Headquarters, Royal Engineers

Abbreviations

137247

2IC

A/C

Adm

A/Q

Batt

Bde

BNAF

Coy

CRE

Def
Div

GOC

GSW

HQRE

IC
Inf

Instr

IORE

LC
MC

Pers

Regt

SAA

Sigs

Sqn

Tp
WE
WO

Map Reference

Second-in-Command

Anti-Aircraft

Aircraft

Administration

Army Form

Adjutant and Quartermaster Branch

Anti-Tank

Battalion

Brigade

Brigade Major

British North Africa Force

Chief Engineer

Company

Commander Royal Engineers

Defence

Division / Divisional

Drop Zone

Field

General Officer Commanding

Glider Pilot / Group (lower case)

Gunshot Wound

Headquarters Royal Engineers

In-Command

Infantry

Instruction

Intelligence Officer Royal Engineers

Line of Communication

Motorcycle

Map Reference

Officer Commanding

Other Ranks

Personal

Park

Platoon

Royal Engineers

Regiment

Rendezvous

Small Arms Ammunition

Signals

Squadron

Training Manual

Troop

War Establishment

War Office

1 Airborne Div "BIGOT" Adm Instr No.3 received. Orders for Tps of 1 Airborne Div to be confined to camp received.

Report forwarded to Headquarters 1 Airborne Div on "Mobilization Move to North Africa, and preparations for operations". Appendix "A". General Sir Bernard Montgomery visited Div and inspects tps R.E.

1200 - Personal Messages received from Commander 8 Army and G.O.C. 1 Airborne Division.

1930 - C.R.E. and 1 O.R. of H.Q.R.E. and Tps of 9 Fd Coy R.E. (Airborne) under command 1 Air Landing Bde took off on invasion of SICILY.

Probable use of 261 Fd Pk Coy R.E. (Airborne) put forward to Headquarters, 1 Airborne Div. Appendix "B".

"Report on Activities of R.E. 1 Airborne Div in North Africa and Sicily up to 15 Jul 43" issued. Appendix "C".

Subject:- Notes on Mobilization, Move to North Africa and Preparation of Operation "HUSKY".

All our difficulties can be traced to the reluctance of the War Office to admit that the R.E. of an Airborne Division was a necessary organization. All our requests for W.Es. and A.Fs. G 1098 were passed ultimately but not until it was too late. It was as though a jockey was riding not to jump fences but to look as though he meant to without actually putting his horse at the first one. As last the fact that the race was really on dawned on the jockey and he took the fences in a hurried and untidy way. An example may be quoted. The W.E. of a Fd Pk Coy was submitted 6 months before mobilization was ordered. The A.F. G 1098 depends on the W.E. and this had to be rushed through with the result that it was only be sending lorries all over England that the equipment could be collected. No training with it was possible.

One of the first R.E. units to arrive in an area should be the Fd Pk Coy. They have workshops and plant that is helpful in preparing camps. But the Fd Pk Coy could not be included in the first convoy as it had no W.E. until too late.

There has been a muddle over Dummy Parachutists. A design was produced by me in June 1942. Had any serious steps been taken then to produce a few thousand it could easily have been done. Instead, the pundits at the W.O. thought of all the reasons why the design was unsatisfactory and we have been put to great pains in Africa to produce 1,000 of a slightly modified pattern and in fact we are 200 short.

If one accepts as inevitable the fundamental reluctance to face facts, all concerned (including the War Office) took tremendous efforts to give us the best possible passage and their efforts, even if belated, deserve our thanks.

The operation ending in the capture of SYRACUSE and AUGUSTA suggest that it is not always possible to get engineer units quickly into a captured port to repair damage and get the port working.

For example, in SYRACUSE on 11 Jul the only R.E. troops available to fill craters, remove road blocks and get the port in order were the div engineers of 5 Div. These units were also required for the further advance to AUGUSTA and were in any case short of transport and were tired after two days marching and fighting.

It seemed that if a fresh R.E. unit had been flown to SYRACUSE on 11 Jul it could have made a useful contribution to the campaign. It is for consideration whether the same will not happen when CATANIA and other ports are captured. All the equipment of 261 Fd Pk Coy can be loaded in gliders of C.47 aircraft and I believe this offer - if practicable from the air situation - would be eagerly accepted by C.E. 8 Army.

This is not a very heroic employment of 261 Fd Pk Coy R.E. in an airborne role, but as circumstances are at present I think it worth consideration. The number and allotment of C.47 or WACO aircraft is given in the Appendix.

1. Dummy parachutists were dropped over the Island of SICILY on the night 9/10 and 13/14 Jul. The object was to confuse the defences and mislead them as to the landing and dropping zones actually used for the airborne attack on each of these nights.

3. The first type of dummy is a plain hessian dummy man about 20 ins high with legs filled with sand. A second type is similar to the first but with an attachment on the back of the dummy that fires detonators on landing to simulate rifle fire. Each dummy is attached to a small cotton parachute and from a distance it is not easy to distinguish a dummy from a real parachutist. The parachutes are operated by a static line in the same way as a statichute. The proportion of simulators to plain dummies should be one simulator in every three dummies.

4. Pintail bombs are small metal bombs designed to fire a Verey light on hitting the ground. Four or five per aircraft appears enough.

5. There is no doubt that these dummies and pintail bombs are potentially a first class form of deception, though what effect they had in Sicily one cannot say at this stage.

R.A.F. Formation

326 Wing RAF

114 Sqn

18 Sqn

3 South African Wing

21 Sqn

24 Sqn

12 Sqn

Night 9/10

4 Bostons

Night 13/14

6 Bostons

4 Baltimores

7. (a) Details of Drop. All pilots reported having found the correct D.Z. The runs were made at approx 180 m.p.h. and at a height of 1000 feet above ground level. The time of each run varies between 15 secs and 2 mins, the longer times were due to gunners throwing dummies out in the wrong order and so getting static lines tangled with each other.

(b) Reports of Failures. Two cases of the anchor cable breaking were reported. This can be counteracted by using a double piece of static line cord, or cord of equivalent strength. A number of pintails failed to fire. This was entirely due to the fact that the gunners were unable to remove the safety pins by hand. This difficulty can be overcome by splitting the pin in half and replacing it before loading into aircraft.

(c) Reports on Ground Activity. A number of pilots reported rifle fire; this may be due to the simulators or ground troops firing at the dummies. A great deal of confusion must have been caused by the large number of Verey lights, which in many cases lit up the chutes, and the firing caused by the simulators.

Twenty dummies are loaded into each aircraft, seven with simulators and thirteen without. They are arranged ten on either side of the fuselage in four separate piles (see sketch). The front two piles each consist of two with simulators and two without, the simulators being underneath. The port rear pile has 2 simulators on the bottom and 4 plain on the top; the starboard rear pile has one simulator on the bottom and 5 plain on top. The piles are arranged as close together as possible with the legs pointing aft. The front pile must be as close to the escape hatch as possible without fouling the door. The static line of each chute is threaded on to the anchor cable running along each side of the fuselage in the order in which they are thrown out; this order is shown by the numbers on the sketch. The aft end of the anchor cable is attached to the strong point holding the bottom gunner's safety bolt. The forward end is attached to the bracket securing the top gunners armour plate to the fuselage. When the dummies are in position, a cord is tied to the buckle of the safety bolt and drawn over the top of the dummies so as to prevent them falling forward on take-off. The other end of the cord can be secured to any convenient strong point.

(a) The simulators are operated by the static line pulling a split pin out of a perpendicular igniter. Before loading the ends of the split pin must be closed and the pin partially withdrawn. Care must be taken to see that the pin and the cord are in a straight line. For details see sketch in Appendix "A".

(b) Before loading pintail bombs withdraw the safety pin, split it in half and replace one half. For details see sketches 1 & 2, Appendix "B".

The dummies and pintails are thrown out through the escape hatch by the bottom gunner. The pilot should warn the bottom gunner 5 minutes before he reaches the D.Z. This will give him time to cut the cords holding the dummies in position and to make sure that nothing is fouling the static lines. When the plane is over the D.Z. the gunner will throw out 10 dummies and 2 pintails; the pilot then turns and makes another run, this time the gunner throws three pintails first, then the remainder of the dummies. The gunner should aim at dropping each stick in 12 seconds. NOTE. Before throwing pintails the safety pins must be removed.

The dummies were supplied by the War Office, the fire simulators were made partly by a Bomb Disposal Company in ALGIERS and partly by 261 Field Park Company R.E. (Airborne).

There appears no reason why dummies should not be thrown from any kind of aircraft. But the method of packing them in the aircraft may have to be altered to suit the type. Moreover it is preferable for the pilots to fly in a manner somewhat similar to those dropping real parachutists. Consequently, if it is decided to use dummies, the squadrons detailed to drop them should be detailed early so that preliminary arrangements between H.Q. 1 Airborne Div and the squadrons can be made in adequate time.

Having decided to drop dummies it is important not to disclose this fact prematurely to the enemy. At the same time many telephone conversations and administrative arrangements are necessary and dummies should therefore be given a code word early in the planning so that they can be referred to freely without prejudicing security. In this operation they were referred to by the R.A.F. Squadrons and R.E. Units concerned as "WHITE ELEPHANTS," and other appropriate code names are not beyond the wit of man.

A factor to be remembered in dropping these dummies from Boston and Baltimore aircraft is that the bottom gunner cannot fire his gun until the dummies have been dropped and this may rule out certain areas which otherwise would be suitable D.Zs.

On Friday, 9 July 1943 i.e. D1 Sjt Bushell and 12 Sappers and myself with another 12 Sappers were attached to the Border Regt. We embussed and moved to the aerodrome, Strip F. For months we had been training for this show, and our morale was tremendously high. Everything was "buttoned up". The men were as fit as racehorses, and all we wanted to do was to clean up on the Italians.

The main object of the party was to capture a bridge on the main road leading into Syracuse, capture part of the town, and hold it until relieved next morning by the Seaborne Army who were landing on the beaches Nr. Cassibil and on beaches further south.

When we reached the airfield all our gliders and tugs were lined up and made a very impressive display in the afternoon sun. About 1930 hrs the engines of the tug were warmed up and whipped the sand on the surface of the field into a huge column of dust. A little later the first aircraft pulling its glider, in which were passengers, took off, and one after the other a multitude of gliders followed. Taking off in a glider on these aerodromes is quite exciting. The tugs' propellers kick up so much dust that it is impossible to see a yard in front of the glider until it is airborne, and by then it is travelling at about 100 m.p.h. It is most unfortunate, when it emerges from the cloud, if the tug is not in front; but as the glider pilots skin is not thicker than ours they usually see that everything goes straight.

We circled the airfield once or twice before taking up formation and then headed out to sea for a long 3 hour trip. By this time the wind had been freshening, and was blowing half a gale - not very ideal for an Airborne Landing but the time and place of the offensive could not be changed. Once it had started the passage began to be very bumpy, and once or twice we were lifted off our seats by the bumps, the men taking this opportunity of quoting Tommy Handley's Diver "Going down now Sir".

We often flew as low as 300 ft with nothing to be seen on the horizon except the waters of the Mediterranean which were now white with breakers and spume.

We climbed to 3000 ft and the Officer Glider Pilot handed over control to his "second" a Sgt Glider Pilot. The Sgt Glider Pilot was not very strong and before long the machine was caught in the slipstream, out of control and zig zagging all over the sky. The officer seized the stick and by some miracle the tow rope did not break, and we got on our course again. All this was enacted over Malta with the result that the Pilots were very unnerved, and very shaken. The "intercom" between glider and tug broke down, which did not help matters, and they could not any longer make certain where they were, and when it was time to cast off.

By now we were approaching Sicily and we saw below the black coast line and a bright streak of moonlight on the sea. Searchlights were waving in the air like antennae of giant beetles and little balls of fire defying all the laws of gravity, were flying into the sky like little golden twinkles of light. Nothing could be heard above the roar of the slip stream from the fuselage, and it all seemed beautiful and quite unreal.

The tug took a sharp turn to the right. With a shout of "This is it" the pilot slammed the release lever and we were on our own gliding down towards land. We had cast off too soon, and it looked as though we would land in the sea. We could see the coast getting clearer and clearer, while the pilot was shouting the heights - "500, 400, 300 we'll never make it... 200... 50 ft... 20 ft. - "look out!" At this instant a searchlight was switched on showing a 30 ft. high cliff in front of us. The pilot pulled back on the stick, the glider shot up, stalled and crashed nose first into the ground, 60 yards from the top of the edge of the cliff.

We had landed within 100 yds of an enemy post which now began to fire Verey Lights, bringing the glider into brilliant silhouette and setting the gorse alight. We were all more or less concussed and two of the sappers had an arm and collar bone broken respectively and it took a few moments before we were all clear of the glider. We expected a burst of machine gun fire on us any moment, and we thought a patrol would start out to clear us up. But the tools and equipment were still in the glider, and had to be got out.

The glider's nose was stuck in the ground and the handcart was wedged up in front and so could not be moved, so we cut a hole in the side to unload the tools and took away all we could carry, leaving the rest behind with glider.

We set out in the general direction of Syracuse, and after we had gone two miles, over very rough country, I realised that we could not carry all the tools and excessive weight we had. We buried them in a Vineyard, as a pleasant surprise, at some future date for an Italian.

The country was a continuous grove of olives and almond trees out in every direction with walls up to 5 ft in height. Underneath was loose sand. Our rate of progress was very slow as the Glider Pilot and one of the Sappers with the broken collar bone had to be lifted over all the walls. Finally we struck the road and an Italian Patrol at the same time. The men were very bad shots, and we disengaged without damage. I am sure that in all these encounters with the Italians at night they were firing more with the idea of giving themselves courage than inflicting casualties on us. Several times we owed our lives to the splendid display of fireworks they put up, whilst we were 50 yds from their post. For several hours we moved N.E. just keeping off the main road. Once a patrol of enemy went past. This gave the men a lot of confidence in their training to be completely faded into the background 20 yds from the enemy, and whilst still in full view, not to be noticed. Unfortunately one of the men who was injured was becoming slightly delirious and talking aloud so I decided to leave the road and strike across country mostly in the general direction of Syracuse.

While crossing a ravine to miss an enemy post we got split into 2 parties. The other party got captured, but were rescued by troops of the Eighth Army. In the skirmish by best Corporal - Cpl Collett, was wounded, a G.S.W. in the head.

The bombing of Syracuse then started. The flares made everything as clear as daylight. I now realised that I was right off my route. 10 to 12 miles from the town and I could not join up with the rest of the Airborne Division.

Sapper Graydon with the broken collar bone never uttered a moan during all this rough passage, until he was sent back to hospital. He was cheerful and when asked how he felt, said he always felt fine though he fainted once with the pain.

As soon as the bombing had died down we pushed on again over some practically vertical country, near a railway viaduct, across a wide river bottom, and up the other side. Here we ran into a machine gun emplacement and were fired on from 10 yds range. I ordered the men not to shoot back; disengaging without a casualty, and making a slight detour and crossing the road further up. The object in not shooting back was firstly, that we should have given our position away and secondly, because it seemed at the time vitally necessary to get as many sappers to Syracuse as possible, and not to fight the enemy on the way. We made a small detour round the post which was quite exciting as all the way we were not 20 yds from the enemy and the ground was strewn with bamboo poles which went off like 15" guns when someone stepped on one.

We then met up with an American parachutist. This was quite an amusing moment although it had its nerve racking moments. I crossed the river, climbed up the far bank, through a hedge and found a bayonet point at my stomach. Then ensued an amazing conversation between the American Parachutist and myself, both trying to speak Italian without knowing a word of it, and telling each other not to shoot as we had vast reserves of men behind us.

We finally sorted things out and I found out that he had landed in the wrong place, got concussed on hitting the deck, and had just come round - found himself lying in enemy territory. He was full of the fire and zeal for killing Italians, however he was not much use when the bullets were flying around.

We continued across country until 0415 hrs when realising that it would be light in 1½ hrs, I began to look for a place to [lay?] up.

We came across a little one roomed house full of civilians, which we took over and formed a strongpoint, that is, dug slit trenches and had firing positions round the outside and prepared to defend it, all Hollywood to the last round. Soon I had to deal with forms of war never dealt with in the celluloid. The woman who had been cooped up all night, had to....... I knew if I let them out they might run and inform the nearest garrison. I solved this problem by taking one of the children, and indicating by signs that I would shoot the brat if they ran away.

This solution will be sent in due course to the War Office to be inserted in R.E. T.M.

The battle continued around us and except for a slight skirmish with a dozen "Wops" the battle continued.

About noon on D.1 day we heard a most welcome sound. Broad Yorkshire spoken by a man of the Eighth Army who was in the vanguard of the troops landing by sea. We packed up our stores and made our way to one of the Bde H.Qs. where we were given an Italian Pillbox to defend and spend the night in, in case the enemy counter attacked.

Our rear troubles now started because these Barracks were alive with fleas which attacked us and clung to us like long lost brothers for the remainder of the journey. Every night they would play football, fight and feast somewhere round the region of the middle portion and rest was only taken if we took off our shirts; turned them inside out, and took sleep before they could get in again.

Several times a day we would take offensive action down our clothes for these fleas were most adept and employed camouflage to lay there during the day. Eventually our party formed up except for Cpl. Collett, the Sjt Glider Pilot and Spr Graydon who had been sent to hospital and returned to Airborne H.Q. L/Cpl Lancaster, Spr Tipler and Spr Helsdon also had to go to hospital to be treated for minor injuries.

The Glider load consisted of Captain Wyss, 2/Lt. Badger and 27 O.Rs of the South Staffs besides myself.

We took off at 1930 hrs, and had a rough flight over the Mediterranean. We were flying at about 3000 ft, approximately 40 miles from the Sicilian coast when one engine of our tug caught afire. It was quickly "feathered" but having only three engines we began to lose height slowly. The tug pilot decided to tow us over into Sicily, and we jettisoned all our stores and heavy weapons. We were released about five or six miles inland and landed, I afterwards decided, in the area - square 0926, but this must be taken as very approximate. We actually landed at 2230 hrs. The glider struck a wall and broke in half, skidding over the ground until it hit some trees and stopped. Three men were injured in the crash - Capt. Wyss and 2 O.Rs. We made the injured as comfortable as possible and left them by the glider. We then marched North East as we had already decided that we had landed North West of our objective.

There was very little enemy activity apart from occasional sniping to hinder our progress, although the flares dropped from our aircraft over Syracuse made movement very difficult. At dawn we crossed a canal and immediately came under fire from high ground to our front. The platoon worked its way around the right flank whilst myself and 1 O.R., stalked and killed three snipers who were shooting at us from the rear. Unfortunately the Platoon Commander shot himself in the hand whilst carrying out this flanking movement, but throughout the day he led his platoon and refused to hand over his command to me, although he was in considerable pain. We assaulted the high ground, taking three prisoners, and killing several of the enemy. We suffered two casualties here - 1 O.R. - G.S.W. to the shoulder and 1 O.R. wounded by a grenade. A medical orderly stayed behind with the wounded in a farm in this area. Six other ranks of the Border Regiment joined us as we were about the leave the farm. We then advanced and moved over the main road about 200 yards South of Bilston before the enemy could bring fire to bear on the road. Throughout the day we worked our way towards "Waterloo" fighting various small actions like the first, including an action with two German Armoured Cars. Throughout all these encountered we suffered very few casualties. I believe our total casualties were about 2 killed and 6 wounded. We reached an orchard about 800 yards from the bridge "Waterloo", and decided to rest.

Capt. Foot of the South Staffs and 10 S/Section joined us here. After a rest of about an hour we decided to re-take it. As we were moving up to the bridge I met Capt. Holmes and a few Sappers from 9/S/Section who joined in the party. We had almost reached the bridge when a number of Bren Carriers of the 8th Army moved on to the bridge and captured it. The Brigade which was rapidly increasing in strength concentrated in the area of "Waterloo" and "Walsall". The Sections task (9 & 10 S/Sections) was to hold "Walsall" - a rather weak road block. That night there was no enemy counter attack as we had anticipated and apart from sniping the night was comparatively quiet. On Sunday morning we moved into Syracuse and spent a pleasant 3 days salvaging our equipment.

Adventures - This glider landed in a tomato plantation and the crew succeeded in unloading the combination, but were at once forced to abandon it as they came under fire. They then made E.W.N. along the road leading to Bilston which they by-passed in a Northwards direction and met Col. Walsh and his party. They all then continued northwards, were fired on from "Walsall" and again made a detour arriving at "Waterloo" at 0500 hrs, where Major Beazley at once stripped the charges from the bridge. They then joined in the defence of the bridge, in the course of which the O.C. was killed at about 1430 hrs. The remainder of the glider load were captured by the Italians and later released by the 8th Army. Major Beazley's grave reference 126293 274 (ii) Syracusa.

Remarks - This glider contained one m/c combination and one Holman Compressor, as well as:- Major Beazley R.E. Cpl. Oliver E.J. Spr Oakley. Dvr Stokes. The combination and the compressor were successfully returned to Africa. Cpl Oliver was wounded.

Adventures - This plane never left N. African shores, as a strainer hook broke during a bad bump, and as the Jeep then started moving, the first pilot decided he could not make the sea journey and put the glider down near SFAX. The Jeep was later retrieved intact.

Remarks - The two passengers in this glider of this Unit - Sgt Telford and Driver Cordell returned to the Unit.

Adventures - This glider landed about a 1000 yds S of the centre of the L.Z. It came under fire from two M.Gs straight away and consequently, attempts to unload the handcart were stopped, and the S/S moved North towards the concentration area. It again came under rather erratic fire, and it was decided to lie up and keep a watch for some of our own men. No one had appeared by dawn so we again went North for the coast, but struck an enemy patrol. I decided to dis-engage, but in doing so the rifle and Bren groups became separated. However, the two separate parties continued towards "Waterloo", lying up for some considerable periods due to enemy activity. One party with Lieut O'Callaghan and his men, and arrived at "Waterloo" at 1700 hrs. The other party came in by itself at 2000 hrs to "Walsall".

Adventures - This glider landed far to the east of the L.Z. only making the coast by 20 yds. It landed between two coastal pillboxes, about 300 yds apart. However, both these positions only fired a few shots at the glider and then ceased fire; so Cpl Lake unloaded his handcart but had not dragged it 50 yds, when he was again fired on, this time more heavily. He decided to leave the handcart and hid it beneath a wall. During the night they endeavoured to go west but were unable to find a clear way through. Consequently when dawn came they lay up until they saw some Commandos with whom they joined up. This party they joined up with some Borders and Brigadier Hicks. The latter ordered Cpl. Lake to destroy some enemy weapons in a cave, which he did. The whole party then moved West, spent the night near the main N - S road to Syracuse and finally marched to "Walsall" on Sunday morning where they rejoined the section.

Remarks - I saw the place where this glider landed and I consider Cpl. Lake did a pretty good job to get his handcart out of the glider at all. (Signed) J.N. Holmes, Captain R.E. 9 Field Coy R.E. (Airborne).

Approximate Landing area or D.Z. - 2-3 miles South West of CASSABILE. Sheet No. 274 (ii) SYRACUSA

Approximate Landing area or D.Z. - Seven miles off Sicily. Sheet 274 (ii) SYRACUSA

Adventures - The tow rope of this glider broke seven miles off the Sicilian coast. An attempt to inflate the first R.A.F. boat failed, but fortunately there were two more carried for W.S. purposes which blew up alright. In the meantime L/Sgt Franks and the missing must have been swept off the wing of the glider as they disappeared and were seen no more. The remaining nine were picked up by an L.C.I. some three hours later.

Remarks - Missing. L/Sgt Franks R., L/Cpl Wright H., Spr Von Rossen C., Spr Lloyd D., Spr Mullock C. Returned to unit. Spr Clarke K., Spr McClay C., Spr Ferrier J., Spr Williams C.R., Spr Parry W., Dvr Fairs G., Spr Beaver C.

Adventures - The tow rope of this Horsa broke and the glider came down in the sea. Everybody got out except L/Sgt Baird and Major Lane's C.S.M. who were sitting opposite each other astride a pannier. Major Lowe thinks they both got tangled up with the pannier lashings and he feels certain Sgt. Baird was drowned in the glider.

Statement of Glider No:128 by Major Lane S. Staffs - At about 2200 hrs on Friday, Jul 9, 1943 when approaching the coast of Sicily at about 4000 ft, the tow rope of the Horsa glider broke. Orders were immediately given for the glider to be prepared for ditching which was completed in a few minutes. When it became apparent that the glider would be unable to reach land, orders were given for equipment to be removed; soon after that the glider hit the water fairly heavily. I myself was thrown forward into the cockpit and eventually struggled out through the perspex. When I reached the wing of the glider most of the crew seemed to be standing there. After collecting ourselves together and giving artificial respiration to one man who was choked with water, a roll was called. It was found that two men, C.S.M. Woodhouse and Sgt Baird were not present. These two men were both sitting forward of the main bulkhead and it is thought that they were unable to reach the escape hatches in time, or that they were knocked out on landing. The exit was also obstructed by the Airborne Panniers, which completely filled the gangway between them. (Sgd) - Lane, Major.

Adventures - We took off at 1920 hrs, the glider carrying myself and one platoon of infantry of "A" Coy S. Staffs. We had a rough flight over the Mediterranean, landing at about 2230 hrs, two miles North of our landing zone. The glider broke up on landing but we had no casualties. We moved to "Putney" and cleared some buildings at the head of the bridge but could not take the pillboxes defending the bridge. From 0400 hrs onwards the enemy counter attacked us, using mortars and machine guns. We withdrew from around the building at about 1400 hrs and tried to make for the coast. Unfortunately we were attacked, but ran out of ammunition and had to surrender. We were rescued by the 8th Army about an hour later and joined the Brigade at "Waterloo".

Adventures - This Horsa made a very rough landing about 300 yds from "Waterloo", and in direct view of the pillbox on the bridge. The tail broke off and it is thought that the ammunition and explosive was hit by S.A.A. and went up as the bodies were thrown a considerable distance from the wreckage and badly burnt. Cpl Byers body was found and buried on the canal bank. M.R. Cpl. Byers grave - 124295.

Approximate Landing area or D.Z. - Unknown but within a mile of the correct D.Z. and probably to the S W of it. Sheet 274 (ii) SYRACUSA

Adventures - On landing neither Cpl Green or his G.P's had very much idea of where they were. However they struck North and when Syracuse was bombed, they realised they were going in the correct direction. After three hours, having met no one Cpl Green decided to lie up. At dawn they met Capt. Foot of the Staffords with half a dozen men, and the combined party again went north, but struck either Mosquito or Bilston; it was here Spr Morrall was killed. Capt. Foot then decided to march East; came to the Maddalena area and then went north along the coast road. Throughout the day, this party fought a series of small actions. On its way North up the coast it joined up with another of the Bn platoons, of which Lt O'Callaghan was a member and finally arrived at "Waterloo" at 1700 hrs; as the Eighth Army were capturing that bridge.

Remarks - Capt. Foot was full of praise for Cpl Green and his men, he said that no one did anything outstanding, but that they were very sound throughout the operation. They were unable to unload the handcart as the nose had dug into the ground. However they carried their made up charges until their first daylight scrap with the enemy, when they had to dump them. The only member of this Unit who did not returned was Sapper Morrall who is reported missing believed killed. (Sgd) J.N. Holmes, Capt R.E. 9 Field Coy R.E. (Airborne)

Adventures - Nothing is known of what happened to this glider. The tug pilot reports that he loosed them over the land and that the flak was fairly heavy. He saw the glider caught in a searchlight beam and he himself headed back for Africa.

Remarks - Last seen by rear gunner of tug and tug pilot in a searchlight beam headed for right landing zone. Note:- See attached for details of those missing.

Missing - 1866706 Sgt Bushell J., 2039773 Cpl Hughes J., 1877495 L/Cpl Laughlan E., 1875296 Spr Everton A., 4119241 Spr Herd J., 1886215 Spr Burdett A., 2146433 Spr Lewis E., 5123821 Spr Philpotts C., 2006850 Spr McCall J., 207[9?]986 Spr Atkinson W., 2007232 Spr Lloyd C., 2115239 Spr Nash H.S.

Dropped - Jumped at 2305 hrs. Height 200-250 ft. Speed: fast. One man killed on D.Z. (second from last) 2 men with leg injuries. One trolley smashed, one lost.

Action Taken on Landing - No recognisable land marks. Small arms fire and fired observed to the South. The fires appeared to be flare paths. I therefore decided that we had been dropped to the North of the river Simeto. We moved South for about twenty minutes but the absence of "Flak" in our immediate vicinity and its presence, together with the fires to the North caused me to decide that we had actually dropped a good distance South of Simeto. I therefore changed our course to North East, and crossed the F.S. Leonardo at Torro del Pantona M/R. 947608, and we then moved round to approx. four hundred yards North of Edificio Idronic, where we joined Major Coxon 1st Batt and Major Murdock 3rd Batt. It was decided to move West and lie up in the hills until daylight. Reached hills at about 0330 hrs., and remained there until 0600 hrs. We then moved in a North Westerly direction at the foot of the hills via Bortuccia (0900 hrs) and Massa Greso M/R 927636 (1000 - 1400 hrs) to farm M/R 946648. Here 40 Italians gave themselves up at about 1700 hrs. There had been continuous firing to the North all day and the area just North of Farm M/R 946648 was heavily shelled at 1800 hrs. Major Coxon went forward to try to locate units of the brigade but was unsuccessful. At about 1900 hrs small parties of the Bde began to return from the hills. They had been ordered to leave their positions at return to AUGUSTA. Several of these parties joined up with us, and at about 2100 hrs we returned to Massa Gresso M/R 927636. We spent the night here and moved South to LENTINI the following day. (signed) D.C. Murray, Major R.E., O.C., 1 Parachute Squadron R.E.

Remarks - The plane was badly holed by flak before dropping. Dropped from a height of 200 feet or less, at 2240 hrs, at speed of about 160 m.p.h. and whilst climbing. Two men were injured on landing. All the equipment dropped safely except one trolley which was lost. No opposition on D.Z. Moved to farm at M/R 948608, and definitely established our location. Moved N.W. along road to road junction at M/R 934632. No opposition at all up here. Moved up into the hills after leaving our equipment at road junction. We ran into slight opposition but managed to avoid an encounter. Reached main road at M/R 924645 at about 0230 hrs 14 Jul 43. Crossed road and reached side road at M/R 920647, where we ran into some German opposition of about 20 men. The section got split up in this encounter and I continued with 4 men. We reached the canal at M/R 608684 at about 0500 hrs. We proceeded East along canal until we ran into heavy German fire from a M.G. 42. We retired into an orange grove as daylight came, and lay there all day, very close to some strongly held positions. At night we again tried to get to the bridge, but ran into opposition and realised that the bridge was in enemy hands. We then followed the river valley Westward to about M/R 594655 and from there came through the hills to the South and contacted the Eighth Army at about 1100 hrs on 15 Jul 43. (signed) T.C. Brockington, Capt. R.E., 1st. Parachute Squadron R.E.

Remarks - We were dropped exactly in the right place. Flak over the D.Z. was fairly heavy - 88 mm - 20 mm and small arms fire - but there were no casualties to the parachutists, the plane flew over the coast at zero feet climbed rapidly to 500 ft over the D.Z. and immediately began dropping in shallow glide. Speed of aircraft was about 100 m.p.h. the Anchor Line was fitted with the long strap which made the manoeuvre perfectly safe to the parachutists. Time of drop approximately 11 p.m. to the nearest 5 minutes. 13th. Dropped 11 p.m. formed up and made way to R.V. 1145 hrs. Time was wasted in looking for five missing members of stick and for missing containers. Reported to B.M. at about 1150 hrs. 14th. Move of Brigade H.Q. to culvert in "Caterpillar" M/R 934673. 3 a.m. moved with Bde Def. Pl. to attack bridge. 4 p.m. arrived at bridge. Bridge was assaulted and taken by "R" Coy, 1st Battalion as we arrived. Immediately began removing charges. These consisted of long prepared cutting charges on steel members - 2 cuts at 1/3 first span and 1/4 at third span - and both piers with large mine charges. Abutments were not prepared. Each pier had three specially prepared chambers and each chamber held about 100 lbs of explosive in sacks. Demolition was to be initiated by electrical and instantaneous fuse. All leads were cut many times and removed from bridge. All explosive was removed and dumped in the river. Estimate time required to bung up and refix charges about 4 hours. Enemy aircraft "straffed" bridge, continuous shelling and mortar fire throughout day. German infantry began to close in, in the afternoon. German heavy mortars and 20 mm A.A./A.T. guns began to knock out pillboxes. Bridge evacuated at 8 p.m. Collected all Sappers still remaining on bridge and a few infantry and made for cover, lay up in bamboo thicket until dark. Night march S.W. to Farm M.R. 865643, lay up in thick bushed M.R. 867635. 15th. Lay up all day, moved off at 2130 hrs due South; after going about six miles turned S.W. and met British Troops at road and track junction M.R. 888572. (Sgd) P.T. Stainforth, Lieut R.E. 1st Parachute Squadron R.E.

Report on the Activities of R.E. 1 Airborne Division in North Africa and Sicily up to 15 July 1943

1. This report is divided into 4 parts. Part 1. From the time the units arrived in the MASCARA area till the move forward area in TUNISIA. Part 11. From the arrival in the forward area up to 9 July '43. Part 111. The battle in SICILY from 9 July to 15 July 1943. Part 1V. Lessons for the future.

2. The R.E. units of the division arrived in the MASCARA area in the following order:- H.Q.R.E., 9 Field Company R.E., 2 Parachute Squadron R.E., (less one troop). A fortnight later 1 Parachute Squadron R.E., and lastly, a month later than the first arrivals, 261 Field Park Company R.E.

3. The causes for this may well have been beyond the control of anybody. But the effect was that there was no field park workshop to make the innumerable camp structures required. The 2nd. Para Sqn being one troop shy, could not do all the R.E. works required by 2 Para Bde. Consequently 9 Fd Coy had to assist 2 Para Sqn as well as do the work of the Fd Pk Coy, with the result that the Airlanding Bde and other Div Tps, when they arrived, did not have the assistance of a complete field company. Their camp structures were meagre.

4. In a peace move, where tactical considerations do not count, the importance of getting the R.E. units complete and early to camp sites cannot be overestimated. It directly affects the amenities that can be provided for the other arms and mitigates the discomforts of camp life on unbuilt camp sites.

5. The first R.E. concern was the building of latrines, and water supply. The inefficiency of making latrines for a division without a workshop is obvious. The water supply was thought out by the U.S. Army Engineers. They based their plans on two assumptions. First, that all our units would have water carts and secondly, that every unit would have some means of storing water in camp. In fact, the number of water carts in the division is inadequate, and no unit has proper water storage facilities.

6. As a makeshift, the R.E. were able to hire a certain number of civilian horse carts and fit them with barrels for transport of water, and to issue to units assault and R.A.F. boats. These made quite good water tanks, though the consequent wear and tear is seldom justified.

7. It is recommended that for climates such as AFRICA every unit in the division should have one water cart and one Lister bag (an American water storage tank for 35 galls) per Squadron, battery or company. The 9 Fd Coy water cart was at one time supplying six units with water and doing 18 hours a day on the road.

8. As work services were completed, the R.E. units were able to turn their attention to training for the operations planned to take place in SICILY.

9. That the C.R.E. was in the picture from the earliest stages was a great help. R.E. exercises could be run to practice the R.E. tasks likely to arise. I feel convinced that had the operations gone as planned, the R.E. units would have done their part without a hitch.

10. Besides exercises with inf bdes, each R.E. unit did two R.E. exercise, one unit acting as umpire for the others. This is the way to run R.E. exercises. The umpires learn a lot, and when properly briefed they can ensure that every sub-unit of the company being exercised is continually kept busy and interested. It promotes keen rivalry which, if properly handled, does not become acrimonious.

11. An interesting interlude was provided by marking out for 2 Para Bde as exact a replica as possible of the site on which they would have to operate in SICILY. In contradiction from the practice in ENGLAND for parachute raids, 2 Para Bde organised this in a most effective way. The brigade chose a site they liked. This is far more satisfactory than leaving the choice to others. Choosing a site is like buying a hat. No one but the wearer knows just what he fancies. Having chosen a site, the brigade made a trace of the ground in SICILY on the same scale as the map of the practice site, showing what they wanted represented:- a bridge, a railway, roads, telegraph poles and gun sites. The brigade deputy commander and the C.R.E agreed how best to represent these things on the ground. Between them they collected the materials, and infantry working parties under R.E. supervision laid them out. Roads were represented by cairns of white-washed stones, a timber trestle bridge was built, and gun pits dug. The brigade expressed themselves pleased with the result, and it was certainly good practice and training for the R.E.

a. Para Sqns have too many officers, not enough transport, too few tradesmen's tools, and not enough administrative non-jumping personnel.

13. When the division moved to the forward area, the Para Sqns and the Fd Coy had been well trained in their projected operational roles. But a vast quantity of special equipment was wanted at short notice by brigades. This had to be made by the Fd Pk Coy and the Fd Coy. The provision of these things is inevitable, and for this purpose the Fd Pk exists. Some of the items will recur again e.g. extra seats for every WACO glider. Some were Heath Robinson devices that units thought they wanted, though when confronted with reality they could not carry them e.g. 35 heavy grapnels for one Bn, which were solemnly taken to SICILY and left in the gliders, or dumped because they were too heavy to carry. I consider this sort of thing inevitable till units have found from actual battle experience what is practical and what is not. It is irritating, but not fatal, and it will improve.

14. During this period an Army Fd Coy was provided for camp structures, and so the div R.E. was relieved of all responsibility for which it was most thankful.

15. The part that it was hoped that the R.E. would play is best described by quoting verbatim the R.E. instruction issued by me before the operation.

Skeleton H.Q.R.E. will travel by glider under command 1 Airlanding Bde Gp. As soon as the Bde Gp is relieved by 5 Div, C.R.E. Airborne Div will meet C.R.E. 5 Div and move forward with him or with his forward field company. His job is to get in touch by 68 set with 2 Para Sqn at GLUTTON and later with 1 Para Sqn at FUSTIAN as soon as they are in range. Para Sqns will then pass engineer intelligence direct by 68 set to C.R.E. Airborne Div who will interpret it for C.R.E. 5 Div.

The above units will work under command of their respective bdes. Each bde operation includes:-

(d) Capture of a town as a second objective (except for FUSTIAN where bridge is the only task.)

To assist in these operations R.E. units must carry the following equipment. The quantities depend on the A/C allotment.

2. Entrenching tools or picks and shovels to remove the demolition charges from the bridges.

3. Mine detectors to remove mines which may be found if the bridges are demolished.

5. Compressor or Warsop drill to help infantry dig in in hard ground. The mechanical spade is the most important item.

(a) Each R.E. unit has the latest information on the bridges. It must be assumed that all three bridges are prepared for demolition.

(a) On bde high power set. The Airborne Div R.E. questionnaire will NOT be used.

(b) On 68 set direct to C.R.E., Airborne Div. The questionnaire will be used and supplemented if necessary.

(d) On the Naval Bombardment Officer's set if signal time is available, which is only likely in the dark when artillery targets are not probable.

9 Fd Coy R.E. will take one airborne water point. This may be taken by C.R.E. after the Airlanding Bde is relieved.

(c) H.Q.R.E. will send out a 3 minute tuning call at every oclock hour at and after midnight on the night that each para sqn drops. As soon as communication is established all 68 sets will listen for the first quarter of each hour.

The O.C. of each unit will go with his unit and nominate his replacement in case he becomes a casualty. C.R.E.'s appointment may be filled in order - Major Beazley, Major Murray or Major Vernon, whichever drops first. This is an operational expedient and permanent appointments will be made by H.Q., Airborne Div.

17. The results were somewhat different. In the Airlanding Bde operation the bridge at SYRACUSE, only 4 R.E. arrived on the objective. O.C. 9 Field Company, his batman, one N.C.O. from H.Q.R.E., and one sapper. An infantry platoon had removed the detonators from the charge on the bridge. The R.E. completed the job by removing the charges themselves. This was done in daylight and Major Beazley was wounded in the process. He was later killed. There is no doubt that the combined efforts of the infantry and R.E. did prevent a demolition that might well have delayed the Eighth Army.

18. Also, Major Beazley's batman was able to report to me that the bridge was capable of taking Sherman tanks - a piece of information that was greatly appreciated by the commander of the leading brigade of 5 Div in planning his attack on SYRACUSE.

19. The airborne operation against AUGUSTA was cancelled. I looked later at the bridge that was to have been captured, and saw that it had never been prepared for demolition. The riverline of MOLINELLO would however have been a good defensive position had the Italians had the will to defend it.

20. In the operation by 1 Para Bde against the bridge over the river SIMETO, one section of 1 Para Sqn arrived, under Lt. Stainforth R.E. They removed the cutting charges off the bridge and the mined charges from the abutments. When the Germans counter attacked and took the bridge they tried to demolish it with a surface charge (probably of tellermines) but failed to do more than damage it. The damage was only superficial and did not prevent the bridge from taking Sherman tanks. So it may well be said that the object of the operation was achieved.

21. Again, the early report by Lt. Stainforth R.E. as to the strength of the bridge was of value to the engineers of the 50th Div.

22. No account of this operation would be complete without mention of the fact that small bodies of airborne soldiers of all arms landed over a wide area behind the enemy, and by their offensive tactics did much to disrupt the defensive arrangements of the enemy.

23. An item of R.E. interest is the state of SYRACUSE after capture. The town had been bombed and there were craters in the roads and in the railway station which hampered traffic. There were road blocks of concrete at the entrances which also hampered traffic. One of these had a small minefield round it. On the quay, a 7" main broken by the enemy was discharging petrol into the sea. Thus there was plenty of R.E. work required, but the only sappers available were the R.E. of 5 Div. (The 9 Fd Coy was under command of 1 Airlanding Bde and the Commander would not release them.) These companies were tired from a long march on foot and were primarily interested in the problems for further advance. The beach at this stage was choc-a-block and the road to SYRACUSE so bad that it was impossible to get more R.E. quickly to the town. Is this not perhaps a circumstance in which 261 Fd Pk Coy might have been flown to the scene by daylight and landed by glider? The same, I suggest, applies to other div tps of the Airborne Division.

24. The whole operation provided for airborne supply under A/Q of the division. This included the supply of 80' D.S. Bailey bridge which was ready for loading into WACO gliders. But there was no need for this as things turned out.

25. The Germans also dropped parachutists, and from one of them was captured an elaborate field sketching board and a new booby trap device. The booby trap device has been sent to [A.P.H.Q.?] for investigation. The purpose of the sketching board was apparently to record with great accuracy positions of H.Q.s, batteries and objects of interest to report to his own side when he returned.

26. During the operations, I.O.R.E. flew with 114 Sqn R.A.F., dropping dummy parachutists over SICILY, and a report is attached as an appendix. Some personal accounts of individual adventures are also attached.

27. The lessons for the future are partly in getting the force to the proper place and partly the tasks of the R.E. when they get there. The latter only is dealt with here. The question of the organisation of the div R.E. is also commented upon.

28. R.E. units must be able to prevent demolitions. This presupposes a sound knowledge of demolition methods and therefore training in demolition.

29. All R.E. personnel must be able to estimate the strength of bridges. If the bridges are blown up or damaged they must be able to produce a recce report that will facilitate bridging by the ground forces. To get this knowledge, bridging training is essential, though actual bridging may never be done in war.

30. All R.E. personnel must be fit and able to fight, and determined to create as much havoc as possible if dropped in the wrong place.

31. In spite of training, the Para Sqns lost of lot of equipment on the D.Z. and were unable to use their trolleys. Every effort must be made to dispense with containers and trolleys. The solution may be twofold.

(a) A proportion of sappers must drop with their equipment in kitbags attached to the leg in the same way as men of the Independent Coy. Under their parachute packs should be a folded Everest Carrier. On landing, the kitbag can be carried in the Everest Carrier. This has been successfully tried by 4 Para Sqn.

(b) At least one jeep must be brought by glider to carry heavy stores e.g. Warsop Drill, if not the Fd Coy compressor.

32. A special wireless link between R.E. units and C.R.E. was arranged by 68 set. Had the operations gone as planned, I feel sure this would have been of great value and should be perpetuated. Two 68 sets per unit and two with H.Q.R.E. are the scale. (It is for consideration whether these sets should be manned at both ends by personnel of H.Q.R.E.)

33. C.R.E. should move - not by air as in this operation - with the ground forces. By means of the 68 set he can keep in touch with R.E. units in the battle and when relieved he can organise any engineer work ordered.

34. This is a disappointing role, and compares most unfavourably with that of a C.R.E. of any other division. The latter may go and see the sappers in the most forward area, and by his presence in the battle encourage them - a most important function of leadership.

35. Until a generation of R.E. officers has grown up that has taken part in glider borne and parachute operations, it is for consideration whether the C.R.E. of an Airborne Division should be a young man. If a C.R.E. cannot share any of the dangers with his sappers, perhaps it would be better to have a C.R.E. who had graduated in the last war; particularly if he had some visible sign of having actually fought - a V.C., or a wooden leg.

36. I took part in this battle going by glider with the first attack, though it is hard to justify such an action by logic, and I doubt if I shall be allowed to do so again.

111. (a) The Parachute Squadrons need only 12 officers and 2 1st reinforcements, one of whom should live with the Fd Pk Coy for liaison purposes.

(b) The unit must have more transport. With the present scale training is difficult, works services impossible (though necessary in AFRICA), and maintenance poor. The following is the requirement:-

Any R.E. officer with field coy experience can justify this when he compares it with the vehicles of a field company.

(c) The unit must have more administrative non-jumping personnel. It cannot be efficiently administered with less than 21 men. These will never be required on operations. It is a waste of trained parachutists to employ them on these duties. The actual strength of jumpers is well suited to operation.

(d) Each troop should have the same tradesmen's tools as a platoon of a field coy. This is not for operations but for works services in camp. Works services are not only inevitable in AFRICA, but give the sappers a chance to work at their trades.

39. In conclusion, I must refer again to the possibility of bringing sappers to forward areas by gliders. Whenever a port is captured there is an immense amount of R.E. work to do, and the only troops available are the R.E. of the leading division who have many other duties. When roads are bad, and until the port is in working order, it is for consideration whether gliderborne R.E. units could not usefully be employed. They require no beaches, no road space, and no port.