Appendix VI.

Report on Exercise 'Despatch'. HQ, RASC. 4 August 1943.

 

APPX 'A'.

ST/7/2.

R.A.S.C. 1 Airborne Div.

Report on Exercise 'DESPATCH' - 31 Jul 43.

 

Paratroops Drop.

 

    1. The drop of three sticks each of 10 RASC parachutists was very good in view of the fact that this was the troops first jump from the Ablemarle a/c. The stick times, including containers were respectively 10 secs, 8 ½ secs, 11 secs. Minor difficulties were firstly a/c No 1 - no red light, a/c No 3 - slight delay in middle of stick because one mans foot caught in mats which were apparently laid overlapping the wrong way.

    2. The actual D.Z. was not found by R.A.F. pilots and the sticks did not land in the pre-arranged order. This was, however, quickly overcome, such instances having been anticipated in briefing and orders.

    3. There was only one container failure, the rest dropping successfully and all being easily found and identified.

 

Ground Exercise.

 

    4. The move from the D.Z. to R.V. was covered by a scheme laid on by 250 Lt Comp Coy. The move of the three sections across very open country was quite good, but there was a lack of co-ordination of effort on the whole due principally to lack of communication between Pl Comds and Sec Comds, and failure to give verbal orders to Sec Comds as each situation developed. The Secs showed a certain lack of elementary Infantry Tactics, eg: (1) Halting men and vehs on sky line. (2) bringing vehs up to Sec Comd in open country, thus identifying him. (3) failure to realise the value of dominating features both to the enemy and themselves.

    5. The number of umpires was insufficient. There must be at least one attached to each Section, one with the enemy and one Chief Umpire.

    6. The conclusion is that, although, it is understood that the Secs engaged were not previously trained together nor did they form part of Defence Secs or Pls, all ranks must be trained in Elementary Infantry tactics, and further trg is required within the Coy to attain this.

 

Supply Dropping.

 

    7. The work of the Comp Coy's in preparing the a/c for supply dropping was good. The adaption of the sloping roller conveyor to the Albemarle a/c and loading of panniers was successfully done, and 253 Coy produced a quick release strap for maintaining the loaded panniers in position until released required, which works very efficiently and should prove of great value with further slight modifications. The crews, however, failed to test the visibility of the red and green lights when panniers loaded with the result that there was delay in dropping the panniers at S.D.P. The help given by 296 Sqn R.A.F. and A.L.O. of 'F' Strip in modifying the a/c for the supply dropping was considerable. The aircrews report that the panniers when released went out smoothly and quickly. Ground observation at S.D.P. and all parachute with one exception worked efficiently.

    8. The S.D.P. was efficiently laid out by the Det of 250 Coy after a quick move frpm the R.V. to a map ref not previously recced. The ground strips were correctly placed, except that the smoke generator was put too near the 'Y' and on ignition obscured it slightly. Def was inadequate owing to the number of men available.

    9. The a/c easily found the S.D.P. and the supplies were accurately dropped with the exception of one stick which overshot the target by about 800 yds due to inability of the aircrews to see the warning light.

    10. The supplies were quickly collected, sorted and prepared for distribution, and with the exception of the one pannier, the parachute on which did not open, were in good order.

    11. Conclusions are (a) that Supply by Air by means of Albemarle a/c is successful and can be made economical. (b) that 30 RASC personnel are sufficient to organise a S.D.P. and collect and distribute supplies dropped on a Bde basis provided that at least two Jeeps are supplied by Bde for delivery purposes. If no transport, the Bde's must collect. (c) that 30 RASC personnel is insufficient adequately to defend S.D.P. Therefore Bde must be responsible for defence of the S.D.P. This means that if protection is not afforded by location of Bde Tps, at least some portion of the Bde should have as an alternative task the re-capture of the S.D.P. if over-run by the enemy. Then RASC Det on the other hand (a) can post sentries (b) cover the S.D.P. by fire from its Defence Sec which must be kept concentrated.

 

Intercommunication.

 

    12. Communication with Bde H.Q. by means of W/T (18 set) was maintained throughout and signals excellently received.

    13. Conclusion is that although W/T set is not necessary where the RASC Det moves with Bde H.Q., it is very necessary at S.D.P.

 

T.H. Jefferies.

Lt. Colonel.

Comd, R.A.S.C. 1 Airborne Div.

4 Aug 43.