Divisional Headquarters

Abbreviations

190200A

2 i/c

658797

AA & QMG

Abt

Adjt

Adm

ADMS

ADOS

Airfd

A/L

Amb

Amn

APIS

APM

Armd

Arty
A Tk

Att
BC

Bde

BLA

Btl

Bty

Cas
CB

Comd

Comn

Conc

Coy

CRA

CRASC

CRE

DAAQ

DAQMG

Det

Div

DMA

Engr

Fmn

FOO

FOU

Freq

Fwd

Gds

GOC

GSO

HAA

How

HQRA

Incl

Ind

Inf

Infm

Instr

Int

Ldg

LMG

L of C

MDS

Med

Offr

O Gp

Pet

Posn

Pro

RAMC

RAP

RASC
RC of Sigs

Rds

Ref

Regt

Regtl

REME

Rep

Res

Resup

RHQ

Rly

RMO

Rpg
R Sigs

R/T

SAA

SDP

Sec

Sigs

Sqn

Str

Sup

Tac

Tgt

Trg

Veh

Wef

W/T

X rds

19th September, 0200 hrs

Second-in-Command

Map Reference

Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General

Airborne

Abteilung

Adjutant

Administration

Assistant Director Medical Services

Assistant Director Ordnance Services

Airfield

Airlanding

Ambulance

Ammunition

Armour Piercing

Army Photographic Interpretation Section

Assistant Provost Marshal

Armoured

Artillery

Anti-Tank

Attached

Battery Commander

Brigade

British Liberation Army

Battalion

Bridge

Battalion

Battery

Casualty

Counter Battery

Commander

Communication

Concentration

Company

Command Post

Commander Royal Artillery

Commander Royal Army Service Corps

Commander Royal Engineers

Deputy Assistant Adjutant Quartermaster

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General

Detachment

Defensive Fire

Division / Divisional

Divisional Maintenance Area

Despatch Rider

Dressing Station

Drop Zone

Engineer

Field

Formation

Forward Observation Officer

Forward Observation Unit

Frequency

Field Security

Forward

Guards

General Officer Commanding

Grenadier

General Staff Officer

Heavy Anti-Aircraft

High Explosive

Howitzer

Headquarters Royal Artillery

Heavy

Intelligence

Include
Independent

Infantry

Information

Instruction

Intelligence

Intelligence Officer

Landing

Light Machine Gun

Liaison Officer

Line of Communication

Light

Landing Zone

Motorcycle

Main Dressing Station

Medical / Medium

Machine Gun

Motor Transport
Officer Commanding

Officer

Orders Group

Observation Post / Operation (if lower case)

Other Ranks

Pioneer

Platoon

Petrol

Pioneer

Position

Public Relations

Pounder

Provost

Prisoner of War
Panzer

Quartermaster

Royal Artillery

Royal Army Medical Corps

Regimental Aid Post

Royal Army Service Corps

Royal Corps of Signals

Road

Rounds

Royal Engineers

Reference

Regiment

Regimental

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
Representative

Reserve

Resupply

Regimental Headquarters

Railway

Regimental Medical Officer

Rounds per gun

Royal Signals

Radio Telephony

Small Arms Ammunition

Supply Dropping Point

Section

Signals

Self-Propelled

Squadron

Strength

Supply

Tactical

Target

Tank

Troop

Training

Vehicle

War Establishment

With Effect

Wireless Telegraphy

Crossroads

17 Sep. AA & QMG and ADMS landed with Tac Div HQ and set up in wood 658797. Parachute Pl 1 Para Bde landed and commenced to recover Bde res amn dropped in spare containers from DZ. On load of this amn was taken into town in captured German veh and succeeded in reaching br party. Veh however shot up on its return. Portion of 1 A/L Bde Para Pl landed with Bde and moved into town with 1 Para Bde to carry out assessment of dumps of pet, amn, stores, etc. in town. This Pl reached the Br area 1 Para Bde, fought with them, and the greater part were later taken prisoner.

18 Sep. As further quantities of res amn could not be got through to 1 Para Bde this and other amn collected from DZs and LZs was taken to Div HQ at x-rds 665784 where small dump was formed. DAAG, DAQMG and Staff, together with remaining Heads of Services (CRASC, ADOS and REME rep) and bulk of adm echelon arrived during the afternoon. Div HQ was then in the process of moving to HARTENSTEIN 7978. Two captured German vehicles were put into running order and were used for ferrying amn to DMA and later for delivery of gun amn to Lt Regt. The re-sup of 35 aircraft was carried out in conjunction with the arrival of the 2nd Lift but dropped largely on pre-determined SDPs which were then in the hands of the enemy; little could therefore be collected. In the evening at 2030 hrs the DMA opened on main rd 693784. The contents of the DMA came from the balance of the res amn from the 1 Para Bde, from the sup drop amn above, and from the bulk loaded HAMILCARS which had come in with the 2nd lift and two of which had been completely unloaded. The third was captured by the Germans before unloading could take place. No pet was available in the DMA. Owing to the general situation message was sent to Base changing location of SDP for following day. Convoy of 6 jeeps and 12 trailers loaded with amn organised and stood by ready to go to 1 Para Bde. This convoy never left owing to the situation, and part of the load was subsequently transferred to 2 carriers which later got through to 2 S Staffords and 1 Para Bn but NOT to br.

19 Sep. All Units informed that Sup drop would take place on following day at 1030 hrs. SDP map ref 685783. Pet pumps captured at map ref 696782. Units notified to draw up to 8 galls per veh in own jerricans. Sup drop for 19th dropped on pre-arranged SDP owing to non-receipt of message sent on 18th. Only isolated containers recovered. During this recovery approximately half the RASC Pl was lost in an ambush. Message sent to Base requesting urgent re-sup on map ref 691785 earliest possible 20 Sep. Possible new DMA was recced during morning but found untenable. As it was appreciated the sup drop was not likely to be successful, attempts were made through the Dutch Liaison Offrs to obtain local sups. Only very small quantities could be produced, the main items being a sack of flour and a pig. These were handed over to the ADMS for consumption at the various DSs. Mortaring and SAA fire caused cas on DMA. All Units warned utmost conservation amn, sups and pet necessary and re-distribution of remaining Compo on basis of ⅓rd ration per man as far as possible. Units informed that limited quantities of amn were still available from DMA.

20 Sep. Re-sup carried out in heavy flak but fair proportion recovered incl 2,000 rations which were all issued and represented a general ration of 1 between 3. Very heavy mortaring on DMA continued in morning. Cas fairly heavy. As a result of increased SAA fire issues from DMA became impossible and it was moved within Div HQ perimeter. Further issues of amn made from DMA incl first delivery of gun amn to Lt Regt by RASC. Some units were, however, able to collect additional sups and amn from outlying areas. MDS captured and majority of cas removed by Germans. Own med staff looking after remaining under ADMS. Two carriers loaded with amn attempted to reach 1 Bde without success. Cas in Div area heavy and many RASC jeeps were diverted as Ambs and trailers for carrying water to MDS. During the evening of 20/21 Sep the bulk of the Div RASC were formed into a platoon under the comd of Capt. J. CRANMER-BYNG, MC., RASC., and took over a portion of the Div perimeter from the 4 Para Bde.

21 Sep. Sup drop carried out in very heavy flak and with high percentage of RAF losses. Proportion of sups recovered and issues made from DMA. Special shortage of sten amn. Remainder limited. Small stock of Pet held. More gun amn delivered to Lt Regt during the day by RASC. Div HQ dispersed over wide area in afternoon to avoid possible casualties. Tac HQ remained in house in cellar. During this day heavy shelling and mortaring of the Div HQ area caused fires and explosions in the DMA. These fires were only put out with considerable difficult.

22 Sep. No Re-Sup. During the day amn in the DMA caught fire twice as the result of mortar fire and a stack of 6-pr amn exploded as a result of a direct hit. All fires were again extinguished. Issues were made to the 1st and 4th Para Bdes in Bren Carriers. Message sent asking for special drop of PIATs, Mortars and PIAT and Sten amn.

23 Sep. Sup drop carried out despite very heavy opposition, small proportions sups collected and distributed as far as possible. At this stage there were only a few serviceable jeeps and trailers which could be used, the remainder having been rendered unserviceable by mortar and shell fire. CRASC and DAQMG recced area towards the river for possible DMA without success, owing to blocking of roads by branches of trees, debris, etc. More very heavy mortaring of DMA after re-sup, amn stacks again catching fire. Very few rations received and all were handed over to MDS's. Stocks of gun amn, PIAT, Mortar and Sten which were in great demand were almost non-existent.

24 Sep. No re-sup. Almost all RASC jeeps out of action. DMA now empty except for stocks of 2" Mor Smoke. 17-pr amn and Pet. On the night of 24/25 Sep an attempt was made in conjunction with 43 Div and Polish Para Bde to ferry Sups, Amn, Pet and Medical stores across the river in DUKWS. 9 DUKWS were loaded but opposition was so heavy that only 4 DUKWS succeeded in crossing the river. None of these stores could be unloaded as the DUKWS were under heavy enemy fire and it was impossible owing to the state of the roads to bring the DUKWS up to the Div area from the river bank.

25 Sep. A re-sup drop of 4 aircraft took place. No sups recovered. When the Div evacuated only 2 RASC jeeps and trailers remained serviceable and DMA was empty with the exception of 2" Mor Smoke, 17-pdr and Pet.

221. The following remarks are of general nature in most cases. The detailed reports of the various Arms can be read in the Annexures.

222. Seven days were found to be adequate for planning, issue of orders, move to airfields, general briefing and loading of gliders. This assumes that transport is available for such moves and transit camps are ready for the reception of troops. It is doubtful, however, if this time would be sufficient for a Div which had either not carried out an airborne operation before, or had not had experience of rapid planning and issue of orders. In an emergency, where the plan is simple, troops are at Transit Camps and gliders loaded, an operation has been laid on in 72 hrs. The operation did not take place, but the drill was worked out so that planning was completed in that time.

223. An Airborne Division is designed to fight as a whole. If the Division is split and committed to a 2nd lift some 24 hrs later then, owing to the necessity of allotting part of the first lift to protect the D.Zs. and L.Zs. of the following troops, the effective strength for immediate offensive action of the Div is reduced to that of a Bde.

224. It is considered that we must be prepared to take more risks during the initial stages of an Airborne operation. When the balance sheet of casualties at ARNHEM is made, it would appear a reasonable risk to have landed the Div much closer to the objective chosen, even in the face of some enemy flak. It has always been the rule when planning that the maximum distance from the D.Z. or L.Z. to the objective should not exceed 5 miles. In the ARNHEM operation this distance was 7 miles and in some cases 8 miles. An extra two minutes flying time in the face of flak, if not too severe, would have put the Div - always supposing the ground was suitable - much nearer its objective. Initial surprise in this operation was obtained, but the effect of the surprise was lost owing to the time lag of some 4 hrs before the troops could arrive at the objective chosen. A whole Bde dropped near the bridge site at ARNHEM might have been a major factor in the outcome of the battle; longer delay on the enemy would have been imposed and, if the SECOND Army had managed to get through ELST within the first few days, the larger bridgehead formed by the Bde might have made just the difference to the further progress of that Army north of ARNHEM.

225. The forecast of the photographic interpretation and of the 'I' appreciation, both RAF and Army, of the flak defences to be met in the area proved very pessimistic. The forecast as to the suitability of the D.Z. and L.Z. in the POLDER country was also pessimistic. From subsequent examination it would appear that parachute troops could have been dropped practically anywhere outside the built up and wooded areas. Gliders could also have been landed in places previously considered as quite unsuitable. It is of course realised that a good deal of dispersion would have been necessary in this case.

226. Close air support during the first afternoon of the operation would have been invaluable. If there had been a "cab rank" available then and on subsequent days, the effect on the enemy would have been considerable. Close air support during the period when troops were in movement might easily have turned the scale and allowed the whole of 1 Para Bde to have concentrated near the main ARNHEM Bridge. Air formations must not be expect to be given pin point targets always when air support is demanded. It was found that when area targets were indicated, both for medium gun shoots and air support, the results were considerable and the effect on the enemy's morale immense. A near miss within two hundred yds or so has a very shaking effect.

227. The support by Typhoon rocket aircraft was a great success and one could have wished that many more sorties of a similar nature had been forthcoming. There is no doubt that in an operation of this kind, immediate air support must be available at very frequent intervals if weather permits. Tac R aircraft were asked for on many occasions but none were allotted. Both those and Arty R aircraft are forms of support which should be automatic in an airborne operation, or any operation for that matter, in the future.

228. It is considered that there should be one to one Signal working between the ground formation and the air formation which is actually detailed to provide close air support on call. A permanent allotment of a VCP to each Div HQ for use on training as well as on operations is a modern necessity.

229. It was found that the glider pilots, numbering some 1100, who landed with the Division took their part with success in the defensive battle which followed. The benefit of their initial training and their ability to shoot was invaluable. If such personnel had been untrained they would have become a complete liability very early on in the battle. In such numbers, if untrained, it is difficult to see how they could have been tucked away without becoming a complete menace to our own side and a liability as regards the consumption of the small amount of rations and water which was available.

230. It was found that the RASC and, of course, the RE could take their place in the line of battle with very efficient results. All personnel in the Airborne Division, who are likely to become involved in a battle, must be given the maximum infantry and weapon training that can be imparted in the time available.

231. It is thought that we do not realise our own strength as regards the effect of the weapons which we possess. It was not until the Div was put to it during the defensive battle and in the decreasing perimeter at ARNHEM that many of the soldiers appreciated how easily they could stop the German and destroy him with the weapons they possessed. The converse of course is very soon realised and over exaggerated during the early stages of a battle. A very few Germans with light automatics sometimes managed to hold up troops for much longer than was anticipated. We can do this equally as well, if not better, but we must appreciate what our weapons are for and we must learn to do early what we had to do in the end.

232. The value of the P.I.A.T. in thick country and in built up areas as a tank destroying weapon is immense. All ranks now have complete confidence in its use and throughout the battle there was a constant cry for more Ps.I.A.T. and more bombs. An increased establishment of these weapons for Para Bns and an initial allotment for the Lt Regt and A tk Btys is being demanded.

233. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the necessity for the strict insistence on discipline during training and preparation for battle. It was borne out in every case that the better trained and better disciplined the unit so the better it fought. Where, in some cases, these factors were not as good as they might have been, the results were very quickly shown. The discipline of units shown during the withdrawal was quite first class and their behaviour on the river bank until light broke excellent.

234. Leadership and determination again showed themselves to the maximum during this battle. Numbers of men are not of the slightest use when the battle becomes really sticky, unless there is an officer or NCO who can, and does, lead them. The success or otherwise of the action always reflects sooner or later the determination and guts of the particular leader who happens to be responsible in that neighbourhood.

235. There is generally a certain amount of stickiness amongst units who are in the battle for the first time. This disappears in most cases when the noises of battle have been experienced. In ordinary formations units are broken in gently wherever possible but this is never the case with an Airborne Division, who generally drop straight into the middle of the battle with little or no time to get its values correct.

236. One way in which this initial nervousness in battle showed itself was in the amount of indiscriminate shooting which went on during the first 48 hrs. Shooting at nothing in particular by individuals is a contagious disease and is extremely annoying to everybody. This must be checked in the very early stages. It must be impressed on individuals that they should shoot only at definite targets or if there is a definite suspicion of a target in their area. This restriction would not, of course, apply when a wood clearing operation or one of a similar nature is taking place, when hosepipe methods or "marching fire" may be just what is required. The need for pre-battle training under conditions which are as realistic as possible cannot be over emphasised.

237. More stress must be laid on training of men to be more individualistic, especially in thick and difficult country. There is always a tendency to bunch together and to look to the local commander before taking any action. We are well behind the Germans when it comes to infiltration as shown by their snipers. The value of night training was borne out and there we have a tremendous advantage over the German who very seldom displays any initiative during the hours of darkness. This inactivity on his part during the withdrawal enabled us to reach the river bank. It is probable that otherwise very heavy casualties would have been suffered.

238. There is still far too much respect for enemy property or property of the country in which operations are taking place. This results in a tendency in the early stages for the troops to become road-bound and a failure to infiltrate or manoeuvre in the way that the situation requires.

239. R.A. The value of the FOU was proved. The immediate support given by medium artillery was quite remarkable. To shoot at the range of 19,000 yards on a map reference target which is surrounded by our own troops only a few hundred yards away, and do this without undue danger to them is a remarkable feat. The tremendous confidence of the infantry was such that repeat shoots were continually demanded and the medium artillery never failed in their consistent and accurate support. The 75mm gun is not a good anti-tank weapon at short range, owing to the lack of a shield to protect the personnel. It did extremely well in all other instances in the normal role. The need for a third Anti-Tank Bty was shown. A third bty had been organised out of Div resources before the commencement of the battle and its value was found immense. It was found that anti-tank guns, either 6-pr or 17-pr, cannot be used as sniping weapons. Once in position they must stay in position. If tanks have to be stalked this must be carried out by anti-tank crews armed with Ps.I.A.T. and trained in tank hunting methods. This form of training must be practiced.

240. R.E. It is considered that all R.E. units within the Division should be homogenous. There is a distinct lack of equipment with the Para Sqn as at present organised. The value of the sapper as an infantry soldier was proved up to the hilt. They cannot, however, be asked both to fight as infantry and work as sappers. They can only do one thing at a time. Flame throwing equipment manned by sappers proved useful.

241. Infantry. The value of carriers to battalions of both Para Bdes and Airlanding Bde were proved. At least two per Bn are essential in future.

242. Royal Signals. Communications within the Airborne Division and to the Base and the next higher formation need drastic revision and improvement. The sets at present in use are not satisfactory in all cases. The range attributed to sets was nearly always found to be greatly exaggerated.

243. R.A.S.C. The whole question of air supply needs reorganising. Some reliable method of communicating a change of SDP must be evolved. The VCP control for close support aircraft can be used for controlling air supply. Large numbers of jeeps were put out of action by air burst mortar fire and vehicles must be dug in as early as possible in a defensive battle. There is no doubt that all ranks can fight with much less in the way of supplies than is normally prepared for. We should concentrate on ammunition and be prepared mentally to exist on very little food for considerably longer than is normally the case.

244. Fd Ambs should be homogenous in future and contain a parachute element, a gliderborne element and a seaborne element. Some medical personnel should be allotted to each unit, however small. Medical supplies during the battle rapidly became short and in the majority of cases those wounded only received a service field dressing. In spite of little attention for four or five days the condition of casualties remained extremely good.

245. In general the organisation of an Airborne Division showed up extremely well. Except for minor internal adjustments there is little need for alteration.

246. The lessons learnt in many cases are not new and they serve as a reminder for constant attention during the preparation period.

247. The Operation 'MARKET' was not 100% a success and did not end quite as was intended. The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future. We have no regrets.

First Glider Lift Major HP Maguire GSO 2 (I) (Due to glider crash in England arrived in fact with Second Glider Lift)

Second Glider Lift Capt CP Scott-Malden GSO 3 (I), Cpl Holden FWE RASC Clerk, Cpl Asterley JB RE Draughtsman, Sjt Smith G IC (att interrogator)

First Seaborne Lift Lieut Hopkins APIS, Pte Rooke E RASC Clerk, L/Cpl Douglas R RE Draughtsman, L/Cpl Sykes RASC APIS, Dvr Taunton Pi Corps.

Second Seaborne Lift Capt K Spencer IO (ph), Lieut R Millican APIS, Cpl Easton Mddx MPES, Pte Wood Mddx MPES, Pte Pearson Mddx MPES, Dvr Farrow RASC MPES

Sun 17 Sep For the first twenty-four hours of the operation, Capt Hodgson and Sjt Smith were the only representatives of the branch, as Major Maguire had crashed on take-off in England. As both were parachutists, it was possible to set up only the most rudimentary I office. Six PW were taken and interrogated within an hour of landing in the WOLFHEZEN area 6680. It became immediately apparent that the enemy order of battle was going to be complex in the extreme owing to the diversity of units present. The immediate strength of German troops in the WOLFHEZEN area was stated to be some 200 men, which subsequently proved to be fairly accurate. By the evening of 17/18 Sep, some thirty PW had been collected. These were confined for the night in a glider on the LZ where Div HQ lagered.

Mon 18 Sep Div HQ moved east down the main rd HEELSUM - ARNHEM and was joined by the Second Glider Lift in the afternoon, consisting as far as 'I' Branch was concerned of Major Maguire, Capt Scott-Malden, Cpl Holden and Cpl Asterley. The HQ was set up at 693784, the branch setting up a tented office outside the house under some trees. A PW cage was set up by the APM in the tennis courts, and the branch functioned normally for three days.

Wed 20 Sep Major Maguire was hit in the back by the nose cap of an 88mm shell which burst in the trees. No limbs or bones appeared to be broken, but he was compelled to lie on his back. He was evacuated to the RAP, and subsequently to the MDS, and is thus assumed to be PW wef 25 Sep.

Fri 22 Sep Owing to consistent heavy shelling and mortaring, it was decided to disperse branches, and maintain a central command post in the cellar of the house. The G (Int) branch was accordingly closed and the personnel removed to slit trenches at the southern end of the race track 693781. Here it was impossible to open an office. PW interrogation continued under difficulties caused by shelling and mortaring. Summary No.4 was produced, but after this no more was written. Cpl Holden was wounded by mortar fire, evacuated, and is assumed PW wef 25 Sep.

Sat 23 Sep - Mon 25 Sep The branch failed to function as such, since no intelligence information was received except captured documents, which were occasionally of interest, and only once of use. The personnel were employed in either avoiding mortar bombs or patrolling in an endeavour to watch the very open southern flank of the HQ perimeter.

Night 25/26 Sep Operation 'BERLIN' was carried out according to plan, the branch suffering no casualties during the evacuation. Copies of all summaries produced during the operation, together with traces showing the layout of our own troops during various phases, were also brought away. The I trailer had to be abandoned after checking for secret documents.

(a) Two features of the operation militated against the efficient working of Intelligence to an increasing degree as the battle progressed. They were -

Lack of communications. The virtual breakdown of wireless communications meant the hamstringing of the swift passage of enemy information, and this largely destroyed its value in a battle which was on the doorstep of the Div HQ. The result was that although, under the circumstances, a not inconsiderable amount of information was available about the enemy, by the time it had been collated and possibly returned to forward units it was of purely historic interest.

The loss of trained I personnel. Experience has always shown that if the specialist or semi-specialist IO at unit HQ does not send back enemy information nobody else will. This was again shown to be true, and forward troops were far too busy fighting to disentangle the nicer points of enemy identification. In view of these drawbacks, a quite surprising amount of information did come back, mostly by personal visits of odd I personnel.

PW These were fruitful sources of historic interest. The enemy intention was always plain, his strength was daily increasing, and the interrogation merely served to confirm what was already known in most cases. In one case a tactical squeeze brought about the silencing of an SP gun, but that was the only case in which any information gained from PW produced any tangible tactical improvement in the local situation. PW were tractable, ignorant, and as we expected to find them. Fuller details from interrogation appear in the 'Report on German Troops in the ARNHEM area' attached. Handling of PW. In the initial stages, PW were being divested of all their documents and personal belongings. As had been foreseen, this frequently led to chaos during interrogation, and it was not until two or three days had elapsed that PW were left in possession of their effects. It cannot be too strongly stressed that officers are the only PW who should be divested of their documents and effects. OR PW should be searched only for ammunition and possible weapons. PW frequently arrived at the cage with no note of where or when they had been captured, and with very little idea themselves. This wasted a lot of time in sorting out details. Co-operation with Pro at the cage for interrogation was very good, and the system worked smoothly.

Captured Documents The surprise gained in the initial landing rewarded I staffs with a large haul of documents. A number of these would have been of value to higher formation I staffs with a long term policy, but it was unfortunately impossible to evacuate them owing to their bulk. A few provided immediate identifications of units, and one a confirmation of a personality.

Information from higher formations Practically none was received, but one report that the SS Pz Div HOHENSTAUFEN was digging in on the IJSELL was followed by the capture of a PW from a march coy of the engr bn of that division.

Civilians Information from friendly civilians was generally found to be fairly reliable, after allowance had been made for the personality of the bearer, and after he had been vetted by the Dutch liaison party. The population was co-operative. Initially a large number of young men rallied to the cause, but disappeared in proportion as shelling and mortaring grew. Several rendered excellent service, and the highest praise is due to those few who helped our wounded throughout and stayed with us to the last.

The Dutch liaison party Commander VOLTERS and Lieut KNOTTENBELT and his Dutch commandos were first class. Their help was unfailingly efficient, and in very great measure. To them is due the great help received from the civilian population, and the averting of the many minor pitfalls into which an I staff might well have fallen when dealing with civilian suspects.

THIS SUMMARY INCLUDES REFERENCES TO Operation 'COMET' and is classified TOP SECRET

(a) Dutch sources have produced a considerable amount of new information. The defences along the MAAS - WAAL Canal are being considerably strengthened (air photos confirm this) and are now definitely manned; troops and labourers are digging hard along the Northern bank of the WAAL from the end of the Canal as far West as TIEL 4168, and it is reported that the line of the WAAL is being prepared as the German main position with an outpost line along the MAAS. An A tk ditch and considerable defensive positions have been constructed round the South end of the MOERDIJK bridge 8652 (South of DORDRECHT). There is a guarded ammunition and bomb dump in the woods South of NIJMEGEN between GROSEBEEK and MALDEN (this is also confirmed from air photos). The SS troops in the NIJMEGEN barracks are definitely still in the area and are estimated at 4,000 (the 1942-3 garrison of the town is thought to have been 3,500); moreover troops are also reported in ST. CANISIUS College and the MARIENBOOM Girl's School (see Town Plan), so that our estimate of a division in the area (plus flak) may still be not far wide of the mark. There are also troop concentrations at TIEL and MAURIK 4176, the latter having the vehicle sign of a white disc with a green horizontal line. It is unlikely that any part of the area could be flooded at this time of year, and the 'winter beds' of the rivers are likely to be quite firm.

(b) The main feature on yesterday's air photos is a remarkable increase in flak - some 10 light and 33 heavy in the immediate NIJMEGEN area. LZs 'U' and 'Z' each have 3 light flak guns sited on the LZs themselves with a further six light guns within 2,000 yards; Dutch sources state that all flak is sited with alternative ground role and is exercised in this role. Two A tk ditches are being constructed on the NE side of the high ground South of NIJMEGEN (the only side not covered by a natural tank obstacle), and it is evident that this feature, as was forecast in our planning summary No 2, is rapidly becoming a strongly fortified position.

15 Army is at present engaged in evacuating the OSTEND - GHENT area by ferry across the SCHELDT estuary to the Dutch islands; having left garrisons on BOLOGNE, CALAIS and DUNKIRK it is now estimated to be only three divisions strong. 7 and 5 Pz Armies have formed a line on the ALBERT CANAL and thence South to the ARDENNES, and they have even found it possible to counter-attack our bridgeheads over the Canal, though without lasting success. The enemy dispositions at the Northern end of the line are shown on the trace attached; which also gives the position of our own forward troops as at 091835. The total strength of the two German armies is estimated at two Panzer and six Inf divs, and others which have been identified (besides those shown on the trace) are 347 Div, 9 & 10 SS Divs, and 2 & 116 Pz Divs. 70 Div is in 15 Army sector.

(a) The need to keep open an escape route for 15 Army, via the Dutch islands, to the mainland.

(b) The need to gain time for the development of defences on the MAAS, WAAL and RHINE, in order to prolong the Siegfried Line to the sea.

(c) The need to gain time for the disengagement, refitting and regrouping of the Panzer formations required for the defence of the REICH.

When the enemy eventually falls back from his delaying position on the ALBERT Canal, he must hold the WAAL line not only to protect the Reich but to guard his V2 sites; for 65 Corps, which controls the 'reprisal weapons', is now located in the tip of HOLLAND North of AMSTERDAM. Moreover it is becoming obvious from the air photo information and ground reports quoted earlier in this Summary that not only does the enemy realise the value of the triple river line as an extension of the West Wall, but he also appreciates the peculiar significance of the feature South of NIJMEGEN (the highest ground in HOLLAND) as the keystone which binds together the two sides of his defensive arch - the West Wall and the WAAL. The NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM road, at present a vital line of communication to the ALBERT Canal area, will become successively his main avenue of withdrawal and our main avenue of advance; and it is becoming evident that its importance has not escaped the Germans. There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery, at any rate in the 21 Army Group area. Although we hold ANTWERP his stand on the ALBERT Canal has enabled 25,000 men from 15 Army to escape North via the Dutch islands. A captured document indicates that the degree of control exercised over the regrouping and collecting of the apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army were nothing short of remarkable. Furthermore the fighting capacity of the new Battle Groups formed from the remnants of battered divisions seems unimpaired. New divisions are being formed in Germany and the degree of control exercised by the Nazis is now such that the Germans will fight to the bitter end. They cannot hope to contain the Allied armies at the gates of Germany indefinitely - it is only a question of time before the American 7th Army forces the BELFORT Gap, the 3rd Army the AACHEN Gap or Hodges fights his way through the ARDENNES to the RHINE, but during that period there will be bitter fighting. Meanwhile behind the front German houses on the West bank of the RHINE are being mined and the men women and children of Germany itself are being taught to shoot and to hate.

The confusion of the battle and the lack of communications has made it extremely difficult to form a picture so far, and what follows is largely a collection of bits and pieces.

First opposition to our landings came from artillery troops in the WOLFHEZEN 6679 area, fighting as infantry; they numbered about 200, and were mostly caught unarmed. 48 PW yielded 27 different identifications (see PART II), and it appears that WOLFHEZEN was a reporting centre for various arty units which were shot to bits in France. This area has now been cleared.

Other troops encountered in the same area came from the COEHOORN Barracks in ARNHEM. This barracks seems, from conflicting reports, to have contained some 200 predominantly SS tps formed into some sort of bn, with a March Coy and a Recruit/Convalescent Coy. There is an extreme shortage of heavy weapons except Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust.

It is not clear whether these tps are the same as those from whom a number of PW have been taken to-day a little further North. These are stated to belong to 3 SS Pz Gr Trg Bn in ARNHEM, a unit with 5 Coys and about 500 men; it is at least possible, however, that this unit is to be equated with the last-mentioned.

Our own tps have reported resistance to our Eastward advance to-day in the area MARIENDAAL 7178 and DEN BRINK 7177, with MGs, 88's and 12cm mortars. Dutch sources report that enemy resistance in the town is centred on the KIPPEN MARKT 746773, and that other strongpoints are at 748768, RIJNPAVILVOEN 728778, and long the line 765763 - 762769. The enemy is in some force at the North end of the main bridge, which is now reported in German hands, and he is reported to have got some half-dozen armoured and possibly tracked vehicles over the bridge into the town; the bridge is now blocked with enemy vehicles, and the whole South bank of the river is in German hands.

There is evidence that the Germans have been using at least one ferry staffed by Poles, to the west of ARNHEM (687767), where some well armed SS tps went South yesterday. Tanks and SP guns, with SS tps, are reported by Dutch sources at RENKUM 6276; this place, together with HEELSUM 6477, has been an SS forming and training area.

In the last ten days the Germans have impressed some 1400 civilians to work on a defence line on the R. IJSSEL; to bring their tps back to this line, assuming that the main road is blocked at NIJMEGEN, they must use the bridges and ferries to the West of us and then either go round to the North or try to fight their way through us Eastwards.

The German posns on MARIENDAAL and DEN BRINK are concerning at the moment since they dominate the bridges, the approaches to them and the low ground South of ARNHEM.

A report from one prisoner of a new "anaesthetic gas" is being further investigated.

In the early hours of this morning our relieving unit were making their way Eastwards along the Rhine towards the main bridge to which the elements of the original formation were still clinging. They had nearly reached it by daybreak, when however the enemy brought up some tanks, apparently across the bridge from the South to North, and after some very heavy fighting with inadequate anti tank weapons these units had to fall back to the line of the railway. The number of tanks is not known - the reported total of 260 is obviously fantastic - nor is their type, though two Mk IVs have been definitely seen, and Tigers reported. Enemy pressure in this area has now eased.

Meanwhile our Northern unit, attacking towards the MARIENDAAL feature, encountered stiff opposition and was unable to secure the objective, and both this and the DEN BRINK feature to the South remain in enemy hands; it appears, however, that we still have a grip on the main bridge, which is intact though blocked by several smashed German staff cars; the garrison there is in good heart.

On our Western flank there has been sporadic fighting all day, but early reports of tanks and guns have not developed into anything much, and it appears we have here to deal only with cyclists and infantry who are not too keen to attack. The South bank of the Rhine does not appear to be held in any strength, and a civilian report says that the ARNHEM - NIJMEGEN road is practically clear of enemy as far South as LENT, where some armour is apparently waiting for our advance from the South.

(a) Marsch coys from the WOLFHEZEN area, having been initially worsted, are being encountered on both East and West flanks of the Division.

(b) 3 SS Wachbataillon, moved into action on foot from the AMERSFOORT area yesterday, has lost a quarter of its strength in PW alone, and has moved South to the Div West flank. Some elements may have slipped down into ARNHEM from the North.

(c) 3 Coy 26 Sicherungs Regt, has been destroyed. The other seven coys are reported by PW to be moving South on bicycles from HILVERSUM area.

It is impossible to appreciate enemy intentions without a full knowledge of the facts which we do not have. He must be concerned however with two things, (a) The destruction of 1 Airborne Division before the link up with the British armour so that he can hold the line of the Upper Rhine to give him more time to prepare defences on the IJSSEL. (b) Keeping open the ARNHEM bridge as a possible route of evacuation for his troops moving through NIJMEGEN (some armour has been reported between ELST and NIJMEGEN) this of course would explain his determined stand on the MARIENDAAL and DEN BRINK features, the possession of which commands the bridge and its approaches. One thing we must expect is the infiltration of large numbers of snipers into the divisional built up areas during the night.

From 191 prisoners taken up to 191645A, 42 separate units have been identified. This gives some indication of the present chaotic state of the German army.

Prisoners fall into two broad classes. The first remnants, chiefly of bombed or destroyed Arty units including GAF from the Western front which used WOLFHEZEN as a reforming centre, and were sent out as ill-equipped infantry owing to the lack of guns with which to refit them. These men are of low category, and include a high proportion of Volksdeutschen. The majority of them had been picked up by Straggler Collecting Unit, and had little infantry training.

The second category is the SS, chiefly from the SS Landsturm Niederland. This formation is the parent unit of several Wachbataillone and we have been in contact (to the extent of 106 PW) with the 3rd of them. It had five infantry coys of four platoons with Czech LMGs occupied with security duties (-4 Coy had been doing guard duty on the concentration camp at S'HERTOGENBOSEN). These were concentrated at AMERSFOORT, and marched into action from there. The personnel is largely Dutch by birth but also includes Volksdeutschen and even two Belgians pressed into service, one direct from prison at UTRECHT.

Oddments in the cage comprise the first Japanese prisoner to be taken by the Division - a civilian; a German WAAF; a Dutch gentleman of the road whose abode has now been fixed for security reasons; several Polish ferrymen and a Swiss.

Morale as usual with PW is low. Most agree that the war is lost, virtually none is truculent and most are cooperative. Their present attitude is however, not a reflection of their recent standard of fighting - particularly with the SS.

Reference Summary No.1, no further information is yet forthcoming about the 'Anaesthetic' (Betäubungs) gas.

Major General Kussin (?). Four corpses found riddled in a staff car at cross roads 679785 on the 18th proved to be Major General Kussin (?), his batman driver and interpreter, all from the Feldkommandantur in ARNHEM.

At Appendix 'A' is a list of PW by units. This will perhaps explain why it has been impossible to present intelligent picture of enemy strengths and locations.

Apart from intermittent shelling from one gun, the night 19/20 was quiet; a small party of enemy infiltrated along the main road from ARNHEM but were neutralised. Soon after first light the tempo quickened, and tanks and infantry attacked on our Western flank; they were held, but soon after a concentration of SS was observed North of the railway about 7079; in due course they attacked and made considerable headway, but at the cost of heavy casualties. The situation on the Northern flank was finally restored when one of our sub-units which had been North of the railway all night attacked SE and broke through into our main position inflicting very heavy casualties on the enemy. Meanwhile an attack had come in along the main road from ARNHEM which made considerable progress and overran the MDS, but then petered out; it was made by 90 men of an Engr Coy supported by two SP 7.5 or 8.8cm guns - information volunteered immediately by a very frightened PW who thought he was going to be shot out of hand.

Soon after lunch the flak opened up in force at our supply aircraft and for one reason and another a large proportion of the first resupply failed to fall within the Divisional area. However at 1715 hours another first class resupply drop was made the bulk of which landed in the right place. Flak on both occasions was very heavy.

All this time our unit on the main bridge, though hard pressed, was holding out and in good heart, with the bridge intact and covered by our fire. They reported by 1800 hrs the death of 400 Germans and the capture of 140 together with the destruction of 6 tks (2 Mk IVs), 6 armoured carriers and an armd car.

Sporadic fighting continued on the main divisional perimeter, with infiltration and patrolling activity by both sides. Towards evening the enemy put down considerable mortar fire on our Western position, but this was countered by our arty, and through the night there was only slight activity: the only change in the position was that yesterday evening our second unit from the NW forced its way through into the main perimeter.

With the advance of our armour continuing across the intact NIJMEGEN bridge, it is to be expected that the enemy will draw in his force on to the ARNHEM flank in order to be able to disengage them as our bridgehead is reinforced; meanwhile he is likely to shoot off his available mortar and heavy ammunition in our direction, a process which at the moment appears to be in full swing.

One PW, captured on main road 7078 approx 1000 hrs 20 Sep, the only one yet taken from this unit, is a typical Nazi, and is now cooperative. He gave the following information of immediate tactical value.

His unit had come immediately from LOUVAIN where it had been hastily formed. It consisted of two pls of two secs each of approx 25 men. The armament of each sec was 1 LMG and the remainder of the weapons were rifles, machine pistols and pistols. It was operating from East to West, with a pl each side of the main road. Fire support was provided by two 75mm SP guns, on what PW believed to be Mk IV chassis, but was not sure. They were in action on either side of main road 800 yds to the rear of fwd tps.

This is the first PW to be received at Div HQ direct from having been in action, and having had no time to think. His response to a firm tactical squeeze was immediate and productive, having resulted in the destruction of at least one, possibly both SP guns.

Identifications of PW captured in the area 'Spoilterrein' 6879 showed the presence of at least two coys of Pz Gren Regt 63. PW were of 1 and 7 Coys. Information revealed that in addition to those two coys other units of this bn were present.

The coys were of normal strength, formed in ARNHEM, and marched round the town to the NE and were put into action immediately.

Each coy was organised of 3 pls of 4 secs with 1 LMG each. Owing to their speedy formation no confirmed knowledge of the other units in this regt could be obtained but an NCO believed that each bn had a mortar pl consisting of 4 secs with 50mm mortars ?. 2 50mm SP Pak were seen and some SP 2cm on caterpillars. Most of the personnel arrived from WUPPERTAL two days ago.

During the morning of 21 Sep an attack came from the North which made some headway, but the situation was soon restored. In the afternoon the enemy's main effort was from the East and directed SW towards the HEVEADORP ferry, and some progress was made on the bank of the river where some enemy are still ensconced. An SP gun was used in this attack, and has been troublesome today in this area but it has now been liquidated.

The night 21/22 Sep was quiet, and enemy infiltration was not on the scale expected; there are, however, numerous snipers in the divisional area, many of which have been accounted for. The marked reduction in enemy activity from the evening of 21 Sep is probably attributable to the additional arty support which became available in the afternoon; it is evident that the Germans were severely shaken by our heavier shells, and some parties have been offering to surrender to single jeeps.

To-day as well the enemy has shown little inclination to attack; a few tanks have caused a little trouble to the East and SE, and a small attack with SP guns came in on the SW at about 1930 hrs; the usual snipers have been active, but otherwise the low standard of the troops opposed to us is beginning to tell. One PW brought in today attributed his capture to the fact that he had forgotten his rifle, and said that his Landsturm unit of old men and crocks had been put in to stiffen up the SS. Mortaring, on the other hand, has been if anything more troublesome than yesterday, and it appears that the enemy now disposes of a few artillery pieces of 10.5cm or 15cm calibre; these too, however, have not been neglected by our own counter-battery fire.

PW statements yesterday indicated that they intended to continue to attack from the West until they achieved a breakthrough, which was expected by the evening. Their expectations not being realised, they have been far less determined to-day, and it appears that the intention now is rather to pound us into submission by weight of explosive. Neither method is being successful, but it is likely that the second will be followed from now on rather than the first; the troops at the enemy's disposal are not of a calibre to stand up too well to the punishment they have been getting from both arty and small arms.

The identity of Major General KUSSIN and his appointment as Feldkommandant of ARNHEM, mentioned in Summary No.1 have now been confirmed by his signature on a court of inquiry report on the death of a sentry killed by a train on NIJMEGEN Bridge.

(a) A "propaganda van" has been touring some of our units with the usual stories that the division was surrounded and a German Panzer Division was just about to attack. The troops were exhorted to think of their wives and children and surrender while there was still time. The smooth-voiced gentleman with the loudspeaker was chased off with a PIAT.

(b) One unit has reported some "mock surrender" parties. The chief technique appears to be for half a dozen troops to come forward with their hands up, and at the last moment fall flat to allow an MG behind to open up on the British party receiving the surrender.

(c) One of our officers walked into the dressing station to have an arm wound dressed when the station was in enemy hands; the operation performed he brushed aside the sentry's suggestion that he was now a PW, walked out and returned to duty.

(d) Earlier on, an SP gun put two shells through the same MDS; the surgeon on duty ran out with a Red Cross flag and protested in colourful language, and the gun commander said "Oh, sorry" and went away.

The following new units have been identified since the last summary; for details see the interrogation report below. 155 Mixed Flak Abt (by doc). 2 / Sich Btl 908 (by PW). SS Unterführerschule 34 (by PW). Pz Gren Ers Btl 361 (by PW).

Offrs

ORs

Civilians

Male

201

Female

Owing to communication difficulties and other reasons, not all vehicle casualties are reported; the following are known and confirmed.

Tanks

Armoured Carriers

Armoured Cars

SP Guns

Armoured Lorries

Loudspeaker van

Personnel Lorries (with personnel)

- 6

- 1

- 2

- 1 damaged

- 1

The present tendency seems to be to plug holes in the files of the SS with any occupational troops who have been rushed up. One such stop-gap unit has been:-

908 Sicherungs Bn This unit, identified by one PW on the East of the div sector, was originally stationed in the LILLE-HAZEBROUK area performing security duties. PW, who was aged about 45, military correct, friendly, affable and dirty, volunteered the following information. His coy consists of about 120 men, organised in four platoons, armed only with rifles. It has been in action with SS tps since Monday when it left ARNHEM. PW believes there is a No.1 coy and also 3 and 4 coys are engaged. The general age of men in the unit is 40-50 years.

The chief difficulty in assessing enemy order of battle arose from the lack of communications experienced by 1 Airborne Div, particularly in the later stages, when all touch was lost with 1 Para Bde. This meant that practically no identifications were passed back, and the general picture had to be gleaned from interrogation of PW, which was carried out at times under extreme difficulty owing to persistent shelling. Any accurate assessment of the enemy strength opposing the division at the time of withdrawal is out of the question. The main trend was as follows.

No battle group were identified by name. The largest unit identified was of bn strength. Below is a list of all the tps fighting as formed bodies identified as such.

3 SS Wachbataillon. This unit was first encountered on 18 Sep on the West flank of the div. Its parent unit was SS Landsturm Nederland. 106 PW were taken from this Bn, which was organised in five infantry coys of four pls of three secs armed with Czech LMG. It had been engaged in security duties at various points in the AMERSFOORT area - 4 coy had for a time performed guard duties on the concentration camp at S'HERTOGENBOSCH. The bn was concentrated at AMERSFOORT on 17 Sep, and marched into action from there. Personnel were about 60-70 Dutch volunteers, but also included two Belgians, released from prison a few days previously for drafting purposes. The rest were Volksdeutschen. All personnel had had a few months infantry training. Total strength approx 500 men.

3 SS Pz Trg Bn. Stationed in the COEHORN KASERNE in ARNHEM, providing inf trg for three months. NCOs came from the Unterführerschule in ARNHEM. Organised into five coys of about 120 men each, armed with LMG varying from one to three in number in each pl. Personnel was mainly German, with a fair number of Dutch volunteers. The Bn was engaged on the Eastern flank of the div within a day of landing.

March Coy of SS Pz Pi Btl HOHENSTAUFEN. Only one PW was taken from this unit on 22 Sep. He gave the following infm. His unit had come direct from LOUVAIN, where it had originally been formed. It consisted of two pls of two secs each of approx 25 men. The armament of each sec was 1 LMG, rifles, machine pistols and pistols. The coy had been quartered in ARNHEM, but only for a brief period, so PW was unable to give its location. (Note: Immediately prior to the capture of this PW, a message from Dutch sources had suggested that SS Pz Div HOHENSTAUFEN was digging in on the IJSELL).

3 Coy 26 Sicherungs Regt. This coy was destroyed on the div WEST flank on 19 Sep. 26 Sich Regt was stated by PW to contain seven coys, each of unknown armament. It was reported by the same PW that the other six coys were moving on 19 Sep by bicycle from the HILVERSUM to ARNHEM area, but none of them had been identified up to 25 Sep.

Pz Gren Regt 63. At least two coys of this Regt were identified north of the div. PW were taken from 1 & 7 coys. Other coys were stated to be engaged, but were not identified. 1 & 7 coys were organised into three pls of 4 secs, with 1 LMG per sec. Owing to their speedy formation no confirmed knowledge of the other units in this regt could be obtained, but a NCO believed that each bn had a mortar pl consisting of 4 secs with 50mm mortars. Most of the personnel arrived direct from WUPPERTAL where they were undergoing primary training.

On 22 Sep the forward units of the division were visited by a loudspeaker van which threatened them with an attack by a German Armd Div, and exhorted them to think of their wives, sweethearts, etc. and surrender. It then played dance music, and was forced to withdraw in some confusion after an attack by 21 Indep Para Coy with a PIAT.

(a) The low standard of the infantry, despite their eventual superiority in numbers, forced the enemy to rely chiefly on his support weapons, and cas from SP gun fire and mortars were very hy, particularly in wooded areas initially before our men had dug in. There was a morning and evening hate on div HQ which became more and more intensive, and at times continuous, as more hy weapons were engaged. The following were identified: Mortars of varying calibres. 105mm gun hows. 150 mm hows. 88mm flak (HE and air bursts). Rockets (a few of unidentified calibre). The use of all hy weapons was as laid down in the text books. Mortar fire in particular was accurate and rapidly forthcoming. SP Flamethrowers were reported but details are lacking.

(b) A few "mock surrender" parties were encountered among SS tps. The technique was for the Germans to fall flat on their faces, to permit a hy MG to open fire on the British party receiving the surrender.

(c) The observance of the red cross was very good by the Germans except for their snipers. An SP gun commander apologised for having put two shells into the MDS in error. It was overrun by the Germans but men who got away later reported that our men were being well looked after.

(d) Snipers were numerous and inaccurate. No night attacks were attempted but snipers infiltrated at night, and one in particular existed for three days in the centre of the Div area without being spotted, although his approximate location was confined by observation and experience to a group of three trees.

In general PW gave information freely. Only one case was found of a refusal, by a SS private, but this was soon quelled by a theatrical demonstration. Three officers were captured, - a security minded oblt from 3 SS Wach bn, who had been a waiter in civil life, and was aged about 47, an oblt from 908 Sicherungs Bn, aged about 47 who spoke freely within the very limited confines of his knowledge, and a third SS officer who was evacuated to hospital before he could be interrogated. As for OR - The SS gave infm freely as did the Wehrmacht. A high proportion of Volksdeutschen and Dutch was encountered. Curiosities included a Pole aged 65, a Japanese, and a German WAAF from ARNHEM. Casualties inflicted on PW after capture by German shelling and mortaring totalled about seven killed and a score wounded. Morale of most PW was fair and increased as the battle progressed. One noticeable feature was that when all PW who eventually totalled about 200, were fallen in for roll-call by their own NCOs the SS and Wehrmacht automatically fell in as separate bodies.

(a) Order of Battle. This was confused in the extreme. March coys and ad hoc units are being formed out of army remnants, and the only units of bn size were SS.

(b) Enemy Strength. Impossible to assess, partly due to no estimate of German killed being available, chiefly due to the fact that no march coys had been formed for more than a few days.

(c) Fighting Value. Of the Infantry, poor. The SS were very noticeably better than the Army. Not one night attack was made although machine gun demonstrations by night were frequent.

(d) Method of Reinforcement. All available troops were rushed from the West of HOLLAND and GERMANY to reinforce the threatened area. Transport was chiefly by road from GERMANY, by bicycles in HOLLAND.

Missing. Sjt. Chambers, Sjt. Syme, Cpl. Lindon, Cpl. Maybury, Cpl. Gately, Cpl. Smyth

17 Sep. 1st Bde sub. sec. moved into ARNHEM according to plan. Capt. Killick joined them in the evening from Div. HQ. Sjt. Chambers having moved off directly upon landing.

18th Sep. CSM Armstrong at Div. HQ with Sjt. Ramage and Cpl. Foster from 1 A/L Bde. Joined later in the evening by the 2nd lift. Sjt. Syme, Cpls. Gorrie, Hanet, Scarr, Smyth and Zitman. As no news had been heard from FSO and as the situation in the town was still confused, it was decided to remain concentrated at Div. HQ.

19th Sep. House searches carried out on information from local resistance in collaboration with Dutch liaison party. No casualties were sustained. Capt. Killick was in civil telephone communication with Lt. KNOTTENBELT.

20th Sep. Cpls. Foster, Hanet and Scarr wounded by shrapnel from mortaring. Cpl. Foster sustained a compound fracture of the arm, was evacuated to MDS and is assumed PW w.e.f. 25 Sep.

21st Sep. Slight patrolling activity by members of Section. Cpl. Zitman shot a sniper.

22nd Sep. Cpls. Gorrie and Zitman wounded by shrapnel. Cpl. Zitman evacuated to MDS and assumed PW w.e.f. 25 Sep.

23rd Sep. CSM Armstrong wounded by shrapnel. Sjt. Syme, Sjt. Ramage and Cpl. Smyth carried out night patrols on southern part of the perimeter.

25th Sep. Night 25/26. Operation Berlin. CSM Armstrong, Sjt. Ramage, Cpl. Hanet, Cpl. Gorrie and Cpl. Scarr successfully evacuated.

29th Sep. Evacuated by air from BRUSSELS airfield. CSM Armstrong and Cpl. Hanet evacuated to hospital on landing in UK.

The plan of the section was to concentrate in ARNHEM as soon as the situation was under control, and set about the large list of Ib targets. The progress of the operation rendered this impossible, and it was decided to keep the 4th Para and 1st A/L sub secs concentrated at Div HQ rather than waste trained personnel by putting them into a fluid battle where it would have been impossible for them to operate. The work of the section outside the town was therefore confined to: a) House Searches, (b) Document sorting, (c) Snap checks.

(a) House Searches. These were undertaken on locally volunteered information after it had been checked by the Dutch liaison party. In practically all cases all incriminating documents had been destroyed and the owner had fled.

(b) Document sorting. A large number of documents was gone through, but it was found impossible to evacuate any, the labour entailed was unfortunately wasted.

No news was received from the bridge party under Capt. Killick after the phone message of 19th Sep. At that time fighting was in progress, and no Ib work at all was performed. Members of the section helped in patrolling, and Cpl. Zitman distinguished himself throughout, helping to put out fires under trying circumstances, bagging a sniper, carrying wounded and keeping up morale until he himself was hit in the foot and evacuated.

(i) Seize and hold ARNHEM in order of priority (a) Main rd bridge (b) Pontoon bridge.

(ii) On arrival of second lift, seize and occupy the SE section of the proposed Div perimeter.

(ii) Establish posts (strength approx one coy) at (a) Rd EDE - ARNHEM near PLANKEN WAMBUIS. (b) Rd WAGENINGEN - ARNHEM near RENKUM.

(iv) After completion of 2nd lift unloading, seize and occupy the WEST section of the Div perimeter.

4 Para Bde with under comd 2 A/L A Tk Bty RA was to seize and occupy NE section of Div perimeter, axis of movement being rd EDE - ARNHEM.

(i) Employment. The two btys (1 and 3 Lt Btys) in the first lift [were to?] remain under command CRA with one bty in sp of each 1 Para Bde and 1 A/L Bde.

(ii) Comd and Control. BCs of 1 and 3 Lt Btys were to join their respective Bde Comds on landing. Throughout the operation the intention was to keep the Lt Regt centralised under comd CRA so as to afford the maximum concentration of fire on any sector but as 1 Para Bde were to move immediately on landing to the town, it would be necessary after the initial advance, due to range, to move 3 Lt Bty and place it under comd 1 Para Bde until the Div less 1 Para Bde also moved into the ARNHEM area.

(iii) Gun Posns. Initial gun area was in a central posn SOUTH of WOLFHEZEN, from which either Bde could be supported immediately after landing. 3 Lt Bty were ordered to be prepared to move EAST on the evening of D Day.

(c) Period D+5 to end. With the availability of sp from 30 Corps arty the remaining amn of the Lt Regt was largely kept for repelling assaults on its own area - by then part of the Div perimeter - and occasionally for thickening up the most important and urgent tgts engaged by 30 Corps Arty. Most of the Lt Regts personnel were by then filling their time with active inf fighting incl tk hunting and periodical ejection of snipers from the gun area.

3. Anti-Tank. Owing to the extremely close country incl much street fighting and to the high rate of casualties, accurate or even approx. compilation of enemy tks destroyed or damaged is not possible. It is known, however, that the A Tk guns did account for a considerable number of tanks, armoured cars, half tracks and S.P. guns which, except on the last day, never made a major penetration of the Div perimeter. The Div as a whole accounted for upwards of 25 tks and S.P. guns for certain (PsIAT included). 1 A/L A Tk Bty which supported 1 Para Bde went with its bns into ARNHEM. The tp under comd 2 Para Bn on the main bridge, did not re-appear, but the remainder of the Bty fought the battle either in the SE sector on the lower road into ARNHEM or also in the main A Tk reserve at Div HQ. The effect of the tp on the bridge is clearly seen by the number of derelict vehs of all types shown by air photographs taken on 18 Sep. 2 A/L A Tk Bty under comd 4 Para Bde suffered hy casualties both to guns and personnel during the very confused fighting in the woods on D+2 and +3. The losses both in personnel and transport throughout the Bde were very considerable owing to the difficulty of crossing the rly and the thickness of the woods making it impossible for transport. The original Div HQ reserve was to be one 17 pr tp from each Bty and a 6 pr tp from 2 A/L A Tk Bty. This in practice proved to be the mainstay of the A Tk defence and varied in str as odd guns, with their detachments, were added to it, or parts of it were despatched on various missions throughout the battle. Its HQ was alongside HQRA and the necessity for a strong reserve at Div HQ was proved without question. Both Sabot and APCPC in proportion 65% to 35% both proved most satisfactory. Some difficulty was experienced in observing the SABOT and had such close fighting been envisaged, it is possible that a larger proportion of APCPC would have been taken. A small proportion of 6 pr HE was received in re-supply.

4. Sp from 30 Corps Arty. At about 0900 hrs on D+4 wireless contact was first made with the arty of 30 Corps, namely 64 Med Regt. Two R.A. sets from 1 A/B Div were from then on kept permanently on the command net of this unit, and most of the calls for fire were sent by this means. 64 Med Regt had normally available their own two btys of 4.5 and 5.5 gun hows and a hy bty of 155mm. In addition they could, and did, call on a 4.5 bty of 7 Med Regt, Bty of 3.7 H.A.A. and two 25 pr Regts from 43 Div. Communication between 1 A/B Div and the 4 FOU reps with 30 Corps Arty was never satisfactorily established, though from time to time it was through. Shoots only took place on this link on one day. On the last day one of the CPs from 121 Fd Regt that crossed the R. LEK with the DORSETS joined the Lt Regt and thus provided a direct link with 43 Div Arty. Due however to the first class communications between HQRA 1 A/B Div and 64 Med Regt it was possible to call for fire extremely quickly and the response by the 30 Corps Arty was excellent. More than 40 MZ tgts were registered and during the five days at least 160 tgts were engaged - the great bulk of them being enemy attacks at all stages of development. The quick and accurate fire had considerable effect in beating up the attacks and the moral effect on our tps was tremendous. Complete figures of amn expenditure are not available but it is known that an 8 gun 4.5 Bty of 64 Med Regt fired a total of 3000 rds and the 4 gun 155mm Bty fired 630 rds, the last named being finally reduced to 4 rpg. The Arty sp from 30 Corps undoubtedly proved to be a decisive factor and without which the course of the battle would have been completely altered. A detailed account of 30 Corps Arty sp is in Appx. "C".

(a) At 1300 hrs on 25 Sep details of concs and timings of the fire plan required to cover the withdrawal of 1 A/B Div was sent by CRA 1 A/B Div via 64 Med Regt to CCRA 30 Corps.

(b) The net result was to produce a ring of fire about 500x round the Div perimeter. The programme included fairly intensive fire from 2000 - 2300 hrs with spasmodic concs between 2300 hrs and 0400 hrs. Every available Regt was employed and the results were most satisfactory. The enemy made no attempt to follow up the withdrawal and very little interference was experienced from mortars or guns. It is more than probable that the enemy thought that 30 Corps was reinforcing the bridgehead as opposed to the withdrawal of 1 A/B Div.

1. Communications and Method of Link Up. During planning three 30 Corps Arty Regts had provisionally been allotted to sp 1 A/B Div as soon as in range. At each Bde HQ the FOO control sets had set their flick frequency on to the command frequency of one of these Regts. Their sets had their primary frequencies netted on the CRA 1 A/B Div comd net on which were also tuned (but not netted) the four FOU reps who were with 30 Corps. On Thursday 21 Sep the FOO control with 1 A/L Bde heard on his flick frequency the command net of 64 Med Regt. He immediately came up on the net with his 22 set and after certain identity difficulties, was recognised. HQRA 1 A/B Div immediately put a HP 19 set on to their comd set and first class communication was established. This R/T communication never broke down. During the day time it was invariably strength 5, and by means of a relay station on the South bank of the river, speech was kept working throughout every night. Owing to the failure of the FOU reps to establish satisfactory communication, all calls for fire were put through on the comd net of 64 Med Regt. It was a large net varying from 10 up to 18 stations. First class control and strictest wireless discipline were responsible for its success.

(a) Enemy attacks by small battle groups in various stages and usually consisting of about one coy Inf with 2 or 3 tanks or SP guns.

(b) Enemy mortars, M.Gs and S.P. guns. An unusually large proportion of these were close tgts within 100/200 yards of our own tps. During the latter half of the battle, there was extremely close contact both in the woods and built up area; infiltration was constant and by the last day the enemy succeeded in establishing himself strongly in a wood within the Div perimeter and this also became a tgt for the Mediums, our own tps being 200/300 yards all round the wood. Owing to the closeness of the country observation became quite impossible for tgts even a little way behind the enemy front line. Close shoots in front of our own inf became the usual order of the day, and it was the accuracy of the medium and hy arty shooting that made their engagement so effective. At no time did inf stop calling for fire despite a few unpleasantly close rounds. Many tgts were called for by map reference off a 1/25,000 map which proved most accurate.

3. Method of Call and Control. Two A/B stations were established on the comd net of 64 Med Regt. One was the 22 set of the FOO control at 1 A/L Bde, the other a HP 19 set at HQRA. From an early moment it was discovered that the 22 set was much less effective on the net than the 19 set. For this reason, in addition to the necessity for control by CRA, all calls for fire by the FOO control were first made to HQRA 1 A/B Div on this net, who at its discretion passed them for action to RHQ 64 Med Regt. This proved quite feasible and quick. Many calls for fire came in from units of the Div over the "G" comns. These were relayed by CRA through RA channels. Meantime other calls for sp came in to HQRA on the CRA's command net. They originated from various OPs that were put on this set and also from the RHQ Lt Regt passing on its demands from its OPs, or, later on, on its own account. There were thus three main sources from which demands for fire were reaching HQRA.

Two tgts were constantly being engaged as a sandwich shoot and on several occasions even three simultaneous shoots were effected. It was often possible when communications were good to allot one or more Btys direct to FOO control A/L Bde who could then give fire orders direct on the net, but all other shoots had to be relayed by HQRA 1 A/B Div and RHQ 64 Med Regt on the same net. In addition to its own Btys which included a 155mm Hy Bty and a Bty of 7 Med Regt, RHQ 64 Med Regt could, and did, call on Fd Regts of 43 Div Arty using the CRAs 43 Div comd net. In view of the above, it was clear at an early stage in the battle that the strictest control by CRA 1 A/B Div was essential. Amn difficulties of 30 Corps and the natural desire by every sector of the Div perimeter for maximum sp made strict control by CRA a necessity.

4. Allotment of Amn. When communication was first made, CCRA 30 Corps allotted 40 rpg for Fd and Med Arty and 20 rpg for Hy arty daily to sp 1 A/B Div. This amount seemed small until the L of C difficulties of 30 Corps were realised, and in any case the amount fired was far greater than this provisional allotment. A very large allotment of amn by arty supporting an A/B Div was always considered to be necessary and this operation proved it.

5. Procedure. Normal Mike and Uncle tgt fire discipline procedure was used. Results proved that there is no need to deviate at all. Tgts were all numbered as MZ tgts to prevent confusion. The tgts were allotted by HQRA 1 A/B Div and relayed normally to RHQ 64 Med Regt. HQRA relayed the numbers and data to FOO control A/L Bde and to the Lt Regt and other OPs on the CRAs comd net. 40 MZ tgts were recorded during the battle; the earlier ones gradually becoming obsolete as the perimeter grew smaller.

6. Control of 43 Div Arty Fire by the Lt Regt. On the last morning an OP from one of 43 Div fd regts crossed the river with the DORSETSHIRE Bn. He arrived with a 68 set at the Lt Regt HQ who immediately gave him a 22 set to put on his own Regtl. Comd Net. The Lt Regt were given control of this OP and put all their calls for sp direct to CRA 43 Div via his Regt. This proved most satisfactory and lightened the traffic on 64 Med Regts net and provided two links to 30 Corps arty instead of one. If necessary HQRA could put calls to 43 Div Arty using CRAs comd net to the Lt Regt who then passed it on by this OP.

1. The C.R.A. together with B.M.R.A. were permanently with Tac Div HQ during planning. As a result of planning 16 operations in June, July and August, a complete drill and sequence of events was devised for planning any operation (Appendix "A"). This proved a tremendous asset and not only did it lead to greater efficiency and better briefing, but saved considerable time, which in many cases became an essential factor.

2. It has always been stressed that the CRA must visit personally the CCRA or CRA of the relieving formation. This would have helped considerably in 'MARKET'. Points to be considered at this conference are shown in Appendix 'B'. The C.R.A. must take with him a liaison officer from the FOU who can be left behind to visit Regts and tie up all the details, and act as L.O. with CCRA or CRA during the operation.

3. In 'MARKET' the tie up with 30 Corps regarding frequencies - call sigs - codes etc. left much to be desired.

(a) Important information and messages were held up owing to a delay in obtaining a common slidex; in future BOTH sides must have each others slidex.

(b) Had we had the frequencies of 43 Div Regts, a set could have been put on their command nets earlier. The A/B Div must know the command net frequencies of all the Regts likely to be in range. Frequencies of A/B Div must be carefully checked beforehand with the other formation. In one case two sets at one HQ were trying to work on two frequencies only 10 Kcs apart.

(c) There was delay in recognition over the air with 64 Med Regt, as a result of them not having our call signs or a pre-arranged code word.

(a) Local Protection. During the latter stages the gun area became part of the Div perimeter, particularly after the infiltration by SP guns and Inf. The gun detachments were all playing their part in repelling inf attacks with small arms and taking on the SP guns over open sights with the 75mm How. The latter is known to have accounted for two tanks (claimed as Tigers) with A.P. at ranges under 150x. This action proved beyond doubt that in future a large number of L.M.Gs are required and that a substantial number of PsIAT must be carried. As regards training, it is most apparent that more attention than ever is required in Inf training and tactics and in addition Officers and N.C.Os must be trained on all weapons including the 6 pr. Cases arose of other weapons being manned by Lt Regt personnel but without the best effect, owing to lack of knowledge of the weapon concerned.

(b) Communications. (i) The 22 set proved adequate for internal use, but the 68R was a failure. The sets were all in communication on landing, but once movement off the LZ started, communication failed owing to lack of range under difficult circumstances. This was found to be universal with all 68R sets in the Div. It is proposed to find by trial an alternative. The S.C.R. 300, 610 and 694 are all possibilities. (ii) The charging of batteries with the 300 watt dynamo was most successful throughout.

(c) 75mm Equipment and Amn. No difficulties were experienced and the guns stood up to it well. They are undoubtedly excellent for close sp owing to their accuracy but no weapon for engaging tanks even in an emergency owing to lack of shield, traverse and sighting. The A.P. was effective in two cases at extremely close range. The HE and Smoke were satisfactory.

(d) Transport. As a result of the limited number of spare wheels that can be carried it is strongly recommended that all Jeep, gun and trailer wheels should be made interchangeable. A great number of tyres and wheels were damaged from mortaring and replacements were far from sufficient.

(a) Organisation. 52 x 6 prs and 16 x 17 prs were taken airborne. This is a total of 68 guns against the W.E. of 56. In planning operations the W.E. of 56 has always been inadequate, and in addition the present organisation requires re-adjustment to allow for the inclusion of 17 prs in sp of all three Bdes and also to cater for a reserve of guns for protection of Div Tps and defence in depth. It was the Div reserve which became the backbone of the A.Tk defence.

(b) PsIAT. Owing to the extremely close nature of the country, it was only possible with the limited number of guns to cover the main approaches and open ground. This resulted in infiltration of the individual S.P. guns or tanks through built up areas and woods. There were continual demands for 6 pr guns to go forward on sniping expeditions. These were all refused except in two cases of real emergency. In the first case the SP gun was accounted for; in the second the 6 pr was hit first. The answer in all cases having no SP guns of our own is to despatch a tank hunting party with a PIAT. In consequence it is most strongly recommended that in Airlanding A.Tk Btys all detachments carry a PIAT and are trained in addition as tank hunting teams.

(c) Tractors for 17 prs. The Morris 30 cwt is an unreliable and unsatisfactory tower. At present no substitute has been found, which will fit in the Hamilcar. This is a most urgent requirement as continual breakdowns are experienced with these vehs by all concerned.

Location of enemy mortars becomes of primary importance immediately Corps Arty is in range and capable of engaging counter mortar tasks. Prior to this it is not feasible to use up the limited Lt Regts amn in this way. However, if counter mortar tasks are to be engaged with satisfaction a counter mortar organisation is required as in other divisions. The FOU is not capable of satisfactory results on its own or without the mechanical methods of mortar location. The enemy mortars at ARNHEM were one of the main menaces and little counter mortar was carried out owing to lack of amn and the difficulty of obtaining any accurate mortar locations, despite various attempts of plotting sound bearings.

(a) By the time the 30 Corps arty was in range (D+4) the FOU layout had to be improvised, and therefore the organisation was not really tested. However, from the experience obtained this does not warrant any changes, and the requirement of an FOU as part of the establishment is more than proved.

(b) Communications. (i) It is proposed that all 22 sets should be replaced by 19 sets. The difference in performance was very considerable. (ii) The four sets from the FOU at HQRA A/B Div should be either a 19 H.P. or even a Canadian 9 or equivalent. The latter are at present under trial in this Division. (iii) The remarks in 1(b) above apply also to the 68R in the FOU. (iv) It is not intended to change the communication layout or organisation (Appendix 'C').

(c) Deployment. (i) It will not be normal to provide officers and sets with Regts. The circumstances under which this was done was exceptional owing to the Divs seaborne element already being overseas. However, a responsible L.O. with the supporting formation's HQ is considered essential. (ii) On future occasions every effort should be made to have a high powered set on the FOU net in an armoured car or tank OP, which can move right forward with the leading tps as an immediate station.

(a) Priority. When Regts are made available to sp an A/B Div it is essential to differentiate between Regiments, which are available to respond to any call at any time and those which reply if they are not engaged on other tasks in sp of their own formations. It is the first category which are required for D.F., immediate counter attack tasks or any pre-arranged attack, and dependent on which all fire plans defensive or otherwise within the A/B Div will be based.

(b) Allotment of Amn. Difficulty was experienced in obtaining an estimate of amn available. This again is so necessary to the A/B CRA so that he can sub-allot for fire plans, counter mortar and other tasks.

A considerable number of shoots were carried out by the infantry and recce sqn. The basis was the Mike target procedure, which varied slightly, but the results were most satisfactory. This operation merely emphasised the necessity of training other arms in correction of fire as is confirmed by any operation.

2. Get rough glider allotment and decide who is not able to go. Depatch to units forthwith.

3. Obtain, if possible, 1/25,000 maps and make 1/50,000 trace of Div A.Tk layout, giving detailed layout for Parachute Bdes and general layout for Airlanding Bde. Get GOC's approval of this layout and then make at least 35 copies of trace.

4. Put in bid for lashing gear transport (17 x 3 tonners) and warn units how much they are getting.

5. Put in bid for transport to lift units to airfds (24 x 3 tonners required but incl 17 in para 4).

6. Order units to send rep (Officer or Sgt and O.R. + Jeep) to HQRA for map plan 'A' (detailed distribution on maps on Bty level). Arrange special transport (C.47) to bring a few maps to permanent area for early briefing.

8. Extract details of RA units from Air Movement Table (Form "A") and send out early to units. At same time demand from units Forms A+B by a certain time and give them list of all other units landing on their LZs.

9. Tie up with 'G':- (a) Tactical order of landing on each LZ. (b) Local protection for Lt Regt between LZ and gun area. (c) Action of glider pilots.

11. Put in order to 'G' (Int) for photos and enlargements of air covers. (At least one big enlargement per bty and HQ).

12. Write RA Operation Instruction incl Trace I showing CRA's A.Tk layout and Trace II showing Div layout, gun area, DZs and LZs etc.

13. Send out warning order to CRA's 'O' Gp to meet 90 minutes after GOC's 'O' Group.

14. Distribute RA Op Instruction to Bdes at GOC's 'O' Gp. Get times of Bde Comds 'O' Gp.

15. Hold CRAs 'O' Gp incl orders and arrangements for netting. Discover time of Lt Regts 'O' Gp.

16. Arrange for HQRA Officers (a) to attend Lt Regts 'O' Gp and (b) to discover A.Tk Btys detailed plans, after Bde 'O' Gp.

2. Additional R.A. Regts likely to be in range, and able to sp when not required to sp own formation.

(c) Check that inter-change of ALL call signs, frequencies, slidex and codes likely to be required, has been arranged by R.C. of Sigs reps. Times of changing etc.

8. Arty R or air OP to deal with flak during fly in or for counter bty or counter mortar at a later stage.

11. Action on relieving formation joining up, and allotment of Arty to come under comd A/B Div.

1. Responsibility of C.R.A. In the Airborne Div the C.R.A. was made responsible for the coordination of all demands for air sp. The main tentacle whether British or American was to be with Div HQ and any others available would be sent out to a Bde.

2. "G" Officers. In training it was not found practical to overload the HQRA staff with the additional duty of controlling air sp. It was therefore decided to make available a "G" Staff Offr (the G.II (air)) to control air sp under the general direction of the CRA.

3. Methods of Call. Calls from Bdes would come via "G" channels to Div, but if these failed R.A. comns (both Lt Regt and FOU) were an alternative means.

4. Communications with Second Army. The two American veeps taken in did not succeed in making satisfactory communication with their counterparts at HQ Second Army. This may have been due to long range, and unfortunately later when distances were growing less, the sets were destroyed by mortaring. Demands for air sp were then sent by:- (a) Phantom to Second Army. (b) The RA link to 64 Med Regt. They were sent in the normal demand from and were passed on as quickly as possible. However, this resulted in an unfavourable delay but there is no doubt that the air sp demands were received and during the last two days they were answered.

(a) Arty R. was requested but did not materialise. This could have been of considerable assistance in (i) Counter mortar and counter battery. (ii) Counter flak during re-supply.

(b) In addition to the tentacle at Div and Bdes on tac A.S.S.[U?] net, it was requested most urgently before the operation that a V.C.P. should be made available for fly in. This did not materialise but is required more than ever for the future, particularly if there is the prospect of a "cab rank" being established, or if it can be used for ground/air communication in connection with re-supply by air.

(c) Had a V.C.P. been available and briefing in the air possible, the possibility of flying in 25 prs for the purpose of putting down coloured smoke was under consideration. However, to avoid this in future, further investigation is necessary regarding coloured smoke for 75mm How.

(d) Pre-arranged bombing tasks to sp the initial landing was not tied up until 12 hrs before take off. This resulted in Bde and Bn Comds landing without a full knowledge of what air sp would be forthcoming. This particularly affected 1 Para Bde who required sp against the numerous 88mm gun posns in ARNHEM between H and H+2. It is considered that this should have been finally tied up at least two days before.

1. In the ARNHEM operation, the initial engineer tasks - there were few subsequent ones - can be considered under two headings -

(a) Specific, (previously planned). Recce and 'coup de main' tasks, either under command of bdes or of the CRE.

2. 1 Para Sqn RE - in attack on ARNHEM main road bridge. 1 Para Sqn RE complete was committed initially under command 1 Para Bde, to seize the ARNHEM main road bridge. For assisting the advance of this Bde on to the bridge, neutralising and removing the demolition charges, and for assisting in the subsequent defence of the bridge area, the Squadron was suitably equipped. The portable flame-throwers were useful in the house to house fighting, and all other weapons were used offensively or defensively. But this Squadron had an unnecessary number of officers (12 out of an establishment of 17) and of valuable tradesmen (there are 35 rank and file Group A to D out of a total of 127 rank and file in a Squadron) for this initial task. Many were called upon to make the supreme sacrifice in the hard battle for the bridge. The remainder, in the area of the North end of the bridge which they gallantly held and blocked for two days, were subsequently annihilated, captured or forced into hiding to evade capture.

3. 9 Field Company RE (Airborne) - Coup-de-Main Party for ARNHEM main road bridge. A mobile detachment of 9 Fd Coy RE, in two jeeps, was detached under command of the Recce Sqn to go on ahead of 1 Para Bde independently, to seize the main ARNHEM bridge. This force was delayed on the landing zone in marshalling the parachutists and gliderborne elements. When it did get away, it met too much opposition on its way to the bridge. It was eventually held up, and 1 Para Bde passed through it. In order to provide transport to equip this mobile detachment of sappers some equipment had to be left at home, and two platoons of this company were temporarily deprived of some of their little transport for equipment and tools. In view of the early engineer commitments in this particular operation this was justifiable, as the equipment left behind could normally have been made available from re-supply by air, if it had been wanted. Such temporary adjustment and flexibility must be accepted to produce efficiency in the many situations necessarily different to those envisaged when drawing up the War Establishment. An important lesson however, is that even in a relatively unopposed landing from the air, such as this was on 'D' day, unless at least sub-units and detachments destined for specific tasks arrive self-contained, all by parachute or all by glider, the time liable to be wasted by concentration may prove to be the cause of loss of most of the surprise value and the subsequent failure of individual tasks. In this particular case 9 Fd Coy RE detachment all travelled by glider, but not in the next flight serials to the Recce Sqn, who partly arrived by glider and partly by parachute, on different grounds.

4. 9 Field Company RE (Airborne) - in attempt to seize railway bridge West of ARNHEM. A platoon of 9 Fd Coy RE was detailed, unaided, to seize the railway bridge just West of ARNHEM. With its own arms, men on bicycles, and its tools in two jeeps and trailers (a platoon has three jeeps and trailers, one trailer being a compressor trailer which in this instance was left with Coy HQ). It would have been well constituted had it met with only the light opposition which it was calculated the surprise arrival had every chance of giving them. But the bridge was ready for demolition and was blown up in their faces. It is reported that this platoon, without specific instructions for any alternative task, subsequently fought its way unaided to the pontoon bridge a few hundred yards West of the main road bridge at ARNHEM, and that it actually held it for a short period before everyone was either annihilated or captured. But no one has yet escaped to give the full story. In the planning for the ARNHEM operation no coup-de-main party was detailed to seize the railway bridge (third in priority in comparison with the other two bridges) because none was available. The CRE was given permission to have a go at it with one platoon not then earmarked. Risks, calculated on the probable strength and action of the enemy, have to be taken in planning airborne operations, more even than in other operations, and it is not considered any fault of engineer organisation or equipment which led to the failure of this particular task - the capture of the railway bridge intact. The platoon was led by a particularly forceful and brave officer. All ranks knew the Divisional tasks and general plan. The platoon commander's decision to attempt to seize, without specific instructions, the pontoon bridge, after having failed in his initial task, cannot be judged in the absence of all knowledge of the local situation.

5. Engineer Tasks in Support of Bdes. One troop or platoon was put under command of each bde. The platoon of 9 Fd Coy under comd 1 Airlanding Bde was used within the first 24 hrs to destroy a park of enemy field guns. But its tradesmen were never used. Subsequently it was used as ordinary infantry, and on the last day but one, the surviving officer and other ranks were lost in carrying out a tank hunting patrol. Mines (Hawkins Grenades) road blocks were laid from time to time, usually by sappers, sometimes by a detachment from HQRE as the infantry were too pinned to the ground in fighting. Normally the best part of a troop or platoon is required continuously in support of a bde which is engaged in a fluid battle such as is likely in the first few days of an airborne operation. Initially however few, if any tradesmen other than pioneers are required. The deduction appears to be that tradesmen should be organised in self-contained increments to troops or platoons or as separate troops or platoons. (See para 6 below).

6. 4 Parachute Squadron RE. 4 Para Sqn RE arrived with, and temporarily all under command of, 4 Para Bde on D+1. From the beginning (when heavy opposition was met near the landing zone) to the end, it was used almost entirely in a fighting role. Alongside the Independent Para Coy it put up an excellent fight, and accounted for more than one SP gun and a tank with its PIAT. It could have done its job equally well though, with fewer officers and with no tradesmen. Leg bags containing engineer stores and equipment were attached to many sappers as they came down. But, owing to enemy action, and the necessity of concentrating for battle at the utmost speed, few of these were collected off the dropping zone. Because of the lack of transport and in an attempt to equip the unit with the necessary engineer stores and tools, sappers were, without question, greatly overloaded. This is no new lesson. Sappers can fight or they can do field engineering. They cannot do both simultaneously. This parachute sqn had, for months - almost years - been yearning for a fight. It got it, and it did magnificently - as fighters - but to the complete detriment of any capacity for engineering work. Fortunately in this operation it was not required of it. The deduction is that pioneers in the form of light assault sappers, with few tools only, should be committed with bdes initially, if they are likely to have a fight or join in the battle on arrival. Tradesmen and tools must arrive in transport by glider, as self-contained increments to sub-units or as separate sub-units when, and not unless, they are required. A sub-unit consisting almost entirely of tradesmen is not an economical sub-unit for field engineering. Dilution with a proportion of pioneers is nearly always possible, and, in both training and operations, more economical so far as the employment of tradesmen is concerned. The deduction is that troops or platoons should consist of assault sections with technical increments. The former should all be parachutists, normally with few tradesmen other than pioneers, and with few tools and no transport. But they must be prepared, should the tactical situation demand it, to travel in gliders. The self-contained technical increments, consisting mostly of tradesmen, with tools, engineer equipment and transport, should travel normally in gliders - sometimes in aircraft. When married up with the assault sections, they would make troops or sections economical for all field engineering. Technical increments should be encouraged to be capable of parachuting, so that assault parties can be reinforced with particular technical personnel, should the situation demand it.

7. Detachment of 9 Fd Coy in a support role. On D+1 a detachment of 18 OR of 9 Fd Coy, under command of an NCO, as no officer was available owing to casualties, was put under command of OC 2 South Staffs, who were sent into ARNHEM to reinforce the battalion of 1 Para Bde held up in house to house fighting in its advance to the main bridge. The detachment reported at the rendezvous complete with its bicycles, but as the S. Staffs force was on foot, it was ordered to leave its bicycles behind. This was the last ever seen of these bicycles which, with the area where they were ordered to leave them, fell into enemy hands shortly afterwards. The deduction seemed to be that bicycles are a mixed blessing and not always required. They occupy valuable room in the gliders which sometimes could be filled better with more personnel. This force was eventually stopped by the enemy north of the railway bridge at the Western end of ARNHEM. It could make no further headway. In the subsequent heavy and involved fighting, all but a handful of the sappers detachment became casualties. The survivors were eventually withdrawn to 9 Fd Coy HQ two days later, by which time the company itself was employed in an entirely infantry role holding a sector of the Divisional perimeter. Again, lightly equipped assault engineers would have done the job equally well. Mobility, in the form of bicycles until a better alternative is available, is required as soon as proper field engineering develops. But until then bicycles, like tradesmen, are normally wasteful and uneconomical. Should an Airborne division in the later stages of an operation take on an infantry div role, then the sappers must be given complete mobility. A transport platoon RASC is necessary for each RE unit. Until then a proportion of bicycles should be sufficient. It would normally be sufficient to provide bicycles on a scale of one for each sapper of the technical increments to troops or platoons. This should provide sufficient for the equipment of assault sections with them, should the necessity arise.

8. Organisation of Heavy Ferries across the RHINE. On D+2, 9 Fd Coy (elements of HQ only were available) subsequent to a preliminary recce by the CRE, carried out a detailed recce of the ferry across the RHINE, North of DRIEL, and of the barges moored in that area, with a view to marshalling them on the North bank of the river, to assist the expected crossing of 30 Corps later on. Here steam and diesel engine drivers would have come in useful, had we been able to develop work there. But there was only one steam barge which was not grounded, and the ferry was lost before that one barge could be brought within our bridgehead area. Divisional Engineers must include a small proportion of tradesmen of all categories likely to be required to operate all types of prime movers and machinery of essential services. One or two of the following should be available for inclusion in assault sections - steam engine, (railway and barge), diesel, electric, (power station, maintenance and railway) operators.

9. Night Recce Patrols. On the night D+2/D+3 two recces were carried out, each by one officer, one sapper, and one Dutch patriot, one on each side of the demolished railway bridge West of ARNHEM. One was carried out by the Field Engineer, and the other by an officer of 9 Fd Coy RE. There is no Field Engineer on the establishment of HQRE of an airborne division. Both for training and operations, one at least is always essential and should in future be provided.

10. Improvised Ferrying across the RHINE. On the night D+3/D+4 a small party of 9 Fd Coy RE under the Field Engineer attempted to get some of the Polish Para Bde from the South of the RHINE where they landed across into the bridgehead area. Three rafts were successfully constructed from jeep 10 cwt trailers. But, by means only of recce boats, the current proved to be too strong, and defeated all attempts to put a line across the river, and work eventually was stopped by the CRE just before dawn, when the enemy would have caught the party in the open and under direct observation. On the following night a composite party of a dozen battle-weary sappers of 4 Para Sqn and 9 Fd Coy RE were taken out of the firing line, and with all the recce boats which could be mustered - four in number - rowed 60 Poles across. One strong officer, the Field Engineer, crossed the 100 yards fast-flowing river twenty-three times that night - a great feat of endurance after three nights out on operations. It was not until the following night that assault boats were made available by a Bde of 43 Div which had by then advanced from NIJMEGEN to the South bank of the River. Three hundred and fifty Poles were got across under their own Bde arrangements. The whole Polish Para Bde could have been got across, if sappers, or even infantry trained in watermanship, had been available to act as rowers. (The less said about the watermanship of the Polish Bde the better). But no Airborne Div sappers could by then be withdrawn from the fighting positions they were holding, and none of 43 Div were then available. Had the Airborne Div had 30 assault boats available two nights earlier, sufficient sappers could have been mustered to get the whole of the Polish Brigade across in one night. Had the sappers been equipped with a line rocket firing apparatus, (necessary for improvised ferrying across the broad rivers of Europe and for effectively making aerial ropeways across the gorges of Burma and the Far East), many more Poles could have been got across. But in the planning of the operation it was envisaged that when the Poles would be dropped South of the river, we would have been in possession of the ARNHEM main bridge. Bad W/T communications prevented any last minute alteration of their dropping area, and were then in possession of no area suitable for bringing in assault boats by glider. Line rocket firing apparatus must be on the G 1098 of at least the Fd Pk Coy RE of an Airborne Division. And if the map shows any large rivers in the vicinity of operations, engineer equipment suitable for ferrying all required loads should be earmarked and ready with gliders at the base to cover any eventualities, as materialised in this case.

11. The Field Park Company RE. A Det of one officer and 12 ORs with three jeeps and trailers (two of which were initially loaned to the Para Sqns to provide them with additional transport for a few tools and engineer equipment) and a D2 tractor arrived on D and D+1, a part on each day. This detachment was taken with the object of organising an RE Dump from captured equipment and the tractor was for assisting clearing the landing zone of stuck vehicles, tasks for which they were never called upon because of the turn of events. The majority of the Field Park Company with all the rest of its equipment had by the time of the operation already been in France some time with the Non-Airborne Echelon of the Division, waiting to move up. In view of the uses to which it could have been put, it is felt that this small commitment fully justified the risk taken. Had operations proceeded more satisfactorily, an early task given to the Div RE would have been the construction (or the clearance of an existing) airstrip. This will be a normal early engineer task, and it would be wrong to consider it an abnormal one. Whether an Airborne Division be operating in Europe, when the early requirement for an airstrip will be the necessary sequel to a successful operation, or whether it be operating in the Far East when not only strips, but jeep tracks will have to be made through jungle, swamp or boulder country, a bare minimum of earth moving equipment should be provided as an increment to the Fd Pk Coy, and will normally be required in the early follow on glider loads, if not actually initially.

12. Headquarters R.E. Since shortly after the formation of 1st Airborne Division, a field engineer has proved essential, not only for operations, but for training. HQRE though it has less Field Engineering liabilities than that of an Infantry or Armoured Division, by no means has none. In addition it has such other commitments as Glider and Aircraft allotments, loading, training and supervision for operations and the organisation of resupply. All tasks which the Adjt and Intelligence Officer cannot take on in addition to their normal work. At least one Field Engineer has been permanently attached to HQRE from one of the operational RE units since the formation of the Division.

13. W.T. WT intercommunication throughout the Division and to Corps (except for the RA and the low wavelength long distance sets of Public Relations and Phantom) were to put it mildly unreliable; and the RE link was no exception. The Divisional RE had only recently been issued with their sets which were manned by clerks, tradesman sappers and all sorts of people already with other primary tasks. Much more training by personnel whose sole job is WT is required in the future. A high standard of WT as well as RT is essential for times when conditions are bad and distance great. All RE sets must be capable of fifteen miles RT in normal country to ensure good reception under bad conditions and in bad terrain. A properly trained Royal Corps of Signals section is necessary for Div RE link to units.

14. Non-Operational Tasks. The non-airborne echelon of units will often leave the base before the airborne echelon goes on operations. After all operational echelons have left the base, no one is left except sometimes a few first reinforcements who are liable to be called on for operations. Unlike other formations an Airborne Division often returns to its base in the course of a campaign. Permanent personnel are necessary not only to assist the unit on to operations, when it is denuded of part or all of its non-airborne echelon, (in particular of administrative personnel) but also to maintain the base. A few low category sappers and a low category officer would prove invaluable for this purpose, and are in the interests of economy, a necessity. The alternative can only be that operationally fit personnel are tied up in these duties, which have got to be done by someone.

15. RE Airborne Holding Unit. It may not be out of place to add to this report the urgent need for an RE Airborne Holding Unit. Airborne sappers, even airlanding sappers, require considerable specialised training. Their equipment is different to that of normal Divisional Engineers, and they have much extra to learn, apart from the actual parachuting or loading of gliders. There is no regularized system thereby casualties from RE units of Airborne Divisions are not lost sight of when they become fit for duty again. There is no regularized system for obtaining volunteers or reinforcements. A small holding unit of approximately one hundred all ranks is much needed. This unit could economically be incorporated with a wing of the Airborne Development Centre, where technical labour is continuously required.

16. Although it would be unsound to base too many recommendations for modifications upon the lessons of this particular operation, certain weaknesses in organisation and equipment have definitely been brought to the surface. In the ARNHEM operation no big engineer commitments ever materialised. Consequently technical personnel, both officers and men, were used, a few as pioneers, but mostly as infantry - as which it must in all fairness be said they fought gallantly and superbly. On the other hand, although they had a considerable number of technical tradesmen, neither of the Para Sqns would have been capable of intensive or extensive engineering because of their lack of tools, equipment and the means to transport them on the ground. While the Field Coy had too few officers, the Para Sqns had too many. In the next operation there may be a heavy engineering commitment - not least the hasty construction of airstrips, the seizure and prevention of demolitions of and operation of essential services; on in the Far East, the construction of jeep tracks, aerial ropeways and water supply. The huge loss of technical officers and sappers due to enemy action (in comparison to the relatively few casualties in the Div RA) points to an uneconomical organisation incapable of adapting to what (anyhow for the first three days) was not an abnormal operation. Increased flexibility in organisation and equipment is necessary to that Airborne Div RE can be adapted to each operation without an unavoidable waste of men and equipment - either tied up unused or wastefully committed to battle. The Airborne Divisional Engineers as constituted at present whilst they lack certain essentials, are also neither flexible nor economical.

Recommendations for Alteration of Organisation and Equipment of Airborne Divisional Engineers

1. Introduction The Arnhem operation was, perhaps, in its later stages, exceptional but the recommendations in this report, although they owe their origin to this operation, are not necessarily nor solely based upon it. They are designed to meet all normal requirements of an Airborne Division operating within the next twelve months in Europe or in the Far East. They are designed to avoid an actual increase in personnel; to achieve an economy in officers and in technical tradesmen; and to meet all normal demands for engineers operating with an Independent Airborne Brigade, Para Tps, Airlanding or Mixed, or with a whole Division. No request for any equipment has been made which would either be uneconomical or unobtainable. The recommendations are submitted as a result of the conclusion (in Part I of this report) that the Airborne Divisional Engineers as at present constituted, whilst they lack certain essentials, are also neither flexible nor economical.

2. Cause of Present Weakness of Organisation. The weaknesses are neither obscure in their origin nor do they cast any shadow upon those who have overcome great difficulties in getting this organisation and equipment of Airborne Divisional Engineers to its present standard. It is only recently that Para Bdes have become more normally employed within a Division rather than as Independent Bdes. Consequent upon the normal employment of Airborne Divisions committed as a whole into battle, Divisional RE require modification. This can be done without detriment to the provision of sufficient engineers for at least one Brigade of a Division at any time acting in an entirely independent role.

3. Airborne Echelons Every Divisional RE unit must be capable of division into three main echelons ( (a) (b) (c) below). The airborne echelon may consist of one or more elements, according to the unit and the circumstances.

(a) Airborne Echelon (i) Parachute Element (ii) Gliderborne Element (iii) Airtransportable Element.

(b) Non-Airborne Echelon (or Echelons) In MT whether or not seaborne in addition.

(d) Holding Units. Reinforcements and "X" List personnel. (All potentially operational except for low category permanent staff).

4. Brigade Initial Requirements. Each Airborne Brigade of whatsoever type it may be, and whether acting independently or within a division as soon as it is committed to battle, normally requires initially parts or all of a lightly equipped or self contained Assault Troop or Platoon RE of approximate two officers and twenty to thirty sappers, mostly pioneers. This Assault Troop or Platoon must all arrive by parachute or by gliders. If it arrives all by parachute it will have no transport other than one or two cycles or Lt M/Cs. If it all arrives by glider it can be provided with any necessary transport.

5. Brigade Subsequent Requirements. As the battle becomes more static, Troops or Platoons in support of Brigades should be readily capable of adaption to more normal field engineering as compared with their initial assault, 'coup de main', or recce tasks, whether such tasks remain Brigade, or for reasons of economy become Divisional once under the CRE. Each Troop or Platoon therefore requires a technical increment consisting of tradesmen tools, equipment and transport. For this purpose a self contained gliderborne or air transportable increment of one officer and fifteen to twenty technical tradesmen with transport is required by each Troop or Platoon. One unit of these Troops or Sections composed on the above lines would be capable of nearly all Brigade tasks, and would equally be capable of concentrating for engineer tasks under the CRE.

6. Divisional Requirements. Although little more than recce tasks may sometimes be initially required, the reverse may often be the case. All forms of land and water transport, Docks and essential services may have to be immediately seized and operated. It may be possible and essential immediately to commence construction of improvised roads, airstrips or aerial ropeways. Sooner or later all or some of these tasks are likely to materialise. The minimum normal requirement is therefore for one further RE Field Unit, which for economy, flexibility and control, should be identical to that already outlined. To meet only abnormal requirements will an additional Corps Tps Unit capable of being airborne or air transportable, be required for a Divisional Operation, in addition to the two Divisional Field Units. Such an eventuality might be when all three brigades of a Division are concurrently called upon to act in independent roles.

7. Field Park Company. The operational part of the Field Park Company is correctly organised as at present, except that it should include an Airstrip Constructional increment (equally well capable of track clearance for MT).

9. All RE Units, including HQRE. All Divisional Units require an officer to be in charge of Non-airborne echelons. They all require a few low category personnel and a vehicle for base maintenance during the temporary absence of the Division on operations. These personnel would be invaluable in assisting the units when in the stage of departing on an operation.

10. Holding Unit An RE Holding Unit, staffed by low category personnel, is necessary for the effective provision of reinforcements and as a collecting centre for recovered wounded.

11. WT. Personnel must be specifically provided for WT duties; Drivers RE for links within units and preferably a R. Sigs Section for links from CRE to units. If a R. Sigs Section is not available, a special allotment of Drivers must be provided for this purpose.

12. Proposed detailed establishments or amendments to establishments have already been prepared in draft and will be completed as soon as these recommendations have been approved in principle. The final establishments show no overall increase in operational personnel and a decrease in the overall strength of Officers and Technical Tradesmen.

1. Although it really has no place in a report of this nature, the outline plan of the operation is given here for the convenience of those who may not be familiar with it.

2. By the middle of Sep 44, 21 Army Group had reached the line of the ESCAUT CANAL. On front of 2nd Army there were some German Parachute formations who were comparatively lightly armed and without a full proportion of arty etc. Commander 2nd Army was confident that when he was ready he could easily break through this screen.

3. Commander 21 Army Group decided that in conjunction with 2nd Army a large Airborne Force would be dropped in the area of the enemy with the object of seizing the crossings over the LOWER RHINE and MAAS. These consisted of three bridges at GRAVE over the R MAAS, at NIJMEGEN over the R WAAL, and at ARNHEM over the R LEK. The destruction of any of these crossings, it was calculated would delay the advance of 2nd Army by at least one week.

4. The Airborne plan was to use three Airborne Divisions, 101 and 82 US Airborne Divisions and 1st Br Airborne Division. 101 Airborne Div were given the task of seizing the bridge at GRAVE and a number of smaller bridges on the road further SOUTH. 82 Airborne Div would seize the bridge at NIJMEGEN, and 1 British Airborne Div the bridge at ARNHEM. British Airborne Corps, who would command the three divisions, would land in the area of NIJMEGEN. Priority of aircraft was from SOUTH to NORTH. Owing to the enormous air effort required it was not possible for 1 Airborne Div to fly in complete on D day. Commander 1 Airborne Div therefore decided that on D day 1 Para Brigade and 1 Air Landing Brigade with a proportion of divisional troops should go, 4 Para Brigade and the remainder of Div troops should go on D+1 and the Polish Para Brigade, who had been placed under command for the operation, should arrive on D+2.

5. ARNHEM is a town of about 86,000 inhabitants with a large residential area surrounding it. The country outside is undulating and heavily wooded, with a large proportion of coniferous trees and some heather. DZ and LZs were approximately 8 miles from the main bridge. ARNHEM is normally the administrative capital of Holland; it has well equipped barracks and a German garrison.

6. Before the operation, orders were given that no destruction to communications was permissible except the cutting of what was obviously German field cable. All trunk cables and locals in the area are buried; switchboards, except for trunk switchboards, are automatic. The high tension electric supply network, which is extensive throughout the country, has its own trunk telephone system, whose switchboards are kept separate from the Post Office switchboards.

7. The only switchboard which was captured by 1 Airborne Div was at OOSTERBEEK; this was an automatic switchboard and had been completely destroyed by the Germans. The Dutch resistance movement appeared to be well organised in the Post Office and Dutch Liaison Officers assured OC Signals that the main trunk switchboard at ARNHEM had been rendered unusable to the Germans. The main ARNHEM auto switchboard was working however, and by its means some information of enemy movements the far side of the town was obtained from members of the Dutch resistance movement.

1. GENERAL. Copies of Div Signals Insts. 1, 2, and 3 and Div Op Order for Ops LINNET and MARKET are at Index B in order to show the signal comns which it was intended should be provided.

2. D DAY. All Gliders arrived except Glider C. Gliders landed at approx 1300 hrs, unloaded and vehs proceeded immediately to the first position of Div HQ which was on the edge of the wood beside the LZ. The parachute party landed very shortly after the gliders. Comns were set up only on those sets which could operate on the move since the Comd wished to keep Div HQ as mobile as possible. This prevented sets being erected to work to Base, Phantom, etc. On the Div Comd net the following stations were through by 1607 hrs:- 1 Para Bde, A L Bde, 21 Ind Para Coy, Tac Div HQ (Para party), GOC's Rover. At 1645 hrs 1 Para Bde started to move from the DZ and they reported at the same time that their lateral set (SCR-300) was in communication with 82 US Airborne Div. The Div Comd freq was proving unsatisfactory at this time there being a powerful British station almost exactly on it, and it was therefore decided to change over the A and B freqs at 1900 hrs; a message to this effect was sent to all concerned. 1 Para Bde had with them only a No 68P set working on the Div Comd net since they had not waited for their glider element to join them before moving off. Consequently they were soon out of range and the message about change of freq could not be got to them. A SDR was sent to 1 Para Bde at 1730 hrs with an OP message among others, but returned at 2050 hrs to report he could not find them. G Staff thereupon ordered that no further DRs should be allowed out without their permission. At 1930 hrs Div HQ closed and moved into a lager among the gliders on the LZ. It was now dark and open wire aerials were erected for the longer links. Interference however was very bad. Links worked as follows:-

A Wave - unable to work until 2300 hrs when A L Bde and 21 Ind Para Coy came on the air. There was no comn with 1 Para Bde or GOCs Rover, which latter was still absent from Div HQ.

Base Set - contact with Airborne Corps at 2145 hrs. Corps reported they could work Base 5/5. Contact was lost soon afterwards.

Other sets, which did not establish comns on D Day were:- Phantom set, PR set, Air Sp Set.

It is clear that the 1 Para Bde No 68P set was out of range, and it transpired that the GOC's Rover set had been put out of action by a mortar bomb. On the B Wave comn was most difficult owing to the heavy interference and lack of selectivity in the R 109. Similarly the same reasons probably were the cause of failure of the Base and PR links. The LO from the Recce Sqn at Div HQ reported through to his tps with 1 Para Bde and 1 A L Bde but comn to the former was lost shortly after dark.

3. D+1. At 0015 hrs comn 3/3 was established with Base. Traffic could be passed on DC procedure RA and Recce reported they had lost touch with their sets with 1 Para Bde, otherwise no change in comns. At 0630 hrs Div HQ moved into some scrub at the edge of the LZ. Comns were as follows:-

2 i/c Div Sigs was despatched at 0715 hrs with orders to go to 1 Para Bde, see what the trouble was and inform them of the change of frequency. The order "prepare to move" came at 0730 hrs by which time no further comns had been established. At 0800 hrs Div HQ closed and moved on to the main road ARNHEM - UTRECHT and established a new HQ at HILL OEK at 0930 hrs. Aerials were erected immediately. The GOCs Rover was still off the air on the A Wave, but AL Bde and 21 Ind Para Coy were still on. At 0945 hrs 2 S Staffs were ordered to reinforce 1 Para Bde. A No 68P set working on the Div Comd net was attached to them and they left Div HQ at 1010 hrs. At 1030 hrs a LO with Jeep and No 22 set were despatched to endeavour to get to the main br at ARNHEM. This LO however, could only get about half-way where he found 2 i/c Div Sigs with 1 Para Bn. The latter had informed 1 Para Bde by wireless of the change of Div Comd frequency, using the Bde comd net. The LO shortly afterwards returned to Div HQ, and 2 i/c Div Sigs continued on with 1 Para Bn. The latter shortly afterwards was forced to lie up and took no further part in the op. Throughout the morning Base, PR, Phantom and Air Sp Sets tried hard to establish comns but all failed. Base set contacted Airborne Corps strength 3/3 and 1335 hrs. At 1415 hrs 2nd lift aircraft began to appear and 4 Para Bde were on Div Comd net at 1530 hrs. Phantom set reported contact with 30 Corps at 1510 hrs. At 1630 hrs Div HQ prepared to move in direction of ARNHEM and opened at PARK HOTEL, HARTESTEIN at 1740 hrs. There was still no news of the GOC. The 2nd Glider Lift and one Para stick had now landed safely and had joined Div HQ. Also Glider C which had failed to arrive on the previous day. HQ RA also moved to Park Hotel and were established by 1840 hrs and a No 19 HP set took command of the CRAs net. A No.22 set on another net was working to 2 Lt Bty which had just landed. A further No 22 set with a Captain from 1 FOU was sent out to act as FOO with 4 Para Bde. The second No 19 HP was dug in and a 34 ft rod aerial set up in preparation for the link to the ground fmn FOOs. Lines were laid to Lt Regt and between G and RA offices. At 1800 hrs the B wave crystal in the No 76 set failed. This was quickly rectified. At 2040 hrs the No 76 set on the Base link failed and this was not rectified until 0055 hrs. At 2120 hrs orders were given by OC Signals that since the Air Sp net was not yet through all demands for Air Sp should be cleared through Airborne Corps, 30 Corps or 2nd Army, whichever set was through at the time of demand. It had been decided that 11 Para Bn should be detached from 4 Para Bde and given the task of relieving 1 Para Bde, who were now involved in fighting in the town and with whom no comns had yet been re-established. A No 22 Set with crew and jeep from A Sec was allotted to 11 Para Bn, which set off at 2300 hrs.

4. D+2. At 0055 hrs the Base set now in working order, could hear Airborne Corps and Base working together but was unable to get on net. At 0200 hrs a Jeep SDR was sent with offr to try and get through to 1 Para Bde, but failed and returned. At 0503 hrs RA reported that they were through to 3 Bty who were with 1 Para Bde, but comn was lost 7 mins later. The Comd returned to Div HQ at 0730 hrs, his Rover set having been destroyed. A new set and jeep was immediately prepared and the crew briefed. At 0915 hrs the No 68P set with 2 S Staffs was heard on the Div Comd net but it was so weak that comn could not be established. At 0947 hrs this was re-established. On the Div Comd net there then were:- 4 Para Bde, A L Bde, 21 Ind Para Coy, 2 S Staffs, 11 Para Bn, GOCs Rover.

At 1200 hrs 2 S Staffs set failed; it was heard again at 1455 hrs but faded away and was not heard again. PR set reported comn had been lost but this was through again at 1250 hrs. The Air Sp set had still not established comn. At 1450 hrs the No 22 set which had been with 11 Para Bn reported back at Div HQ having been given orders to return. At 1700 hrs the 3rd lift aircraft began to arrive and encountered heavy flak. The Polish Para Bde was called on the Div Comd net and on the 1 to 1 link but nothing was heard and it was later ascertained that they had not arrived. At 2100 hrs the comn state was as follows:-

Lines had now been laid locally and to 4 Para Bde. A L Bde line was about to be started. At 2300 hrs PR set established comn and traffic was passed. There was no change in RA comns throughout the day. The spare No.19 HP set was moved to an attic in Park Hotel and a 34 foot rod aerial erected to try and get early as possible contact with ground FOOs.

5. D+3. At 0200 hrs it was reported that there was heavy interference on all links and the Comd net, although receiving strength 5 signals was unable to pass traffic. The PR set was unsatisfactory. At 0440 hrs 4 Para Bde came up on the B wave. At 0500 hrs Phantom set reported through to 2nd Army and 30 Corps. At 0720 hrs Base set reported through to Base and Airborne Corps. The Comd held a conference at 0800 hrs. In the middle, GSO 3 (Ops) reported that 1 Para Bde had come up on the Comd net. They were at the North end of the main road bridge at ARNHEM. 1 Para Bde remained through on this net until the evening when it is reported that they were overwhelmed. Lines were now through to both the other Bdes. During a recce by the Comd his Jeep was again hit by a mortar bomb but the set was salvaged and repaired. At 1400 hrs the Base set reported unable to pass traffic owing to heavy interference from RAF Station P6Z. During the rest of the day A L Bde, 4 Para Bde and 21 Ind Para Coy kept going off the Comd net for short periods, also their lines were similarly out of action. This was due to enemy action. At 1830 hrs a new Rover set was ready for the Comd. At 1900 hrs the GSO 3 (CW) was despatched with Jeep and No.22 set, netted on the Comd net, with the task of endeavouring to get contact with ground forces believed to be nearing the SOUTH BANK of the river. This set however remained on the NORTH BANK of the river while the offr crossed over. It remained through during the night and, on the offr not returning, was ordered to report back to Div HQ at first light. At 1800 hrs contact with 4 Para Bde was lost on both A and B waves and it subsequently transpired that both the bde sets had been destroyed by enemy action. After dark some interference was experienced on the Base link. Mortaring and shelling of the Div area was much heavier than on previous days, and valves in some sets were put out of action through near misses. The No 19 HP set at the top of the house was moved back to the grounds and dug in. A ground FOO was heard for a few moments but no contact could be obtained. Other RA comns were working satisfactorily. A number of vehs in the Div area had now been put out of action, including both Air Sp vehs. Throughout the day constant search was maintained on both links to Corps without result. Sets were changed and resited and open wire aerials tried. The Div Guard set which had maintained a listening watch hitherto still had made no contact with anyone.

6. D+4. There is little to report during the early hours of darkness. The PR set failed but was repaired shortly after by an IM. 4 Para Bde Sigs had suffered heavy casualties in men and equipment the previous day and 2 No 22 sets and 3 No 68P sets were made available to Comd 4 Para Bde. Lieut BOSWORTH was ordered to act as Bde Sig Offr. Owing to heavy mortaring, lines kept being out and linesmen were kept busy throughout the day. The new 4 Para Bde set was on the Div A wave at 0900 hrs and remained through for the rest of the day. The Phantom set was having difficulty in passing traffic throughout the morning, but improved later. At mid day the Comd decided to move all offices into the basement of the PARK HOTEL, there to form a strong-point. The Signal Office and switchboard were therefore moved and were working by 1530 hrs. Outside locals were duplicated in all cases, four lines being laid to RA. Actually in the building the following sets were located:- Comd Set; Recce Set; Base Set; B Wave set; Polish Bde set. Since the B wave could now only communicate with A L Bde, and there was little or no formal traffic to be passed, this link was closed down and not reopened. The sets listening on both Corps links and on the Div Guard freq were still searching but had heard nothing. A large proportion of the Polish Para Bde landed about 1900 hrs SOUTH of the River and both No.22 sets due to contact them now began to call and search for them. No contact however, was made. By now both day crystals of the Base set had failed and this link thereafter had to work on the night freq throughout the 24 hrs. Comn was therefore difficult during day time, and at night interference was experienced. Contact was established at 0900 hrs with 64 Med Regt, using a No.19 HP set, and ranging was commenced at once. This link remained through for the rest of the op and the Arty Sp provided proved invaluable. Other RA comns worked normally throughout the day.

7. D+5. At 0320 hrs a message arrived saying that 43 Div would come up on Airborne Corps comd frequency and giving the call signs they would use. Hitherto Gds Armd Div had been expected but had not been heard. Before first light 21 Ind Para Coy was placed under comd 4 Para Bde. They were therefore transferred from the Div Comd wave to 4 Para comd wave. At 0800 hrs Base set reported through to Airborne Corps and Base, and traffic was being passed. At 0800 hrs hy mortaring cut all lines leading into Div HQ. At 0900 hrs contact was established with the Polish Para Bde on the 1 to 1 link. This link subsequently proved invaluable. Throughout the day mortaring cut lines frequently and caused the two bde sets to close down on occasions. Breaks, however, were only of short duration and comns were more than adequate to enable the Comd to control the Div. Some interference was being caused at Div HQ owing to sets being so close together. Throughout the day listening watch was still maintained on both the Airborne Corps links and on the Div Guard wave. Aerials were resited and every possible improvement made but still without success. During the morning a mortar bomb destroyed four 300 watt charging sets. This made the battery charging situation very difficult, as a number of batteries had also been destroyed. The utmost economy was ordered and batteries from Jeeps, which had been put out of action, were collected. Comns on the Phantom and PR sets remained satisfactory throughout the day. The Base link however was difficult, although some traffic was passed both to Base and Corps. RA Comns throughout the day were normal.

8. D+6. It now became clear that the remaining charging sets could not hold their own on the battery drain, and early in the day a further charging set was destroyed by enemy action. Furthermore, owing to the number of near misses, the IMs, two of whom had been wounded, could not keep the necessary number of sets in working order. OC Sigs therefore decided to close down the two No.22 Sets listening for Airborne Corps and also the Div Guard set. Comns on the Div Comd net, Polish link, Recce, PR and Phantom were satisfactory. Aerials, however, were constantly being blown over by blast so that inevitably there were breaks in comns. Lines also were constantly being cut and linesmen were kept busy. The Base set comn was very difficult, signals being weak and interference fairly heavy. Some traffic however was passed to Airborne Corps and Base. At 1800 hrs very heavy mortaring occurred and three direct hits were scored on Div HQ. Three working No 22 sets were put out of action and all lines cut. Sets were not repaired before dark and great difficulty was found in establishing comn again since sets had to be kept more or less in the open and the light necessary for the operator to tune the sets constantly drew snipers fire. During the night Base and PR sets reported fading and heavy interference. A det of Polish Para Bde was expected to cross the river during the night. A No 22 set in Jeep was despatched to make contact with them and establish comns on the Div Comd net. RA comns worked very satisfactorily throughout the day. The second No 19 HP set established comn with Maj Whyte Boycott of the Seaborne FOO element. By the evening 1 Airborne Div could obtain arty support on demand from one med and three fd regts. A large number of targets were registered and arty sp was almost continuous. At 1800 hrs a German station came on the FOO net and endeavoured to confuse fire orders, so that supporting arty would shell our own troops. It appeared however, that the No 19 HP set was sufficiently powerful to prevent confusion and characteristics of the officers working British sets were sufficiently well known to each other to overcome the difficulty.

9. D+7. At 0800 hrs Maj Holbrook, OC 2 Coy, using a No 22 set came up on the one to one link to the Polish Para Bde. He was at once ordered to report to 130 Bde where he remained for the rest of the op. This link proved invaluable. Comns were fair up to first light, then things improved and all sets were through and working by 0600 hrs. There was then very heavy mortaring for three hrs and aerials kept being blowing down. Great difficulty was experienced in keeping lines through, but it was usually found that either line or wireless was through at any one time. Other wireless links worked satisfactorily throughout the rest of the day except for the Base set which lost comn about 1800 hrs. About 1145 hrs two sets using the call sign of the Rover set of Comd Br Airborne Corps, were heard on the Div Comd net. Calls were exchanged but it was impossible to pass any useful traffic. It subsequently transpired that these were sets specially sent forward by 43 Div in an effort to contact us direct, and that they were using the incorrect call sign. As comn with 130 Bde was working very satisfactorily and the two sets were in danger of jamming our comd net, they were asked to close down. The charging sets still in action were able to keep the remaining sets working. Things were very difficult at Div HQ throughout the day owing to heavy mortaring and the fact that entrances were covered by enemy snipers.

10. D+8. The Phantom set closed down between 0200 hrs and 0530 hrs. The PR set was out of comn during the same period. Base set established comn in the early hours and remained working for the rest of the day although signals were weak. Other wireless links remained satisfactory throughout the day except for the usual difficulties of aerials being blown down at either end. Mortaring was heavy and linesmen were kept busy repairing breaks. The links to 130 Bde and Ground FOOs worked very satisfactorily and arty sp was constantly being demanded. IMs were working hard in repairing sets. Only two spare No.22 sets were now available. At 1900 hrs the plan for the evacuation of 1 Airborne Div was given out to the men, the route memorised, and orders issued for the destruction of equipment and records. At 2145 hrs the final call for arty sp was put through and answered. At 2200 hrs the destruction of all equipment was completed, except for the two sets working to Base and 130 Bde. Wounded signallers who could not be evacuated volunteered to pass traffic on these two links after the departure of Div HQ and one message was received at 130 Bde at 0330 hrs the following morning; that is 5 hours after Div HQ had left. By 2230 hrs Div HQ had been evacuated, OC Sigs being the last to leave.

1. Signal Security in the Airborne Division is difficult, as no establishment exists for a monitoring section. Much must be left to operators on sets, and close scrutiny on traffic by Signal Officers.

2. RT Generally speaking RT security was fairly good. Much time and practice had been put in before the operation and officers had reached a reasonably high standard. At times however, owing to the stress of circumstances some bad breaches of security were committed. One example was during a report by a Brigade to Division on a recent enemy attack on one of their units, it was stated that the attack had been beaten off but it was doubtful if another such attack could be held. This was presumably not Intercepted as a similar attack did not occur.

3. AUTHENTIFICATION The usual authentification system was taken into the air and was used, but when units were contacted by our nets and their identity was not known the authentification system did not cover such a circumstance. There was no choice but to use some unauthorised method such as asking a known Officer at the other end some details of his personal history. This occurred on at least two occasions and worked satisfactorily, although it is by no means recommended to be adopted as standard.

4. SLIDEX CODE This worked satisfactorily both within the division and to higher formations. The latter had not however made a sufficient distribution of keys, with the result that some delay ensued until the ground unit spotted the fact that special Airborne keys were being used.

5. SIGNAL INFORMATION As had been previously planned the minimum amount of signal information was taken into the air, this was limited to the frequencies on which Airborne Sets were required to work and the code signs of formations with which they were likely to come into contact with. When the appropriate links to higher formations failed, efforts were made to make contact by putting sets of the command nets of ground formations. This method was doomed to failure since a list of the frequencies and the call signs in use was not held by the Airborne Division. Furthermore, should such a contact have been made the passing of messages by Slidex code would have presented a problem since the keys appropriate to the ground formation were not held in the Airborne Division. It is vital that in all future operations this information is at the disposal of the Airborne formation and taken by them into the air. One example of the difficulties which were encountered was when Major Holbrook, OC No 2 Coy, who was with the ground formations, came up on the air from the Polish Parachute Brigade area on the SOUTH Bank of the River, and it was desired to order him to report to 130 Infantry Brigade. Since however the code sign of the latter was not known, he had to be ordered to go to a formation whose Sunray's name was "-----".

6. COMPROMISE. Owing to the confused fighting in the 1 Para Brigade area, it is not known whether the information contained in the self-destroying tubes was denied to the enemy, it was assumed that it had been. The Polish Parachute Brigade however, reported that their Slidex and Maplay keys had been lost and compromised. Reserve one keys were taken into effect at 0100 hours the following day and the change worked smoothly.

7. MAPLAY As far as could be ascertained no instance exists of the employment of Maplay for distinguishing map reference.

(b) One time letter cipher was used for messages between Polish Para Brigade and Airborne Division.

(c) One-time-pad cipher was used on all the links outside the Airborne Division. It proved a great success and was found quick and simple to operate. There were only two snags. The first was that a three leg pad would have proved invaluable to work to 30 Corps and Airborne Corps, since a large number of messages were for these two addresses. Since such a pad had been withdrawn just before the operation messages for these two had to be en-ciphered and sent twice. The second snag was that 30 Corps had not passed on one leg of the six way pad to 43 Div, and as a result no one-time link existed between that formation and the Airborne Div.

1. GENERAL. Although the direct air support was provided by the RAF the communications were provided from American re-sources under arrangements made by 1st Allied Airborne Army. They consisted of two air support parties with 1st Airborne Div working on a net to the two other airborne divs and to Airborne Corps. Control was at Second Army. Each of these parties consisted of one Officer and 4 ORs, a "Veep" and a Jeep. A "Veep" is a Jeep fitted with an SCR-193 for ground-to-ground communication and a VHF transreceiver for ground-to-air communication. The SCR-193 set is crystal controlled, the required frequency being slightly different from the crystal frequency; two frequencies were provided.

2. Owing to last minute changes the air support parties were not briefed until the middle of the night prior to take-off. They were flown in with the first lift, Waco gliders being used. On arrival at ARNHEM it was found that neither set could be tuned to the lower of the two frequencies allotted. Every effort was made to establish contact on the higher of the two frequencies, but unfortunately without success, and as a result these air support parties were quite useless.

3. After D+2 when the HQ area began to be more or less heavily mortared and shelled, it became necessary to dig in all working sets. The equipment in the Veep however could not be dismantled for the following reasons:- (a) It is extremely bulky. (b) It is wired into the vehicle. (c) It is necessary to use the vehicle engine when operating. As a result of this both sets were soon riddled and put out of action.

4. This arrangement for air support communications is unsatisfactory since the personnel had never actually worked with the equipment they went with, nor had they worked with the other crews on the same net. In future it is strongly recommended that air support communications are provided from an existing air support signal unit, or alternatively that the crews are practiced together before the operation. Smaller equipment is required, capable of being dismantled from vehicles and dug in in slit trenches.

5. GROUND TO AIR COMMUNICATIONS. All arrangements for ground to air communications are made by OC Independent Para Coy direct with the RAF. These consist of ground to air recognition signals, coloured smoke and frequencies for Eurekas etc. After the initial phase it was found in practice that Signals were called upon to undertake this task, and it is strongly recommended that they should be made responsible from the planning stage onwards. In this connection a R Signals officer is already attached to the Independent Parachute Coy.

6. RE SUPPLY. It is thought that the Germans were endeavouring to confuse the signals which were being displayed during re-supply, owing to the very large number of aircraft which continually dropped supplies in the wrong place. This fact is borne out by conversations overheard by officers evading, and in future operations it is very desirable to change from day to day the ground to air signals and, if possible, frequencies for Eurekas. It is known that at least one Eureka was captured by the enemy.

1. GENERAL. All the sets at HQ RA could not be flown in on the first lift, with the result that the normal RA layout was not possible until after the arrival of the 2nd lift.

2. In spite of some non-arrivals on the first day HQ RA was fully complete by the evening of D+1. Communications worked well on D day and D+1 except that great difficulty was experienced in keeping through to the OP with 1 Parachute Brigade in ARNHEM. Lines were laid on D+1 from HQ RA to the Light Regiment and G Office. On arrival of the second lift a No 19 HP set was used for the control set.

3. As will be seen from the diary of events no contact with the ground formation was made until D+4, when a No 19 HP set established contact with 64 Medium Regiment at a range of about eleven miles. Ranging was commenced immediately and a number of targets registered. A No 22 set was being used at the distant end and it was found that although communications worked well during the day, at night a step-up was necessary; the latter was provided by using an FOO belonging to the regiment. OC 1 FOU and three FOOs with one No 19 HP set and three No 22 sets had been attached to RA 30 Corps, with the task of making early contact with RA 1 Airborne Div; a special frequency had been provided for this purpose. Communication to the No 19 HP set was not, however, established until D+6, the range then being about 10 miles. Communications were then quickly organised and by the evening of that day one medium and three field regiment RA were all on call to 1 Airborne Div. For the remainder of the operation these communications worked satisfactorily and artillery support was extremely good.

4. It is clear from the experience gained in this operation that the No 22 set has not an adequate range nor is its receiver sufficiently selective for communication between the Airborne Division and FOOs coming up with the relieving ground forces. The No 19 HP set with its greater range and better receiver is more suitable, but even so a more powerful set is desirable.

5. Communications for the FOOs with Parachute and Air Landing Battalions is not satisfactory, it being found that the No 68R set is quite inadequate for this task. Ranges obtained in the very wooded country were far less than the specified ranges, and contact was soon lost between FOOs and FOO Controls at Brigade HQ. A FOO is quite useless without a means of communication and a more powerful set must be found. The SCR-694 may prove to be suitable.

1. GENERAL. During the first two days when the battle was still mobile, a fair opinion could be formed as to the behaviour of equipment, and as a result of experience gained the following have come to light.

(a) Air landing battalions. Existing scales are adequate except for the following changes:- Add - one Switchboard UC 10 line. This is required since existing scale only allows one, and in an airborne operation this should be duplicated. Furthermore during the static phase it was found that a large number of lines were laid and two switchboards are really required. Delete - Three wireless sets No 22 and one Wavemeter Class C. These are required for the Recce Platoon which is no longer allowed on WE.

(b) Parachute Battalion. There is a definite requirement for line equipment on the same scale as an ordinary inf or air landing battalion. A para bn is required to undertake much the same tasks, and therefore requires the same scale of signal equipment. It is recommended however, owing to limitations in weight, that only half the amount of assault cable be added.

(c) Mortar Platoons. Telephones Head and Breast Sound Powered No 2 should be replaced by Telephone Sets L, the reason being that the former have really insufficient range, they are bulky and heavy, they are uncomfortable and they have no calling device. The telephone L has been chosen since it has magneto ringing and no adjustable parts.

(a) No.18 set. This worked extremely well, and it was found that its range is perfectly adequate. There is a demand for the controls to be painted with luminous paint, and Aerial bases No 10 should be mounted on top of the set. The existing aerial rods were found to be very fragile, but the last modification recommended will obviate this.

(b) No.38 set. This set appears to have worked well, the only criticism being the old one of the junction box. Batteries appear to have required replenishment only every 48 hours.

(c) SCR-536. This appeared to have worked well, but its lack of robustness was criticised. It was noted that when units make reports of losses of major items of equipment and from which demands for resupply are prepared, in the case of this set the frequency required was never stated.

(d) Assault Cable. This was generally liked, it appears however to be a little fragile and thicker insulation would improve it.

(e) Battery Supply. No 2 batteries for No 18 and No 68 Sets proved a great success and in some cases appeared to have lasted up to 72 hours each.

4. WE. Establishment of signal pls are inadequate. The same amount of signal equipment as in an ordinary inf bn is held and a similar WE is required. In the case of para bns who have only three coys a reduction of five signallers is permissible. More MC orderlies would have been a great advantage in both cases.

5. TRAINING. The trg of personnel to work No 38 and SCR-536 sets appears to have been adequate.

6. AERIALS. No open wire aerials with No 18 sets were used during the operation. No instances are reported of personnel carrying sets being deliberately sniped for that reason.

1. SCALE. The scale of Pigeons throughout the Airborne Division is laid down in 1 Airborne Div Signals Operation Instruction No 3. Pigeons were provided from RAF sources, the lofts being situated in the London area.

2. The distance which pigeons had to fly was approximately 240 miles. They were distributed over the glider element to units and formation HQ, except for Para Battalions who dropped with them in the one bird cylinders. Since everyone was delivered to the correct LZ and DZ there was really very little scope for the use of pigeons. Some were released immediately on landing when it was evident they would not be required, some were obviously kept in their containers and subsequently released. A proportion of these were to be seen in the Div area right up to the evacuation, obviously having made no attempt to go home.

3. Of the 82 Pigeons taken on the operation 14 returned to their home loft; of these eleven carried no messages, the messages carried by the other three being delivered to Airborne Corps Rear.

4. A German Pigeon loft was situated in the grounds of PARK HOTEL HARTESTEIN, that is, at Div HQ. Although no experienced pigeon personnel had been taken on the operation, birds were distributed to Brigades but they were never used for communication purposes. By D+3 the shelling and mortaring in the vicinity of the loft was so bad that the pigeons seldom used it. In the first two days a number of homing pigeons carrying German messages arrived at the loft and the messages were passed to I. It is really doubtful whether pigeons are worth taking on future airborne operations similar to this.

1. COMPANY SET FOR INF. The alternative sets are the No 38 and the SCR-536. It is understood that the latter set is no longer in production in America and the set to replace it has not yet appeared. In the circumstances therefore, there appears to be no alternative. The No 38 set is satisfactory. Furthermore a new model is shortly to be introduced with certain advantages over the old model.

2. BATTALION SET. The alternatives are:- Wireless set No 18, Wireless set No 46, Wireless set No 68R, Wireless set, Wireless set SCR-300. The No 46 set was originally produced for combined operations. It has a nominal range of 5 to 8 miles, and is crystal controlled, each set having one common and two other crystal frequencies. In practice however it is found that the range of the set is much less. It cannot be guaranteed that the spot frequencies on which the set is to operate will in fact be workable and the lack of flexibility and difficulties in resupply consequent on having crystals makes this set unsuitable for airborne. The No 68R set although already in use in the Airborne Division would present a considerable problem in frequency allotment if used in infantry battalions. As it works in the lower end of the Army band (3.2 to 5 Mc/s) it is doubtful whether, when all division and enemy nets are working, sufficient channels could be found for the set. Furthermore the range of the set was found under the conditions of the operation only to be 1 to 2 miles and this is insufficient. The No 18 set was satisfactory, and it is recommended that unless a better set of proved reliability and range is known to be available, no change is desirable. The SCR-300 set is an American set similar to the No 18, but it has two distinct advantages. Firstly, it works in a much higher band (40 to 50 Mc/s) and secondly it is frequency modulated. The higher frequency, although making the set more liable to shadow effect, is much quieter and less adjustable under most conditions. The advantages of FM, particularly in a tropical climate, are enormous, the signal noise ratio being much better than with AM. As a long term policy it is recommended that this set might be adopted.

3. BRIGADE SET. The alternatives are:- Wireless set No 68P, Wireless set No 22, Wireless set SCR-694. At present the No 68P set is used, except in Air Landing Brigades where the No 22 set is used. It has been found however that the No 68P set has really insufficient range; in other respects it is perfectly satisfactory. The No 22 set is really too heavy and bulky for parachute brigades. The SCR-694 set, with its normal range of 15 miles RT, appears to be the most suitable, it has still however to be given field trials in this formation.

4. DIVISIONAL COMMAND SET. The alternatives are:- Wireless set No 22, Wireless set No 19, Wireless set SCR-694, Wireless set No 62. The No 22 set has been used hitherto, crystal controlled sets having been provided. In practice however, it is found that the range of the set is not always sufficient, and the receiver owing to its lack of sensitivity frequently made communications most difficult, even though a fair signal was being received. This last drawback is considered serious. The No 19 set is a most attractive proposition. Although it has a higher current consumption than the No 22 set it has better RT performance and a more selective receiver; it thus ensures communications being established when possibly a No 22 set would not get through. As a short term policy it is strongly recommended that it be adopted. The SCR-694 is a possible set for this link, but as stated above it has not had a field trial in this unit. It is not known at present whether the set can be battery operated, and unless this can be done satisfactorily it is unsuitable. The wireless set No 62 is a new set replacing the No 22. It is the same size as the No 22 set less its power unit and a little lighter. Its frequency band is wider (2 to 10 Mc/s) and it has both AM and FM facilities. This last makes it a most attractive proposition. Originally large quantities were promised for delivery this year, but it now transpires that only about 100 will be available. It is highly probable that a large proportion of these would be made available to Airborne Forces, but there is always a danger of having teething troubles when adopting a set just in production, and although the sets may be available very shortly it is strongly recommended that they are not adopted as the standard set in the division until they have proved themselves over a period of time.

5. DIVISIONAL REAR LINK SETS. No 22 set has proved quite inadequate for this role; other possible sets are:- Wireless C52 or C9, Wireless set No 12 HP, Wireless set SCR-499, Wireless set No 53. The Wireless set No C9 is a Canadian version of the old No 9 set; its performance is extremely good, giving 25 miles RT and up to 100 miles WT, and it has proved itself most reliable during operations. It is larger than the No 19 HP, the complete station including charging equipment weighing 1,000 lbs, but it can be fitted conveniently into a trailer 10 cwt. The wireless set No C52 is a development from the C9; it is exactly the same size and current consumption, but with a better performance. This set is now in production and would be available for field trials immediately. Both these sets, although bulky compared with sets already in use in the Airborne Division, are quite capable of being sited in a slit trench. The wireless set No 12 HP, although it undoubtedly has sufficient range, is not considered suitable since its current consumption is extremely large, it requires a power unit working the whole time, and it cannot be taken out from its vehicle and sited in a slit trench. The same remarks apply to the Wireless set SCR-499 as to the No 12 HP. Under this heading should be mentioned the No 76 set; this has always proved itself a fairly good set, but a receiver better than the R109 is definitely required. Should a suitable one not be found then it is worth while taking some R107s by air.

6. AIR SUPPORT. The set in use in Air Support Signal Units is the wireless set No C9. This set has proved itself extremely good, and is reported never to have failed on WT. This set, or the C52 in due course, should be the standard set for air support tenticles with airborne.

(a) Battalion FOOs. The No 68R set proved itself quite inadequate and the only alternative appears to be the SCR-694. Field trials of this set will be carried out as quickly as possible.

(b) Light Regiment. Within batteries and for the regimental command net the No 22 set is quite adequate and no change is contemplated.

(c) FOO Communications. The No 22 set, for obvious reasons, is unsuitable and it is recommended that these be replaced by No 19 sets. The No 19 HP sets should be replaced by the C9 or C52. It is recommended that those sets from 1 FOU who will be accompanying the ground forces should be carried in trucks 15 cwt fitted for wireless. At least one set should be mounted in an armoured car or other armoured vehicle to enable it to press forward as a step up set with the ground formation when a soft skinned vehicle might not be able to get forward.

BY COLONEL E.I.B. HARVEY, D.S.O., A.D.M.S. 1 AIRBORNE DIVISION (not present on operation)

This report has been compiled from evidence collected from returned personnel, and two letters from Medical Officers in enemy hands at the time of their writing. The narratives of the individual units are appended, and these are of necessity incomplete. The proposed method of implementing the Medical Plan is indicated in 1 Airborne Division Medical Operation Instruction No.1 (see Annexure 'L').

1. On 17 Sep, 16 Para Fd Amb (Lt Col E. TOWNSEND, M.C.) were dropped accurately and landed with full equipment and personnel. 181 Airlanding Fd Amb (Lt Col A.T. MARRABLE) less one section landed successfully in nine gliders.

2. 16 Para Fd Amb proceeded direct to ARNHEM and established a D.S. in SAINT ELIZABETH HOSPITAL which was opened by 2200 hours.

3. 181 Airlanding Fd Amb opened a D.S. at once in the area of the L.Z. and casualties were received shortly after landing, some of these being landing injuries.

4. During this and the succeeding day the Medical Services functioned according to plan, the responsibility for casualties of the second lift, being undertaken by 133 Para Fd Amb (Lt Col W.C. ALFORD) and the reserve section of 181 Airlanding Fd Amb.

5. By the evening of the 19 Sep both 133 Para Fd Amb and 181 Airlanding Fd Amb were established side by side in OOSTERBEEK. En route 133 Para Fd Amb had been delayed by the enemy who were in close contact in the area OOSTERBEEK.

6. On 20 Sep both medical units in OOSTERBEEK were captured, and the majority of Medical Officers and R.A.M.C. personnel were removed to a P.O.W. cage, but a small number were allowed to remain with some 40 seriously wounded casualties.

7. From 21 Sep these units, or that part of them that had been left in the area, united to form a small hospital, centred in the Municipal Hospital.

8. 16 Para Fd Amb was captured in ARNHEM on 18 Sep and the C.O. and majority of Medical Officers were sent off as P.O.W. After protest the surgical teams were allowed to remain to care for some thirty serious cases.

9. Thus by 20 Sep all three medical units were in enemy hands, and the Divisional Medical Services organised the reserve section of 181 Airlanding Fd Amb, A.D.M.S. (Col. G.M. WARRACK) and his staff and certain R.M.Os. These were all amalgamated and casualties from within the perimeter were collected to this improvised dressing station.

10. On 26 Sep certain medical personnel, including Lt. Cols ALFORD and MARRABLE were apparently released to work in the D.S. at OOSTERBEEK, and this installation seems to have carried on as a Dressing Station until 27 Sep.

11. On 24 Sep Lt. Col. HERFORD of 163 Fd Amb organised an attempt to get Medical supplies over the river. He and Capt. LOUIS, R.A.M.C. would attempt to take over six cwt of medical stores with four medical orderlies. This was made in daylight, at 1430 hrs on 24 Sep. Lt. Col. HERFORD constituted himself an envoy and made contact with the senior German officer after crossing the river by assault boat. It appears that Capt LOUIS and his party were made P.O.W. and nothing further has been heard of them.

12. Lt. Col. HERFORD made contact with the senior German medical officer, and arranged for barracks at APPELDOORN to become a hospital for British wounded. This was staffed by personnel who arrived from OOSTERBEEK on 26 Sep. Col. G.M. WARRACK also arrived on that day and took command of the hospital. At the same time as the hospital was being organised parties of wounded and medical personnel were being evacuated to the interior of Germany. The evacuation arrangements were bad, but as a result of strong protests from Lt. Col. HERFORD the arrangements were improved and properly equipped hospital trains were provided.

13. Valuable assistance was rendered by the Dutch, who provided some medical stores and offered the services of Dutch surgeons. Many British wounded were distributed among a number of German hospitals in the area, some of these were brought into the barracks, but the majority were evacuated.

14. By 30 Sep there were some 850 cases and 250 personnel in the hospital. Evacuation proceeded from time to time up till 16 Oct when the hospital was almost clear. The majority of personnel by this time had been sent back to the HANOVER area as P.O.W. Lt. Col. HERFORD escaped from the hospital on the night of the 16 Oct. Col. G.M. WARRACK and Lt. Col. A.T. MARRABLE were still there.

15. The hospital at ARNHEM was closed on 12 Oct and the remaining personnel sent to APPELDOORN.

16. A further attempt to get medical stores across the river had been made on the night of the 24 Sep by Lt. (QM) J. TIERNAN, 181 Airlanding Fd Amb; six half ton blocks, mainly plasma, sulpha drugs, dressings and blankets, were made up by Lt. (QM) J. TIERNAN and he, with some 20 other ranks, were ferried across in DUKWS and assault craft. These were sunk on the north bank and it was impossible to land the stores. Lt. (QM) J. TIERNAN remained all day on the north side and swam back on the night of the 25 Sep.

17. The withdrawal of 1 Airborne Division took place during the night of the 25 Sep.

18. Initially the medical arrangements worked according to plan, provision being adequate for DZ and LZ immediate casualties. By the third day all three medical units were in enemy hands, but were permitted to carry on. Conditions of working were fair, and much assistance was obtained from the Dutch. Food was at times short. The enemy, on the whole, were co-operative and rendered assistance in the care of wounded. The impression is that this behaviour was largely due to the apprehension, on the part of the Germans, of a successful British attack. Some examples of Nazi boorishness were noted.

19. Something over two thousand casualties appeared to have been treated in the period 17 Sep - 16 Oct, all of 1 Airborne Division.

21. The majority of wounded were later evacuated from British Dressing Stations and Hospitals to the interior of Germany.

22. Only three Medical Officers have returned from the north of the river together with some 25 other ranks R.A.M.C.

23. Capt G.F.H. BRAYSON, R.A.M.C. attached 10 Para Bn and Capt J.T. DOYLE, R.A.M.C. were killed in action, and Capt B. BROWNSCOMBE, R.A.M.C. appears to have been shot by a drunken SS Corporal outside the Municipal Hospital at ARNHEM.

24. The initial supplies landed were adequate for three days working. Plasma and Penicillin were short after this period.

25. Re-supply failed and the only replacements available were those taken through the lines under the Red Cross. Some plasma and other items of medical equipment were brought into ARNHEM by the Dutch underground, but the major part was picked up by the enemy.

26. Plasma retrieved from D.Z. three weeks later was in good condition. The Dutch provided what medical equipment they could and, at APPELDOORN, the German medical service also provided drugs and dressings.

27. It would appear that the Medical Services provided a large measure of care for heavy casualties under the most difficult circumstances. Collection of casualties into the Dressing Stations in the initial phase was difficult owing to lack of transport, and later owing to the close contact of the enemy. After the medical units were over-run collection was even more difficult as all jeeps were either destroyed or captured.

28. The high value of the Surgical Teams in an Airborne Operation was once again evident.

29. Inter-communication between A.D.M.S. and Medical Units was impossible in the early stages, and was later only established by personal contact and passage through the enemy lines under Red Cross protection.

30. It was once again clear that one of the principal difficulties of the Medical Services is lack of transport in the early stages, which can only be overcome by the allotment of a glider element of not less than four Horsas.

17 Sep. Drop accurate and 100% landing of equipment and personnel. Immediate move to ST ELIZABETH HOSPITAL, ARNHEM, open by 2200 hrs; casualties waiting on arrival of unit. D.S. established in a large well equipped hospital with 2 operating theatres and Dutch civilian nurses. No X-ray available.

18 Sep. Heavy fighting in hospital area, which was occupied by S.S. Troops. Lt. Col. E. TOWNSEND, Major GORDON, Capts. WELLS and TOBIN and majority of O.Rs. were taken prisoner. The two surgical teams were allowed to remain, as a result of protest, but the remainder of personnel were removed to P.O.W. cage.

19 Sep. Hospital recaptured. Capt. KEESEY and 10 O.Rs. rejoined. Later in the day S.S. Troops again captured the area.

20-27 Sep. The hospital was under German supervision, and during this period many casualties were dealt with, the majority being evacuated through enemy services to APPELDOORN. On 25 Sep there was heavy shelling believed to be covering the withdrawal of the Division.

27 Sep. With the exception of 1 Surgeon, 2 M.Os. and a R.C. Chaplain and 20 O.Rs., British personnel left for APPELDOORN, these remaining to care for 30 serious cases unfit to be moved.

SUPPLIES. Plasma soon ran out but was obtained from D.Z. via German lines, safe conduct being afforded to the Red Cross Flag. German medical supplies were fair, but no sulpha drugs could be obtained. Penicillin ran out on D+4.

18 Sep. The unit was dropped accurately except for 2 sticks of Lieut OLLIFF's section, that landed 1 mile south of OTTERLOO. A Dressing Station was established in a house on the E. side of the D.Z. where some 50 casualties were dealt with. At nightfall the unit moved, with wounded, to WOLFHEZEN and set up in a hospital by the level crossing.

19 Sep. At 1000 hrs the unit moved into houses in OOSTERBEEK. An air attack by German fighters was encountered en route. A Dressing Station was established opposite 181 Air Ldg Fd Amb and an operating theatre established in a Dentist's home.

20 Sep. Enemy advanced up ARNHEM - OOSTERBEEK road and at 0930 hrs both Fd Ambs fell into enemy hands.

21 Sep. 181 Air Ldg Fd Amb and 133 Para Fd Amb coalesced and formed a M.D.S. under general supervision of Colonel G.M. WARRACK.

21-26 Sep. It seems that during this time large numbers of casualties were dealt with, and the M.D.S. became very congested. On 22 Sep Colonel WARRACK received a message from A.A. & Q.M.G. as a result of which he went through the lines back to the Divisional H.Q. A truce for an hour was arranged by Colonel G.M. WARRACK and some 80-90 casualties were taken over to M.D.S. in British transport, which was given a safe conduct. The Germans also provided a lorry for this purpose. In the later phase casualties, and R.A.M.C. personnel were evacuated from time to time to APELDOORN area. Lt Col W.C. ALFORD is believed to have arrived at APELDOORN, together with O.C. 181 Air Ldg Fd Amb and others on 27 Sep. The whereabouts of these two officers from the 20-26 Sep is uncertain.

27 Sep. The M.D.S. at OOSTERBEEK was finally closed and all personnel were sent to APELDOORN.

17 Sep. The unit less Reserve Section landed successfully in nine Gliders, and established an M.D.S. in houses near WOLFHEZEN at 665807. Casualties, not in any great numbers, were received in during that day, and the day following.

19 Sep. The greater part of 133 Parachute Field Ambulance came in to this area and set up an M.D.S.

20 Sep. The M.D.S locality was overrun by the enemy and certain personnel were removed. It would seem that Lt. Col. A.T. MARRABLE was removed to a P.O.W. cage but returned later. From this time on the M.D.S. was merged with 133 Parachute Field Ambulance, the whole being under the supervision of A.D.M.S., Colonel G.M. WARRACK.

20 Sep. An R.A.P. under Lt. D.H. RANDALL, R.A.M.C. was established in the cellar of Divisional Headquarters. Mortar Fire and Shelling of the Divisional Headquarters area became very heavy and a number of casualties were admitted to the R.A.P. This quickly became very congested and there was shortage of water and Medical supplies.

21 Sep. By this time conditions were becoming impossible and A.A. & Q.M.G. gave instructions for an additional house to be opened up for the less badly wounded. This was put under the charge of Capt. T.D.V. SWINSCOW R.A.M.C. Conditions became so congested in Divisional Headquarters R.A.P. that with the heavy fighting round the perimeter, the wounded were in extreme danger, as there would have been no possibility of clearing them if the house had caught fire. The casualties would have proved a serious embarrassment in the event of an attack on the Headquarters. For this reason A.A. & Q.M.G. sent for the A.D.M.S. from OOSTERBEEK and they obtained the consent of the Divisional Commander to ask for safe conduct for the wounded to OOSTERBEEK.

22 Sep. During this period some Medical supplies and water were obtained by War Correspondents under cover of the Red Cross, passing through the enemy lines. Some wounded had been evacuated to the M.D.S. at OOSTERBEEK, but each time transport was sent across it failed to return, having been retained by the Germans. The enemy at all times showed complete respect for the Red Cross and their behaviour towards the wounded was correct.

The unit dropped on 21 Sep and a M.D.S. was established in a hospital at DRIEL. Casualties were dealt with and evacuated via 130 British Field Ambulance to Corps Medical Units. In the initial stages there was a shortage of transport. The M.D.S. came under heavy Mortar and Shell fire at frequent intervals. The transport of the sea tail joined with the unit on 23 Sep., but nearly all of it was lost shortly after this from Shell Fire.