Abbreviations

9560 A.A A/C ADS AFV A/L A/Tk BC Bde BHQ Bn Bty Comd Coy DZ Ex H HE i/c Incl Ind Junct LA OC Offr Op OR Posn RA Regt SA SAA Sq Trp W

Map Reference Anti-Aircraft Aircraft Advanced Dressing Station Armoured Fighting Vehicle Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Commander Brigade Battery Headquarters Battalion Battery Commander Company Drop Zone Exercise Horsa High Explosive In-Command Including Independent Junction Landing Area / Light Arms or Artillery? Officer Commanding Officer Operation Other Ranks Position Royal Artillery Regiment Small Arms Small Automatic Arms? Square (map reference) Troop Waco

Report on Operation "FUSTIAN" 13th July to 18th July 1943

Sheets ITALY 1:50,000 270/III and 274/IV

1. A/Tk Plan for Operation

1st A/L A.Tk Bty RA operation order for Ex. FUSTIAN is attached.  The last minute addition of "D" Trp, 1st A/L A.Tk Bty RA and increased Bty HQ party into the plan was made possible by the addition of tug A/C available due to the cancellation of 2nd Para Bde operation "GLUTTON".

2. Date

Operation took place on night of D 3 (July 13th) and subsequent days.

3. Gliders

11 Horsas and 8 Wacos were loaded with 12 A/Tk Guns and H.Q. Blitz Buggies.  Serial Nos were as follows:- Horsas 119 - 129, Wacos 114 - 118(c).

4. Recce Parties

These were constituted as per Op. Order and all personnel took off.

5. Action on Base Aerodrome

Strip E

10 of 11 Horsas Serial Nos 119 - 129 took off from 2145 hrs to 2200 hrs.  Serial No. 125 damaged his tow rope on take off and did not continue.

Strip F

8 Wacos Serial Nos. 114 - 118(c) took off but Serial Nos 115 and 118 landed before reaching the coast.  Reason given was unserviceability of gliders.

6. Action During Flight

Course followed as set save that tug A/C were flying at considerably over 500 ft.

7. Coast Approach and Glider Release

Navigation to the coast-line was accurate but on crossing the coast considerable flak was encountered also searchlights.  Tug A/C commenced to take evasive action and there was considerable weaving in and out of the flak belt.  This drew the tug pilots off their correct line of run in from which few correctly recovered.  From my position on the ground (having dropped by parachute) tugs and gliders could be seen flying up and down the coast or turning inland and going out again.  Glider pilots eventually got orders to release and released at their own accord.  The result was that gliders crash landed scattered over an area of 10 miles by 6 miles (see attached map).  It is obvious that many navigators confused the valley of River Leonardo 9560 with the River Simeto.

8. Intruder Patrols and Fighter Support

Although promised no fighter support or intruder patrols over A.A. posts were noticed.

9. Numbers of Gliders Down and Location on Ground

Reports and interviews to date give the following figures of gliders down and locations.

Summary

Type	Crossed Tunisian Coast	Landed Possible to Unload	Landed Impossible to Unload	Crashed Completely	Unaccounted For
HORSAS	10	5 incl 1 which caught fire on blowing tail	-	2	3
WACOS	6	2	2	-	2

10. Landing Areas and Lights

It will be noticed from above paragraph that only 4 Horsas got gun anywhere near L.A.8 while only 1 Waco landed near L.A.7.  As reported earlier, confusion [?] two valleys counted for this low figure.  No landing devices or lights were set up by personnel of the Ind Parachute Coy as these men had been incorrectly dropped.  L.A.8 proved to be extremely small and was further complicated by several rows of telegraph poles running parallel with the road and into the field.  The corn was out and shocked which obstructed area further.

11. Condition of Gliders on the Ground

Horsas

In all but one case undercarriages were either jettisoned during flight or ripped off on landing.  Guns and Jeeps were removed either through the door, nose or tail, whichever appeared to be the most practical according to the position.  There was little difficulty in doing this as the gliders were badly knocked about.  In one case the skid came through the floor of the glider and prevented the easy removal of the Jeep.  The use of Cordtex net in further operations is not advised for when used the glider is completely burnt out.

Wacos

Only two gun teams were carried in Wacos, the remainder being used to carry Blitz Buggies for Trp HQs.  In the case of one detachment split in Serial Nos 116 and 117, the gun came down on Catania Aerodrome and Blitz Buggie at Lentini, a distance of over 15 miles apart.  Two Jeeps broke their lashings on impact and jammed the front cab so that it could not be lifted.  The presence of enemy troops prevented these from being extricated by means of hacksaws.

12. Subsequent Action After Landing

After unloading, the three A/Tk guns landed in the vicinity of the bridge were deployed as follows:-

Serial 116 "B" Trp gun only, Sgt Shelswell i/c landed within Catania Airfield outer defences.  Having immobilised the gun by removing the striker mechanism he withdrew with his detachment to the bridge where he manned a captured 88mm.  Two further Axis A/Tk guns were captured in pill boxes on each side of the bridge.  Under instructions of 2/Lt E.E. Clapham RA these guns were manned by Glider Pilots and parachute personnel.  B.H.Q. was established at Track Junct 936665.

    (a) Targets

No enemy A.F.Vs or lorried infantry were observed.  Sgt Anderson's gun successfully engaged enemy pill box at North side of river when 1 Para Bn withdrew south of bridge.

    (b) Withdrawal

At approx 1945 hrs orders were given to withdraw into the hills.  All personnel and guns of 1 A/L A.Tk Bty RA less Sgt Anderson's gun detachment, were successfully brought back without casualties, to the area 925590, where contact was made with recce elements of the 8th Army.

    (c) Recce Parties

These accompanied Parachute Units that their respective Trps were supporting.  In common with the Parachute Units these parties were in all cases dropped at considerable distances from the D.Zs.  Details as below.

            (A) B.Cs recce party dropped in Sq 9363.  Arrived bridge 1030 hrs following day.

            (B) "A" Trp recce party under Lt Hogan dropped S.W. of Etna.  Lt Hogan made his way back three days later.

            (C) "B" Trp recce party dropped Sq 9259 under Lt Tansley.  Never arrived at bridge.  Sgt Quinn who dropped with "A" Coy 2 Para Bn arrived at L.A. before gliders and gave considerable assistance.

    (d) Individual Actions

Capt N. MacLeod RA who travelled in Horsa Serial 126 was severely bruised and cut about on landing.  He, however, carried on until the arrival of the Bty Comd when he was treated and was held at A.D.S.  Later, on withdrawal, he came back in company with the Bty.

2/Lt E.E. Clapham on landing from Serial 129 worked tirelessly in assisting gun teams to unload their gliders in the area of the L.A.8.  He further organised the manning of the Axis A/Tk guns in the pill boxes near the bridge, and instructed the paratroops in the firing of the gun.  Later in a jeep accompanied by Dvr Reed he made many journeys from the bridge to the A.D.S. carrying wounded stretcher cases.  At all times the road was under fire from L.A. and snipers.  Throughout the operation his energy and devotion to duty was an inspiration to all around him.

Dvr/Mech Reed D cooly drove his jeep under fire at all times.  He assisted in bringing in many stretcher cases from the bridge to the A.D.S.  Later he was instrumental in the distribution of reserves of small arms ammunition to Bns.  His jeep was holed by S.A.A. fire on more than one occasion.  His cheerfulness, energy and devotion to duty was an inspiration at all times.

Sergeant Anderson J.G. with his gun was in position south of the river.  When the parachute troops were withdrawn south of the bridge he engaged the enemy occupied pill box north and silenced the fire coming from it.  He later withdrew his detachment, gun and jeep along the bare fire-swept road.  He was exceedingly cool and collected at all times.

13. The Action as it Affected the Bty.

"FUSTIAN" is the first operation in which Gunners have been carried into the battle-field by air.  Although completely unprepared by any previous experience for what lay before them every man did his job coolly and with not a sign of any wavering.  The flak encountered was considerable and in every case gliders made heavy landings, and most partially disintegrated on hitting the ground.  Nevertheless detachments regardless of being under fire and away from their correct landing area proceeded to unload their equipment.  In all respects every man lived up to the high traditions, bravery and loyalty to their guns which is characteristic of the R.A.

14. Casualties

Figures of casualties on operation "FUSTIAN" are as follows:-

Lessons from Operation "FUSTIAN"

The following constitute the main lessons brought out as a result of Operation "FUSTIAN".  The points 1-8 are of general note and are applicable to all arms.  Points 9-12 are applicable to A/Tk only.

1. Opposed Landing By Night

    (a) Flak

The presence of flak around the D.Z. and L.A. upset all plans for an accurate and punctual landing.  The present training of pilots does not make a repetition of such an operation a practical proposition.  Further, it is doubtful if, even with increased training, that pilots could take evasive action against the flak and still release the gliders at the correct point.  Glider pilots, after release, have the same trouble with S.A. A.A. fire.

    (b) Ground Opposition and Contact

Once gliders and guns are down and spread over a wide area, the Bty Comd can never properly regain control.  Unlike parachutists, a detachment with jeep and gun cannot move through enemy held territory by day due to the target it presents.  Further, with the present form of communication there is no method of contacting the gun once it has gone astray.

2. Communications

The major weakness, once on the ground, throughout units was the lack of wireless communication.  Relying on sets to be correctly dropped in containers and recovered is a dangerous assumption.  The following are priority wireless requirements:-

            (i) Light set to be dropped on the men with a range sufficient to work back to all Bns and the relieving force.

            (ii) A set with similar characteristics by which recce parties can contact the gliders in the air some distance from the L.A. and so delay their release should conditions be unfavourable.

            (iii) Each A/Tk sub-section to have a Walkie-Talkie to enable it to gives its location immediately on landing.

3. Choice of L.As and Flare Paths

Much more consideration earlier in the planning of the operation must be given to the choice of L.As.  They should be given preference over D.Zs if the gliders are to land so that the guns can be readily available and fit for action.  O.C. Glider Pilot Regt and O.C. Independent Parachute Coy must be present when the selection of these areas is made.  The fullest and latest Intelligence Reports must be available up to the last minute.  For example on L.A.8. there were several rows of telegraph cables inside and parallel with the road that were not reported on Intelligence Reports; also, during the immediate weeks, the corn crop had been cut and shocked, which further obstructed an already small area.

    Flare Paths - If they are to be used they must be unmistakable from the inevitable fires that spring up on all sides, otherwise fatal results are inevitable.

4. Use of Waco Gliders

Waco gliders for the carriage of the gun detachment, necessitating its being split into two glider loads, is not practicable.  The two halves cannot be guaranteed to arrive in any close proximity and therefore gun and jeep never "marry up".  It can continue to be used for the lifting of Troop and Bty HQs, but fuller experiments must be made in lashing down the Jeep to prevent it moving forward and jamming the cab on a heavy landing.

5. Recognition Signals

With parachute troops operating in small bodies over wide areas some confusion and shooting of ones own troops is inevitable.  However, it is felt that some easy recognition signal for distances up to about 150 yds would considerably reduce this.  This could be by light or whistle.  The password for very close contact worked very satisfactorily.

6. Unloading Horsas

It is difficult to point any constructive lesson from the operation.  Horsas landed up in various positions on their skids and bellies and at varying angles.  Unloading had to be left to the individual ingenuity of Comds.  This, it is felt, may always have to be so.  The emergency ramp should, however, continue to be carried in the glider.

7. Cordtex Ring

In one case where cordtex was used the whole glider fired and the load was completely destroyed.  The use of cordtex is therefore most dangerous and should only be used after every other means has failed.

8. Attachment of Glider Pilots

Both for morale and for efficient subsequent action after landing, the contact between the glider pilots and gun detachments must be of the closest.  Owing to overweight one man of the detachment has to be left behind, his place being taken by a glider pilot.  A multitude of jobs for the second pilot are always available once the glider is down.  To obtain this close contact, glider pilots must be attached to the sub-section they are to fly much earlier before the action and for longer periods.  Permanent attachment between operations could be wisely considered.

9. Recce Parties

More offrs and O.Rs must be trained to jump.  Parachute Bns often have spare room for one or two in their various planes.  By this means reinforcements and reserve personnel could be landed.

10. Proportion of H.E.

A proportion of H.E. would have been of use - especially as the Parachute Bns were so short of heavy support weapons.  In the operation no A.F.Vs were encountered and therefore guns were not fully employed.

11. Training in Infantry Tactics

The importance of training in infantry tactics cannot be overstretched.  Every A/Tk gunner must be capable of using his small arms as efficiently as a parachutist.

12. Stretcher Attachment on Jeeps

The attachment worked most admirably and stretcher bearers were saved much walking, and wounded men more quickly carried to the A.D.S.  Every Jeep should be fitted with the attachment on the rear of the vehicle.