Appendix IV.
Report on activities of RASC, 1st Airborne Division. 14 July 1943.
APPX 'C'. WD.
SECRET &
CONFIDENTIAL.
Copy No. 8.
REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF RASC 1st AIRBORNE
DIV (RENDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 'G' LETTER
OF NO REFERENCE AND UNDATED). ST/3.
14 Jul 43.
OBJECT.
1. Nothing has been inserted in any sense of recrimination, the objects of this report being:-
(a) to record difficulties met with which are liable to recur.
(b) pass on lessons from these to 6th Airborne Div.
(c) improve the RASC organisation for Supply by Air as a result of these experiences.
MOBILIZATION.
2. Prior to January this year the RASC 1 Airborne Div consisted of one Coy. The new W.E. on which the Div RASC is at present formed was submitted to the War Office in January, but it was not finally approved until one month before the date of embarkation.
3. The re-organization involved the conversion of 250 Coy to a Jeep basis, the conversion of 253 Coy from a Tp Carrying basis to a General Transport basis involving the selection of an additional 200 personnel, the disposal of its Tp Carrying vehs and the taking over of those serviceable 3-ton lorries in 250 Coy which now became redundant owing to the new W.E. and finally the addition of extra vehs to bring the Coy up to W.E. A third Coy, No 93 Airborne Div Comp Coy, was converted from the existing 20th Armd Bde Coy. This Coy also had to select some 200 additional personnel of all ranks and trades. H.Q., R.A.S.C. was not finally approved until 7 April 43 and it also had to form and draw its G.1098, etc, under conditions of extreme urgency.
4. The new G.1098 for HQ, RASC and the Lt Coy was submitted to the W.O. from Div about 14 March. This G.1098 was hardly amended at all, but was not received approved until 24 April.
5. As a result of the short time for mobilization it was not possible to test all personnel in their ranks and trades, to check and tactically pack all the G.1098 equipment, nor to give proper embarkation leave to all ranks. With the exception of a few personnel, however, all ranks received at least 48 hrs embarkation leave. The vast majority of new intake personnel were entirely untrained having been drawn from A.A. units. Details of equipment difficulties are given in Appx 'A'.
6. Whenever possible a new Div RASC should be formed 6 months before the date ordered to mobilize, but when not possible the need is all the more great for co-ordination by one Branch of the various mob orders and instructions issued from the W.O. and for these to be issued as a complete instruction. This should include a complete and amended up to date W.E., G.1098, L.1398 and Def List pro-forms. It is felt that the authority having power to order mobilization of a Div should also have power to issue orders at the same time for action to be taken on W.E.'s which have not yet been passed, but have been submitted to the W.E. Committee. This would avoid the last minute rush to fill vacancies on the establishment when large numbers of personnel have to be found, particularly where men of a high medical category and a large number of ranks and trades are involved.
MOVE OVERSEAS.
7. For Security reasons it was not possible to obtain any but the scantiest information. I was informed by Div that the destination was North Africa, the approximate dates of Advance Parties and Main Bodies departure, and that the journey would be by sea. By the date on which Advance Parties of the Div had to leave England, the Div RASC possessed only four Jeeps, and the re-organisation of the new W.E. had hardly begun. I represented to Div the need for an Advance RASC Party and the desirability of this was appreciated at DIV. I was, however, only allowed to send Capt. Cranmer-Byng, approximately 9 O.R's with one Jeep. On more than one occasion during visits to the W.O. I represented the need for an RASC Advance Party and finally I asked Brigadier Dowse, the Asst Inspector RASC to accompany me at an interview with Gen. Snowden-Smith, D.S.T. at the W.O. I represented to the D.S.T. the need for an RASC Advance Party, but I was assured that the Branches planning the move of the Div at the W.O. would make all the necessary arrangements for RASC Services in the north African Theatre for the first party of the Div. I also discussed the supply situation in North Africa with Lieut. Col. Heywood, S.T. 6 and was assured that all our needs would be provided in the North African Theatre.
8. The Div RASC moved overseas less the following vehs:-
All Motor Cycles.
2 cars - 4 str.
200 trailers - Jeep.
An assurance was received from the W.O. (WS6) that these would be issued on arrival in North Africa and that they were being sent out in bulk from this country for that purpose. As a result all spares for Matchless Motor Cycles were brought out to North Africa, but are now quite useless as we find that BSA cycles are being issued. No cars or trailers have yet been received up to 14 July.
ADM IN NORTH AFRICA.
9. Subsequent events have familiarised everybody with the difficulties to be encountered by a British Formation in an area occupied by Troops of Allied Countries in an overseas Theatre of War. At MASCARA the Div RASC was 65 miles from the Base port of ORAN and 240 miles from the nearest superior British Formation HQ. i.e: A.F.H.Q. to which telephone communication was extremely precarious and teleprint messages sometimes took 2 to 3 days. There was no British Base or L of C units in the area which would have been familiar with our requirements and method of working. It was, however, necessary to draw all our requirements direct from American sources, and the greatest possible co-ordination existed between all the American authorities concerned and ourselves. Their efforts were untiring and their willingness to help was very great, but the point of difficulty was, at the time,
(a) a different ration and a different ration scale which British troops found contained too little bulk and was unfamiliar to unit cooks.
(b) a shortage of American M.T. which did not allow them to fulfil our needs during the period before our M.T. ships arrived.
10. The next point of difficulty was due to the delay in the arrival of the 6 M.T. and Stores ships for the Div. Had it been so arranged by the W.O. that these ships arrived simultaneously with the Main body, the chief hardships at FLEURUS Staging camp could have been eliminated and the Div could have concentrated at MASCARA a week or ten days earlier, thus permitting more time for training. FLEURUS Staging Camp, was, in fact, nothing but a small piece of Africa allotted for the use of the Main Bodies until such time as the Div's tentage and equipment became available, and it was not possible for my 1300 men to do much training at this camp without their vehicles and G.1098. As a very small, but important example, the pamphlet "Instructions for Officers Commanding Units ordered Overseas 1942" instructed that Cooking Equipment under G.1098-1000, Schedule 17 & 18 was to be despatched in the Baggage Train. It was obviously assumed that the contents of the Baggage Train would be sent in personnel ships. The fact that this did not happen resulted in units being without their cooking equipment for 10 days until the M.T. ships arrived.
11. As a result of my appreciation issued under ST/3 dated 30 May I decided that the first priority task was clearing of ports of all M.T. and Stores, and an RASC organization was set up to carry out this task in accordance with instructions issued in RASC 1 AIRBORNE DIV ADM INSTR NO 1 dated 1 June. The results of this were reported to Div HQ under ST/3 dated 20 June. 1600 M.T. vehicles and 2200 tons Stores were unshipped, sorted by serials, prepared and despatched by road and rail to MASCARA, subsequently all stores arriving at RH's were delivered by RASC to units own lines. It can finally be stated that this method whereby one authority handled the Div stores and baggage had great advantages and worked without a hitch. It was, however, the beginning of intense M.T. activity which up to the present day has necessitated the fullest use of every M.T. vehicle in the Div RASC.
(a) All troops and baggage, with the exception of the Light Regt, Div Sigs and REME, which moved under their own arrangements had to be cleared from FLEURUS to Area MASCARA vide RASC 1 AIRBORNE DIV ADM INSTR NO 2 dated 4 June, and at the same time the Div stores and baggage had to be cleared from RH, TIZI to unit camps.
(b) From the 7 to 29 June, apart from the Daily Maintenance of the Div and various other duties, between 70 and 130 lorries per day had to be found for troop carrying during Bde Exercises vide RASC 1 AIRBORNE DIV ADM INSTR NO 4 dated 8 June.
(c) In addition, it was necessary to run vehicles to PERREGAUX (40 miles) to draw supplies, and to ORAN and ALGIERS to draw various special requirements.
SCARLET FEVER.
12. The outbreak of Scarlet Fever in 253 Coy resulted in the isolation of that Coy, involved a re-organization of the Div RASC in order to carry out all the commitments which had by now accumulated. This organisation is outlined in RASC 1 AIRBORNE DIV ADM INSTR No 7 dated 17 June and necessitated the employment of all Relief Driver Increments (except 253 Coy) and sometimes other tradesmen as well in order to keep vehicles of 253 Coy on the road. It was thus not possible to relieve drivers who often got very little sleep. The position today, 14 July, is that 130 men of 253 Coy are still isolated at MASCARA, but 30 R.A. drivers were provided to ease the situation and have been of great value.
MOVE FROM MASCARA to SOUSSE AREA.
13. This involved the movement of the Div by road and rail for a distance of approx. 1000 miles. Chief difficulties of the road move are illustrated in my report to Div HQ "Convoy 06502E" (Div Advance Parties). Apart from the lack of any assistance from Movement Control details of which are contained in my very restrained report, the road moves were accomplished without any difficulty. As regards rail moves, trains had to be cleared from TUNIS, SID EL HANI and KAIROUAN. It was necessary for convoys of from 60 - 100 lorries to proceed to TUNIS daily to collect personnel and stores. At the same time trains arriving at SIDI EL HANI had to be cleared and M.T. had to be sent to BONE from ammunition, TRIPOLI for special stores and CONSTANTINE for rollers. Drivers on the TUNIS run have very often not returned until early in the morning when they have had to re-fuel, which meant they have been up till four and five o'clock and starting out again on another run to TUNIS at 0700 hrs. This has only been possible with the same drivers for two or three trips, since they then fall asleep at the wheel, but it was necessary owing to the man-power situation as a result of the many other tasks to be carried out at the same time, and I wish to record that I have never, on any one occasion, heard anyone grumbling in the RASC Coy's concerned. Owing to the ever increasing transport commitments, it was necessary to obtain assistance of SOUSSE AREA which provided 'X' and 'Y' Transport Platoons of 354 General Transport Coy. These Platoons have carried out valuable work. In addition 30 lorries without drivers were obtained by arrangement with A.F.H.Q. from CONSTANTINE and although these lorries have been of the greatest assistance, they had previously been driven from CAIRO and consequently required considerable maintenance. They also required 30 drivers which have had to be provided from Div RASC resources.
In addition 20 lorries (American) have been borrowed, but drivers for these also being found by Div RASC.
The Div RASC has thus been operating approx. 340 x 3-ton lorries plus domestic vehicles amounting to about 60, and has been operating some and maintaining all of its 180 Jeeps and 112 Trailers, a total of about 700 vehicles, excluding motor-cycles. It is to be noted also that although three transport platoon's have been borrowed from other sources, no Coy HQ accompanied them and administration of this party developed on the Div RASC.
As an example of work done, one Coy (93 Coy) covered:-
(a) An average of 1000 miles per vehicle with 100 x 3-ton lorries from 15 June to 21 June and
(b) An average of 1100 miles per vehicle with 174 x 3-ton lorries from 22 June to 14 July.
In this latter period alone (23 days) excluding minor details, 93 Coy used 19,758 ½ gallons petrol for a mileage of 196, 770, lifted 16, 500 personnel and cleared 4750 tons of stores and baggage.
14. The main difficulties of operating such a large M.T. organization in circumstances which have been described above, arise chiefly from the lack of opportunity to settle down in one place. Ever since we arrived in the North African Theatre we have had to maintain two circus tents, one closing down in one area, another opening up a thousand miles away. This cannot be avoided and it is only for consideration whether it is worth while opening up the entire organisation of an Airborne Div in one area when it is to move again in three weeks or a months time to another. It is for consideration, for example, whether BONE would not have been more suitable port of entry than ORAN in these circumstances.
PRESENT OPERATIONS.
15. It has been found necessary during the last week to provide between 120 and 170 x 3-ton lorries daily for lifting Brigade's from unit lines to Air strips. In addition, one thousand tons of ammunition had to be drawn for the Div, 500 tons of supplies and miscellaneous stores had to be drawn for the Div and for FORCE 141 and finally about 300 tons of ammunition, supplies and stores have been delivered by American transport to form Reserve Dumps for FORCE 343, all of which have been formed under Div RASC Control. The setting up of the organization for Supply by Air also involved finding RASC Staffs at each airfield and at each of the pre-packed and Reserve Dumps to meet demands which we might receive, has involved earmarking a minimum of 25 x 3-ton lorries at airfields and Dumps. 2500 panniers have been packed with stores and harnessed and stacked ready for despatch. For pre-packing, 250 men have been employed for about four days. A total of 105 men are employed on guard duties and fire-watching, i.e: 40 from 93 Coy, 40 from 253 Coy and 25 from 250 Coy. The above figures are given to indicate the tightness of the man-power situation which has only been managed as a result of Daily man-power states to HQ, ARSC for co-ordination.
16. It is considered that there is an advantage in keeping Reserve Dumps to be held by the Div RASC as small as possible. Reserves should therefore, when possible, be earmarked available in local depots. The fear that some other formation might steal a Div allotment of ammunition should not be allowed to influence the taking of this risk. As a result of pre-packing at Depots at 21 A.A.D. it is now considered an advantage to carry out pre-packing at Depots if within 20 miles and if suitable conditions exist. Co-operation of the Depot Staff is essential. It is also considered that if within one hours run, replenishment of pre-packed dumps may be made direct from Depots with Div transport. Finally it has been ascertained that water can be stored in cans if kept in a suitable pit. As an experiment 6000 gallons so stored have been found perfectly cool and fit to drink after six days.
SUPPLY BY AIR EQUIPMENT.
17. There has been difficulty in getting adequate supply by air equipment. At the last minute a search had to be made in order to locate roller conveyers, 100-lb breaking strain cord and extensions to static lines. The rollers did not in fact arrive until D + 3 and in the meantime it was necessary to improvise sets of rollers from whatever material could be found, in case a demand for supply by air should have been received. In addition parachutes, panniers and harnesses have been in short supply, the total having risen, after great effort, to only 4000 for all purposes of supply. It is considered that in operations on a large scale the Div should have immediate access to at least 10,000 of each of these articles of common use, and they should either be held in depots locally under arrangements of a higher formation or held within the Div in the Fd Park, MPSU or other suitable unit.
M.T.
18. There is great need for standardisation of the type of vehicle to be used in the British Army. The GMC American vehicle is noteworthy as having been designed for its work. Some details in connection with M.T. are given in Appx 'B', but the difficulties arise chiefly from lack of spare wheels and tyres (the scale is only one per 5 vehicles), the operation of different makes and types which necessitates the carrying of several sets of spares and the fact that trailer wheels are not interchangeable with the towing vehicle. It is considered that a degree of cylinder wear should be laid down above which no vehicle should be taken abroad. This figure should allow of a reasonable expectation of a further 10,000 miles running before an engine overhaul becomes necessary.
ORDERS & INSTRUCTIONS.
19. It is considered that these do serve a useful purpose even if only in confirmation of verbal arrangements, which is probably the best use for them. It is not always easy for subordinate commanders to keep in the picture when very little information is vouchsafed to them. Although they act as a result largely on their wits and in many cases will do very well without any orders whatsoever, yet there is a possibility that in operations some point may be overlooked or some action taken in direct contravention of the desired policy. Owing to a clerical oversight, CRASC was not included on the distribution of Div Adm Instrs No's 2, 3, 4 & 5 and so did not discover their existence until D + 1.
20. Due to the very complicated mechanism which has gradually been developed for Supply by Air it was very difficult to obtain information as to what was to be done in advance. To quote the worst case, we have still at this date no documents to say what should be held for FORCE 343. Large convoys of lorries have been driven up to 93 Coy and it has only been possible at the time to off-load these and accept stores without any consignment note. An attempt to deliver 1200 tons of American ammunition was frustrated in the nick of time by the arrival of an American Liaison Officer, who himself had very little idea where he was to deliver the ammunition, or in fact what it was for.
21. Copies of instructions have been sent to SOUSSE AREA and KAIROUAN AREA on several occasions without a copy to Airborne Div and invariably without a copy to CRASC. KAIROUAN AREA appeared to be responsible for passing on all information concerning FORCE 141 and FORCE 343, but SOUSSE AREA were responsible for the provision of supplies laid down. KAIROUAN AREA seems to have been an unnecessary link. It is essential when Airborne Forces are employed in close co-operation with ground troops that a definite and speedy method of communication be laid down to ensure that definite information reaches the Div in time for supplies by air to reach their destination before our troops are overwhelmed.
FUTURE ORGANISATION OF DIV RASC.
22. This cannot be final until the role of the Div is decided. It is felt at present that considerable time must elapse before sufficient aircraft will be available to allow the Div to operate as a formation, When many thousands of (c.47) aircraft are available, it may be possible to build up a force by air as a result of the establishment of an Airhead. When such an event is possible, many transport companies on the same organisation as the Light Company RASC may be required. It is, however, considered that at present, that is to say, whilst Airborne operations are confined to a series of Brigade Group operations, that the Light Coy RASC is a highly extravagant play thing. Apart from the Light Coy however, it has become apparent in the circumstances in which the Div is operating at present in North Africa, that the W.E. is inadequate. The addition of two extra transport platoons is necessary, one to each of the three-ton companies and in addition it is necessary for the Light Coy, if retained, to have a small number of 3-ton lorries for domestic purposes, which can also be used to carry part of its G.1098 during a move.
A paper is being submitted on the future organisation and possible employment of the RASC allotted to Airborne Formations.
23. Finally the difficulties met with may be summarise as due to:-
(a) Short time to form and mobilize.
(b) Lack of arrangements on arrival in North African Theatre.
(c) Necessity to maintain two camps 1000 miles apart.
(d) Bad luck (Scarlet Fever and Fire).
The loyalty and effort of All ranks of the Div RASC has gone unquestioned since its formation. It is a new organisation formed within the last six months from personnel drawn from many sources. It has, however, triumphed over all these difficulties and its "Esprit de Corps" is second to none.
T.H. Jefferies.
Lieut. Colonel.
Comd, R.A.S.C., 1 Airborne Division.
DISTRIBUTION.
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Headquarters 1 Airborne Division. Copies No. File. War Diary. Spare. |
1 - 6 7 8 - 9 10 - 12 |
APPX 'A'.
EQUIPMENT AND N.A.A.F.I.
(a). Two pairs of boots should be issued and War Clothing Regulations amended accordingly.
(b). Portable supply shelters are essential. These were not provided.
(c). A scale of spare clothing and equipment would have been a valuable guide as to what to pack for shipment. Could such a scale be issued.
(d). Size rolls of intake were incomplete and were not accurate. Training and other units should be able to improve on this.
(e). 'P' helmet size 7 ¼ is equal to a normal 6 7/8. Many men fitted up with helmets too small for them since when demanding it was assumed sizes would be normal.
(f). Standard packing case schedule for G.1098 could well be issued for all units whose G.1098 is similar. Smaller packing cases most desirable.
(g). It would have been considerable assistance if cooking equipment as per Schedule 17 & 18 of G.1098-1000 were taken on the personnel ship.
(h). Paint brushes and paint are in short supply at home and in such urgent demand on mobilization, that a special allocation should have been made.
(j). Many men were sent by Supply Units who were not up to the Medical standard of A.1.
(k). It would appear to be necessary for Airborne RASC to be responsible for and to carry Airborne and Technical equipment for Supply by Air, Scales to be based on experience gained by RASC itself. Such items as:-
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PANNIERS. CONTAINERS & CRADLES. HARNESS. STATIC CORD. BREAKING STRAIN CORDS. |
RUNWAYS. PANNIER & CONTAINER LIGHTS. LASHINGS. PADDING MATERIAL. PLYWOOD BOTTOMS. |
should be brought out from U.K. loaded in RASC vehicles if possible.
(l). More maps on a scale of 1 per officer and 1 per section should invariable be issued.
(m). Watches to a scale of 1 per full rank (except officers) would be a great advantage.
(n). N.A.A.F.I. scale of commodities is limited to a few very excellent products, but chocolate is of no use in this hot climate. I would suggest a confectionary able to stand up to the high temperature be sold, i.e: boiled sweets.
Brass and Boot polish are in very short supply.
APPX 'B'.
VEHICLES.
(a). Vehicles over 10,000 miles running should not be taken abroad. Those under 10,000 miles with bad cylinder wear should also not be taken.
(b). The Austin 10 Utility and 8 hp 2 str are not satisfactory and should be replaced by a stouter and more powerful and better designed vehicle. A Jeep type with modified body is suggested for heavy Coy's.
(c). O.C. a unit should never be left without a car.
(d). Spare wheels and tyres must be issued to all vehicles proceeding to a Theatre of War. At present one tyre burst and a load does not get through on schedule. Not only that, but vehicles become V.O.R. for want of a tyre alone.
(e). Maintenance crews for sea voyage were insufficient to carry out the job they were assigned to do.
(f). Seats should be incorporated in the sides of vehicle bodies fro Troop Carrying purposes. These seats must be made to fold away to enable the vehicle to be used for load-carrying at will.
(g). Each transport platoon should be given three petrol pumps each on their G.1098.
(h). Cleaning rags should be included in substantial quantities in all vehicle platoon's G.1098.
(j). AC Sparking Plugs are insufficient; Lodge, Champion & KLG are suitable for hard conditions and then only if of their best type.
(k). Magneto ignition would be preferable on all W.D. load carriers.
(l). The GMC American vehicle is note-worthy as having been designed for its work. If a design were drawn up for a G.P. Vehicle and given to all large manufacturers, who should each make vehicles to the standard design. This would, of course, take time but the immeasurable advantages gained are obvious. If somebody in authority would brave the storm and lay down this policy now, the Army would have a standard suitable vehicle, easily supplied with spares, maintained and operated. Special types of vehicles could be designed similarly on a Group Pattern basis. At present we could not do better than adopt the American G.MC.
(m). Petrol tanks should run the width of the chassis and be fitted with two fillers, one at each end. Two such tanks could be fitted to split the risk of loss in action.
(n). Forward Drive vehicles are not the answer for Army use. The inaccessibility is a considerable disadvantage when maintenance is considered. The best answer is six wheels and a forward engine mounting.
(o). Starter motors should be fully enclosed in respect of the Bendix drive on all vehicles.
(p). Fan belts should be abolished and a gear train totally enclosed and self lubricated be employed instead.
(q). Brakes should be air-cooled with fine gauze-covered inlet vent and should be of the two leading shoe-type in all cases. Heavy vehicles, of course, are now fitted with excellent systems which need no change except air cooling.
(r). Front wheel drive with a low ratio set and transfer box ought to be incorporated in every military vehicle (this in addition to rear wheel drive).
(s). A Temperature Thermometer for water should be fitted to all vehicles.
(t). More use by manufacturers could be made of silent Block bushes.
(u). Seating comfort for 15 cwt vehicles especially must be more fully considered. At present the position on those vehicles of all types is anatomically incorrect.