the Mediums.

        2152 - 21 Indep Para Coy given orders to withdraw to the Div Maint Area by 0200 hrs to come into Div reserve.

        2200 - The Div perimeter was shortened in the North by withdrawing further South.  7 KOSB were moved to the area of the edge of the wood at 693788, with contact on their left with the Glider Pilots, and Recce Sqn on their right.  9 Fd Coy were in reserve just behind them.  In the event of the Polish Brigade being ferried across during the night they were to take over 1 Border positions and 1 Border was to come into reserve.  In fact the Poles did not arrive.

22nd September.

        0730 - After a comparatively quiet night, the usual hour's morning hate of shelling and mortaring started.  A number of men of Brigade HQ were killed and two officers wounded.  They were

                Both were removed to the ADS where Capt Lockyer subsequently had a leg amputated.

        0900 - Decision taken to move Brigade HQ to an area less easily selected as a mortar target.  Location selected was in a wood at 692778, the local defences moving also.  Dispositions now were:-

                (a) Glider Pilot Sqn holding a line from the [?] at 688779, to HEMELSCHE BERG 689776.

                (b) Two anti tank guns of 2 S Staffords were sited, one to cover the approach from the East and the other at the road junction at 690777.

                (c) Platoon 9 Fd Coy was released to command own squadron.

        0910 - 1 Border reported that their ammunition dump had been blown up by a direct hit.

        1300 - A plan was laid on for Breeseforce to attack HEVEADORP at first light next morning with a view to recapturing the ferry so as to get the Poles and follow-up troops across.  Orders for the attack were issued and Capt Lee of the Light Regt was to get the whole of the artillery available from 2nd Army registered before dark.

        1600 - Heavy attack on D Coy 1 Border in the centre locality.  They reported themselves as nearly surrounded and that their strength was 2 and 35.  They beat off the attack and stood fast.  This was the last communication with them for some days.

        1700 - Last touches were being put to the Brigade HQ command post trenches when heavy mortaring came down and tree bursts caused a number of casualties, including Major Norman-Walker, Comd 1 Lt Bty our affiliated bty.  An immediate replacement was asked for and Capt Taylor of the Lt Regt arrived with Capt McMillan with a FOU set.

        1715 - Report from Div that 30 Corps had overcome the last obstacle holding them up and that they should be up to the river very shortly.

        1725 - Arrangements made to receive a number of Poles who were to cross the river tonight.  Glider Pilots were to meet them and lead.

        1600 - Visit from ADMS, OC 181 Fd Amb and Capt Rigby-Jones who informed us that the Brigade HQ Padre, Rev Benson had lost an arm when the MDS was shelled by an SP gun at short range.  They also said that Capt Robson the GSO III would be ready to come out tomorrow and rejoin for duty.

        1945 - An SP gun was reported in the vicinity of our former Brigade HQ.  This was subsequently confirmed by 4 Para Bde.  Div troops undertook to deal with it.

        2145 - The attack by Breeseforce on the Ferry was cancelled by GOC it not having been possible to carry out any registration owing to bad visibility.

        2245 - Information received that 5 DCLI can be expected to cross the river in DUKWS tonight.

        2345 - Some Poles started arriving across the river in the area of the Light Regt.  They missed the guides owing to crossing at the wrong place.  They were collected at the Church and numbered in all about 35.  They were given to Major Breese to reinforce his party.  As they were not battle inoculated they did not dig satisfactory slit trenches and were quickly reduced by half by shelling.  Capt Wilson GSO 2 with Liaison Section, crossed with them and reported to Brigade HQ.

23rd September

        0730 - Morning hate started again.  It was noticed that heavy mortaring and shelling invariably about this time and went on for an hour.  Fire seems to be brought down later during the day on areas indicated by SP 88mm guns firing signals into the air.  This was particularly noticed during the rest of the battle when the SP guns got inside the perimeter.

        0800 - Infantry and some tanks and SP guns had infiltrated into the wood at 694778 and were taken on by the Light Regt.

        0930 - A heavy attack estimated by 1 Border as being at battalion strength with many Spandaus was launched against their right.  Enemy were said to be Rumanian SS.  This attack developed strongly and was supported by SP guns and flame throwing tanks.

        1200 - A Coy 1 Border had their north flank turned and there was much confused action until a counter-attack by the battalion reserve restored the position.  Medium guns of 30 Corps assisted throughout.  The GOC sent his congratulations to 1 Border.

        1452 - A heavy attack developed against 7 KOSB and continued at intervals during the day.  Support fire on 693787 given by heavy guns from the South bank of the river.  This shoot was most successful but caused some alarm among the KOSB as they thought it was firing short.  It subsequently transpired that the enemy were firing at the same time and that the drop of our own shells was difficult to differentiate.  Corrections were given and the main attack broken up.

        1600 - Resupply drop and activity by our rocket firing Typhoons.  Some of this drop fell in the Brigade area and was collected by us.  There being no transport left at Div it could not be distributed.  Brigade transport by now was reduced to the three Signal Jeeps.

        1800 - Recce reported that they had been blasted out of their houses and had withdrawn about 100 yards.  The situation was well in hand and the troops' morale high.

        2000 - A ration distribution, the first at Brigade HQ, worked out at one sardine and some biscuits per man.

        2355 - Liaison Officer from Division arrived to explain the details of the reception of the Polish Para Brigade which was due to cross complete during the night.  It was arranged that the GSO III who had returned from hospital during the morning should meet them with a party of guides from the Defence Platoon and bring them to the area of the ponds at 691778 where they would pass the night in slit trenches which were already there.  In the morning they would be given a task as required.

24th September.

        0145 - Polish Liaison Officer arrived after having got lost on the way.  A party of Signals with a wireless set had already left for the Church for the Poles.  During the course of the night about 125 Poles crossed the river and were met by our guides.  They were difficult to control and were very noisy, causing alarm to all troops in the vicinity.  Some went astray and fetched up at the Church with the Light Regt.

        0900 - All Poles were brought to the Div HQ area whence 100 were sent to reinforce 4 Para Brigade.  The remainder were put under command of the Glider Pilots in the area of the cross tracks at 688781 to contact 1 Border on the road.  The GSO III with the Poles who had been captured by the Germans during the night in the vicinity of Brigade HQ was sent on to join the main party of Poles with 4 Para Brigade.

        1100 - Sitrep from 7 KOSB reported no major activity by Germans during the night.  They were now busy hunting out parties who had infiltrated into the lines in the darkness with MGs and were causing a lot of damage.  A light attack at this time was broken up with shellfire.

        1200 - Enemy infantry established themselves in strength about 30 in the wood at the crossroads at 693778 and started to infiltrate into the wood across the Brigade HQ side of the road.  One complete section of them was wiped out by a Signals Bren but other individuals got across.  Individual effort on the part of spare men from Brigade HQ accounted for a number of them but they remained in possession.  A small party under Lieut Austin JLO, and CSMI Morgan of the PT staff tried to drive them out but they had established themselves in some old slit trenches and both the above were reported killed.  Later a party of about 20 Glider Pilots in their usual willing manner, under Lieut Boyd, tried without success to drive them out.  This was found impossible because two tanks appeared at the road junction 693777 and covered the road.  A tank hunting party from the Defence Platoon tried to stalk them with PIATs but without success and the PIATs were lost owing to casualties.

        1230 - The Glider Pilot Bn was badly shot up by flame throwing tanks.  They held on and two were knocked out by 17 prs.  They approached 7 KOSB and asked them to dispose themselves in greater depth so as to cover the Glider Pilots rear.  The suggestion was agreed to by Lt Col Payton Reid, who shortened his front accordingly.

        1407 - An attack preceded by heavy shelling and mortaring came in on the Glider Pilots right.  This continued for the rest of the day but they said they could hold out till dusk.

        1700 - Finally they evacuated the wood in the area of 692787 and took up positions behind 7 KOSB.  This left the left flank of 7 KOSB badly exposed as the enemy could now form up under cover about 50 yards away from them.

        1740 - Brigade Commander visited Div HQ and returned with orders as to what to be done in the event of the Div being overrun.

        1915 - The enemy laid down a smoke screen and started forming up in front of 7 KOSB.  This attack was broken up by the Mediums before it started.

        1930 - It having proved impossible to clear the wood in the vicinity of Brigade HQ at 693777 it was decided to bring the Mediums onto it.  They were registered in, one gun at a time, by Capt Taylor.  When all were 'on' a number of concs were brought down and the enemy kept quiet for the rest of our stay at ARNHEM.

        1935 - Attacks on 1 Border centre and right were broken up by fire from the Mediums.  D Coy in the centre was reduced by this time to 1 and 19, the Coy Commander Capt Hodgson being still in command.

        2145 - The enemy started ferrying our wounded from the MDS established by 181 Fd Amb into hospitals in ARNHEM.  The MDS being in enemy hands all units had to hold their wounded at their RAPs those from Brigade HQ being sent to Div HQ dressing station.

25th September.

        0445 - Liaison Officer arrived to find out whether we had made contact with the follow-up troops who were said to have crossed the river with supplies and ammunition.  No contact had been made and it subsequently transpired that the crossing had taken place 1000 yards to the West in the HEVEADORP area.  Lt. Col. Haddon, OC 1 Border crossed with this party to rejoin his battalion but never made contact with his unit and has since been reported as prisoner of war.

        1000 - After a comparatively quiet morning heavy mortaring and shelling broke out all along the front.  No major attack was put in anywhere but under its cover parties started infiltrating at all points and the morning was very sticky everywhere.  A party estimated at one section occupied the houses at 693781 and ambushed all traffic moving along that road between Div and Brigade HQ.  This was successfully dealt with by Major Dale's party of Glider Pilots.  3 SP guns and a Tiger Tank were now firmly established at the road junction 693777 and started moving North up to the entrance of Brigade HQ.  The leading tank stopped with its nose just visible round the corner of the gate but no alarm was felt because that part was covered by a concealed anti tank gun.  Unfortunately the breech got jammed as a result of mortar fire and another 6 pr had to be fetched.  This gun fired 3 rounds and immobilised the tank but did not destroy it.  When darkness fell it was towed away by another tank.  The presence of that 6 pr deterred the enemy for the rest of the day.

        1030 - Div O Group at Div HQ.

        1051 - An SOS call came from the Light Regt saying that they were being heavily attacked, the object being apparently to cut the Div off from the river.  They asked for immediate infantry support and PIATs.  As nothing was available from us the request was passed to Div HQ who replied that nothing could be found for them and that they must hang on.

        1330 - Orders for Operation BERLIN issued, i.e. orders for the evacuation to the other side of the river during the night.  The order of move as far as the Brigade Group was concerned was - D Coy 1 Border, 7 KOSB, Brigade HQ Group, Glider Pilots with Poles under command, 1 Border less D Coy, Breeseforce.  The time of move as far as Brigade HQ Group was concerned, was 2240 hours but all timings were later postponed 20 minutes.

        1430 - A corporal from D Coy 1 Border Regt got through to Brigade HQ giving their strength and fighting state.  This was the first communication with them for two days as WT had failed and patrols had failed to get through.  He was sent back immediately to order the withdrawal of D Coy forthwith to the line of the track South of the monument at 688779.  He returned to Brigade HQ some time later saying that he had arrived back at the coy just as it was being overrun.  Nothing further was heard of any of this coy.

        2330 - Brigade HQ personnel went to the RV at the road junction 690778 in parties holding hands.  On arrival there it was found that units which should still have been in position were already moving past.  Brigade HQ joined in and crossed the start line on time but well back in the queue.  The move to the river bank as far as most units were concerned was uneventful except that 7 KOSB ran into a barrage and part of their tail got cut off.

26th September.

        0200 - 7 KOSB completed their crossing in assault boats.

        0600 - Evacuation by boat ceased at first light, about two thirds of Brigade HQ being left on the North bank.  Thereafter no further evacuation took place except for a few swimmers and a small party which arrived the following night.

        1200 - A strength check carried out at NIJMEGEN showed the following survivors:-

Appendix

TAC. HEADQUARTERS,

21 ARMY GROUP,

28 September 1944.

Major-Gen R.E. Urquhart,

Comd. 1 Airborne Division.

        1.  I want to express to you personally, and to every officer and man in your Division, my appreciation of what you all did at ARNHEM for the Allied cause.  I also want to express to you my own admiration, and the admiration of us all in 21 Army Group, for the magnificent fighting spirit that your Division displayed in battle against great odds on the North bank of the Lower Rhine in Holland.

        2.  There is no doubt that, had you failed, operations elsewhere would have been gravely compromised.  You did not fail, and all is well elsewhere.  I would like all Britain to know that in your final message from the ARNHEM area you said: "All will be ordered to break out rather than surrender.  We have attempted our best, and we will continue to do our best as long as possible."  And all Britain will say to you:- "You did your best; you all did your duty; and we are proud of you."

        3.  In the Annals of the British Army there are many glorious deeds.  In our Army we have always drawn great strength and inspiration from past traditions, and endeavoured to live up to the high standards of those who have gone before.  But there can be few episodes more glorious than the epic of ARNHEM, and those that follow after will find it hard to live up to the standards that you have set.

        4.  So long as we have in the armies of the British Empire officers and men who will do as you have done, then we can indeed look forward with complete confidence to the future.  In years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able to say: "I fought at ARNHEM".

        5.  Please give my best wishes, and my grateful thanks to every officer and man in your Division.

(Sgd) B.L. Montgomery

Field Marshal,

C.-in-C., 21 Army Group.

In The Field.

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND ARMY.

SEPTEMBER 29th, 1944.

My dear Urquhart,

        Before you leave Second Army I want to tell you how much I appreciate the great action fought by your Division at Arnhem.

        From the moment that you came under my command on September 17th until the day on which you were ordered to withdraw, you were fighting ceaselessly against odds, which increased as days went by.

        I want all ranks in your splendid Division to know that this action of yours played a vital part in the whole Second Army Operation.

        Thanks to the way in which you contained the enemy at Arnhem, we were able to secure the bridges at Nijmegen intact.

        Please convey to them all my admiration and gratitude for their great work.

Yours Sincerely,

(Sgd) M.C. Dempsey

SUBJECT:- Operation 'MARKET'

To:- Commander 1 Airborne Division.    Reference: GOC/P/2

        Commander 30 Corps is sending you a letter from himself and his Corps expressing their unstinted admiration and gratitude for the gallant part played by 1 Airborne Division in the Second Army's drive to cross the RHINE.

        He will explain to you, and in his expression of opinion I absolutely concur, that without the action of the 1st Airborne Division in tying up, pinning down, and destroying in large numbers the German forces in the ARNHEM area, the crossing of the WAAL, the capture of the bridges at NIJMEGEN and, above all, the advance from the bridgehead, would have been quite impossible.

        I am intensely proud of the magnificent fight put up by your Division.  With you, I deeply regret the sacrifice that has been entailed in the Division which I had the honour to raise originally.

        I hope to have an opportunity of telling them something of the course of the whole Airborne operation and the drive of the Second Army north, before they are evacuated to ENGLAND.  I should be grateful if you would afford me an opportunity which we can mutually arrange.

        In the meantime, I do not hesitate to say that the operation, taken as a whole, has done more to speed up the war and further disrupt the already disorganized German Army than any other action up to date.  In fact, none other than an Airborne operation could possibly have achieved the result.

(Sgd) FAM Browning Lieut-General

Commander British Airborne Corps.

BLA

26 Sep 44

From: Commander 30 Corps, Second Army.

To:- Commander 1st Airborne Division.    26 Sep 44.

        I want to congratulate you and all ranks of your Division on their tremendous achievement during the last eight days of fighting.  We realize that, had it not been for you, we should have had no chance whatever of securing the NIJMEGEN bridge intact.

        I am afraid that your losses have been very heavy, but in your fighting NORTH of the NEDER RIJN you contained a large number of German reserves, and while your Parachute Brigade was holding the NORTH end of the bridge at ARNHEM, you prevented any reinforcements from moving down towards NIJMEGEN.  This just gave us time to secure these vital bridges.

        There is no doubt that this may quite likely have a decisive influence on the war, and will, at any rate, I am certain, shorten the period of the war by several weeks.

        Well done First Airborne Division!

        On behalf of the Second Army - many thanks.

(Sgd) B.G. Horrocks Lt. Gen.

Commander 30 Corps.

Subject: Operation 'MARKET'

To: Officer Commanding, 64 Medium Regt, R.A., B.L.A.

        On behalf of the 1st Airborne Division I wish to thank you, your Regiment, and 419 Heavy Battery for the support given to us during the last week.

        It is quite obvious now that the part the Regiment played in the battle of ARNHEM was a deciding factor in the survival of the Division for the nine days it spent NORTH of the River RHINE.  At the time your Regiment came into action in support of us, things were looking fairly black, and your fire just made all the difference.  It was not only the devastating and very accurate effect produced by your fire during the last six days of our battle that had such a heartening effect on all ranks of the Division, but also the way in which all calls were so promptly answered.

        The Commanders of 30 Corps and the Airborne Corps have agreed to our request that we may be allowed to present your Regiment with our Airborne sign, the Pegasus, to be worn on the lower half of the right sleeve.  We shall regard it as a great privilege if you will undertake to wear this as a lasting remembrance of our liaison during the battle of ARNHEM.

        I hope I shall have an opportunity of seeing your Regiment in the future and thanking them personally for their efforts.

(SGD) R.E. URQUHART,

Major General Commander

1 Airborne Division.

27 Sep 44

B.L.A.

From 6 Airborne Div

To: 1 Airborne Div (via Airborne Corps)

magnificent achievement (.)  all ranks thrilled by your epic battle (.)  good luck to you

HQ AB V WAROF 'P'

FROM SIGMR WAROF

TO SIGMR HQAB

        SS772.  RESTRICTED.  HEREWITH COPY OF PIGEON MESSAGE RECEIVED AT REAR 61 DIV 261400.  ADDRESS TO REAR AIRBORNE FORCES HQ ADDRESS FROM OC 2nd PARA BN.

        ORIGINATORS NO W F L.  DATE 18.  TEXT.  2ND BN CAPTURED NORTH END MAIN BR AT 172000.  NOW HOLDING PERIMETER 300 YDS RADIUS FROM BRIDGE.  BDE HQ AND C COY 3RD BN WITHIN THIS PERIMETER.  C COY 2ND BN HOLDING BUILDINGS 42 ON TOWN PLAN.  1ST BN ABOUT 1 MILE WEST OF BR ADVANCING AGAINST LIGHT OPPOSITION.  3RD BN POSN LESS C COY UNKNOWN.  2ND BN CAS ABOUT 60.  ENEMY CAS DUE TO 2ND BN APPROX 400.  ENEMY DEF OF TOWN LIGHT.  ENEMY ARMD CARS TOTAL 20 CROSSED BR DURING LAST MM 1/2 HR 10 DESTROYED.  EXPECT TO CAPTURE SOUTH OF BR TONIGHT.  ADDITIONAL AMN ESPECIALLY A TK REQUIRED.  END OF TEXT.  TOO 0845.

SIGNED D.W. WALLER MAJOR.

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BROWNING FROM MAJ. GEN URQUHART

        I MUST WARN YOU THAT UNLESS PHYSICAL CONTACT IN SOME STRENGTH IS MADE WITH US EARLY 25 SEP I CONSIDER IT UNLIKELY THAT WE CAN HOLD OUT ANY LONGER.  ALL RANKS ARE NOW COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED AS THE RESULT OF 8 DAYS CONTINUOUS EFFORT.  LACK OF FOOD AND WATER AND DEFICIENCY IN ARMS COMBINED WITH HIGH OFFICER CASUALTIES RATE HAS HAD ITS EFFECT.  EVEN COMPARATIVELY MINOR ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION MAY CAUSE COMPLETE DISINTEGRATION.  SHOULD THIS BECOME APPARENT ALL WILL BE TOLD TO BREAK TOWARDS THE BRIDGEHEAD IF ANY RATHER THAN SURRENDER.  CONTROLLED MOVEMENT FROM PRESENT POSITION IN FACE OF ENEMY IS OUT OF THE QUESTION NOW.  WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.