1st Parachute Brigade Signals

Abbreviations

932658

Adj

ADS

ALO

Amb

Armd

Bde

CCS

CMP

CRA

CRE

DLI

Div

DR
DZ

EME

FOO

FUP

i/c

Offr

PT
RA

RAMC

Ref
REME

Sigs

Stn

TLC

W/ch eng

W/fuel

Map Reference

Anti-Aircraft

Adjutant

Advanced Dressing Station

Air Liaison Officer
Ambulance

Armoured

Brigade

Brigade Major

Battalion

Casualty Clearing Station

Corps of Military Police

Commander Royal Artillery

Commander Royal Engineers

Durham Light Infantry

Division / Divisional

Despatch Rider

Drop Zone
Electrical and Mechanical Engineer

Field

Forward Observation Officer

Forming Up Place

Intelligence

In-Command

Middle East

Medical Officer

Officer Commanding

Officer

Observation Post / Operator (if lower case)

Physical Training

Royal Artillery

Royal Army Medical Corps

Royal Engineers

Reference

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Rendezvous

Signals

Station

Tank Landing Craft

Wireless Telegraphy

With Charging Engine

With fuel

2200 - Set up Section Office, but no stationery had arrived. Signal officer & rough line system already installed, only a line to 1st Bn, Lines to switch boards functioning badly due to lack of new cable, & want of replacement switchboard. This will improve.

2210 - Still very disorganised. No stationery. No stores except the base sets which we brought by air with us.

2200 - Arranged with O.C. Div Signals for Capt. Titmuss & 2 R.E.M.E. Z trailers to visit us tomorrow & to stay with us until all our own sets, & the Battalion R.E. Sets are done. Train Party from [Tiyi?] (nr. Matmore) arrived.

2200 - R.E.M.E. working very hard on our 22 sets, which are all off net & they are not getting on very fast. Stores unloaded from train by Section working parties.

2200 - Section wireless crews sorting out all our 22 Sets (18 of them) & finding out whether any of them are O.K. It is now known that only 3 are serviceable. We are preparing under great difficulties for Exercise PREFACE, previous a Brigade Signal Exercise to practice staff officers in the use of Codex, M.E. Map Reference Code, and Signals in cipher, also in the special vocabulary of code words for the coming operation.

2200 - R.E.M.E. now making good progress with the new issue of 22 Sets, checking them over. I feel far more confident now that Titmuss has condemned the old ones. After all they have been in solid use for 7 months, & all through the Tunisian Campaign. Party in officers mess for stick commanders, air crews & officers, who are taking part in the coming operation, "Husky/Fustian". Very successful.

2200 - Concentration preparation for operation FUSTIAN. Stores prepared. Containers collected. General Montgomery visited the Brigade. It was a most inspiring visit. The troops reacted wonderfully to it, & were mad with excitement crowding around his car. He is a good showman, and talks to them well. They absolutely love him. Section Rear Party arrived by road, having fishing up about 25 miles of cable at Matmore. Exercise PREFACE. Communications were satisfactory as far as state of old 22 Sets would allow.

2200 - D day for operation FUSTIAN disclosed; this is night of 10/11 August. It is too late to have disclosed it. I should have been informed earlier. There is too much work to be done to be properly prepared in time. Operation GLUTTON began. 1st Air Landing Brigade. This led the invasion of Sicily. No news yet.

2200 - We finished packing containers. Several small details of container repairs had to be attended to by R.E.M.E. at the last minute. However, they were coped with. I gave a short briefing to Wireless Crews on detachments to Battalions. They had already had a detailed briefing by the Battalions with which they were functioning. After that they left to join their respective Battalions for the duration of the operation. News of GLUTTON was that half of Air Landing Brigade had been dropped in the sea off the coast of Sicily. The remainder were putting up a fine show. Operation LADBROKE postponed 24 hours - 2nd Para Bde operation.

2200 - Still working desperately hard to get ready. Codex, M.E. Map Reference Code, Cipher are all prepared now. L/Cpl Potter D.R. came & told me that owing to trouble at home he felt he could not go on the operation, & felt he could not jump again. I told him I was not disposed to look into the matter at all, but that he must be relieved of his strip at once either as a result of disciplinary action, or at his own request. He chose the latter, & I immediately promoted Sigmn. Muircroft to Lance Corporal. 2nd Para Bde Operation "Ladbroke" now cancelled. I sympathise with them. This has happened too many times to them.

2200 - Everybody up to scratch. Bde H.Q. wireless crews were briefed by myself. It took a solid 3 hours. And more time is needed later but we will not get it. The operation FUSTIAN - 1st Para Bde operation is postponed 24 hours. Returned to camp from the airfields & rested.

2200 - For my account of operation HUSKY/FUSTIAN, see Appendix 0409. For reports of individual N.C.O's i/c wireless crews see appendices 0412 & 0416 to 0425.

2200 - Whole section rested by mutual consent, without a word! Sigmn. Baxter & Southward returned on 21 July. For Baxter's account see 0423.

2200 - Section getting back to normal again. Lt Golden returned. For his account see Appendix 0413.

2200 - Normal routine. All new members of the section who are not parachutists, nominated for a jumping course.

2200 - Conference on the Operation. Reports checked. Return of missing men rendered. Sigmn. Fitzgerald posted from Section. Sgt. Tennant posted to Divisional Signals, as he will not jump. Sigmn. Brown & Bryant court-martialled for refusing to jump on one of the Cactus Exercises last June. Sigmn. Allen, A.T.W. left as duty D.R. for Tunis Rest Camp. Kit inspection for Section.

2200 - Section rested. Normal duties only. Conference at Div. Sigs. on War Establishments. L/Sgt. Pugh & 4 men left for 4 days at Airborne Rest Camp at Tunis.

2200 - I was admitted to hospital with malaria, going first to C.C.S., & then to 71st General.

2200 - Lt. Gordon admitted to hospital with malaria. Lt. [Marqrand?] took over the Section.

Much of this account is from my own personal experience, some of it is taken from 1st Parachute Brigade Operation Order No.14. Much also is taken by reports by individual N.C.O's and men of the Section, both those attached to Battalions, and those at Brigade H.Q. Finally much has been learnt as a result of various conferences held after the operation.

1. The first intimation given to us that there was to be a parachute operation was at the end of April, 1943. We were told that it would be "a parachute operation on a large scale carried out by night, in moonlight, in the Mediterranean area." This was while we were at Boufarik. After we moved to Matmore, all the energies of the Section were concentrated into overhauling our Signal Equipment, which was still the same that we had been using for the previous six months in the Tunisian campaign. We had been promised a complete new issue of 22 or 68 sets, so we started on the 65 sets, and finished them. Then we started on the 22 sets, which were in a very bad state. The Airborne Division had by this time arrived in Mascara, and with the help of O.C. Divisional Signals, 2 R.E.M.E. Z Trailers were laid on for the Brigade to work, first on the Battalion Signal Equipment and then on the Brigade Signal Equipment until it was all finished. In addition to this, much time was spent in Morse Tasks, Night Marches, P.T., organised games, lectures, etc. A series of four parachute exercises was performed, "Cactus", I, II, III & IV, the first three of which were designed to resemble the operation as it would be for 3rd, 2nd, & 1st Parachute Battalions & Brigade Headquarters respectively. "Cactus IV" was a combination of the first three, and the entire Brigade dropped. On all four exercises, the uncertainty of being dropped on the correct D.Z., and with the containers, was very apparent. From the Signal point of view, reasonable satisfaction was given, as far as the doubtful condition of the old 22 sets, and the mistakes by the pilots in dropping would allow. Incidentally, the uncertainty was as great with the R.A.F. pilots & their Albemarles as it was with the American pilots & their Douglas C47 & C53 aircraft.

2. From Matmore we moved to Sousse Area about a fortnight before the operation, and one more exercise, PREFACE, was carried out. This was purely a ground exercise designed to practice Signals, Codes, Cipher, a general application of communications. This was satisfactory.

3. The two R.E.M.E. Z trailers came again to Brigade to finish our 22 sets, which they had not had time to do at Matmore. About a week before the operation, having worked long and hard, the E.M.E. wireless of Division decided he could not make them reliable for parachuting, and condemned them all. We were issued then with 15 new 22 sets for which I was truly thankful, & these were checked over and made ready by R.E.M.E.

4. During this last fortnight, work was intense, & a lot of time was spent on Syllabic Cipher, Codex, Middle East Map Reference Code, and Wireless Verification Tables. The first three of these had of course to be distributed to Battalions.

5. The Operation was destined to begin on the night of D2, i.e. Monday, 12 July, 1943, and it was thought that the Brigade would be relieved within 24 hours, i.e. by nightfall on Tuesday, 13 July.

6. All was ready by the appointed times during Monday, 12 July, & transport was ready in unit lines to take units to their respective airfields, allowing about 3½ to 4 hours after arrival at the airfields for containers to be loaded on to aircraft, meals to be served, parachutes to be fitted, emplaning, and taking off.

7. Brigade Headquarters transport left our lines at 1545 hours, arriving at Strip F at about 1630 hours. No sooner had we arrived at the airfield than the A.L.O., Lt Garnet, gave us information from 51 Wing that the Operation was postponed for 24 hours, and that we were to go back. The convoy, therefore, turned round & returned to Brigade Headquarters. Containers were left on the lorries for the night, and parachutes were collected & put under cover. There was nothing to do but wait for 24 hours & rest.

8. On the morning of Tuesday, 13 July, the Brigade Commander invited all our 38 Wing Albemarle pilots and observers for Brigade Headquarters to an unofficial briefing, from the military point of view. They came, & it did a lot of good. I personally showed my pilot and observer exactly what I had got to do after dropping, and how I wanted them to drop me; but I omitted to stress to them the importance of their sticking to the correct line of flight for the run in over the D.Z. They had not fully appreciated our point of view before, but cottoned on well when I told them. My pilot was Flight Lieutenant Jamieson. The Brigade Commander also made repeated efforts to get the American pilots of the Douglas aircraft for the Units for a similar unofficial briefing from the military point of view, but 51 Wing stuck out obstinately against it, maintaining first that it was quite unnecessary, & finally that they had too many other things to do. The Brigade Commander was not very pleased about it, & their latter excuse was obviously quite invalid, as the operation had been postponed for 24 hours, and all that time was spare for them, as well as for us.

9. On Tuesday, then, the previous days procedure was repeated, and on arrival at the airfields, the A.L.O's. passed the code word "MARSTON TONIGHT", which had been radioed from Sicily, and which meant that the operation was on. We were full of hope, & morale & spirits were high. Our equipment was the finest, the men were magnificently trained & eager for action - this splendid Brigade.

1. The 8th Army, after its initial landing in Sicily was advancing up the coast road which runs from Syracuse north through Lentini, Catania and on. They had reached a line running East & West 10 to 20 miles south of the river Simeto, the largest river in Sicily. Over this river is a bridge, the Ponti di Primosole, about 75 yards long, which carries the main coast road leading to Catania, and this bridge is a vital key point both to ourselves or to the enemy, which ever holds it. Catania lies 8 miles to the north. The enemy advance posts or front line were in the hills to the south of the bridge, and in contact with the 8th Army. From the foot of these hills to the north as far as Catania the ground is flat, though not without cover, (Catania Plain).

2. The object of the 1st Parachute Brigade was to capture intact the bridge over the river Simeto at 942675 *, in order to assist the advance of 13 Corps with which it has to be prepared to cooperate.

* Note:- Reference Map is Naval Collation Map - Catania - Sheet [4 squares ? 1 km squares?] Scale 1:25,000 - i.e. 2½ = 1 mile approx.

3. The method to be employed was as follows. 1st Parachute Battalion was to be dropped astride the river and capture the bridge intact, 3rd and 2nd Parachute Battalions were to be dropped North and South of the river, and establish bridgeheads North and South respectively.

4. The tasks of units of the Brigade were as follows. 1st Parachute Battalion, with under command C Troop, 1st Parachute Squadron, R.E. were to drop on D.Z's. 1 & 2 between 2220 and 2305 hours. The bridge was to be captured intact, & if possible by surprise, & for this purpose an assault force of 2 platoons and a detachment of R.E's. was to be dropped 20 minutes in advance of the main body. After capturing the bridge they were to be responsible for its close defence until the North & South bridgeheads should be firmly established. On the South side, their area of responsibility would extend to include the dyke running East & West & crossing the main road at 936668. If the bridge were not captured intact, every effort would be made to repair it, and reconnaissances of alternative crossings over the river to the west would be made. When the North & South bridgeheads should be firmly established, 1st Parachute Battalion should come into reserve in the area of the bridge, less those troops responsible for close defence on the South side.

5. The 3rd Parachute Battalion, with under command one Section of 16th Para. Fd. Ambulance would drop on D.Z. 4 between 2225 & 2330 to be the North Bridgehead Battalion. B Troop, 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery was to land on Landing Area 7 at 0100 hours Wednesday, 14 July, & come under command of 3rd Parachute Battalion. Their tasks would be to neutralise a 4-gun A.A. position at 923706 to prevent it interfering with the main body. For this task 2 platoons would be dropped 30 minutes in advance of the main body; rest to establish a bridgehead on general line from about F in F Simeto 9468 to the bend in the river at about Mass Bicocca, 9269, lastly to destroy or to neutralise any enemy position that can bring fire to bear on the Bridge.

6. 2nd Parachute Battalion was to drop on D.Z. 3 between Z+15 & Z+50, i.e. between 2235 & 2310 hours, & A Troop, 1 Airlanding Anti Tank Battery would land on Landing Area 8 at 0100 hours 14 July, and come under command of 2nd Parachute Battalion. The tasks were first to establish a bridgehead on the high ground south of the bridge by the capture & occupation of High ground about ring contours 933656, and High ground about 945658. Second, to block the two main roads, converging on the bridge from the South & East in the area of those positions. The Battalion area of responsibility would be South of & exclusive the dyke running East & West which crosses the main road at 936668. Third, the destruction & neutralisation of any enemy positions that could bring fire to bear on the bridge; in addition to the above this would entail the capture of the enemy position at Point 72, 924652. It would be decided by the Battalion whether to hold that position, after a daylight reconnaissance. Fourth, to be prepared to act vigorously southwards to assist the advance of 13 Corps if the situation is favourable.

7. In reserve with Brigade Headquarters was B Troop, 1st Parachute Squadron, R.E.

8. The C.R.A., 1st Airborne Division, Lt.Col. Crawford, would detail an F.O.O. Party, to consist of 2 officers, 2 22 sets with operators, and a 5 cwt car, (Fiat), to fly with 1st Air Landing Anti Tank Battery, as to control the fire of 5th or 50th Divisional Artillery, as they should approach 1st Parachute Brigade Area from an O.P. in the high ground occupied by 2nd Parachute Battalion.

9. Anti-Tank reconnaissance parties would be dropped by parachute with Brigade Headquarters, 2nd and 3rd Parachute Battalions. Headquarters of 1st Air Landing Anti-Tank Battery, (Major Arnold), would drop with Brigade Headquarters.

10. Naval Artillery Support could be called for, with permission from Brigade Headquarters, & under the general control of the C.R.A., by wireless through two Naval F.O.O. Parties, at Brigade Headquarters, and at 2nd Parachute Battalion.

11. The priority of tasks of the 1st Parachute Squadron R.E. was first the repair of the Bridge if it were not captured intact, & the reconnoitring of alternative crossings further west of the bridge; second, the reconnoitring & improvement of routes to alternative crossings; third, to reconnoitre & make crossings over enemy minefields in the Brigade area; fourth to thicken up and plot Anti-Tank mines, on road blocks and covering infantry localities; fifth to assist 2nd & 3rd Parachute Battalions to improve their defences.

12. A detachment of 6 men of the Independent Parachute Company would drop with 1st Parachute Battalion. Their tasks were first to operate Rebecca, dropped with them, to guide the Albemarles to the D.Z. Second to mark Landing Areas 7 & 8 by lights to guide in the gliders. After carrying out these tasks they were to report to Brigade Headquarters. They could later be used if necessary for marking & lighting of Supply Dropping Points and Supply Landing Points.

13. On landing, the Glider Pilots were to remain under command of the 1st Air Landing Anti-Tank Battery. When their guns should be in position they would be made available to assist the Battalions in laying Anti-Tank mines.

14. The object of the Brigade Signal Section was to provide the network of communications shown in the Signal Instruction on Sheets 9 & 10. In addition to the equipment shown on the diagram, which includes that of Anti-Tank Recce Parties, Naval F.O.O. Parties, C.R.E.'s Report Set, C.R.A.'s F.O.O. Party, we took two folding motor cycles with D.R's. to ride them, and twelve carrier pigeons in two cartons of six. It was thought to be the ideal signal layout, and incapable of failure. Every member of the Section knew his instructions perfectly, & was fully capable of carrying out his own task. Every member was vitally keen to prove the justification of a remark made not very long ago to me by a Senior Officer of the Brigade that "The Signal Section is one of the finest fighting weapons we've got." Everything appeared to be in our favour, & infinite pains had been taken to make the minutest preparation.

15. We, that is to say I, my 2nd in Command & my Section, suffered a great disadvantage. In the first place I myself was not told until 3 days before the operation what day D day was to be. In the second place, briefing of officers by the B.M. was inadequate, and too late before the operation to allow it to sink in & be properly absorbed in detail, especially as there were endless other details in connexion with communications, which were keeping me busy, as well as being prepared to brief my own Section which had to be done in three subsections owing to the size of it. This of course meant 3 separate briefings, each of which to do properly meant 3 hours solid work in the Intelligence Hut. It really had the effect of not letting them fully into the tactics of the operation, so necessary to them should they be unable to function in their proper role as Signals.

1. The allotment of Troop (Parachute) Carrying Aircraft, Tugs & gliders, by types & serial numbers; the airfields from which they were to take off, the D.Z's. where the parachutists were to drop, & the Landing Areas where the gliders were to land; & the times of dropping & landing, are given on the table on Sheet 12.

2. It will be seen that 11 Albemarles, (each taking a stick of 10), were allotted to Brigade H.Q., Defence Platoon & Brigade Signals inclusive.

1. The total strength of the Section immediately prior to the operation was 2 Officers and 93 Other Ranks.

2. An attached Naval F.O.O. party consisting of 3 officers, 1 O.R., & 3 Naval ratings with 4 66 Sets.

3. H.Q. 1 Air Landing Anti-Tank Battery, and Recce Parties with 2nd & 3rd Parachute Battalions totalled 3 Officers & 6 Other Ranks. They had a total of 6 18 Sets.

4. The C.R.A., with 7 Other Ranks and 2 22 Sets and 2 18 Sets, glider borne, was to direct the fire of the Anti Tank Battery, & to communicate with & control the fire of 5th or 50th Divisional Artillery.

5. Thus the total effective strength of the Signal Section including all the above was

Brigade Signals

Naval F.O.O. Party

C.R.A. Party

Anti-Tank

TOTAL

Officers

O.R's.

110

6. Of the above total, 27 O.R's. of Brigade Signals only were left at Base, so that the total who took part in the Operation were 9 Officers and 83 O.R's.

7. The total taking part in the operation were subdivided as follows. Signal Equipment is included:-

a. At Brigade Headquarters:-

Brigade Signals 2 & 35	4 22 Sets, 2 65 Sets, 6 trolleys, 2 baskets w/ch. eng, 2 baskets w/fuel, 1 68 Set, 1 Reception Set R109.
Naval F.O.O. Detachment 1 & 2	2 66 Sets.
H.Q. 1 A.L. Anti-Tk Bty 1 & 2	2 18 Sets.
C.R.A. 1 & 7	2 22 Sets, 2 18 Sets .
Total 5 & 46.

b. 1st Parachute Battalion.

Brigade Signals 0 & 10	2 22 Sets, 1 68 Set, 2 trolleys, 2 baskets w/fuel, 2 baskets w/ch. eng
Total 0 & 10.

c. 2nd Parachute Battalion

Brigade Signals 0 & 11	2 22 Sets, 2 trolleys, 2 baskets w/ch. eng, 2 baskets w/fuel.
Naval F.O.O. 2 & 2	2 66 Sets.
A. Tk. Recce 1 & 2	2 18 sets.
Total 3 & 15.

d. 3rd Parachute Battalion

Brigade Signals 0 & 10	2 22 Sets, 2 trolleys, 2 baskets w/ch. eng, 2 baskets w/fuel.
A.Tk. Recce 1 & 2	2 18 sets.
Total 1 & 12.

8. The distribution of the above officers & personnel & equipment by aircraft is shown below - (an account of equipment losses is also given).

The first four planes allotted to Brigade H.Q., i.e. 105-107 & 107A, contained the Defence Platoon; but Lt. Golden, 2nd in Command of Brigade Signal Section, jumped No.1 in aircraft No.106. His initial role was a special one. He was equipped with a green torch, & his job was to go straight from the D.Z. to the Rendezvous & flash, continuously, long dashes to guide all sticks to the R.V.

A.C. No.106	No.1 Lt. Golden	with Green torch.
A.C. No.108	No.7 L/Cpl Algie	Command 22 Set. Dropped at night time 4500 yds S.W. of D.Z. No equipment from this plane was found. No.10 never even saw container drop.
	No.8 Sigmn. Corry X	"
	No.9 Sigmn. Stephen J.I.	"
	No.10 L/Cpl Dunning	A Trade.
A.C. No.109	No.3 Capt. Rowland	O.C. Bde Signals. Dropped at night time on right D.Z.
	No.4 Sigmn. Causfield	Reception Set R109.
	No.6 Sigmn. Stevens C.E.	"
	No.5 Cpl. Allison +	Signal Office
	No.7 L/Cpl Muircroft	Despatch Rider. 1 Folding Motorcycle. Not found.
	No.8 Sigmn. Paterson	Spare 22 Set. Both this and R109 were found after a long search in 6-8 ft of water. R109 unrecoverable. 22 Set recovered but unserviceable. Hidden at RV., accessories recovered next day.
	No.9 Sigmn. Wray	"
	No.10 L/Cpl Morrison	"
A.C. No.110	No.3 Capt. Boplland X	66 Set. Found & set up. Later ambushed captured. Dropped 8000 yds South of D.Z. X = missing.
	No.4 Tel. Skinner X	"
	No.5 L/Cpl Taylor +	Relieving Inf Bde 22 Set. Found but had to be abandoned owing to crew being ambushed. 2 of crew are missing.
	No.6 Sigmn. Evans	"
	No.7 Sigmn. Clark R. X	"
	No.8 Cpl. Maybury	Cipher
	No.9 A.Tk. N.C.O.	18 Set. No details known.
A.C. No.111	No.4 Sgt. Proctor	Section Sgt. Pilot refused to drop personnel of this aircraft, & turned round & made for home. The aircraft was hit & all the containers, baskets & equipt were jettisoned in the Sea. Aircraft & personnel returned safely.
	No.5 L/Cpl. Wilder	Base 65 Set.
	No.6 Sigmn. Hayes	"
	No.7 Sigmn. Muldoon	"
	No.8 L/Cpl. McGregor	Cipher.
	No.9 Sigmn. Greansill	Despatch Rider. 1 Folding Motor Cycle.
A.C. No.112	No.3 Cpl. Boyd	68 Set. This aircraft dropped about 4000 yds South of D.Z. No equipment from it was ever found.
	No.4 Sigmn. MacLean X	"
	No.5 L/Cpl. Way + X	Airborne Div Link 22 Set. Not found.
	No.6 Sigmn. MacKay	"
	No.7 Sigmn. Knight	"
	No.8 Sigmn. Smith L. X	A Trade. 6 Pigeons - never found.
A.C. No.113	No.1 Major Arnold	H.Q. 1 A.L. A.Tk. Bty. 18 Set recovered & used.
	No.2 Dvr. Cameron	"
	No.3 Sigmn. Brown E.	A Trade.
	No.4 Cpl. E. Watson	Dvr. Mech.
	No.5 Sigmn. Inseal +	Spare base 65 Set. Taken off D.Z. but later hidden when they came under fire. Trolley not found.
	No.6 L/Cpl. Lowrie	"
	No.7 Sigmn. Riley	"
	No.8 Tel. Monks	66 Set. Naval F.O.O. Tel. Monks knocked out on D.Z. 68 Set taken off D.Z. but later abandoned.
	No.9 Cpl. Mead	I. Cpl. 6 Pigeons. Released on D.Z. to avoid capture.
	No.10 Sigmn. Huggett	Despatch Rider.
A.C. No. 113A	No.4 Sigmn. Collis	Despatch Rider. Spare, no technical equipment taken.
	No.6 Sigmn. Amos	O.W.L. "

b. 1st Parachute Battalion

A.C. No.34	No.1 L/Sgt Pugh	22 Set. 2 Baskets. 2 Trolleys. Set less accessories was found, & brought to the bridge in early morning. I requisitioned this set, recovered accessories from set hidden in Bde H.Q. D.Z., & used set to pass code word "Marston One" to 4th Armd Bde.
	No.2 L/Cpl. Bellamy	"
	No.3 Sigmn. Clayton D.G.	"
	No.4 Sigmn. Horne.	"
	No.5 Sigmn. Carney X	68 Set. Found & brought to bridge & used, but without success. Both these sets had to be destroyed later. The stick was another 1000 yds West of D.Z.
	No.6 Sigmn. Doran X	"
A.C. No.62	No.1 Cpl. Collins	22 Set. 2 Baskets. 2 Trolleys. Dropped 1000 yds South of D.Z. Set & power pack only brought back.
	No.2 Sigmn. Reece	"
	No.3 Sigmn. Kean	"
	No.4 Sigmn. Allen W.	"

c. 2nd Parachute Battalion

A.C. No.15	No.3 L/Sgt. Harrison	22 Set. 2 Baskets. 2 Trolleys. Dropped on D.Z. 4, i.e. 3rd Bn D.Z. 22 Set never found.
	L/Cpl Hollott	"
	Sigmn. McCulloch	"
	Sigmn. Bennett	"
Unknown	Cpl. Wilson X	22 Set. 2 Baskets. 2 Trolleys. All personnel & equipment missing. Never seen after take off.
	Sigmn. Lydford X	"
	Sigmn. Binning X	"
	Sigmn. Clayton D. X	"
A.C. No. ?	L/Sgt. Westall	At request of 2nd Bn, these men were attached to Bn Signal Platoon, & at the disposal of Battalion Signal Officer. They all returned safely after the operation.
	Sigmn. Clerkin	"
	Sigmn. Booth	"

The Naval F.O.O. Detachment functioned well; arriving intact with their 66 Set, they, under Capt. Hodge controlled fire from the Uganda, & did magnificent work for 2nd Battalion. The other 66 set was unserviceable on landing. Of the A.Tk. Recce Party, the four of them with two 18 Sets dropped 21 miles North of the D.Z., so they did not function. They did not find their containers.

d. 3rd Parachute Battalion

A.C. No.52	No.1 L/Sgt. Currie	1 22 Set. 2 baskets. 2 trolleys. Plane dropped at great speed, no equipment was found. Crew were separated. All dropped 3000 yds east of D.Z.
	No.4 Sigmn. Cooper	"
	No.5 Sigmn. Serious X	"
	No.6 Sigmn. Abbott	"
A.C. No.80	No.1 Cpl. Clayton E.	22 Set. 2 baskets. 2 trolleys. Dropped 2000 yds north of D.Z. Set recovered, but crew split up, set abandoned perforce later.
	No.5 Sigmn. Baxter	"
	No.6 Sigmn. Southward	"
	No.7 Smith, J.S.	"
A.C. No.81	No.8 L/Cpl. Anson	Dropped 2500 yds North of D.Z. 68 Set. Recovered & brought to bridge, then used unsuccessfully at the bridge. Later destroyed on orders of B.M.
	No.13 Sigmn. Allen A.	"

Of the 2 18 Sets dropped with A.Tk. Recce Party of 4, 1 18 Set did not drop, the other was found, unserviceable, & dumped in the river.

1. The following aircraft returned to base without dropping their sticks:- 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 24, 32, 36, 38, 51, 68, 89, 90, 107A & 111. Total 18.

2. The following aircraft dropped their loads, but as nothing has been heard since of any member of any of the sticks, it is not known where they dropped:- 18, 42, 72, 80, 97. 91 crashed in the sea. Total 6.

5. The following aircraft dropped on D.Z. 3:- 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 48, 49, 74, 76, 93. Total 14.

7. The following aircraft dropped at miscellaneous map references as shown below:-

100

106

108

110

112

113

924203

929691

912702

939636

2 miles West of Mt. Etna

895700

890656

875596

877575

945671

947671

954605

905569

917694

928683

923686

925687

962633

926682

896707

845815

847795

922738

892658

8678

933698

907705

912708

905696

904694

909606

890587

925598

935605

897673

866726

914673

926646

934626

913583

947613

8 miles South of D.Z. 3

884643

895638

4 miles West of Lentini

915722

912723

Off the map to the South West

874693

868724

7 miles West of D.Z. 4

864694

889650

928693

918713

933595

922613

935608

908632

928603

917640

942650

8. Miscellaneous points of interest in common with individual aircraft are given here.

d. No.24 plane was damaged by A.A. fire, & returned to base without dropping its stick.

j. No.53 dropped very low. 1-13 just dropped safely. 16 was killed. 14 & 15 had their legs broken.

k. No.57 dropped its stick North West of Mount Etna, & the stick was not heard of again.

q. No.78 returned without its stick but reported having jettisoned its containers.

y. No.97 dropped 5 out of 16, all of whom are missing. The remainder returned to base.

z2. No.105 - this was a case of duplicate of numbers - this is a C47 & not to be confused with the No.105 which was an Albemarle. The C47 dropped its stick north of Mt. Etna. None of the stick have been heard of.

1. Brigade H.Q., including Defence Platoon and Brigade Signals emplaned in 11 Albemarles on Strip F, half way along the road between Sousse & Kairouan on D3 - 13 July, 1943, at 2025 hrs. My aircraft, No.109 took off at 2045 hrs. The route along which we flew was due east to Malta, flying round Delimara Point 10 miles out to sea, then north to Sicily, up the east coast keeping 10 miles out to sea, past Cape Passero, Cape Murro di Porco, Cape San [Croce?], then west opposite the mouth of the river Simeto. The line of flight for the run in should have been West South West to drop on D.Z. 2, & south of the river Gornalunga, a tributary of the Simeto. We were scheduled to drop at 2333 hours. The pilot had a little difficulty in finding the river mouth, & flew north opposite to Catania, then returned, found the river mouth, and turned west to the D.Z. From the moment we turned west, we flew into A.A. fire of increasing intensity. There were heavy A.A. shells bursting all round us, & the explosives shook the aircraft, & it felt as if devils were trying to beat their way in. In addition there were tracer shells, bullets, & fire from small arms flying everywhere close to us.

2. We got the order for Action Stations about five minutes before the actual drop, & every one was poised ready. The navy had for a considerable time and was still doing its grim work in Catania and the surrounding area, & the whole area seemed to be one vast field of flame. Everything capable of burning was on fire. I was No.3 of the stick, & could see reasonably well both through the aperture, and through the windows in the rear of the plane. At 2336 the red light went on, and 3 seconds later the green light, and the stick went out and we were fairly well lit up by fires below, & also by the moon, and we were the objects of continuous ground fire, mostly light A.A. tracer & small arms fire. No one was hit, & I landed safely & lay flat until I had got out of the parachute harness. On the way down, I observed that all the stick had dropped, including the containers & the basket which had been released after No.10. We were dropped plumb on the D.Z. but the line of flight was slightly North of west, which was wrong as we found later that the containers dropped in the river Gornalunga.

3. We were covered on the D.Z. by small arms fire, but the stick collected together, moving in short bursts & then lying flat, & we went in search of the containers. None could be found of our stick, & it became plain that we should have to get to the Rendezvous. We arrived there, and as Lt. Golden with green torch had not arrived I used my green torch, moving about, shining it first in one place & then in another to avoid being shot at. We collected a total of 4 sticks, but no wireless sets, so a search party was sent out to make a further search for them. The two containers were eventually found in 6 or 8 ft of water & firmly stuck in the mud. The R109 could not be released, but the 22 Set was recovered and brought to the Rendezvous. The set was emptied of water & dried as well as possible then it was set up but would not function. So it was hidden under some straw & left there.

4. At 0120 hours, 14 July, the Brigade Major decided to move to the first H.Q., & when I returned to the R.V. after searching for and finding some missing personnel, only an N.C.O. and 3 men of the Defence Platoon were left there, & they had orders to wait there until 0200 hrs. As we were being paid more & more attention by fire of various kinds from the enemy, I decided at 0135 hrs to move every one out, & we proceeded in the direction of the 1st H.Q. I set the party on its way, & then decided to return with a part of 3 once more to the R.V. to see if anyone else had arrived. On the way back, A Company of 2nd Battalion passed me, & said they were about 60 strong. However, there was no one left at the R.V., and at 0205 hours we set off again for the first H.Q. where we arrived at about 0235 hours. There we found a small party which included the Brigadier, Brigade Major, & about 25 to 30 O.R's. from various units, mostly Defence Platoon & Provost. Myself, Cpl Allison, L/Cpl Morrison, Sigmn Causfield & Wray were all the Signals present. It was at once clear that Brigade H.Q. could not function as a Command or Communication centre, as there were no sets or communications of any kind. Something had to be done. The Brigade Commander said to me "I think that if we organise the people & the arms that are here, we might well take the bridge by ourselves - what do you think, George?" I answered, "I see no reason at all, Sir, why we shouldn't. Let us start." So he and the B.M. organised the party into 3 subsections of the Defence Platoon, a party of R.E's., a reserve party of myself & 4 Signals, & the M.O. & his batman, & we advanced along the south side of the river towards the bridge. We got to a point about 100 yards from it, & the sub-sections with Bren guns ranged themselves to cover the Bridge. It was dark. A scout was sent on to make sure that the bridge had not already been taken by 1st Battalion, as was the intention. He returned to say that no one of our Brigade was there. We were just about to attack with the R.E's. covered by Bren guns when the news was dramatically brought that elements of the 1st & 3rd Battalion were already in possession of the North end of the bridge, having taken it a few minutes previously. The Brigadier & the leading subsections then made their way quickly to the South end, & went on to it. A wretched Italian, leapt out of one of the pill boxes throwing a grenade, which wounded the Brigade Commander in 3 places, & blew 3 toes off the Brigade Major's batman. The Brigadier was in a good deal of pain, but could still get about slowly. The pill boxes were cleared, & the whole bridge was in our hands. I followed up with my little Sub-Section & was ordered to give assistance to the wounded. I left a man with each of the wounded to dress them, & proceeded across the bridge, & on the way met Colonels Pearson & Yeldman of 1st & 3rd Battalions. On the way also, I perceived an ammunition convoy of three vehicles approaching the bridge from the north. They slowed up for the road block at the north end, & I saw 3 R.E's. spring from the side of the road & throw gammon bombs into each of the 3 lorries, killing the drivers, & blowing up the lorries. The 3 trucks blazed up, & the road was thus completely blocked, both at the north end, & the south end by a lorry which was attacked by a large Italian field gun. From the time the bridge was taken no transport of any kind went over it. It was undamaged. The approach to the bridge from the North was covered by a bren gun, which shot everything that moved. 2 Breda guns, with 44000 rounds of ammunition, and an anti-tank gun with a quantity of ammunition, in the pill-boxes at the South end were put in action by 1st Battalion.

5. At the North end of the Bridge I found L/Sgt Pugh & L/Cpl Bellamy with a 22 set & power pack, with batteries but less accessories, also a 68 set in working order. I requisitioned these, had them taken to the South side of the bridge, set up the 68 set in the shrubs, & then proceeded with L/Sgt Pugh & Sigmn. Causfield to the D.Z. to obtain 22 set accessories from where we had hidden them the night before. When we arrived there, the set had been unearthed, but the accessories were still there. We took these & returned to the bridge, where we set up the 22 set & tried to get through to Relieving Infantry Bde, which we knew to be the 69 Bde of 50th Division, and to Advanced Airborne Div. We were unsuccessful but found that the 4th Armoured Bde Command net was on a nearby frequency. I decided to try & get in on that net, and called repeatedly for 20 minutes saying "Hulloh SHO, Pronto SHO calling. Am trying to come in on your net. I have an urgent message for you, will you attention to me and take it." At length, a voice answered "Oh, hulloh Pronto, sorry to keep you waiting." I then passed the microphone over to the Brigade Major who said "Seagull SHO speaking - we cannot tell you who we are, but does "Marston One" mean anything to you." He answered "Yes, my God it does, good show, I wish I could get to you now." We were through on that net until the batteries went down. We had no luck on any other frequency with the 68 Set.

6. At about this time we were attacked & straffed by 2 Focke Wulfes who flew up & down machine gunning us until they ran out of ammunition, & after that 6 more came and did the same. So Bde. H.Q. moved about 200 yards to a culvert under the main road. Here we were sniped whenever any one looked out. Then we moved again right up beside the bridge, where we stayed for about 6 hours, until 1930 hrs on 14 July. Here we were plastered continuously with everything the enemy could give us in the way of artillery fire. Much of it was airbursts right overhead. No one was touched. Lt. Gardner of 1st Battalion did noble work with the two Bredas, & during the afternoon he got through all of the 44,000 rounds of ammunition, wearing out both guns, & killing many of german parachutists on the North side of the river.

7. After that the Brigade Commander gave the order to withdraw to the hills & try to contact 2nd Battalion, as our ammunition had run out, & we did not know whether relief was on its way. We got up to 2nd Battalion after 2100 hours, & were told the stand to as an attack was expected. No attack was made, & we stood down at 0005 hours, 15 July 1943. At about 0130 hours we saw a soldier of the 9th D.L.I. come into the shed, and with great delight & relief we knew that the 8th Army had arrived. After dawn, the Shermans of the 4th Armoured Brigade had a shoot at the bridge, & then moved down, and an attack on the bridge by the D.L.I. They were thrown back, & the next morning, during the night, (16 July) 2 Battalions attacked the bridge, supported by artillery - 72 guns. They took it, & established a bridge-head 500 yds deep on the north side.

8. During the day the Brigade were taken by road to Syracuse, where we boarded a T.L.C. We lay in harbour all night, which was one long air-raid. Bombs fell in the harbour between our ship & the next one to it. But no damage was done. We left Syracuse at 1430 hours, 17 July, & arrived Malta about 0500 hours, 18 July. We left soon after, and arrived at Sousse early on 19 July, where transport was waiting to take us back to camp.

9. After checking up, the number of the Section who are missing is 16 O.R's., and of the Naval F.O.O. Party, 1 officer and 1 naval rating.

1. From the point of view of the operation as a whole it was a catastrophe, so much so that the small fact of Signals having been almost useless pales into insignificance.

2. Sufficient time must be given for thorough & repeated briefing over a period of days, & for individual study of the whole plan.

3. Cipher, map codes, & Codex must be issued several weeks prior to the operation to allow of time to practice them.

4. The signal equipment to be taken must be with the Section for some weeks in advance of the operation to give R.E.M.E. time to test it, & the Section time to try it out.

5. Too many Brigade Signals were taken. No D.R's. are ever necessary. Except for them, 30% of the remainder were only there on account of the weight of the signal equipment to be carried.

7. 68 Sets with end-pe[?]l aerials, dropped on the man on the scale of 3 per Battalion, and 5 at Brigade H.Q., only should be taken, with basic crews of 2 personnel.

8. Suggest that the Base 65 set should be glider borne, & landed later on in the operation.

10. Suggest that Signals dispense with haversacks for an operation, taking only bare necessities in pockets.

11. Revolvers should be is on a scale of one per officer and one per 68 set taken. All the remainder should be armed with Sten guns. Every officer and man should also be armed with 2 36 grenades, to be carried in his pockets.

14. Whilst it is a good and necessary thing to have all Signal personnel proficient in the use of all types of small arms & machine guns, & in field craft, the main thing is to have them good at their own job which is signalling, & training in signalling must always take precedence; the only thing more important than this is absolute physical fitness.

15. It is not advisable to try and draw too many conclusions from the Signal point of view. Nothing could have been worse than the last operation, & it must never from a parachuting point of view, I mean, be as bad again. It is almost certain to be better in the future.

16. The crux of the problem is having efficient pilots & navigators, who are prepared to take flak, etc. & drop sticks & containers together on the right D.Z., & in the correct line of flight.

17. Close liaison prior to an operation between the parachutists on the one hand and the Air Forces on the other, & full briefing of the latter by the former, with full explanation of our plan, requirements & frame of mind. The courage of the parachutists is beyond doubt, but that the American pilots on this particular operation was not, (probably owing to lack of experience), & their frame of mind in flight left a lot to be desired.

1. In case any one wonders to my having referred to the operation as a catastrophe, let there be no doubt of what it achieved.

2. The bridge was taken, intact, by a force comprising 60 of 1st Battalion, 40 of 3rd Battalion and a total of Brigade H.Q. including R.E's. and Field Ambulance of about 30, i.e. by about 130 men. 2nd Battalion, about 160 of them reached their objectives in the hills south of the bridge, and held them throughout. The bridge was held by us for about 16½ hours, & the enemy never came south of it again. All the enemy south of it were taken prisoner or killed.

3. The Commander of the 8th Army said that the operation saved him 7 days' fighting, and many casualties.

4. What would have been our achievements if instead of a mere 300 men of the Brigade, there had been the whole 1750 men in their right places who took off so confidently from our airfields between Sousse & Kairouan?

J. Map of the area is attached. Each cross represents an aircraft. The D.Z's. are numbered. Colours of crosses:-

I crossed the Sicilian coast at dropping height and speed in aircraft 106 at 2327 hrs, 13th July, 1943. After 15 mins. over land we flew out to sea. Five mins. later we crossed land again at about 2000 ft. and again flew out to sea. At 0010 hrs we again flew inland and dropped. During the drop, we encountered considerable AA and light automatic fire which ceased when the stick landed. To my knowledge, no one was injured during the drop.

I landed in a small wood. From there I could see no landmarks at all. Making my way in the direction of the line of flight I saw a figure amongst the trees. On coming towards me, I saw him to be a civilian and let him pass. Further on, I saw four or five numbers of the stick including the Defence Platoon Sgt. Major and stick commander, Cpl. Bissett. We continued on the line of flight and crossed a main road which by its direction I decided was the coastal road. (I had landed at 935664, the remainder of the stick to the S. West straddling the main coastal road.) We found no trace of the rest of the stick or containers. Then, N. West of us, an Albemarle ran in and dropped a stick. We made our way over to them, and near the farm at 932665, I found Major Byng Maddock, Capt Bolland and six men. We went back to where their stick had dropped and found a 22 set (Support set) and 66 set; these were opened up at the farm. The 66 set did not get through, nor did the 22 set which I used on the command net frequency.

We posted sentries around the farm and went inside to study our maps. We were not able to pinpoint our position: to our North were no landmarks to our west gliders were landing, to the East was the coastal road and to our South were hills, apparently some miles away. We decided we had been dropped just North of the bridge, and resolved to travel southwards, parallel to the coastal road as soon as the moon went down. This we did, carrying both wireless sets with us. Near the road we found three of the containers from my aircraft. The bren gun had been removed, but we armed ourselves to capacity and extinguished the container lights. Continuing southwards, the farm at 930658 appeared.

South of the farm lay a tall grass plantation. We went down the Western side of this and along its Southern edge. [?] yards along a flare was fired immediately south of us, light followed and rifles opened up followed by grenades. This programme was repeated several times: the grenades were quite ineffectual for though two fell a yard from where I lay, I was unharmed. The enemy were on a small ridge 25 yds to our South; I neither heard nor saw any trace of the remainder of our party; I assumed that they were either killed, for to live under fire from such close range seemed impossible, or lying motionless like myself. (In actual fact, they had withdrawn into the plantation).

Firing continued for approximately half an hour; by which time it was 0230 hrs. approx. I lay still until 0330 hrs. I decided that to withdraw to the plantation would entail too much noise. I started crawling towards the corner of the plantation whence I'd came, but this too attracted fire. I then resolved to near to the corner of the plantation. The Germans started talking to one another in loud voices, as their conversation got well started, smoke drifted across between me and them, from the plantation which was on fire. I bolted for the corner of the plantation. I was three yards from the corner, the enemy opened fire. I was not hit.

Reaching the corner, I flung myself to the ground. Firing continued and I heard the enemy coming towards me. I made a fifty yard sprint along the western edge of the plantation, and lay motionless. After half an hour, I started crawling into the open at right angles to the plantation. This encouraged more fire, but with only one hour to daybreak it was essential to continue. By daybreak, I was fifty yards out from the plantation. Here I found some plants approx. one foot high and a bush two foot tall under which I put my head to protect it from the sun. I felt exhausted and fell asleep.

I was awakened at 0700 hrs by the sound of German voices. Fifty yards South of me three of them were running across the field whilst several of them were using the track on the western side of the plantation fifty yards from which I lay. From where I was, I could see Mt. Etna to the North, nothing to my West, a small ridge 100 yds South and to my East the plantation. NE from me was a farm 150 yds distant built on a sloping bank. The farm was topped by the Coastal road of which I could see approx 100 yds.

I lay motionless all morning. Firing I could hear of all kinds but I could not make out where it came or at whom it was directed. I observed a dozen British parachutists being marched along the track, prisoners. Among them I thought I could recognise the defence platoon Sgt Major. They returned a short while later carrying red cross flags, obviously to be used as [stretcher?] parties. Throughout the day, the track was used by parties of Germans. At approx. 1700 hrs, a Sherman tank came along the coastal road from the South. The enemy did not fire at this tank. An hour or so later, a company and a half of Germans marched down the track by the edge of the plantation. I thought that they were retiring to take up new positions in the plantation area.

As my water had all been used, I resolved to find water at nightfall and then moved Southwards until I came to British forces. But at 2030 hrs whilst it was still light, a party of troops entered the plantation. It took me some time to decide if they were British or German parachutists; I decided they were British and dashed over to them. But they had disappeared. This, however, brought me to the farm near the coastal road. I gingerly explored the farm, obtained water and observed a quantity of British arms in a tunnel neath the coastal road. Here, apparently, prisoners had been disarmed. I climbed over the farm wall and on the road, a 100 yds to the South, was a Sherman tank. This I found to be knocked out and deserted. Mild shelling started and I lay concealed for 30 minutes. Continuing South after half a mile I heard the sound of tractored vehicles. Another half mile further on, I came to the bren carriers of the relieving DLI battalion. I heard British voices, and resolving to make myself quite plain to the sentry, walked boldly up to him. Twenty yards from him, he fired but missed me.

The DLI gave me some food. I there met Lt Miller, 2nd Btn, with whom I returned to 2nd Bn positions and spent the night there. I met the Brigade Commander and Brigade Major next morning.

During my day of hiding, I had lain 400 yds from 2nd Bn positions, but from my place of hiding, I had been unable to see the hill that the battalion had occupied nor had I any indication that there were British troops in that area.

As N.C.O. I/C W/T detachment of Brigade Signals attached to 1st Parachute Battalion, I encountered several minor difficulties before the actual operation which I consider are worthy of note.

Brigade Headquarters had only catered for the actual sticks dropping as Headquarters in the operation, and the signals who were attached to 1st Para Bn had great difficulty in attaining such items as rations, life belts, luminous triangles, sweets, chewing gum etc. as both the Bn concerned and Bde H.Q. tried to put the responsibility on each other. I would like to suggest that on future operations Bde. signals have their parent section fully equipped in every detail, and that steps are taken to prevent the needless arguments that arose between Battalion quartermasters and Bde H.Q.

On the evening of July 13th, together with L/Cpl Ballamy, Sgm Claydon, Horne, Carney, and Doran, I and 10 other men from 1st Bn emplaned in aircraft C53 no 34 at 1915 hrs and were airborne at 1935 hrs.

We had with us one No 22 wireless set in an F type container, one No 68 wireless set also in an F type container (for which Sgm Carney & Doran were primarily responsible) and 2 Baskets containing fuel & batteries and Charging Engine & Batteries.

Our destination was the River Semeto on the East Coast of Sicily. As I was jumping as No 1 I had a first class view the whole time through the door. We reach Malta just as it was getting dark and left it behind on the port side. Shortly after this several flares were dropped by unknown aircraft in front of us. This continued for about 20 minutes.

At about 2220 we sighted Sicily, the first thing discernable was mild AA fire. We flew up the coast about a mile out to sea for about 15 minutes being fired at once by surface vessels. At approximately 2240 hrs, 5 minutes before our scheduled time of dropping, I saw through the door several large fires, some near the coast and others inland. We flew past these for about 4 mile then out to sea & back again in a circle passing these fires again.

This procedure was repeated often during the next 50 minutes, sometimes going as far north as Catania where a searchlight very nearly picked us out, and heavy anti-aircraft fire was directed at us, the black puffs being clearly seen in the moonlit sky horizontal with us. At 2335 hrs our plane, which was one of a pair that had kept together since the start, flew inland & the red light went on. 30 seconds later the green light appeared & I pushed the 2 baskets out helped by the crew chief. The latter then removed the rollers & I jumped.

Even before my 'chute properly developed I was aware of red & green balls of fire shooting from seemingly all directions up into the sky in our direction. Then a searchlight swept low beneath me and the noise of A.A. and machine gun fire increased. I later learnt that L/Cpl Ballamy was caught in the searchlight beam. After what seemed like hours I landed on a corn field very softly fortunately as I had to leave my helmet in the plane owing to broken straps. I found that the field was surrounded by about 4 large fires, one of which was easily distinguished as a burning aircraft. I immediately followed up what I thought was the line of flight so as to meet my crew, who jumped 3. 4. & 5. & to get to reach the containers which were released after No 9. I went some 300 yds but met no-one neither did I see any 'chutes or containers. I retraced my steps & near where I landed was challenged by Lt. Col. Pearson. I explained what I was doing & was told to carry on & meet him in a nearby ditch. By my compass I found the direction of the coast & walked off in the opposite direction, this time calling out L/Cpl Ballamy's name, but although I searched for nearly 25 minutes I neither found nor saw one of my stick. I returned & reported to the C.O. 1st Bn. who told me to get a bren gun from a nearby container of his aircraft & set it up in the ditch. As I was doing so L/Sgt Currie appeared and it transpired that he also could not find his stick. About 0030 hrs a small party of us set out for the Bridge. Previous to this I noticed 2 aircraft crash, one whilst the occupants were still jumping.

After about 3 hrs marching & halting we arrived near the North bank of the river some 600 yds to the west of the Bridge. The C.O. set up a temporary Bn H.Q. and some 30-40 Italian prisoners were brought in. Whilst we were here 3 gliders landed nearby, each one being subject to much A.A. and machine gun fire.

By now there was quite a lot of fragmentation shells bursting overhead, & to our north.

At first light I made my own way to the Bridge where I saw, L/Cpl Ballamy, Horne & Claydon with our set. This set was requisitioned by Capt. Rowlands for Brigade use and was never used as a Bn link set. As the set was taken to the south side of the river I accompanied Capt. Rowlands to Bde HQ, situation some 200 yds from the south part of the bridge in amongst small bushes.

As there was no battery head for the set, the O.C. Section, myself and Sgm Causfield made our way back to the Bde H.Q.'s D.Z. and recovered 2 satchels of gear from a farm & returned with them to the Bridge.

As there was only one 22 set working, I started to dig a small slit trench but was disturbed by 2 F.W. 190 who straffed the Bridge position for about 5 minutes, returning 15 minutes later with 2 others. After this we were not worried by enemy aircraft.

The 68 set with HQ moved some 200 yds further west into a small plantation of Bushes & the 22 set into a culvert under the Road. Several of us stayed near the 68 set until this too was sent to the culvert. As there were a number of Signals present, and only a limited number could enter the culvert, I stayed with L/Sgt Currie & others in this plantation near the 6 pounder Anti-Tank gun.

When fragmentation shells started bursting fairly regularly near us we moved to a gulley about 150 yds away and sheltered under a bridge, where I met QMS1 Milson, & about 8 other Bde Signals & we stayed here for the next few hours, going out every [now & then] to the river to see what was happening.

Towards late afternoon, when some 1st Bn men arrived & told us that the order had been given by the Brigadier to withdraw individually, Q.M.S.I. Milson and myself set out along the tributary bank moving towards the west.

That night we laid up in some bushes with what remained of a platoon of 1st Bn under 2/Lt Lazenby.

The next morning there was continuous shelling both ways over our heads and at 1100 hrs 2 Sherman tanks approached; under their cover we withdrew into the hills and subsequently hitch-hiked to Lentini where we met other paratroops & heard of still others from Maj. General Hopkinson. That afternoon we travelled by lorry to the outskirts of Syracuse prior to embarking the following morning in a Tank Landing ship.

Throughout the whole of this operation I was not able to carry out my correct role once.

At approx 2340 hours on the night of 13th July the complete stick and containers of aircraft 109 dropped on approximately their correct DZ. During the drop and for about 10 mins beforehand we met heavy ack-ack fire especially from Breda guns whose red tracers seem to be bursting all around the aircraft. There was also a considerable amount of machinegun and small arms fire during the drop. I noticed on my way down that all containers had dropped with their 'chutes fully developed. Having a fairly light landing it was not long before I was ready to move from the bushes in which I found myself. This first person I contacted was Sgm Wray. Together we made our way to an arms container which contained 2 rifles and had landed only 10 yards away. Standing by this container I flashed the red signal lamp in the general direction of the remainder of the stick but knowing that few would probably see owing to the high road cutting up the stick we changed our position to the top of the embankment. There we contacted Cpl Allison Sgm Paterson and Pte Lee from A/C 108. Leaving Sgm Wray & Paterson flashing red light Cpl Allison & I returned to find other containers. We found the 22 set container totally immersed in 6 ft of water in the dyke which crossed the D.Z. The M/C lay halfway in the water [next?] to the 22 set. Across on the opposite bank some 20 ft away and partially immersed lay the R109 container. Further up the steep slope on the opposite bank lay another red chute which I believe was the trolley.

Cpl. Allison & I tried to drag the 22 set container out of the water but found this was quite impossible as the container was firmly embedded in mud. We then returned to the small party and made our way to the R.V. This we reached at about 0100 hrs and reported to the Brigade Major and Capt Rowland who detailed a party of men to return to salvage set. Cpl Allison waded out up to the shoulders in water and managed to open container and pass out set with all accessories. We carried it to the R.V. where we set up station after emptying a considerable amount of water from set. Although the power pack was vibrating OK the sender and receiver refused to work although both head sets were thoroughly dried. During the next half hour we dried set but still the sender and receiver did not work. Shortly prior to our move from R.V. the Brigade Major gave orders to hide the set and move off with Capt Rowland's party. We dismantled set and choosing a spot near the farm house we covered set with loose straw and empty baskets until it completely hidden. We then moved off in a party with Capt Rowland i/c. The signals included Cpl Allison, Sgmn Causfield, Wray and Paterson and I. On reaching first H.Q. the party of signals was split up as riflemen and were posted as sentries to various points. Cpl Allison Sgmn Causfield & myself were together. There was not much action in that area although some mortar shells did land nearby. I did not see Sgmn Wray and Paterson until almost 6 that morning near the bridge. Between 3 and 4 o'clock the Brigadier led the party in 3 strong sections to attack south end of the bridge. On Capt Rowland's orders we tended and bandaged wounded on bridge after attack. Amongst those bandaged were a 2nd Lt. of 1st Bn and Pte Rudge BMs batman. Cpl Allison Sgmn Causfield and I carried the wounded to the comparative safety of a crashed glider. About 0800 the M.O. arrived and location of 16 Para Fd. Amb. H.Q. was known. Sgmn Paterson then arrived on scene near bridge with one Italian lorry which he had captured. He evacuated the wounded to 16 Fd Amb. Having no set Cpl Allison & I set up an RPA in a culvert which ran under the road about [?] yds from the bridge. This culvert was used by Bde H.Q. at 1000 hrs after heavy machine gunning by plane and shelling from enemy. We [stayed?] in the culvert until late afternoon. During this time there was a considerable amount of mortaring and shelling, especially, anti personnel shells which burst about 8 ft in the air. The signals in the culvert included Capt Rowland, Cpl Allison, Sgmn Wray, Paterson, Amos, [?], Causfield, L/Cpl Bellamy and myself. L/Cpl Bellamy had the 22 set. In the late afternoon the Brigadier gave orders for personnel to move out of culvert to south end of bridge. This was done in parties of 2 as snipers were active there. When the party had re-assembled on south end of bridge in a gully the 22 set was missing. It has been carried in "jeep" to 1st Bn H.Q. During the remainder of the afternoon we lay in the gully and in a trench being heavily shelled and mortared. About 2000 hrs on Brigadiers orders we withdrew from bridge under heavy fire along the embankment. Sgmn Wray and I withdrew together with the main body of Bde H.Q. and 1st Bn. We worked our way up the embankment as far as electrical power stn where we filled our water bottles and where we saw L/Cpl Bellamy Cpl Maybury. Leaving the power stn we were joined by L/Cpl Dunning and Sgmn Brown. We set off in a S.E. direction hoping to reach 2nd Bn H.Q. After 10 minutes marching and crawling we caught up with the main body of 1st Bn under Major (Booth)? He asked us to join his group we said [?] and continued to move in a W. direction. About ¾ hour later whilst doubling across an open field we were swept by m/g fire from a house about 400 yards away. We withdrew under the officer and moved on behind the house to a large vineyard where we rested. This was about 2200 hrs and the moon was brilliant. The officer i/c decided to remain here to rest and when darkness fell that we should make our way in small parties over the hills which lay to the S.W. About 0115 hrs when the moon was lower our party (L/C Dunning Sgmn Brown, Wray, & myself) set off towards the hills. About 0300 after crossing several small hills we found ourselves in a valley brought to a standstill by m/g & small arms fire from the south. We moved along the valley through which ran a small dried-up river bed, in an easterly direction. After ½ hr. we climbed to the top of the valley in a northerly direction. On the top we found a heavily barbed wired entanglement outside which lay 2 paratroops (presumably 2nd Bn. as this was their area). Those bodies had been partially stripped, one had only boots and socks, the other shirt, boots and socks. Their rifles and several empty Bren magazines lay beside them. The enemy m/g post opened up on our right so we withdrew to the valley and moving still further East found a disused stone shed containing a well of good drinkable water. [Approx map ref at this time 932658]. Here we decided to lay down for some rest. We were awakened about 0400 by heavy firing about 800 yards west. This heavy small arms and m/g fire continued until 0545 hrs. During this time L/Cpl Dunning and Sgmn Brown decided to move off in an easterly direction. They left the shed about 0500. At 0600 we heard the sound of heavy tanks and saw about 800-900 yds to the west several heavy tanks. We looked in vain for the recognition pennants on the aerial masts and could not be sure if they were our Shermans. About 10 mins. later we heard an English voice yell "Down there, mate". We then knew that the valley was in English hands. About 300 yards away on our "blind side" was an artillery gun. This was part of 50 Div. Whilst crossing the dry river bed towards the lorries we found that the ground was extensively mined with A/Tank Teller mines. They were fairly visible in places. One jeep had actually commenced to cross the field before we had time to yell a warning. It stopped with its front wheel about 4 ins from a mine. The major i/c called RE's to the field which they were clearing when we left. We gave this Major details of capture and withdrawal of bridge (Marston 1). On our way back to Lentini we received a lift from Lt. Colonel of the D.L.I. to whom we again reported position of bridge. This was about seven or eight o'clock. By various lifts we arrived in Lentini and reported to an Airborne Stragglers Centre there. From there we left in truck with Sgmn Knight and McKay whom we met at Centre and arrived in Syracuse on night of 15th July.

After the withdrawal from the bridge I did not see Sgmn Paterson until he joined the ship at Syracuse. He states that he met up with 2nd Bn and withdrew with them. Sgmn Wray accompanied me as from the withdrawal.

At 2300 hrs on the 13th July 1943 we dropped and within about 10 minutes the whole stick was ready to move off, myself and my crew carrying a complete 22 Set. The only flak we had encountered was from what I thought were our own ships, a few miles from Sicily. We did not recognise any of the surrounding features and saw no other paratroops there. We then moved off in what we thought was the direction of the bridge, Major Cleasby-Thompson & Captain Jessop being the officers in charge. After marching about 3 miles over very rough country we came upon a farm and tried to find out where we were. The result of this we set off in another direction. We came upon a small river and made our way alongside it shielded on our left by an embankment. We suddenly came upon what appeared to be a group of buildings. We formed ourselves up within 25 yards of these and one of the stick went forward to investigate. Suddenly a revolver went off and, I think a machine gun opened up. Some of us replied with our Sten guns. Major Cleasby-Thompson shouted to us to run back the way we had come. This we did. All my crew were very tired through carrying the set etc.. And Sgn Kean after a few yards running had to drop the set as he could not carry on running with it. Subsequently I found that Sgn Allen W had done the same thing with a battery. We then proceeded back alongside the river and crossed it by a small bridge. Once or twice bursts of tracer came over the river but well to our rear. I then told Sgn Reece to get rid of his battery as we seemed hopelessly lost and one battery did not seem to be of any use, myself still retaining the power pack and two satchels. After a while we decided to rest until it was light enough to find out where we were. This we did and the officers i/c decided we were about six miles south of the bridge instead of being north of it. We then saw a party of men near a farm. We found out they were Commando's and Major Cleasby-Thompson agreed to cover their withdrawal down a railway line by the far for two hours as they were trying to reach the coast. I then hid the power unit & satchels near the farm. After two hours we moved back to the gully by the river, posted lookouts and remained there. Ever since we had dropped there had been firing all the way round us so we knew we were still well in enemy territory. Once or twice enemy planes flew low over us but did not spot us. During the day we saw parties of what we thought were Italian soldiers also some at the farm we had left. We had decided to split up into two parties of about 9 men and try to get back to our lines that night but about 1900 hrs that evening a Commando accompanied by the nearby farmer came to us and said there were about 80 Italians at the farm who wished to surrender to us so we had to send down and collect them. Whilst this was happening a German officer & his batman from the Hermann Göering tank regiment drove up at the farm in a scout car. These we also collected & brought back to our old position. A few minutes later three more paratroops from the 2nd Bn joined us bringing with them about 3 prisoners. That night we put all the prisoners in an open field and kept guard around them. Captain Jessop and three men going off to try and get through to our lines. Later on we heard German tanks come down a track just off our field about 50 yards away. Before it got light the next morning we moved off to another position near the position. Later on during the morning, the lookouts spotted through their glasses what they thought were out 15 cwt trucks also what appeared to be a Jeep. So we waited 2 hours and then decided to move off in the direction of our lines. It was then I found that Sgn Allen W. was missing. I realized he must have been left asleep when we moved off from the open fields with the prisoners. This proved to be the case as I saw him on the boat coming back. We passed through the farm once more and I recovered the power pack and put it on the scout car which we were bringing back. The satchels I could not find. After a few miles we met a few Commandos & they joined us. Whilst Sgn Reece was guarding some Italians filling their water bottles at a spring a patrol of the East Yorkshires burst upon them and their officer fired a round over Sgn Reece's head thinking he was a German. It appears that our own troops do not know our uniform. We then joined up with this patrol and marched the prisoners back to Div H.Q. There I met L/Cpl Ballamy who had my set with him. He had been a prisoner at an Italian H.Q. and saw it there. On being released by our troops he brought it back with them. The next morning we got on a truck to go to the ship & the set & power pack was left behind with other equipment to be brought back by a 1st Bn Corporal in the scout car. Presumably the 1st Bn still have the set & power pack.

This stick was one of ten men. In order of parachuting they were, (1) Major Arnold A/Tk (2) his batman, (3) Telegraphist Monks, (4) Sgm Brown, (5) Sgm Inseal, (6) Sgm Huggett, (7) L/Cpl. Elletson, (8) Sgm Riley, (9) Cpl Mead, (10) L/Cpl Lowrie. Three type F containers were carried containing a 65 set, crew L/Cpl Lowrie, Sgm Inseal - Riley; one 68 set in the care of Tel. Monks, one 18 set, crew Major Arnold - batman. Six pigeons were also taken, Cpl Mead being responsible for these.

The journey over was uneventful until the plane actually reached the island of Sicily where it was met by flack though this did not appear to be heavy. The usual warning of "Ten minutes to go" was received but when that time had expired and no lights had come on it became evident that the pilot was having difficulty in finding the D.Z. Eventually the green light came on and the stick began to jump. No 9 was slow in moving then he caught his pack on the fuselage thus causing a gap in the stick. From this point I can only speak for No 9 and myself as I saw no more of the others until I reached the ship. When I left the plane I found that heavy M.G. fire was being directed on us and that tracer bullets were being used. On reaching the ground it was evident that we were at the wrong place for we were on a hillside and had landed among rocks. Later I found that we were about 3 mls South and 1 mile East of the proper D.Z.

Immediately on landing, having unharnessed myself I began to look for my container. About a dozen yards from me I found the 18 set with its lights on so I set that up on end as a signal to the rest of my stick and began to search for my own but without success. At this point I saw a figure approach. It was No 9 and he was carrying the pigeons.

Together we set out to find the rest of the stick. We had to crawl as the hillside was under heavy M.G. fire and for a time was swept by a searchlight though as it was behind the hill the ray was broken on the ridge. Our search being unsuccessful we returned to the 18 set container and finding some shelter [amongst?] rocks sat there for ½ hr. hoping that the others would see the lights and come along. Meanwhile we tried to plot our position. We decided, wrongly as it happened, that we were North of the river so when the others failed to appear we set off south and having reached some good cover in the form of a copse we lay up till daylight. When daylight came we saw no sign of the river and discovered that we were in a copse with open country all around. Heavy gun fire was going on and enemy shells landed near to us. We decided it would be wiser to lie up for the day and move at night but after lying in the sun until about 5 pm without any shade we ran out of water so resolved to risk creeping to a farm some 400 yds away. We reached it safely and were received in a friendly manner by the farmer. Having rested a bit and filled our water bottles we endeavoured to find out where the river was but the farmer apparently didn't understand. Next we enquired for our lines and he waved his hand in a S.E. direction. As the shelling had now stopped we decided to risk moving in daylight so set out. We travelled about a mile then suddenly ran into an Italian held farm. The sentry at the gate recognised us at the same moment and shouted. We immediately turned and ran as a machine gun opened up on us. There was a ditch some 50 yds away so I jumped into it. That was the last I saw of Cpl. Mead. I found later that he had been captured but released the following day when his captors were themselves captured.

The Italians searched along the ditch firing into it every few yards but none of their shots hit me and as the reeds were high and thick they failed to see me. There was two feet of water in the ditch and I had to sit in it until it was dark before I thought it safe to come out. After dark I crawled out and set off north for I knew now that the river was north. I travelled as far as possible until it grew light then hid among some bushes. All that day (Thursday) I lay there watching Italian soldiers searching the country and surrounding farms and I realised that it would be impossible to go north as there seemed to be many M.G. posts along the ridge to the North. When darkness fell again I crawled off south and after some time came to a farm. It was deserted but some distance away I heard Italian voices. I approached silently then suddenly burst through some trees among them. Immediately eight pairs of hands shot up but as they were civilians I did not fire. I called out "friend" and they came running over shaking hands and bringing me food. They found me a place to rest for the night and in the morning showed me the way to the British lines five kilometres away. At 10 am on Frid morning I reached the 8th Army and safety.

From reports received from the other members of the stick on their return, I have put together the following summary of their movements. Major Arnold, his batman and Sgm Brown got together on landing and began the search for containers but being unable to find them and being under M.G. fire decided to go off on their own in an westerly direction. Finding cover for the night they lay up and at first light next morning found the 65 and 68 sets. The 65 they hid but the 68 they carried with them until they were forced to discard it in order to escape from M.G. fire. At 8 am on the Wed. morning, they found Tel. Monks who had been knocked out on landing. Later Sgm Brown [lost?] himself from this party and eventually found his way to Bde H.Q. The others joined up with one of the Battalions. L/Cpl. Elletson, Sgm. Huggett, Inseal and Riley got together on the ground but failed to find anyone else. Being under fire they lay low till daylight then found shelter. They were unable to estimate their position so decided to lie up till night. They then went south east the following day (Thurs) they lay low till 2 pm when a party of British troops came along whereupon they joined forces with them and eventually reached Syracuse. Thus the whole stick returned safely but without their wireless sets.

The following, to the best of my knowledge, is what happened to the members of the above stick on landing on Op. HUSKY FUSTIAN.

Numbers were as follows (1) Maj. Byng-Maddic (2) Pte O'Donnell (3) Captain Bolland (4) Tel. Skinner (5) L/C Taylor i/c (6) Sgmn Evans (7) Sgmn Clarke (8) Cpl Maybury (9) L/Bdr Greeney (10) Sgt. Maj Milsom Q.M.S.I.

We dropped at 0030 hrs 14 July at 600 feet and were subjected to fire from a M.G. firing explosive tracer and another firing ball during the whole of the descent. This continued sporadically during our forming up and verey lights were fired to light us up. I remained within a few yards of my chute expecting to be joined by Nos 1 to 7 in the normal manner. Nos 4 to 7 joined me (Skinner Taylor Evans Clarke) and we lay down in a circle waiting for Maj Byng-Maddic, Capt Bolland and O'Donnell. After about 15 mins No.9 (Greeney) came up and said he had landed near Italians and had shot one. Sgt Maj Milsom says that No 9 tripped and fell in the matting, hence the gap between us. It seemed to us that Mr Milsom must have dropped behind the MG and Greeney said he had not been able to contact him.

We waited in a ditch on the DZ for another half an hour but no-one else turned up and we decided we were on the wrong DZ far N of the correct one for we took the square of blazing buildings to be Catania 'drome and could not identify any landmarks. We decided to make East to the coast road and coastal plain and from these strike South. First of all it was necessary that I should destroy my cipher equipment and I crawled into a furrowed field and spent 45 minutes tearing it into small pieces and burying it.

By this time the others should have been ahead of me to the East and I pushed on expecting to find them. I found only Evans who had left the others. He and I continued Eastward until we came up with the 2nd BN, with which we stayed until 10.30.

According to Pte O'Donnell who contacted the two officers Taylor Skinner Clarke and Greeney eventually came up with them. This party met Mr Golden and others, forming one large party which got shot up and separated later. This is all I know of them. I saw Mr Milsom the following day and he said he had found some of the containers in water, probably a dyke. I have not seen L/C Taylor, L/Bdr Greeney, Clarke or Skinner any more during the operation or since.

The above personnel dropped in the Brigade Commander's Stick at, believe, approximately the appointed time some miles to the SW of the D.Z. among the hills. The Brigade Commander and his Batman immediately made their own way to "Marston".

As neither the containers nor the basket could be found, Captain Perrin-Brown organised his seven remaining personnel into a search-party for them. They had not been seen by No 10 of the Stick (L/Cpl Dunning). The search was made increasingly difficult due to the fact that the ground fell away beyond No 10 into a deep and precipitous ravine.

After a time Captain Perrin-Brown stopped the search, and led us away in the direction of "Marston" which we reached just after dawn. Our only casualty getting there was Sigmn Corry who was lost while crossing the DZ.

At the time, approx 0230 hrs 14/7/43, he and I were acting as advance scouts, when machine-gun and rifle fire opened up on us from about 20 yds range. The rest of the stick withdrew without, it seems, Sigmn Corry and myself. As I was about 100 yds from the others, I did not hear the order to withdraw; but being unable to get any reply to continued whistling, I also withdrew under the impression that Sigmn Corry, who had been about 20 yds behind me, was with the others. Catching up with them just before dawn, I heard that they had not seen Sigmn Corry since that firing at 0230 hrs. Although they had come under considerable fire since that time, there were no further casualties, except for L/Cpl Dunning who had his cheek cut by a grenade splinter.

Arriving at "Marston", I reported to Captain Rowland the loss of Sigmn Corry, and our set, basket and trolley.

At "Marston" we stayed with Brigade HQ Groups until the withdrawal when we split up into small parties, L/Cpl Dunning and Sigmn Stephen separately contacting Relieving Forces about noon on 15/7/43 and myself at dawn on 16/7/43. During this withdrawal Sigmn Stephen came under occasional fire from both enemy and friendly forces, none of our separate parties suffered any casualties.

SUBJECT: DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES OF 2582460 L/SGT. R.E. HARRISON, ON OPERATION 'FAUSTIAN'

I, to-gether with L/Cpl Hollatt, Sgm. McCulloch and Sgm. Bennett formed the crew for Bde Command Group Link at 2nd BN. PARA. REG.

We became air-borne at 1915 hrs. The plane no. was 15 and we were nos. 3 to 6 in the stick. The flight to Sicily was uneventful and the drop commenced at 2214 hrs. The basket, containing charging-engine and 2 batteries in one, and 4 galls. of petrol and 2 batteries in the other were pushed out, followed by the folding-bicycle on the green light. Next the containers, two arms and one type F, containing the 22 set, one type E containing an 18 set and one trolley were released by the crew-chief. I followed no.2 and dropped without incident.

I arranged that the crew should remain standing on reaching the D.Z. (or kneeling or lying as the circumstances permitted) and No.6 would contact No.5. Both 5 and 6 contact No.4 and so on, there-by moving to-wards the containers. In this way all but L/Cpl Hollatt assembled round me. I found out later that he drifted some considerable way and was unable to find us on DZ but subsequently joined us at the F.U.P.

We found the basket, 18 set container, trolley & bicycle about 400 yds away very close to-gether. In spite of the fact that we searched the D.Z. for 75 mins. we failed to find the 22 set or the 2 arms containers. We then assembled the trolley. One basket had apparently landed heavily because the batteries and charging-engine were smashed. This left only petrol and 2 further batteries of any use to us. By now the opposition looked so heavy I didn't anticipate the need for petrol so I decided if we took the batteries we could put it to use on Cpl. Wilson's spare set (He was to take [a?] charging-engine, 4 batteries and 22 set, on a trolley to the F.U.P. only. There he was to have had 3 more men sent from his crew to carry the equipment) that would give us 10 batteries before the need for charging arose. As it happened Cpl. Wilson did not appear at the F.U.P. nor has he, so far since been seen. I thought there ought to be an outside chance of picking up a spare set on the way to the objective.

We put the Bn. 18 set & satchel which had not been collected by its own crew, to-gether with two miles of assault cable and two batteries, on the trolley. However, the going was [?] to difficult to-gether with the fact that 3 men and a trolley were making such an obvious target that I thought it necessary to abandon the trolley and carry the impediments.

We met up with the Bn. at the F.U.P. and reported to Colonel Frost. The Bn. which numbered approx. 100 moved off along the "caterpillar" to-wards its objective at about 0030 hrs. on the 14th July. We were continually shot at by M.G., rifle and air-burst shells. I then saw Capt. Rowland and reported the state of communications. At the foot of "Johnny One" the Bn. split up into companies, myself and my crew being in C Coy. We attacked the northern slopes and finally took the hill without much opposition in the early hours of the morning. The enemy counter attacked all morning mainly on the Southern flank. It was during this attack that Sgm. McCulloch was hit by a bullet which entered both legs above the ankles.

Fighting died down about midday due, as far as I can ascertain, to a direct hit on an enemy mortar which was causing casualties by fire from the Navy directed by Capt. Hodge. It was thought that his fire direction saved the situation at that time. Firing then became sporadic until nightfall. The situation seemed to be obscure no one knowing where the next shot would come from. Nor was it clear which artillery was ours and which was the enemy's.

About 1700 hrs on that day (July 14th) the Troops other than 2nd Bn withdrew from the Bridge area. We were also preparing, after covering their withdrawal, to evacuate the hill. However tanks, which proved to be British, followed later by a platoon of Durham Light Infantry arrived at our position. This was the expected relief and so all thought of [withuation?] ceased. We continued to hold the hill whilst an armoured force & infantry tried to cross the Bridge during the morning of July 15th. This appeared to be unsuccessful and artillery duels were fought all day.

My crew and I then joined Bde HQ which was now on "Johnny One" and were taken in transport to Syracuse on the morning of July 16th. We were evacuated by sea to Sousse.

During the whole of the operation my wireless crew carried out their enforced Infantry Role extremely well.

On landing I made my way towards the location in which I imagined the containers to have landed, after searching for about ten minutes (our container lights had failed to function) I found Cpl. Clayton in the act of removing our No.22 Set from its container. Sigmn Southward had by this time made an appearance, in the meantime Sigmn Smith had found the No.68 set which had been dropped prior to our landing and was carrying same on his back which meant that there were now only three of us available to carry the No.22 set. Cpl Clayton took the set, Sigmn Southward took the power pack, two satchels and aerial rods, I was carrying one battery on my back, the other bty was being carried by Cpl. Clayton and myself. After a while Sigmn Southward helped me to carry the other battery, but across the roughly ploughed fields our progress was slow and we weren't able to rest for as long as the leading party, for when we caught up with them they had almost finished their rest and set off again marching in the direction of our objective. Handicapped as we were we could not but help in falling behind to such an extent that we could not see the leading party. However we followed in the direction taken, making as good progress as was possible. After possibly ¾ of an hour we cam across what appeared to be a very good track, or a third class road which lay directly in our line of approach. I was not certain whether the leading party had continued to march straight on, or if they had made a turning to the right or left. We both decided to continue in the direction which had already been taken, which was straight ahead. After marching in this direction for some little while machine gun and rifle fire opened up to our left, it was then the battery which I was carrying on my back was struck by a bullet or some such missile, the acid soaked onto my back and burnt off the skin in the small of my back, the following day the action of the acid had eaten away a large area in my smock, my shirt and undervest, also my equipment was ruined to such an extent that it fell to pieces on my back and had to be discarded. Later we found that the wooden casing of the second battery was badly split (possibly due to heavy handling) for the metal casing of the power supply unit was badly bent inwards. We both retained all wireless equipment with the exception of the useless battery which I had been carrying, and tried in vain to locate the rest of the party. Just before first light we decided to go into hiding to avoid possible capture, until such time as we were able to locate and rejoin our own troops. By Wednesday night we assumed that our own troops had been relieved as planned, but on this point we could not be certain, for we could hear heavy fire from our left front, also we observed parties from eight to twelve strong of German troops moving about in our near vicinity, they did not seem to be taking any active part in the battle which was in progress and seemed quite unconcerned, a fact which made me realise we were behind enemy lines and for the moment stood little chance of reaching our own troops. On the afternoon of Friday 16th June we met up with a private from "C" Company 3rd Bn. the three of us decided at the first opportunity to make our way towards the direction of our own artillery gun flashes. That night we made a reconnaissance of local ground and found a number of empty German machine-gun posts (we had heard them firing on the previous day) we stayed in these posts until first light on Friday morning and our observations showed very little activity. During the morning we were discovered by an elderly civilian whom we detained. About two hours later a woman and a boy arrived and asked us to go with them to their house for food & drink, we accepted but suspecting an ambush we remained where we were for a while and observed the woman & boy cross the open field unmolested. We had a good look around but could see no one, so we followed them at the double, on arrival at the farm house they gave us food & wine and offered us shelter for the night. During the late afternoon the area we were in came under very heavy shell fire from our own guns and we left immediately, making our way along the railway track towards our own troops. We marched all that night and just before first light we rested at the foot of a range of hills, as soon as it became light we made a reconnaissance and found signs of recent occupation by enemy troops. We established ourselves higher up on the side of the hill so as to command a view of the plain below. Later during the day we found civilians in the area who fed us and gave us information concerning the whereabouts of enemy troops. We stayed in the area on the night of Saturday 16/17 June, and on the morning of June 17th we found ourselves on the main road which runs from north to south of the island. We then saw a British water truck driven by two men of the highland division who told us that a town twenty miles north along the road was in our hands, so we set off in this direction, after marching for about an hour three Italian soldiers without arms or equipment surrendered to us, we took them along and marched most of the day making poor progress because of sore feet suffered by the prisoners. During the night we stopped a staff car, 15 cwt truck and a motor cyclist, the officer in charge informed us of the new password and directed us to his camp, an advanced airfield construction unit, after arrival at this camp we handed over the prisoners. The following day Monday 18th June we obtained transport to SYRACUSE where we heard our own troops had departed from, we contacted the C.M.P. H.Q. who referred us to the authorities at NAVAL HOUSE, the following afternoon we boarded T.L.C. 199 and docked at SOUSSE on the morning of Thursday 22nd June.

On the night 13/14 July 1943 I took part in the Brigade operation on the bridge south of Catania. I was attached to 3rd Battalion with one 22 set and charging engine and petrol etc in 2 baskets, and my crew were Sgm Cooper, Sgm Serious and Sgm Abbott. We emplaned in plane no 52 which was the C.O's plane and took off about 20 minutes earlier than scheduled time and had an uneventful flight until the coast of Sicily was reached. I was jumped No 1, and the remainder of my crew Nos 4, 5, and 6, and I had a good view of what was happening on the land from the doorway. There was a good deal of flak coming up as we crossed the coast line, and numerous parachute flares lit up the scene. The pilot flew in and suddenly banked steeply and flew out to sea again, and followed the coast for a while and then banked and went inland again. Once more he turned out to sea again and appeared to be having difficulty in locating the correct river, but after flying a few miles along the coast once more he came to the correct river mouth. We followed the river inland and the plane was rocking quite violently owing to the flak when the signal to jump came on. I pushed the baskets out but had to pause for a few moments because the wireless operator seemed to have forgotten that he was to remove the rollers, and by the time they were removed and I had jumped I was a good way behind the containers etc and could see nothing of them, also I was held on a searchlight and machine gunned continuously while descending so I was unable to concentrate fully on the position of any other chute. I had a heavy landing due to the speed at which we were dropped and lay where I landed for about 10 minutes to clear my head and to wait until the searchlights and machine guns had finished raking the area. I could not see anyone of my stick in the vicinity so I waited for about a further 20 minutes in a shallow ditch in the hope that they would come along to look for the containers and when no-one appeared I set off to search on my own. Whilst doing this two more planes came over and dropped their sticks on the same DZ so I went up to the first person I saw on the ground and it turned out to be Colonel Pearson of 1st Battalion. One of his men said he had seen a Signals basket on the DZ so I went off with this man and although we searched as far as the main road we found nothing and returned to Col. Pearson's group again. L/Sgt Pugh had also joined this group after losing his set and crew, so I remained with them and we all made our way towards the objective. We took up a position in a dyke near the bridge and various isolated groups of men kept joining us - we had also collected about 30 Italian prisoners by this time too so I remained there to assist in guarding the prisoners and to defend the position if necessary. At approximately first light I found Sgm Smith J.S. (a member of Cpl Clayton's crew), he had lost the remainder of his stick but had found a 68 set complete and had carried it around with him all the night. We set up the 68 set and endeavoured to get through to Brigade but without any success. The remainder of 3rd Battalion then joined us but all my crew were still missing, and then L/Cpl Ballamy joined us with his 22 set. A general move to the bridge was started and as soon as I arrived there I saw Capt Rowland and reported the wireless situation. He ordered me to set up the two sets at Bde H.Q. and remain there because these were the only sets that had shown up. I set up the 68 set in the small plantation SW of the bridge and although I called and searched for a long time I could not contact the relieving force. I then discovered another group working lower down the frequency band and tried to contact them in the hope of getting a message relayed. I did contact them once but they did not know my code sign and I lost them again probably because the distance was too great for the set. I reported to Capt Rowland and he instructed the 22 set to get on to this group. They did so and after a while were successful and were able to pass on our situation to the 8th Army. After this I handed over the 68 set to L/Cpl Ballamy while I commenced to dig a slit trench. I had only just got started when two enemy aircraft began strafing the area, and the sets were moved to a culvert near the railway. I remained in the plantation with Sgm Smith J.S. and we took up positions so that we could watch the river and also the left flank in case of an enemy counter attack. One Italian was captured after crossing the river here and another shot whilst trying to run away. We remained here until about 1500 hrs and then we saw some of the 1st Battalion men retiring across the bridge, and a little later I saw Col Pearson crossing the field towards the railway line. Nobody seemed to know what the true position was and there had been no orders given by anyone in our sector, so I went across to the Bde H.Q. culvert with Sgm Smith to try to find out what was happening. The only officers when we arrived there were Capt Perrin-Brown and the M.O. and a little further along the line was Col Pearson. A bombardment of fragmentation shells started about this time and the M.O. told me there was another culvert further up the road so Smith and I took shelter in here, and remained there for about an hour while we had a meal and rested. A number of paratroops began running past this culvert at the end of that and so I went outside and saw S/Sgt Swaine of Bde H.Q. and asked him what was happening.

He told me that the order had been given to split up into small groups and make for the coast. There was some doubt about the authenticity of this order although it was supposed to have originated from the Bde Commander, but there were no officers left to verify this for me so I made for the ADS post because I had seen Capt Perrin-Brown and a small party head in that direction. When we arrived at the ADS Padre Watkins said he had heard the order and he believed that 1st Bn. had already left and he pointed out the best way for us to follow. Our party now consisted of myself, S/Sgt Swaine and Smith J.S. and we made our way to within sight of the coast, and because we had not seen any of our own men and were still uncertain of the enemy positions we decided to hide up for the remainder of the night under a hedge at the side of a secondary road. Next morning we could hear Italians talking in a nearby farm and occasionally a few came along the road so we decided to wait until dark before moving out again. At about 1700 hrs, much to our surprise we saw a soldier who turned out to be one of the D.L.I. who had got lost. We showed him a map and he took us to an R.A. H.Q. and they told us where to find some more of our men. These were RAMC and were taking wounded to Lentini so we went along with them and stayed the night at the hospital there. Next morning we were told to make our way to Syracuse and when we saw several lorries of our own Battalion people going that way, we also started getting lifts until we finally reached the port and rejoined the remainder of the Bde on the boat.

Nearly everyone I met on this operation seemed to be completely in the dark as to what was happening, and it was extremely difficult to know just how to act. I did my best to find out all I could about the situation, but information was very scarce and orders seemed to be non-existent so there I was little I could do but wait for developments, and I have never felt so useless on active service before.

On Saturday 7/7/43 under L/Sgt Currie we reported for duty to 3rd Bn. This day, and Sunday, we devoted to a most complete briefing, and when it was over everyone was most confident as to their knowledge of the operation and their particular role to be carried out. On Monday 9/7/43 we proceeded to the Airfield, only to be told as soon as we arrived that the operation had been postponed for 24 hrs. We returned to camp and the following afternoon went once again to the Airfield where we were assured that this time we would definitely be taking off.

At the Airfield we were provided with a hot meal and at 1845 hrs fitted out 'chutes. Emplaning took place at 1930 hrs and at 2005 hrs we took off. The trip out was most enjoyable, mainly in view of the fact that we were in a C47 aircraft thereby being afforded a considerable amount of movement. The journey was very steady and uneventful. By 2230 hrs we were nearing our objective and at 2245 hrs we were given the order to "Stand up hook up". At 2305 hrs we crossed the coast of Sicily and were met by, what seemed to all of us, a considerable amount of anti-aircraft fire. The red light flashed and at the same moment the plane gave a terrific lurch sending everyone to the floor of the aircraft. The baskets and rollers went up in the air and the rollers and one basket came down across my right foot. On the green light I managed, with the aid of the Radio Op. to heave one basket out of the door but the other one was jammed against the starboard side of the plane and I was forced to jump and leave it.

On landing I found myself within 10 yds of the containers. I proceeded at once to them and waited for the rest of my crew to turn up. Five minutes later the Bn. M.O. arrived but there was no sign of anyone else. The M.O. instructed me to follow him to the Adj where I also found the 2nd i/c 3rd Bn (who had a leg injury) and three other members of our stick. Within ten minutes Sigmn Baxter, Southwood and Smith J.S. arrived - the later carrying a 68 set! This we presumed was the one belonging to L/Cpl Anson and Sgmn Allen.

On orders from the Adj I then went with Baxter and Southwood to get the 22 Set from its container returning immediately, but without being able to find either the basket or the trolley. Meanwhile the Adj had caught four Italians and decided to make use of them to carry the 2nd i/c on a stretcher.

We then moved off under the Adj to make for the Bn H.Q. position leaving the 2nd i/c, the M.O., Sigmn Smith J.S. (with 68 Set) to carry on at their own speed. The Adj set off at a very fast pace and by the time we had covered 2 - 2½ miles Sigmn Baxter and Southwood began to lag considerably. I wish to mention that apart from the men who were carrying sets nothing was being carried except personal equipment, but the Adj would not permit us to take it in turns to carry the sets as he said he wished some men to fight if the need should arise. I then asked if he would permit us to proceed independently but this he would not allow. After a short while both Sigmn Baxter and Southwood were not following up so I decided to wait for them and Cpl Bradley (3rd Bn Sigs) who was carrying an 18 set stayed with me.

After waiting for some time we went back to where I had last seen the two men but there was no sign of them, and we then carried on by ourselves. We arrived at the river bed at approx 0400 hrs and hiding ourselves in the rushes laid up for the day. At frequent intervals we opened up on the 18 Set but could not get any reply to our Signals.

When darkness fell (10/7/43) we decided to hide our sets go and find Bn H.Q. and then return for them. We set off across country and found Bn H.Q. location, but there were no signs whatever of it having been opened. We then went on towards the bridge on the south side of the river, destroying any telephone lines that we saw. When we were within 75 yds of the bridge we heard Italian voices, and as there appeared to be far too many men for us to tackle we returned towards the river bed and our sets.

We had gone about ½ mile when we heard a German patrol and had to quickly take cover. It seemed to be an anti-parachutist patrol as they were making a very thorough search. We did however manage to surprise two of them who had detached themselves from the rest of the patrol and using them as cover we captured the other eight without firing a shot! We disarmed them and searched them and found them to be Panzer Grenadiers. We could not however get anything reliable from them regarding the positions of the German or Italian troops so again decided to lay low for yet another day.

Late in the afternoon a patrol of 3 men from 3rd Bn found us and took us back to the river bed where about 20 officers and men of the 1st and 3rd Bns had gathered. This included the Sigs Offr of 3rd Bn and I immediately reported to him and was told that as soon as darkness fell we were moving off and making for the hills where it was hoped we would meet some of the Eighth Army's troops.

Soon after 2100 hrs we crossed the river and made off towards the hills, and after an uneventful journey of about 4½ hours we arrived at the hospital (ADS) on the hills. We were then told to rest, if possible, until 0500 hrs when we would be relieved.

The following morning (13/7/43) we proceeded to the embussing point where I at once reported to my O.C. and rejoined the section.