CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF CAMP.

        STALAG LUFT VI (HEYDEKRUG) was situated about one mile South-east of HEYDEKRUG Railway Station (EAST PRUSSIA) (GERMANY, 1:100,000 Sheet 1, 2934), which is on the single-track railway between TILSIT and MEMEL. The Lithuanian frontier was about 8 km. East of the Camp. The whole area is flat, swampy, wooded country.

        The Camp, which was specially constructed for the accommodation of Air Force personnel, was built on sand. The water level was about 3 feet below the surface.

        A detailed plan of the layout of the Camp is at Appendix "B".

2. CAMP CONDITIONS.

        (a) Number of P's/W and accommodation.

                The Camp was divided into three Compounds, known as "A", "E" and "K". "A" Compound was the first to be used and was opened in June 1943 when the N.C.O's from STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN), Centre Compound, were transferred there in batches of about 200. About the same time batches of new P's/W were transferred from DULAG LUFT (OBERURSEL).

                In October 1943 "A" Compound was filled to capacity and "K" Compound was opened with the transfer of a number of N.C.O.'s from "A" Compound. Soon afterwards, most of the N.C.O.'s at STALAG LUFT I (BARTH) were transferred to this Camp and accommodated in "K" Compound. Batches of new P's/W continued to arrive from DULAG LUFT (OBERURSEL) and this Compound was filled to capacity in February 1944. At that time the construction of "E" Compound had been almost completed and new P's/W arriving from DULAG LUFT (OBERURSEL) and a small batch of N.C.O.'s from STALAG LUFT I (BARTH) were accommodated there. Most of these new P's/W were U.S.A.A.C. N.C.O.'s.

                The capacity of each Compound was about 2,000 men. There were a certain number of wooden Army huts in each Compound, but the main accommodation was in a single storey barracks, divided into nine rooms, each holding 50 men. The barracks had double roofs, of wood, covered with tarred felt. There was a space of about 1 foot between the weather roof and the inner roof. The floors were wooden planks laid on joists about two or three inches above the ground.

                Personnel of all Air Forces were accommodated in this Camp, i.e. R.A.F., R.A.A.F., R.C.A.F., R.N.Z.A.F., S.A.A.F., Naval Air Arm and U.S.A.A.C. All were N.C.O.'s and those who were commissioned after being P's/W were transferred to Officers' Camps.

                The Germans made several attempts to segregate personnel of the various Air Forces, but the P's/W created so much trouble on these occasions that the idea was abandoned.

                In early February 1944 the Germans asked for a party of 80 volunteers who were willing to be transferred to STALAG LUFT I (BARTH) to act as batmen to the Air Force Officers there. A list was compiled by the Camp Leader and the transfer was effected. A proportion of the volunteers were individuals who planned to escape en route to STALAG LUFT I.

                In July 1944 the whole Camp was evacuated because of the Russian advance. The majority of the personnel from "E" and "K" Compounds were transferred to STALAG LUFT IV (GROSS TYCHOW). The remainder, and the personnel from "A" Compound, were transferred to STALAG 357 (THORN).

        (b) German administration.

                The Camp was administered and guarded by German Air Force personnel, who numbered about 500 men. Nearly all of these, with the notable exception of the Abwehr Officer, Major PESCHEL, had not had previous experience in dealing with British-American P's/W.

                The majority of the administrative staff remained at the Camp throughout the period it was in use, but the guard personnel were changed at irregular intervals.

        (c) P/W Administration.

                The general administration of the whole Camp was carried out by a Camp Leader and Secretary, both of whom acted in a similar capacity in the Centre (N.C.O.'s) Compound at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN). They were accommodated in "A" Compound. They were:-

                        580114 W.O. DEANE, J.A.G., R.A.F.

                        744979 W.O MOGG, R.P.L., R.A.F.

                When "K" Compound was opened in October 1943, the Camp Leader appointed

                        959892 W.O. CLARKE, V.R., R.A.F.

                to act as Leader in that Compound. When the contingent of N.C.O.'s arrived from STALAG LUFT I (BARTH) accompanied by their former Camp Leader, an election was held and CLARKE was confirmed in his appointment.

                When "E" Compound was opened in February 1944, the Camp Leader appointed

                        T/Sgt. PAULES, F.S., U.S.A.A.C.,

                to act as Leader of that Compound, as most of the P's/W accommodated there were American personnel. At a later date he was confirmed in this appointment by majority vote.

                The Germans permitted weekly conferences between the various Compound Leader and their staffs and the Camp Leader, who advised them on matters of policy, etc. The Camp Leader and Compound Leaders also attended conferences with the German Camp Kommandant and brought all breaches of the Geneva Convention, complaints, etc., to his notice.

                The Camp Leader made appropriate representations to the Protecting Power when necessary and dealt with the visiting delegations from the Protecting Power, International Red Cross Society, Young Mens Christian Association, etc.

                The Germans provided office accommodation for the Camp Leader in "A" Compound and for the Leaders of "E" and "K" Compounds in their respective Compounds. They also supplied office furniture, typewriters, stationery, etc.

                This administration continued to function until the Camp was evacuated in July 1944.

        (d) Roll calls.

                At first, weather permitting, roll calls were held each morning and evening on the Sports Fields within each Compound. During inclement weather the P's/W were counted in their barrack rooms. After the mass escape by tunnel in September 1943 the evening roll call was always made in the barracks after 2100 hours when all barracks were locked and the P's/W were liable to be shot if seen outside after that hour.

                During all roll calls, guards were posted at strategic points in the area of the barracks in an endeavour to ensure that personnel could not move from one barrack room to another.

                Personnel who were ill were allowed to remain in their barracks during all outdoor roll calls. These were counted by a German accompanied by a member of the P/W administrative staff.

                At a later date, as Compounds became filled, the outdoor roll calls were divided into two in each Compound. The personnel from each pair of barracks, roughly 1,000 men, were paraded as opposite ends of each Compound and counted simultaneously.

                During all outdoor roll calls the P's/W were formed up in a hollow square, in files of five, in parties representing each barrack room. These parties were arranged in numerical order and there was a space of several yards between them. Guards were posted round these parades with the object of ensuring that personnel did not move from one party to another after being counted.

                When the parades were assembled a party of Germans, always headed by an officer, approached the P/W N.C.O. in charge of each parade, who stood in the centre of the hollow square. After the exchange of salutes this N.C.O. called the parade to attention and after the German officer had saluted, the parade was ordered to stand at east and the counting commenced. The officer remained in the centre with the P/W i/c parade.

                On each parade two Germans, accompanied by a member of the P/W administrative staff, counted the occupants of each barrack room. Each Room Leader informed the P/W accompanying the Germans of the details, if any occupant were missing from the parade, e.g. Sick Quarters, ill in the barrack, working in the cookhouse, etc. The counting of the P's/W was always done in the same order, i.e. the same barrack room was always the first to be counted on every parade followed by the others in numerical order. One German walked before and the other behind the rows.

                While the parades were taking place another German counted the P's/W working in the Vorlager, in Sick Quarters, etc., and noted the barrack rooms to which they belonged.

                When the counting was completed the German N.C.O. i/c the counting of each parade checked the figures supplied to him by each of the checkers. On many occasions the figures were at variance with those obtained by the members of the P/W administrative staff who accompanied the German checkers. Sometimes a complete re-count was ordered, but on other occasions the Germans were satisfied with recounting the occupants of the barrack room concerned.

                The procedure for indoor roll calls was more simple. A whilst was blown to indicate that all P's/W were to be in their own barrack rooms. There were no inter-communicating doors between barrack rooms and the guards posted outside ensured that personnel did not move from one barrack room to another whilst the roll call was in progress. Two Germans, accompanied by a member of the P/W administrative staff counted the occupants of each barrack room, but this was not always done in the same rotation, i.e. a start might be made at either end of a row of barrack rooms.

                After the mass escape by tunnel from "A" Compound in September 1943, frequent surprise counts were made during the night. Sometimes the whole Camp was checked, but more frequently only one row of barrack rooms in each Compound was counted. The P's/W were counted in bed. After several months this practice was discontinued.

                Despite these elaborate precautions by the Germans, the Escape Organisation was able to prevent the Germans from learning of the absence of all those individuals who succeeded in escaping from the Camp. In some cases this was only necessary for a few days, but in several cases it was done for a number of weeks. This was done in several ways, e.g. The transfer of one or more men from one party to another on outdoor parades so that they were counted twice: the placing of cleverly made dummies in beds: the transfer of one or more individuals through concealed panels in barrack room walls during indoor parades so that they were counted twice, etc.

                These arrangements were so well organised and so cleverly executed, with the assistance of a German "contact" who helped to fake the count that in no instance did the Germans discover that a man was missing from the Camp until the Escape Organisation had decided that it was no longer necessary to conceal the fact. In "A" Compound these "covering" arrangements were made by

                        914683 W.O. GIBSON, J.N., R.A.F.

                In "E" Compound this work was done by

                        968327 W.O. KERR, W.E., R.A.F.

                No escapes were made from "K" Compound.

        (e) Food.

                When the Camp was first opened in June 1943, consignments of Red Cross food parcels were re-directed from STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN). In due course, consignments of these parcels arrived direct from GENEVA, but for the first few months the total quantity was insufficient for the issue of one parcel per man per week. This was largely due to the influx of new P's/W from DULAG LUFT (OBERURSEL) and the time lag in increasing supplies. From about September 1943 until the evacuation of the Camp in July 1944 the supply of food parcels was adequate.

                Throughout the period under review the German rations were inadequate and decreased in quality and quantity. No fresh green vegetables were supplied at any time, but the P's/W endeavoured to overcome this shortage by cultivating garden plots. Small quantities of seed were obtained from the Germans through the Camp Canteen.

                The issue of Red Cross food parcels was done by Air Force N.C.O.'s working under the supervision of Luftwaffe personnel.

                A reserve of food suitable for escape and for bribery of Germans was maintained in the Red Cross food store in the Vorlager and was transferred to the Compounds as required. This work was done for the Escape Organisation by

                        1378671 W.O. LEWIS, K.G., R.A.F.,

                who worked in the Red Cross parcel store.

        (f) Clothing.

                A certain amount of R.A.F. O.R.'s uniform, underwear, shirts, boots, etc., was transferred to this Camp from STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) with the movement of the N.C.O.'s from that Camp in June 1943. From time to time consignments were received direct from GENEVA.

                R.A.F. O.R.'s uniforms, greatcoats, etc., which were required by the Escape Organisation for conversion into Luftwaffe uniform, etc., were available at all times.

                The issue of uniform to P's/W was controlled by Air Force N.C.O.'s working under the supervision of Luftwaffe personnel, but the Germans did not limit the quantities to be issued.

                Further details of clothing in connection with escape are given in Chapter II, Section 4.

        (g) Searches.

                The Germans carried out frequent and intensive searches of all buildings used by the P's/W. As a rule these were carried out by members of the Abwehr staff, but frequently they were assisted by guard personnel. Several major searches of all buildings and all P's/W were carried out by large number of plain clothes police aided by Abwehr and guard personnel.

                The usual method of conducting these searches was for the searchers to go to a barrack room, or rooms, whilst the P's/W were on parade. Armed guards were then posted to ensure that no P/W could gain entry, and sick personnel, who were in the selected rooms, were evicted. In some cases a thorough search was made of all the personal effects of the P's/W, barrack furniture, etc. On other occasions the wooden flooring was ripped up and entrances to tunnels, caches of forbidden articles, etc., were sought with the aid of long pointed iron spikes.

                At first, searches were unpredictable, but as the Escape Organisation developed and became more efficient, prior warning of all searches was obtained through those P's/W who were engaged in trading activities with certain Germans.

                The main object of these searches was to discover escape aids, tools, entrances to tunnels, radio sets, diaries, etc. As a rule, hoards of food were not interfered with, but food for escape purposes and bribery was kept in the Red Cross store in the Vorlager.

                Details of the counter-measures adopted by the P's/W are given in Chapter II, Section 3.

        (h) German anti-escape measures.

                The German Anti-Escape Organisation, or Abwehr Department, was very highly organised under the direction of Major PESCHEL, who had gained a wide knowledge of the activities of Air Force P's/W by virtue of his previous appointment in a similar capacity at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN). His staff consisted of specially trained Luftwaffe personnel  who were detailed to be in the Compounds during the greater part of each 24 hours. These men, who were unarmed, were dressed in dark blue overalls and wore Luftwaffe field-service caps and the normal Luftwaffe leather duty belt. They were known to the P's/W as "ferrets". They walked around the Compounds, and entered the barracks, at all times of the day and night, looking for signs to indicate that someone was engaged in some forbidden activity.

                All vehicles leaving the Camp were searched at the Vorlager gate. Garbage wagons were probed with a bayonet mounted on a pole.

                The perimeter fence of the Camp and the dividing fences between Compounds wee composed of two fences of barbed wire about 6 feet 6 inches apart and 8 feet in height. The area between the fences was filled with barbed wire entanglements to a height of about 2 feet 6 inches. Zig-zag barbed wire trip wires were fastened to posts about 1 foot in height over an area about 20 feet in width along the inside of the North fence of "A" Compound.

                All fences were lighted from dusk to dawn by arc lights spaced about 20 yards apart. Sentry towers, which were fitted with searchlights and machine-guns, were situated at strategic points, particularly corners (see Appendix "B").

                Sentries patrolled outside the perimeter fences throughout the 24 hours.

                A warning fence, which consisted of a wooden rail attached to posts about 3 feet in height, was situated inside all Compound perimeter fences at a distance of about 15 yards from the fences between Compounds and 30 yards from outside fences. The area between the warning fence and the main fence was "No Man's Land" and it was a German order that anyone touching the warning fence would be shot. Footballs, etc., were knocked into the forbidden zone many times daily, but they had to be recovered by a German.

                Shortly after the mass escape by tunnel from "A" Compound in September 1943 a continuous trench was dug inside the Camp perimeter fence, about 10 feet from it, down to water level. It was about 6 feet in width at the bottom and 10 feet in width at the top. The evacuated sand was spread evenly over the area on both sides of the trench. About 100 guards were engaged on this work daily for several months. Where the trench passed under the fences separating Compounds, the fences were modified to extend down into the trench.

                Shortly after the main body of N.C.O.'s from STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN), Centre Compound, had been transferred to 'A' Compound the Germans ordered the undermentioned personnel to live in Barrack room A.12. All were P's/W known as escapers or trouble-makers. Whenever there was any trouble in the Compound, whether escapes or 'baiting', the Germans always went to this room to look for the culprits. The individuals were:-

                        524851    W.O.   FANCY J.                  R.A.F.

                        628366    W.O.   FLOCKHART C.B.   R.A.F.

                        775137    A.C.1. GEWELBER J.           R.A.F.

                        631689    W.O.   GRIMSON G.J.W.    R.A.F.

                        580224    W.O.   LASCELLES E.B.     R.A.F.

                        518168    W.O.   LIGGETT H.              R.A.F.

                        994380    W.O.   MORRIS A.               R.A.F.

                        509661    W.O.   MURTON C.             R.A.F.

                        563997    W.O.   PARSONS J.W.H.     R.A.F.

                        580025    W.O.   PAVEY C.W.J.          R.A.F.

                        364766    W.O.   SNOWDEN J.R.        R.A.F.

                        580932    W.O.   STANFORD J.R.       R.A.F.

                        1068112  W.O.   WILKIE J.B.              R.A.F.

                The above named lived in this barrack room from June, 1943 until October, 1943 and were supposed to be under special surveillance. The overcrowding of the Compound in October, 1943 caused the Germans to put another 13 men, new P's/W into the room. The special precautions continued for a time and were discontinued eventually.

                A novel feature of the Germans' endeavours to discover the sites of tunnels in this Camp was the use of a motor-driven road-roller which weight about 5 tons. At frequent intervals after the successful tunnel in September, 1943 this was driven round the Camp, inside the Compound perimeter fences, by a member of the Abwehr staff. Although no tunnel was discovered by its use, the constructions of tunnels was retarded considerably, as such work had to be done close to the surface due to the high water level.

                It is believed that the Germans installed a system of microphones around the Camp perimeter fences, similar to those used at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN), which would enable the vibrations caused by tunnel construction to be noted and the sites discovered, but there is no confirmation of this.

                All German personnel entering and leaving the Camp, or passing from one Compound to another, had to produce a special pass signed by the Abwehr officer. These were complicated in design and bore an embossed stamp. The design and colour was changed from time to time.

                All P's/W when going from one Compound to another, or into the Vorlager, had to be accompanied by a German with a special pass for each party, which had to be signed by the Abwehr Officer.

                All German personnel, except the parties of guards who went into Compounds during roll calls, had to produce their passes at a special office at the Vorlager outer gate when entering or leaving the Camp. In addition, they had to "book in" and "book out" and were scrutinized by an interpreter who was on duty there throughout the 24 hours. It was his duty to ensure that no P/W left the Camp disguised as a German and in possession of forged documents, etc. The effectiveness of this measure lay in the system of "booking" since no "German" could leave without first having "booked in", i.e. signed the book and been given a number.

                Until early February 1944 the only gates in "A" and "K" Compounds led into the Vorlager and there was only one gate out of the Vorlager. Prior to that date "E" Compound was under construction and workmen, etc., gained access to it through a gate in the North fence. During late January 1944 an additional fence was erected between "A" and "K" Compounds and gates were fitted to each end of the lane thus formed so giving access to "E" Compound from the Vorlager. When the first P's/W were accommodated in this Compound workmen were still engaged there and continued to use the gate in the North fence. A small guardroom was erected just outside this gate, but no "booking" system was introduced. It was an order that all Luftwaffe personnel entering this Compound through the Vorlager should leave the Compound by the same route and they were forbidden to use the North gate. This order was not strictly adhered to.

                Foreign workers, Russian P's/W, etc., who were taken into the various Compounds for construction work, etc., were always accompanied by armed guards. They were not allowed to speak to, or come into contact with Air Force P's/W.

                Luftwaffe workmen, i.e. bricklayers, etc., and German civilians employed on construction, i.e. surveyors, etc., were issued with a gate pass and were allowed to enter all Compounds unaccompanied. They had to "book in" and "book out" at the office in the Vorlager.

                During the hours of darkness the Compounds and areas immediately outside the perimeter fences were patrolled by armed guards accompanied by specially trained dogs.

                Immediately after the mass escape by tunnel from the North end of "A" Compound in September 1943 the trees outside the Compound, which came to within 20 yards of the North fence, were felled for a distance of about another 100 yards. Barbed wire trip wires were affixed to the tree stumps over the whole of this area. At the same time, the searchlights on the two sentry towers overlooking this area were modified to enable them to sweep outside the Compound to the trees. Formerly they could not illuminate the area outside the fence.

                A further measure taken to prevent another successful tunnel was the confiscation of bed boards. Originally each bed contained an average of 14 boards. After the escape mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Germans caused the whole Compound to parade on the Sports Field  and then removed all bed boards in excess of 5 from every bed.

                From about October 1943 onwards from 10 to 20 unarmed Luftwaffe personnel, in uniform, were on duty in each Compound daily from 0900 hours until 1700 hours. Their instructions were to watch for any suspicious actions by the P's/W. These were in addition to the Abwehr staff, or "ferrets", already mentioned.

                All P's/W were photographed and finger-printed and these together with full descriptions of the individuals were kept by the Abwehr Department.

        (i) Punishment for escape activities, etc.

                The usual punishment given by the Germans to individuals apprehended in attempts to escape, constructing tunnels, etc., was a period in cells in a specially constructed Cell Block situated in the Vorlager. The sentence varied with the seriousness of the offence and the individual's previous record. As a rule 14 days in cells was the minimum sentence, and serious offences were punished by 28 days' in cells. The period in cells meant that an individual was permitted to have a double ration of bread daily and water only for three days and on the fourth day a hot meal of German rations only. No Red Cross food was allowed to be included. This was repeated throughout the period of sentence.

                In certain cases where serious offences had been committed, or where the Germans wished to make an example of an individual, the limit of 28 days' punishment laid down in the Geneva Convention as a maximum for one offence, was overcome by holding a man "pending investigation" for a period of from one to several weeks. At the end of that time the individual might be sentenced to 2, 3, or 4 weeks in cells or, in rare cases, released. When a man was held "pending investigations" he was permitted to have the contents of a Red Cross parcel per week and was allowed to smoke.

                In all cases, with one notable exception, recaptured escapers were returned to the Compound after serving their sentence in cells. The exception was

                        625503 W.O. TOWNSEND-COLES, R.B.N., R.A.F.,

                who was recaptured at DANZIG and returned to Camp in April 1944, where he was held in cells, but not allowed any communication with other prisoners. He was wearing the civilian clothes in which he had escaped and was not permitted to have a uniform. About a week later he was removed from cells to an unknown destination. He is believed to have been executed.

                Three other N.C.O.'s who escaped from this Camp in the spring of 1944 are believed to have been recaptured and executed, but they were not returned to the Camp after recapture. They were:-

                        631689 W.O. GRIMSON, G.J.W., R.A.F.

                        1061420 W.O. CALLENDER, E., R.A.F.

                        970467 W.O. LEWIS, E.P., R.A.F.

        (j) Education.

                As soon as the Camp was opened, the educational classes begun at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN), Centre Compound, were resumed. The Germans permitted the use of a wooden barrack for classrooms. A wide range of subjects were taught and a large number of the P's/W were enabled to sit for various professional examinations under a scheme sponsored by the Red Cross Society Educational Section, which provided text-books, etc. School equipment, stationery, etc., was supplied by the Young Men's Christian Association.

                The chief organiser of education in the Camp was

                        939492 W.O. ALDERTON, E.,  R.A.F.

                He assisted the Escape Organisation by supplying paper, pens, inks, etc., required for forgery or documents. At first, some forgery was done in one of the classrooms when it was not in use for instruction.

        (k) Library.

                The Library which had been built up at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN), Centre Compound, was transferred to "A" Compound when it was opened in June 1943. It was increased in size by gifts of books from the P's/W and various welfare organisations. As the other Compounds were opened, they were given the nucleus of a library.

                All books borrowed by the P's/W were "booked out" and a time limit set for their return. Offenders against this rule were debarred from further borrowing.

                The Germans permitted one half of a wooden barrack to be used for the Library in each Compound. In "A" Compound the other half of the barrack was used as the Camp Leader's Office and living quarters. In November 1943 the Escape Committee arranged for the construction of a concealed room between the Library and the Camp Office. Forgery, photographic reproduction of documents, etc., was done in this room and entrance to it was normally gained through the Library, although a door could be opened into the Camp Office in the event of a rapid getaway being essential. Photographic reproduction plates were hidden behind books, overnight, for drying.

                The Chief Librarian was

                        530404 W.O. EDEN, W.H., R.A.F.,

                who was helpful to the Escape Committee at all times.

        (l) Sports.

                Soccer, rugby, cricket and softball were extremely popular and the Sports Fields in each of the Compounds were in constant use daily from dawn until dusk, except during roll calls and meal times. Each barrack room had its representative interested in each type of sport and these formed committees to arrange matches, etc. In each Compound one member of each committee was a member of the Compound Sports Committee, which decided when the Sports Field was to be available for the various types of sports and arranged inter-Compound matches, etc.

                Boxing, basket-ball, tenni-quots, medicine ball, putting the shot, throwing the discus, running and P.T. were also popular pastimes.

                During the Winter of 1943-44 ice-skating rinks were made in "A" and "K" Compounds. The Germans made a fire-pump available for the flooding of the rinks, but the weather was so mild that little skating was possible.

                All the sports equipment which had been used by the N.C.O.'s at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) was brought to this Camp when the N.C.O.'s were transferred in June 1943 and additional supplies were received from the Young Mens' Christian Association.

                Because of the facilities available for sport and the enthusiasm of nearly every P/W, the standard of physical fitness in the Camp was very high at all times.

        (m) Amateur theatricals, etc.

                As soon as "A" Compound was opened the Germans agreed that one complete wooden barrack could be converted into a Compound Theatre and Church. They supplied tools and materials, on parole, after the plan for the proposed alterations had been approved by a German architect. The work was done by the P's/W. When the alterations had been completed the Theatre accommodated about 400 persons.

                When "K" Compound was opened the Germans agreed to a similar plan, but this was carried out on a much less elaborate scale than the Theatre in "A" Compound.

                No Theatre was constructed in "E" Compound.

                Various Plays, Revues, Symphony Concerts, Gramophone Recitals, etc., were produced until the evacuation of the Camp in July 1944. Most of the Shows were attended by German Officers and members of the German Administrative and Abwehr Staffs.

                The Germans were most helpful in all matters connected with the Theatres and did everything possible to meet requests for materials, etc., which were supplied on parole. When required, they sent a German N.C.O. to KONIGSBERG and BERLIN to hire stage costumes, drapings, etc. These were paid for by the P's/W in Camp money drawn from the Communal Fund subscribed by the Air Force Officers at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN).

                All the stage properties, costumes, etc., which had been acquired by the N.C.O.'s at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN), Centre Compound, were transferred when the N.C.O.'s  were moved to this Camp in June 1943.

                The personnel connected with the running of the Theatres were allowed to manufacture civilian clothes for use in Plays, etc., but a parole had to be given that such items would not be used for escape. This also applied to stage costumes which were hired.

                Some of the skilled P's/W who were engaged on work connected with the Theatres were most helpful to the Escape Organisation. The most important of these were the Stage Wardrobe tailors. Full details are given in Chapter II, Section 4.

                On a number of occasions the Germans locked the Theatre in "A" Compound for several days and forbade its use. This was done as a reprisal for the stealing of tools, discovery of tunnels, etc. The closing of the Theatre caused some ill-feeling amongst the P's/W, because the majority were not interested in escape and disliked having their pleasures interfered with.

        (n) Religion.

                The Compound Theatres were used for holding religious services. A Protestant and a Roman Catholic Padre were resident in the Camp. They had special passes which enabled them to visit all the Compounds without an escort. They carried messages between Compounds, but were unaware of their contents.

        (o) Shooting incidents, etc.

                A large number of shooting incidents occurred in this Camp. In most cases personnel were fired upon for going beyond the warning fence, contrary to German orders, with the object of recovering footballs, etc., but no P/W was injured on such occasions.

                On 28th October 1943, Sgt. KENWELL, R.A.F., was shot in the arm whilst throwing washing-up water over the warning fence in "A" Compound, during the hours of daylight. His arm was broken and he was taken to the Camp Sick Quarters. At a later date he was sentenced to 14 days' in cells for touching the warning fence.

                At about 1220 hours on 6th January 1944 the guard located in the North-east sentry tower covering "A" Compound opened fire with a machine gun on a P/W who was several yards away from the warning fence. The P/W had thrown some cigarettes to a Russian P/W who was working nearby. This was contrary to German orders. After throwing the cigarettes, the P/W walked towards the barracks and began to run when the first burst of bullets struck the ground close to him. Three other bursts were fired before he reached the corner of the nearest barrack. Many of the bullets entered the barracks, but nobody was injured although one bullet passing through the trousers of another P/W. Many other P's/W had narrow escapes.

                On 29th April 1944, Sgt. WALKER, G., U.S.A.A.C., and another man (name unknown) were attempting to escape from "E" Compound and had reached the Vorlager when they were detected at about 0215 hours. Some shots were then fired and both men stood still with their hands raised above their heads. A patrolling guard walked towards them and shot Sgt. WALKER dead, although his hands were still raised.

                About 26th May 1944 Staff Sgt. NIES, W., U.S.A.A.C., was shot and killed whilst walking from his barrack room to the wash-house in "E" Compound at about 0530 hours, when it was full of daylight. A German order was in force at that time to the effect that any P/W seen in the Compound between 2200 hours and 0600 hours would be shot. It would appear that Sgt. NIES awoke early and went to the wash-house as it was daylight and the door of the barrack room was not locked, as it should have been during the hours when the P's/W were forbidden to be in the Compound. Sgt. NIES was carrying his towel, etc., when he was shot. The Germans claimed that he was attempting to escape.

        (p) P/W morale.

                The morale of the P's/W in this Camp was extremely high at all times. It is considered that this was due to the fact that B.B.C. news broadcasts were received daily on a secret radio receiver in "A" Compound and a bulletin read to all P's/W in the Camp. Full details of this news service are given in Chapter VI, Section 1.

        (q) Medical.

                Two N.C.O.'s in each compound acted as first-aid men and resided in special rooms set aside for that purpose. They had bandages, ointments, etc., supplied by the Camp Sick Quarters from Red Cross medical parcels. When any case requiring the attention of a doctor was notified to them they notified the Sick Quarters situated in the Vorlager and a German Medical Orderly accompanied a British Medical Officer to examine the patient. If necessary, he would be transferred to the Sick Quarters.

                The Sick Quarters was staffed by two British Army Medical Officers:-

                        Captain R. POLLOCK, R.A.M.C.

                        Captain FORREST-HAY, R.A.M.C.

                assisted by several N.C.O.'s who volunteered for this work. The establishment was under the supervision of a Luftwaffe Medical Officer. A Luftwaffe Medical Orderly was always on duty. German sanction had to be obtained before any P/W could be sent to a German Hospital for treatment. The Germans supplied very few drugs and little medical equipment was available. The two British Medical Officers had an extremely difficult task and were very overworked, as the strength of the Camp grew to over 5,000 P's/W.

[Note: Many pages are missing in this report. The last entry was on page 19, what follows begins on page 61.]

... R.A.F.

16. TUNNEL CONSTRUCTION.

        (a) General.

                Individuals interested in tunnel construction formed themselves into groups and approached the Escape Committee with details of their schemes. If the Escape Committee decided that a proposal was practical, and the site had not already been "booked" by another group, permission was given for work to commence provided that no other tunnel was bring constructed in the Compound.

                The Committee rules that only one tunnel should be under construction at a time, mainly because of the difficulties of dispersing excavated sand and to uphold the prestige of the Escape Organisation in the Compound. It was felt that the discovery by the Germans of one tunnel after another would have hampered the plans of the Escape Committee regarding other methods of escape by placing the Escape Organisation in a position where its activities could be ridiculed by the majority of the P's/W, who were not interested in escape, but whose co-operation, or at least inactive resistance, was essential to the success of the Organisation.

        (b) Engineering.

                Throughout the period under review all tunnels were engineered by groups of personnel who worked without direction from the Escape Committee. The "TALLY HO" Organisation provided the timber for shoring, etc., and disposed of the excavated sand.

                The most active personnel in connection with tunnel construction were:-

                        J 4737      F/Lt.   ASH,                       W.F.,       R.C.A.F.

                        743687    W.O.  BENFIELD,             H.G.,       R.A.F.

                        1061420  W.O.  CALLENDER,         E.,           R.A.F.

                        524851    W.O.  FANCY,                   J.,           R.A.F.

                        520659    W.O.  FLYNN,                   D.,          R.A.F.

                        742039    W.O.  GARRIOCH,            W.G.,     R.A.F.

                        564839    W.O.  HANCOCK,            R.C.S.,    R.A.F.

                        516865    W.O.  HATT,                      A.S.,       R.A.F.

                        518168    W.O.  LIGGETT,                 H.,          R.A.F.

                        3977635  Sgt.     O'BRIEN,                 A.T.K.,   S.A.S.

                        620735    W.O.  PRENDERGRAST,   J.N.,       R.A.F.

                        1200275  W.O.  PRYOR,                    S.J.,        R.A.F.

                        754903    W.O.  SAXTON,                 A.,          R.A.F.

                        539339    W.O.  STREET,                   W.W.,    R.A.F.

                        997227    W.O.  WEBSTER,               F.,           R.A.F.

                In July 1943 the construction of a tunnel was begun under the direction of ASH and FLYNN. F/Lt. ASH had exchanged identities with an N.C.O. at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) in order to take advantage of conditions in this new Camp for an attempt to escape.

                The project was designed by FANCY and he did most of the construction, working on the "face". The system of shoring was a "box-section" every 2 feet 6 inches with a complete roof of boarding fitted in. Bed boards were used for this.

                A simple air-pump, made from a canvas kit-bag fitted with wooden ends and used in concertina fashion, was used for ventilation.

                Illumination was provided by duck lamps with cloth wicks. Margarine was used as fuel.

                The entrance to the tunnel was made under a copper in the West wash-house, which had a concrete floor. To do this the copper was removed from its frame and the bottom of the fire-box, an iron plate, was broken out in one piece. A hole was then cut through the concrete floor, but slightly smaller than the outside dimensions of the fire-box. A concrete slab was then made and fitted into the hole. This was made so that it could easily be removed by means of a piece of wire passed through loops made by two nails embedded in the slab in grooves. This trapdoor was covered with ash, which hid the grooves, when work was finished for the day.

                The next stage was the sinking of a shaft to a depth of about 8 feet, followed by the excavation of a space for the accommodation of the air-pump and the amount of sand which could be excavated in one day during the construction of the lateral shaft. This space was well below the concrete floor of the wash-house so that tapping of the floor would not indicate that there was a space under it, and was shored and roofed with bed boards. The tunnel was then commenced.

                Entrance to, and exit from, the workings was accomplished very speedily. Whilst work was in progress, the cooper and fire-box were not in position. However, the copper was always in its place, except when workers were entering or leaving the shaft. At the end of a shift, or when a signal was received that a German was approaching the wash-house, the copper was removed by two men always on duty there for that purpose and the workers climbed out. This occupied only a few moments. They wore the minimum of clothing and passed into the shower-room, in the same building, where they washed the sand off their bodies in a few seconds. As soon as the last man stepped through the frame of the copper, the trapdoor, plate of the fire-box and copper were placed in position. One man then transferred a few shovelsful of the burning fuel from the other fire-box in the room to the empty fire-box, and another man transferred a few bucketsful of warm water from one of the other coppers to the empty one. This occupied only a few seconds. A pail of water thrown on the floor washed away all sand. These precautions were taken during the whole of the time the tunnel was under construction.

                During the excavation of the first few feet of the lateral shaft, the sand was pushed back into the space constructed for that purpose. Wooden sledges were then used to transport the sand from the "face". Owing to the position of drains between the wash-house and the North perimeter fence, the tunnel could not be constructed in a straight line and men were stationed at all bends to prevent the sledges from damaging the sides of the tunnel as they were hauled to and from the "face". It was not possible to tunnel beneath the drains as the water table was about 6 feet below the surface and the tunnel was built at that level.

                Work continued for about six weeks, at the end of which time the tunnel was about 145 feet in length and about 40 feet outside the perimeter fence.

                Owing to large-scale searches by the Criminal Police which were taking place in the Compound at this stage, a number of the personnel selected to escape through the tunnel agitated for its immediate use although it had not reached length planned. The Escape Committee had intended that the exit should be beyond the first trees of the wood bordering the Compound at this point, a distance of about another 30 feet. The Escape Committee insisted that this plan should be adhered to, as the risk of discovery through searches was remote, and the distance which had been reached beyond the fence was not sufficient to ensure a reasonable margin of safety from observation by the guards located in the two towers on this fence and the patrolling sentry outside it. FANCY, the engineer of the tunnel, supported this ruling, but ASH and FLYNN opposed it and were supported by most of the personnel selected to use the tunnel who had not been actively engaged in its construction. Certain individuals threatened to use the tunnel as it was, despite the ruling of the Escape Committee.

                The Escape Committee decided to attempt to persuade these men to agree to wait for another week so that the additional 30 feet could be constructed. They then arranged a meeting of the 50 selected escapers on the morning of 29th August. ALEXANDER, the Chairman of the Escape Committee, informed them that information had been received from reliable sources to the effect that no further large-scale searches would take place for some time, and pointed out the desirability of minimising the risk of discovery whilst leaving the exit of the tunnel. He asked everyone to agree to wait for a further week whilst the last 30 feet was excavated so that the exit would be within the wood. ASH then addressed the meeting and stated his point of view, which was that the tunnel should be used at once. He contended that as the tunnel was now well beyond the fence, the risk of its discovery before it could be used should not be increased by further delay. There was strong support for both points of view and ALEXANDER decided to settle the matter by vote. The result was a majority of one vote in favour of using the tunnel at once. One man did not vote. Subsequent events relating to this tunnel are described in this Chapter, Section 24.

                Various other tunnelling projects were started in this Compound, but all were discovered, or abandoned, during the early stages of their construction and none is worthy of description. The additional anti-escape measures introduced by the Germans after the discovery of the tunnel described in the foregoing paragraphs of this sub-Section, which are related in full in Chapter I, Section 2, sub-Section (h), were effective in discouraging further serious attempts at tunnel construction.

        (c) Dispersal.

                The dispersal of the sand excavated from the major tunnel described in the preceding sub-Section was carried out by members of the "TALLY HO" Organisation. They worked during the time between the afternoon roll call, which took place at 1700 hours daily during this period, and 2100 hours, when all P's/W were locked in their barracks.

                As previously mentioned, the sand excavated from the "face" of the tunnel was stored in a space under the wash-room floor, being transferred there whilst construction was in progress. It was removed from this chamber in partly filled kit bags which were passed into the washroom and then carried through the shower-room into the urinal, all of which were in the same building. It was possible to pass from one to the other without going outside. There was no door connecting the urinal with the lavatory, and in order to dispose of the sand in the cesspool below the lavatory floor without going outside the building, it was necessary to find a means of passing the bags through the partition wall.

                In order to do this a hole was made in the wall at a place which was covered with waterproof roofing material to form the urinal. The hole was covered with a strip of similar material fastened by means of nails which were finger tight. The hole did not permit of direct access to the lavatory, as a ventilator shaft, built like a chimney, was located on the lavatory side of the partition wall at this point. A concrete trapdoor, about 9 inches by 6 inches, was located near the base of the ventilator shaft, on the lavatory side.

                The bags of sand were passed through the hole in the wall into the ventilator shaft and removed from it, in the lavatory, through the trapdoor. The floor of the lavatory consisted of planks laid on joists and one of these was lifted in order to empty the send each day so that the sand was spread over the greater part of the cess-pool. This was done so that the sand would not show when the level of the contents of the cess-pool was lowered by removal in special tank-wagons. On such occasions members of the Abwehr Section always inspected the cess-pools for signs of sand dispersal.

                The sand excavated from other tunnels which were begun at various times, was usually disposed of by members of the "TALLY HO" Organisation. Generally it was placed under the floorboards of a room, or rooms, remote from the site of the tunnel; also mixed with the sand forming garden plots in various parts of the Compound which were not under observation after dark.

        (d) Supplies.

                The materials required for tunnel construction, principally bed boards for shoring, were collected by the "TALLY HO" Organisation as described in this Chapter, Section 3. The supply of these materials was controlled by the Escape Committee through the agency of the "TALLY HO" Chief.

        (e) Security.

                Some of the precautions taken to prevent premature discovery by the Germans of the major tunnel described in this Section are related in sub-Sections (b) and (c). These were the concealment of the entrance of the tunnel and removal of all traces of sand from the site, and the method employed for the disposal of sand excavated from the tunnel.

                In addition, watches were always on duty in the wash-house whilst work was in progress to give warning of the approach of Germans. Other watchers located at strategic points in the Compound signalled to those on duty in the wash-house if a German appeared to be heading in that direction. This was relayed to the workers who remained at the "alert" until the "all clear" or "danger" signal was received. In the event of a "danger" signal being received all work ceased immediately and all workers acted in accordance with a pre-arranged plan which effected the removal of all traces of operations within a few moments. All the watchers were supplied by the "TALLY HO" Organisation.

                The security of all other tunnels was the responsibility of the individuals concerned in constructing them, working in conjunction with the general security organisation operating in the Compound at the time. Full details of this are given in Section 3 of this Chapter.

        (f) Comments.

                The ingenuity displayed in connection with the concealment of the entrance to the tunnel described above, and the means employed to facilitate the disposal of the excavated sand, are noteworthy.

                No other major tunnel was attempted because of the counter measures adopted by the Germans. These included the removal of the majority of the boards from all beds in the Compound, the digging of a wide trench round the Camp to below water level, and the use of a heavy roller between all buildings and the fence.

17. GATE WALK-OUT SCHEMES.

        (a) First attempt.

                During the afternoon of about 21st January 1944, the first escape to be made from this Compound by walking through the gate was effected by:-

                        631689 W.O. GRIMSON, G.J.W., R.A.F.

                This was the first stage of organising the escape route described in this Chapter, Section 2.

                At this time, roll calls took place daily at 1500 hours and were usually held in the open. The Escape Committee planned that GRIMSON should leave the Camp, after the afternoon's roll call, disguised as one of the armed guards drafted into the Compound for the supervision of the parade.

                These guards, usually about 12 in number, entered the Compound in a body a few minutes before the parade and took up their allotted positions in various parts of the Compound, where they remained until the parade was dismissed. They then made their way, individually, through the Compound and Vorlager gates to the Guardroom. For some months the Escape Committee had been aware of the possibility of escaping by this method, but had not used it previously because their preparations had not been completed. Originally, it was not intended that GRIMSON, or other fluent German speakers, should escape by this method, but that it should be used by personnel able to speak only a limited amount of German. The reason that GRIMSON utilised this method was that during the previous ten days he had made preparations to leave the Camp by two alternative known "loopholes", but conditions had changed and neither could be used.

                Shortly after midday on about 21st January 1944, GRIMSON was dressed in civilian clothes in the office attached to the Compound Library. His outfit consisted of:- A good quality black jacket and waistcoat, dark grey worsted riding breeches, knee-length boots with laced fronts, a white shirt and collar, a black tie with white stripes, and a R.A.F. Officer's raincoat without belt, or belt loops. When dressed in these clothes, the legs of R.A.F. O.R.'s trousers, which had been treated so that they were similar in appearance to Luftwaffe O.R.'s trousers, were fitted to cover the legs of the boots and the riding breeches to half way up the thighs. They were fastened in position with pins. GRIMSON then wore a large-size Army greatcoat and a R.A.F. blue scarf to hide his white collar, and went to a barrack room half way along "A" Block (see Appendix "B"), at about 1430 hours. Certain other parts of the equipment to be used by him had already been taken to this barrack room by members of the Escape Organisation.

                GRIMSON removed the Army greatcoat and donned a "Luftwaffe" O.R.'s greatcoat, which had been made from two R.A.F. O.R.'s greatcoats. A set of Luftwaffe equipment harness, complete with ammunition pouches and dummy bayonet, was then fitted. When dressed as described he lay down on a bed in a dimly lighted part of the room and was covered by a blanket. He remained there until a few moments before the parade was dismissed. ALEXANDER, the Chairman of the Escape Committee remained in the room with him.

                Meanwhile, arrangements had been made by GIBSON, of the Escape Committee, for the necessary changes of personnel to conceal the absence of GRIMSON and ALEXANDER from their proper rooms, and their presence in the barrack room in "A" Block, as neither of them lived in this room. To do this it was arranged that two men, who resembled them, would occupy their beds. Two men from the room in which GRIMSON and ALEXANDER were staying during the roll call were to take the places of these two men. These plans were executed satisfactorily.

                It was also arranged with MOGG, the Deputy Camp Leader, who was to be in charge of the roll call on that day, that the roll call would be delayed for about an hour, when it would be dusk; also, that the roll call would be carried out inside the barrack rooms, ostensibly because of the cold weather. By having several mis-counts the roll call was prolonged until 1600 hours, when the release whistle, used to signal the end of all indoor parades, was blown.

                At that moment GRIMSON slung the dummy rifle on his shoulder in the manner adopted by the guards and placed a Luftwaffe Field Service cap on his head. As was usual immediately after such indoor roll calls, hundreds of P's/W swarmed out of their barrack rooms and GRIMSON was able to leave the barrack room in which he had been waiting. He walked through the Compound and Vorlager gates without difficulty, and was the third or fourth "guard" to leave the Compound. As there was no commotion when the last guard left the Compound, it was obvious that they had not been counted as they passed through the gates.

                After GRIMSON had passed through the Vorlager gate he went to a lavatory close to the guardroom, where he placed the dummy rifle in the cess-pool. He then walked towards the German living quarters and entered a locked store used for the storage of surplus clothing, etc., belonging to the P's/W. He had been provided with the key, which was kept by HARRISON, the Camp Quartermaster. GRIMSON fastened the door on the inside and located a marked packing case which had been taken to the Store earlier that day by HARRISON and a fatigue party escorted by Unteroffizier MUNKERT, a bribed German.

                This packing case contained a brief-case packed with all the forged documents prepared for GRIMSON, his toilet requisites, boot brush and blacking, spare collars and socks, tobacco, etc. All these items were of German manufacture. The packing case also contained a quantity of food for consumption on the spot.

                After removing the brief case and package of food from the packing case, GRIMSON packed his Luftwaffe uniform in it. This packing case, together with others, was taken back to the Compound the following day by HARRISON and a fatigue party, again accompanied by MUNKERT.

                GRIMSON ate the food which had been provided and remained in the Store for some hours. He left about an hour before the train on which he intended to travel was due to leave HEYDEKRUG. After locking the door of the Store he left the key in a pre-arranged place to be picked up by HARRISON the following day. He walked through the German Camp, now dressed as a civilian, to the Railway Station, a distance of about 3 kilometres.

                His subsequent activities are outlined in Chapter X, Section 1, which should be read before sub-Section (b) of this Section.

        (b) Second attempt.

                The second attempt to escape by walking through the gate was made by:-

                        628366 W.O. FLOCKHART, C.B., R.A.F.

                This took place on 18th February 1944. This was the second stage of organising the escape route described in this Chapter, Section 2.

                The following is FLOCKHART's own story of this escape as compiled from M.I.9/S/P.G.(G)1833 and Appendix "C" to that report:-

                        "I escaped alone from the Camp on the morning of 18th February 1944. The previous day Feldwebel SCHRODER had taken me from my own Compound to another Compound which was nearing completion and partly occupied. My absence from my own Compound was covered by the Escape Committee, and the Germans did not know I was in the unfinished Compound. I met SCHRODER, by arrangement, in the wash barrack of the unfinished Compound about 0830 hours on 18th February. While he conversed with the Feldwebel in charge of the guard in the guardroom outside the gate of the Compound, I left the wash barracks dressed in a green tweed jacket, riding breeches made from Italian pantaloons, top boots (Stiefel), a soft hat, an R.A.F. Officer's mackintosh. I was carrying a canvas brief case (made in the Camp) under my arm and in my hand a rolled-up plan of the Camp and environs which had been made for me in the Camp by architects among the P's/W. I had my hair cropped and had shaved off my moustache, and looked so like a German that one of the P's/W in my own Compound had actually taken me for a member of the Criminal Police, who sometimes visited the Camp.

                        "I walked to the warning wire, indicated to the guard that I was going to the unfinished was barracks, inspected the wash barracks outside, and made some notes on my plan. I then went inside for a few moments. Coming out again, I walked slowly to the gate, presented my pass (a forgery) to the guard, and was accepted by him as one of the architects who had been working in the Compound. I walked through the gate without being questioned.

                        "I then proceeded to the Camp sewage farm which is under construction near the river, about 200 metres from the Camp. I was within full view of the watch towers. I spent about ten minutes at the sewage farm, examining the excavations, on which there was no one working, and pretending to take notes and pace distances. I then walked back towards the Camp, diagonally towards one corner, and went round the outside wire. This brought me to a road which leads to the main administrative buildings. Before reaching them I turned off on another dirt track through a wood. This brought me to the main road leading to HEYDEKRUG. Before leaving the sewage farm I had put my plan into my brief case, which also contained clothing, toilet gear, and sandwiches. The pass I carried was forged and made out in the name of a Germanised (Eingedeutscht) Pole."

                The remainder of FLOCKHART's statement appears in Chapter X, Section 2.

        (c) Third attempt.

                The third attempt to escape by walking through the gates in disguise was made on 4th April 1944 by:-

                        775137 A.C.1. GEWELBER, J., R.A.F.

                        625503 W.O. TOWNSEND-COLES, R.B.H., R.A.F.

                These two men, both of whom were "traders" informed the Escape Committee that they desired to go to LITHUANIA, and permission was given for them to attempt to organised an escape route there on condition that, if after two weeks no progress was made they should proceed to DANZIG and make contact with GRIMSON.

                The following in GEWELBER's own statement of the escape as compiled from M.I.9/S/P.G./(G)1917 and Appendix "C" to that report:-

                        "I escaped from STALAG LUFT VI on 4th April 1944 with Sgt. TOWNSEND-COLES, R.A.F. On the previous day we managed to secure entry to the American Compound, and about 1300 hours on 4th April we walked out of the gate. I was disguised as a German "ferret" (a German security soldier) and TOWNSEND-COLES was dressed as a civilian engineer. A diversion was made in the Camp to cover our exit. Both TOWNSEND-COLES and myself had forged passes for the gate.

                        "From the gate I conducted TOWNSEND-COLES to the sewage plant beside the river. Here I took off my German belt and uniform overalls, under which I had been wearing a black jacket and blue overall trousers. TOWNSEND-COLES had black trousers, a short coat, and a soft hat. Before we left the sewage farm we burned our passes and buried the cap, belt and anklets which I had been wearing."

                The remainder of GEBELWER's statement is given in Chapter X, Section 3.

        (d) Fourth Attempt.

                The fourth attempt to escape from the Camp by walking through the gates in disguise was made on 13th April, 1944, by:-

                        930291 W.O. LEAMAN, N.H., R.A.F.

                Arrangements had been made in advance between the Escape Committee and GRIMSON that GRIMSON would meet him at HEYDEKRUG and accompany him to DANZIG.

                LEAMAN's own statement of the attempt, and subsequent events as they affected him, which is an extract from M.I.9/S/P.G.(G)2993 is as follows:-

                        "On 13th April 1944 I attempted to escape from STALAG LUFT VI (HEYDEKRUG). I was disguised as a member of the Abwehr staff and had all the necessary forged passed. Underneath the uniform, I wore civilian clothes. I had forged papers, etc., which would have enabled me to travel as a German civilian. I speak fluent German.

                        "At 1200 hours I left a barrack and walked to the gate and produced my pass to the guard on duty there. I believe that the guard recognised me, but I cannot be certain of this. He allowed me to pass through the gate and then shouted that I must "book out" at the nearby guardroom. I then went to the guardroom and reported to the Feldwebel in charge. He asked whether I was new to the Camp and I replied in the affirmative. He then asked which Company I was attached to and I stated that I was with the 3rd Company. He then examined my gate pass and stated that he thought I must be a P/W.

                        "I was arrested and held in the guardroom until the arrival of Unteroffizier HEINZE, of the Abwehr Department. In the interval I attempted to destroy my forged documents in the fire, but the untimely arrival of Unteroffizier HEINZE prevented their total destruction.

                        "I was taken to the office of Major PESCHEL, the Abwehr Officer, and interrogated briefly. I was then taken to the cells and left there in the civilian clothes I had been wearing. Some hours later I was interrogated for four hours by a member of the Criminal Police. I refused to answer all questions or make any statement.

                        "Later that day, Unteroffizier HEINZE came to my cell and stated that I was in a very dangerous position and that I was suspected of sabotage and espionage activities. He asked me to make a statement about my intentions after leaving the Camp. I refused to make any statement.

                        "On 14th April the Kommandant, Oberst Herman von NORBERG, came to my cell and asked me to make a statement about my intentions after leaving the Camp. I refused to make any statement and requested that I be supplied with a R.A.F. uniform. He told me that this was a matter for the Abwehr.

                        "On 15th April I bluffed one of the guards at the cells to bring me some clothing. In this way I obtained my R.A.F. uniform. When Unteroffizier HEINZE saw me in uniform later that day he became very angry. No attempt was made to take the uniform away from me. In the afternoon the Kommandant came to my cell and asked how I had obtained my uniform. I stated that Unteroffizier HEINZE had given me permission, but that as he had spoken in English there must have been a mistake. The Kommandant then said that he would sentence me, not for attempting to escape, but for wearing German military uniform. I was sentenced to seven days in cells.

                        "At the end of that time I was detained in cells "pending investigation" for a further seventeen days. I was allowed normal food, and cigarettes, during this period. I was then released into the Compound.

                        "During the whole of the time I was in cells, I was interrogated several times daily by Unteroffizier HEINZE and Gefreiter KLAUST. I refused to answer all questions.

                        "During the whole of the period I was in cells, I was attended by Captain POLLOCK, R.A.M.C., who dressed the burns I had sustained when I attempted to destroy my false documents on recapture. This was done unofficially with the aid of a guard, whom I bribed.

                        "On 15th June 1945 [1944?] I was court-martialled at STALAG 357 (FALLINGBOSTEL). The charge was:- 'Using forged documents to the confusion of the German military and civilian authorities.' I was defended by Sgt. MESKIN, a South African and a barrister at law. I was sentenced to three months hard labour. This sentence was not served owing to the disrupted state of communication in GERMANY."

                The effects of LEAMAN's apprehension on the Escape Organisation are set out in Chapter X, Section 4.

18. WIRE SCHEMES.

        (a) First Attempt.

                The first attempt to escape from the Compound via the fence was not planned, but took place on a night when the lights on the fence had failed. The personnel concerned were:-

                        1436315 W.O. BERKELEY, F.R., R.A.F.

                        R 110251 W.O. CHISHOLM, R.E., R.C.A.F.

                They did not receive permission for this attempt, nor any assistance, from the Escape Committee. They wore R.A.F. uniform.

                At about 2000 hours on 20th September 1943 they noticed that the lights on the fence appeared to be fading and brightening. They decided to attempt to climb over the fence if the lights failed completely, and prepared themselves with chocolate, biscuits, a map and a compass. They also inserted paper in their gloves to save their hands from being cut by the barbed-wire.

                At about 2100 hours the lights failed and they climbed through the window of their barrack room just after a guard, accompanied by a dog, had passed by. They ran to the North-west corner of the Compound, where they climbed over the fence. In doing so BERKELEY dropped his gloves and these were found subsequently by the Germans.

                Their intention was to make contact with Russian forces by travelling through LITHUANIA and LATVIA, but after three days they changed their plans and walked towards MEMEL. They were apprehended on the outskirts of MEMEL at 0900 hours on 26th September and taken back to the Camp later that day.

        (b) Second attempt.

                About 16th March 1944 the second escape from the Compound via the wire was made by:-

                        970467 W.O. LEWIS, E.P., R.A.F.

                He was dressed as a civilian workman of the foreman type and had forged identity documents, travel permits, etc., all supplied by the Escape Organisation.

                Shortly before this date the Germans had erected a single barbed-wire fence around the North-west wash-barrack, thus cutting it off from the Compound, in order to carry out alterations to the drainage system. A trench, in which drain pipes were laid, was dug from the wash-barrack and passed under this fence extending into the Compound for a short distance then passed under the fence between the Compound and the Vorlager. This left spaces above the pipes and below the bottom strands of the fences, which were used frequently by civilian workmen to pass from the wired-off enclosure into the Compound and Vorlager and vice versa. A gap had been made in the main fence, which formed the fourth side of the wash-barrack enclosure, in order to permit the passage of wagons with building materials, etc.

                LEWIS was dressed in his civilian clothes early on the morning of the selected day and emerged into the Compound from a barrack room near the North-west corner of the Compound. At that moment several German civilian workmen and Russian P's/W were working in the trench. LEWIS walked along the edge of the trench as if he were inspecting the work. Finally he stepped down into the trench and passed between the fence into the Vorlager, where he continued his "inspection". Presently he walked back along the trench, passed under the fence back into the Compound and continued along the trench under the single fence into the wash-barrack enclosure. All his movements in the vicinity of the trench were observed by a guard patrolling outside the main fence near the gap leading into the enclosure. LEWIS "inspected" the work being done around the wash-barrack and finally walked to the gap in the main fence where he presented his passed to the guard for inspection. They exchanged a few words and LEWIS walked off along the outside of the main fence. He was not given details of the escape route as he spoke very little German.

                Little is known of his subsequent movements except that he was met in STOLZENBURG, near DANZIG, in April, 1944, by:-

                        921693 W.O. LEITCH, D.D.P., R.A.F.,

                also an escaper. At that time LEWIS was living with two British Army personnel and was trying to arrange a passage out of GERMANY with the assistance of other British Army contacts in the area.

                Several months later, after the P's/W had been transferred to other Camps, W.O. DEANS, the Camp Leader, was informed verbally by the Germans that LEWIS had been shot whilst attempting to enter the dock area at DANZIG.

19. WALL SCHEMES.

        Nil.

20. TRANSPORT SCHEMES.

        (a) First attempt.

                The first attempt to escape from this Camp was made by:-

                        3644766 W.O. SNOWDEN, J.W., R.A.F.,

                who was placed in a specially constructed box and taken out of the Camp on a German wagon.

                At this time, June 1943, large quantities of crates containing Sports gear, Theatre "props", etc., were due to arrive from STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN). Arrangements had been made with the Germans for these to be placed in a barn outside the Camp where they could be sorted before being sent into the Compound. It was also agreed that items which were not required immediately could remain there.

                SNOWDEN learned of this and considered that it offered an avenue of escape. He approached the Escape Committee and the scheme was approved. The Committee arranged for the construction of a crate resembling two tea chests nailed together. Most of the crates which were expected from STALAG LUFT III were of this type. SNOWDEN made his own arrangements about suitable clothing and a typewritten pass for a foreign worker.

                On 20th Jun 1943 SNOWDEN was placed in the crate, which was located in a store in the Compound. At the same time it was arranged that the P's/W in the barn, who were dealing with the boxes which had by then arrived from STALAG LUFT III, would load similar crates on to the lorry which was being used for transporting them from the barn to the Compound.

                This was done and in due course the lorry arrived in the Compound and was directed to a position outside the Compound Store where it was under least observation by the guards on the main fences. Some members of the "TALLY HO" Organisation began to unload the crates from the lorry, whilst others engaged the driver and escorting guard in conversation. After a few crates had been taken off the lorry the crate containing SNOWDEN was placed on it without the knowledge of the two Germans. At this stage the lorry driver was told that the crates which remained on the lorry contained Theatre equipment and had been sent into the Compound by mistake. He was asked to take them back to the barn, which he did.

                When the lorry arrived back at the barn the crates were unloaded and the one containing SNOWDEN was placed in the most suitable position. He remained in the crate until evening when he released himself and left the barn at about 2300 hours.

                He walked to the outskirts of MEMEL where he was apprehended by a farm and a policeman on the morning of 22nd June. He was returned to the Camp.

        (b) Second attempt.

                On 21st June 1943 the method described in (a) above was repeated to facilitate the escape of:-

                        580224 W.O. LASCELLES, E.E., R.A.F.

                        580932 W.O. STANFORD, J.R., R.A.F.

                They were placed in two crates and taken to the barn successfully. A little later in the day, one of the Germans on duty in the barn sat on the crate containing LASCELLES. He felt the heat of LASCELLES' breath through a small hole and investigated with the result that he was discovered. The guards were furious and smashed their rifle butts through other crates in the barn. STANFORD was discovered, but he had not been injured.

        (c) Third attempt.

                In August 1943 the third escape from the Camp by utilising German transport was attempted by:-

                        646976 W.O. CAWKWELL, S., R.A.F.,

                He approached the Escape Committee and insisted on being permitted to attempt to get out of the Camp by hiding in the wagon which removed the garbage from the Cookhouse, despite the fact that it was pointed out to him that the garbage was stabbed with a bayonet attached to a pole when the wagon was stopped at the outer Vorlager gate on an average of three times out of five. He refused to be dissuaded and the "TALLY HO" Organisation created a diversion to distract the attention of the driver of the wagon whilst he lay down in the garbage and was covered over. The garbage was prodded at the Vorlager gate and CAWKWELL was stabbed in the leg and back which led to his discovery.

        (d) Subsequent unsuccessful attempts.

                Three other attempts were made to escape on German vehicles; one in cupboards which were being taken out of the Compound, one in a lorry loaded with timber, and one in the tool box of a lorry. Two of the attempts failed due to the searching of the vehicles at the outer Vorlager gate. The other attempt was partly successful, but the two P's/W concerned were seen near the Camp by children and the alarm was given.

21. MISCELLANEOUS SCHEMES.

        (a) First attempt.

                In early March 1944 an escape was effected by taking advantage of the German preparations for the modification of the drainage system connected with the North-west wash-house. The escaper was:-

                        1061410 W.O. CALLENDER, E., R.A.F.

                Information had been received that the North-west Wash-house was about to be closed off from the Compound, by the erection of a fence, whilst the work in connection with the new drainage system was carried out. CALLENDER, who spoke excellent French, approached the Escape Committee with a plan which was as follows:- He proposed to hide in a 12 feet long cylindrical wooden water tank fitted with a trap door entrance near one end, which was situated in the wash-house, and to remain there until the enclosure round the wash-house was completed and a gap made in the main fence. He would then leave his hiding place at a propitious moment, dressed to resemble a workman, and walk through the gap in the main fence.

                The plan was approved by the Committee and arrangements were made to supply CALLENDER with suitable civilian clothes, documents, etc. In addition, a partition was made to fit the water tank. CALLENDER was to place this in position between himself and the trap door, after he entered the tank, in order to ensure that an examination of the tank would not disclose his presence.

                Acting on information from German sources, the tank was emptied of water and CALLENDER took up his position on the evening before work was commenced on erecting the fence around the wash-house. He was dressed in civilian trousers, a thigh long civilian overcoat and a cloth workman's cap. He had identity documents and a travel permit authorising him to travel from HEYDEKRUG to DANZIG via KONIGSBERG. A supply of food was placed in the tank with him. CALLENDER planned to make contact with French workers at a Camp in KONIGSBERG. He was not informed of any of the details of the Escape Route because it was not yet in operation.

                CALLENDER remained in the tank for 66 hours, the time taken to erect the enclosure fence and to make the gap in the main fence. He then appeared, acting the part of the inspecting foreman, and eventually walked through the gap in the fence and away from the Camp. Russian P's/W, who were working in the wash-house enclosure, removed all traces of CALLENDER's sojourn.

                CALLENDER's absence was concealed from the Germans for several weeks until information was received from an unofficial German source that a man claiming to be CALLENDER had asked to be admitted to a French Camp near KONIGSBERG. No information was ever received from official sources and he is believed to have been executed by the Germans.

        (b) Second attempt.

                In June 1944 information was received from unofficial German sources that the Camp was to be evacuated shortly. Three P's/W approached the Escape Committee and proposed that they should construct a hiding place under the floor of one of the wash-houses and remain there until the Camp had been evacuated. This plan was approved and the cavity was excavated under a stove. The personnel concerned were:-

                        524851 W.O. FANCY, J., R.A.F.

                        620735 W.O. PRENDERGRAST, J.N., R.A.F.

                        748173 W.O. STIRLING, R.T.G., R.A.F.

                Early in July 1944 these men, dressed in civilian clothes, were bricked into the cavity they had constructed. They had stored sufficient food and water for 14 days. Later that day they received a signal from a member of the Escape Organisation, by means of a series of taps on the bricks, that the last party was about to be evacuated from the Compound. They remained in their hiding place until the evening of the following day when they emerged to find that the Camp was deserted, including all the guards. They cut a hole through the fence and walked into LITHUANIA.

                They were apprehended by members of the Lithuanian Home Guard about 5 days later and eventually taken to STALAG 357 (THORN), where they rejoined the P's/W who had been evacuated from the Camp.

22. NUMBER OF ESCAPEES.

        There were two successful escapes from this Compound. The individuals were:-

                628366 W.O. FLOCKHART, C.B., R.A.F.

                775137 A.C.1. GEWELBER, J., R.A.F.

        Their statements of their escapes are quoted in this Chapter, Section 17, sub-Sections (b) and (c), and continued in Chapter X, Sections 2 and 3.

23. NUMBER OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPES.

        In addition to a number of unsuccessful tunnelling projects involving a large number of men, 72 personnel attempted to escape from this Compound in 15 separate attempts. Two individuals, who are referred to in Section 22 above, were successful. The most important of the remaining 13 attempts are described in this Chapter, Sections 16, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 24.

24. MASS ATTEMPTS.

        At the end of August 1943, fifty men, who had been selected by the Escape Committee, were supplied with civilian-type clothes, forged passes, maps, compasses, etc., in preparation for their escape by means of the major tunnel described in this Chapter, Section 16.

        As related in sub-Section (b) of that Section, it was decided at a meeting of the fifty men on 29th August that the tunnel was to be used that evening rather than wait until it had been lengthened by an addition 30 feet to minimise the risk of its discovery before the fifty men should get clear of the exit. The Escape Committee then drew up a list of the fifty men and decided the order in which they would leave the tunnel exit. Priority was decided by the amount of work done in connection with the project.

        At about 1900 hours the fifty men began to enter the tunnel in their order of procedure and when the last man had gone through the entrance the trapdoor was placed in position. Ash from one of the fires in the room was scattered over the trapdoor and the plate was replaced in the bottom of the fire-box which was then filled with partly burned fuel. Finally, the copper was replaced in its frame and filled with water.

        At about 2200 hours the exit to the tunnel was made and at intervals, when the guard patrolling outside the wire was some distance away, the man crawled to the edge of the wood, a distance of about 30 yards. Eight of them got into the shelter of the trees, but the ninth man, who would appear to have been too anxious to get out of the tunnel and did not exercise sufficient care in ascertaining the whereabouts of the guard, was seen by him. Some shots were fired, but no one was wounded.

        The forty-one men still in the tunnel were trapped as the entrance had been sealed, but they buried all their forged documents, maps, etc. Within a few minutes a large number of guards arrived in the Compound and surrounded the wash-house, and others went to the tunnel exit. The Abwehr Officer and the Kommandant also went to the wash-house where they searched for the entrance to the tunnel, but without success. Eventually it was located through the noise made by some of the P's/W trying to remove the trapdoor. In due course they were released and marched off to cells after being searched and questioned about the number of men originally in the tunnel. They were told that no one had escaped as the first man had been discovered by the sentry.

        The eight men who got clear of the tunnel exit were:-

                J 4737       F/Lt. ASH,                      W.F.,   R.C.A.F.

                10611420 W.O. CALLENDER,       E.,        R.A.F.

                524851     W.O. FANCY,                 J.,        R.A.F.

                742039     W.O. GARRIOCH,          W.G.,  R.A.F.

                518168     W.O. LIGGETT,               H.,      R.A.F.

                620735     W.O. PRENDERGRAST, J.F.,    R.A.F.

                539339     W.O. STREET,                 W.W., R.A.F.

        All were recaptured within 14 days and returned to the Compound after a term in cells.

        On the morning following the escape the Abwehr Officer ordered a special roll call of all the P's/W in the Compound. The result of this was that the final figure was several in excess of the Compound strength.

        That evening, at about 2000 hours, all the P's/W were paraded in the Compound surrounded by a large number of guards, all of whom were very nervous at it was then dusk. The P's/W were then passed through a structure similar to a sheep-pen, in single file, and counted by four or five Germans who were working independently. The Escape Organisation incited the mass of the P's/W to do everything possible to upset the count and to treat the whole thing as a huge joke. Within a short time the P's/W who had been counted and those who were waiting to be counted had lighted bonfires of waste paper, etc., and were dancing round them behaving like dervishes. Those who were passing through the "sheep-pen" made a noise like sheep, while others in the vicinity kept up a continual din of cat-calling and gibing. This state of affairs continued until 2200 hours when the Germans gave it up in disgust with a count of 17 men too many. The P's/W were then permitted to return to their barracks and were locked in.

        On the following morning another special roll call took place. This time all the identity cards of the P's/W were brought and placed on tables in the Compound. The P's/W were called by name and checked with the photographs on the cards. At first, only one P/W at a time was allowed to approach the tables, but in due course crowds gathered round each table and edged nearer and nearer. Eventually the Germans discovered that between 300 and 400 identity cards were missing. A thorough search was organised for them, but by that time they had been destroyed. The Germans attempted to discover the identities of the personnel whose cards were missing, but this was frustrated by men who had already been identified going up a second time. The men who had escaped were also covered up by this means.

        From then until all the escapers had been recaptured, the Germans did not know how many men were missing. Normal roll calls took place and the Escape Organisation made arrangements for the adjustment of the totals as they learned of the recapture of individual escapers through unofficial German sources.

        About this time the Criminal Police arrived and all the P's/W were transferred to the Vorlager and searched. At the same time, all the barracks were searched. The P's/W were passed back into the Compound in single file and checked with their identity cards. They were also finger-printed. The individuals whose identity cards were missing were photographed, but in many instances substitutions were effected.

25. SUMMARY OF METHODS.

        (a) Tunnels.

                The only successful tunnel which was constructed in this Compound is described in this Chapter, Section 16. Comments are given in sub-Section (f) of that Section.

        (b) Gate walk-out schemes.

                The Escape Committee concentrated most of their attention of perfecting preparations for escape by means of walking out of the Camp in disguise. The two successful escapes from this Compound were effected by this method.

                All attempts of this type are described in this Chapter, Section 17. The success of such attempts was dependent upon the ability of the individual to act in accordance with the impression created by his disguise without showing any signs of nervous strain, and upon his knowledge of the German language.

        (c) Wire schemes.

                There were two separate attempts to escape via the wire and they are described in this Chapter, Section 18. The first... [page missing]

CHAPTER III

ESCAPE MATERIAL

1. REQUIREMENTS

        The requirements for this type of Camp are as follows:-

                (a) Authentic civilian clothes, including shirts, collars and ties, of average size each with a good overlap of material to enable garments to be made larger if necessary; also hats, caps and footwear. The material should be of similar quality to that produced in the country where the P's/W are being held. The style of the garments should be similar to those worn in the country where the P's/W are being held. It is considered that Camp-made clothes reduced an individuals chances of success by about fifty per cent.

                (b) Enemy Officers', N.C.O.'s, and lower ranks' uniforms, with belts, pistol holsters, dummy bayonets and bayonet frogs, jackboots (if applicable), caps, dummy dress-swords (if applicable), shirts, collars, ties, etc. The uniforms should be of average size with a generous overlap of material to enable garments to be made larger if required. It should be ascertained whether Air Force, Army or Naval uniforms are required.

                (c) Enemy uniform and civilian clothing material, similar in quality to that in use by the Detaining Power, made up in the form of blankets. It is suggested that these should be overlayed with a design in bright colours which would wash out. They should be despatched as from a Welfare Organisation.

                (d) Tools of all descriptions, especially saw blades, hardened steel wire cutters, various types of files, screwdrivers, wood chisels, stone chisels, steel drills with braces, all kinds of handicraft tools, etc.

                (e) Cameras with quantities of normal film for taking identity photographs, etc. Special reproduction films, or reproduction plates and plate-type cameras, for reproducing documents by photographic means. Quantities of all the necessary photographic chemicals for developing, printing and reproduction printing. Quantities of photographic printing paper of various sizes, surfaces and hardnesses. Quantities of paper dyes for all colours with instructions for their use and the making of tints.

                (f) Portable typewriters for producing certain types of documents.

                (g) Reproductions of all types of identity documents, travel permits, etc., in use by the Detaining Power, with full particulars of the circumstances in which each is used. The documents used by females should be included. If possible, some of each type of document should bear forged signatures of the individuals authorised to issue them in the various areas within a radius of about 100 miles of the Camp to which the documents are sent. Some should also bear the appropriate stamps of issuing offices. It is essential that such signatures and stamps should be up-to-date. It is important that only some of each type of document should be partly completed in this way.

                (h) Quantities of all the food rationing and tobacco rationing coupons used by the Detaining Power and full information about which food coupons are for use in restaurants, and which for purchases in shops.

                (i) Money in bills of small denomination.

                (j) Quantities of chocolate, cigarettes, tobacco, coffee, soap, etc., for bribery.

                (k) Maps of the whole country in which the P's/W are held, scale about 1:250,000. Army/Air series. Maps of the Camp area and of all frontiers, scale about 1:25,000. Target maps of all ports, showing quays used by neutral shipping, etc.

                (l) At least one up-do-date copy of Baedecker.

                (m) Accurate marching compasses and a few bearing compasses for use in tunnel construction.

                (n) The essential parts of at least one small sewing machine with instructions for assembly.

                (o) Reproductions of the headed notepaper used by a number of large firms in the enemy territory.

                (p) Sheets of leather of a size suitable for making briefcases, knee-length boots, etc.

                (q) A small printing press with type.

                (r) Clothing dyes suitable for obtaining good results when P/W own uniform is dyed.

2. AIDS RECEIVED FROM I.S.9.

        Maps, money, compasses, etc., were received from I.S.9. in games parcels, gadgets and double-sided condensed milk tins.

        Two undisguised parcels were received. They contained money, wirecutters, saw blades, maps, etc. As no advice concerning their despatch was received, one was discovered by the Germans through censorship. The other was appropriated by the P's/W before it could be censored because it appeared to be different from the normal next-of-kin parcels.

3. REMARKS ON PACKING.

        All games parcels and gramophone records were subjected to close scrutiny by the German censorship. Games containing balls and those of the puzzle type were most carefully examined.

        All gadgets passed the censorship successfully.

        It is suggested that the best means of introducing escape aids into this type of Camp would be to despatch undisguised parcels, within the authorised weight limits, to specified individuals, but before this is done contact must be established with the Camp in order to ensure that conditions are such that parcels could be stolen before possible censorship. In all cases it is essential that the Camp is advised of the despatch of such parcels by code messages in duplicate, and that ample warning is given.

4. CONCEALMENT OF ESCAPE AIDS - GADGETS, ETC.

        The concealment of escape aids in gramophone records, darts, dart boards, book covers and playing cards was discovered.

        As related in Section 2 of this Chapter, one undisguised parcel was discovered.

        All other methods of concealment were successful.

5. ACQUIREMENT OF SPECIAL PARCELS.

        All parcels known to contain escapes aids, as advised by code message, and all games parcels, were abstracted by the P's/W handling parcels in the Parcel Store situated in the Vorlager. These were taken into the Compound without having been censored by the Germans. Details are given in Chapter IV, Section 1, sub-Section (a).

6. DANGERS OF STEALING PARCELS.

        The success of stealing parcels prior to censorship was dependent upon the quick wit and ingenuity of the personnel handling the parcels in the Parcel Store situated in the Vorlager.

        As no individual was apprehended whilst stealing a parcel it is not known whether any special dangers existed. It is considered that if any individual had been caught in the act the punishment would have been a short period in cells and he would have been debarred from handling parcels thereafter. A stricter control of parcels would have ensued for a time, but this would have relaxed in due course.

7. MATERIAL AVAILABLE/ACQUIRABLE ON THE SPOT.

        Virtually all the materials which were required by the Escape Organisation were available, or acquirable, in the Camp.

        The most productive source was through the "Trading" Organisation and everything which was needed was obtained within the limitations of its acquirability by the personnel who were bribed. The conditions of short supply of goods in GERMANY and the length of time required to develop the usefulness of corrupt personnel greatly hampered the work of the Escape Organisation. Because of these two factors, preparations for the first-class escapes which were planned took six months to complete. A list of the major items which were obtained by trading is contained in Chapter II, Section 10, sub-Section (a).

        Items which were acquirable from the P's/W were collected by the "TALLY HO" Organisation and a list is given in Chapter II, Section 3.

        No tools, or other items, were stolen from the Germans as the policy of the Escape Organisation was to work without arousing the suspicions of the Abwehr Department.

CHAPTER IV

CENSORSHIP BY GERMANS.

1. METHOD.

        (a) Parcels.

                Red Cross food, next-of-kin clothing, games, cigarette and tobacco parcels arrived at HEYDEKRUG Railway Station and HEYDEKRUG Post Office. When the Germans learned of the arrival of parcels they sent a party of P's/W, under escort, with a vehicle to collect them. A number of the Parcel Censorship staff always accompanied the party. The parcels were loaded on to the vehicle under the close supervision of this Parcel Censor and the escorting guards.

                When the vehicle arrived in the Camp Vorlager the parcels were unloaded by the P's/W and transferred to the Parcel Stores. This was done under the strict supervision of members of the Parcel Censorship staff.

                Red Cross food parcels were stacked in one store. Next-of-kin clothing, games, cigarette and tobacco parcels, which usually arrived in mail bags, were taken into another store in an adjacent building, where they were sorted into piles for the various barrack blocks. This was done by P's/W who volunteered for this work. They had nominal rolls showing the location of all P's/W in the Compound. Whilst this sorting was being done by P's/W, who had been specially briefed, games parcels and all parcels addressed to certain individuals were placed on one side. Book parcels were taken to the Book Store for censorship.

                The Germans allowed cigarette and tobacco parcels to be taken into the Compound at once. They were never censorsed nor opened. These were placed in mail bags for transfer to the Compound and the games parcels and others which had been placed on one side were put into these bags while a suitable diversion was created by the other P's/W to distract the attention of those Germans who were in the vicinity. The sacks were then taken into the Compound and the special parcels and games parcels were passed to

                        564838 W.O. HALL, E.L.G., R.A.F.,

                who examined the games parcels, gadgets, etc., and passed the escape aids they contained to the Escape Committee.

                In some cases, those games parcels which could be made to appear as though they had not been tampered with for the purpose of removing the escape aids were returned to the Parcel Store without the knowledge of the Germans and allowed to pass through the censorship. This was done to allay any suspicions the Germans might have had if no games parcels had been received by them for censoring.

                Normal next-of-kin parcels, other than those addressed to certain individuals, were kept in the Parcel Store for a few days. They were then opened by the P/W Parcel Staff in the presence of the Censors who examined each item in every parcel. Certain listed items, especially civilian shirts, etc., were confiscated. The remaining items were then tied in the original wrapping and placed on one side for transfer to the Compound. In certain cases, clothing parcels which were believed to contain escape aids, and which had not been taken into the Compound with the cigarette and tobacco parcels as outlined above, were opened and re-tied and placed with those parcels which had already been censored. This was done whilst a suitable diversion was created by other P's/W to distract the attention of the Censors in the room. In due course all these parcels were placed on a hand-wagon and taken into the Compound. Those parcels which were believed to contain escape aids were passed to HALL.

                When Red Cross food parcels were being issued, the parcels were opened by the P/W Parcels Staff in the presence of the Censors. All tins, except those containing coffee, were stabbed at one end by the Censors. This was the only form of censorship imposed on food. Tins of coffee were never examined in any way.

                Gramophone records, of the 12-inch size, were subjected to special examination, which is believed to have been carried out in BERLIN. Those which were returned in due course were issued to the P's/W but the Germans entered the title of each record in a book against the name of the person to whom it had been issued. About once a month they were collected by the Germans, played by the Censors, and returned to the P's/W. In addition to the foregoing, the Camp Censorship of all gramophone records amounted to each record being played and a hole being drilled through the centre of each where the label is affixed.

                All books were censored. Lists of permissible and forbidden books were used. Those which were forbidden were confiscated. Those which were allowed to be issued to the P's/W were examined for concealed messages, etc., in the bindings. Books which did not appear on any list were read by the Censors and issued, or confiscated, in accordance with their decision.

                The N.C.O.'s who outwitted the Germans and acquired parcels containing escape aids and smuggled them into the Compound were:-

                        656033   W.O. FRIPP,       A.G.,  R.A.F.

                        1378671 W.O. LEWIS,      K.G.,  R.A.F.

                        R 59280 W.O. MENZIES, W.,     R.C.A.F.

                        1200275 W.O. PRYOR,     G.J.,   R.A.F.

                The Camp Leader advised FRIPP when advices relating to parcels containing escape aids were received in code messages. FRIPP informed the others and they worked as a team when such parcels arrived.

        (b) Mail.

                The censorship of all in-coming and out-going mail was done at STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) and is described in the History of that Camp.

                Letters from the U.K. were delivered in this Compound from about ten weeks to sixteen weeks after posting. When complaints about the delay were made to the Kommandant he was unable to offer any explanation, but always suggested that the censorship was responsible.

2. RESULTS.

        (a) Parcels.

                Parcels packed by the Red Cross and parcels containing cigarettes and tobacco were always accepted by the Germans as being above suspicion.

                In theory, the censorship of all other parcels, i.e. next-of-kin clothing, games, sports equipment, books, musical instruments, gramophone records, etc., was carried out efficiently.

                In practice, all parcels which were believed to contain escape aids, and which had been advised to the P's/W by means of code messages, were got into the Compound as outlined in this Chapter, Section 1, sub-Section (a).

        (b) Mail.

                The German censorship of in-coming and out-going mail was reasonably efficient. Obscure phrases, stilted sentences and groups of figures were blacked out. There is evidence that some form of code communication between the P's/W and the U.K. was suspected, but as far as can be ascertained, no code user's mail was interfered with, or subjected to special scrutiny. It is almost certain that the P/W code was not discovered.

                It is worthy of note that certain P's/W, who were black-listed by the Germans for various offences, did not receive their mail regularly, nor were all of their letters received in the U.K.

3. OBJECT OF CENSORSHIP.

        (a) Parcels.

                The object of censorship was to prevent the entry into the Compound of escape aids in any form, or concealed messages.

                The object of puncturing tins of food was to ensure that the contents would be consumed within a short time and not hoarded for use in an attempt to escape.

        (b) Mail.

                The object of censoring mail was to delete passages, or possible keys to a code, which might convey useful information; also to discover, by tests with acids, whether messages were written in invisible ink.

4. PARCEL MARKINGS.

        All parcels bearing special labels, e.g. Licensed Victuallers, etc., were abstracted by the P/W Parcels Staff as related in this Chapter, Section 1, sub-Section (a).

        Advices concerning special markings on parcels containing escape aids were received in code messages.

5. COMMENTS.

        (a) Parcels.

                The P's/W took full advantage of the German system on censoring parcels and devised the means of by-passing it in order to get forbidden items into the Compound without arousing suspicion.

        (b) Mail.

                The censorship of letters addressed to Air Force P's/W delayed their delivery very much longer than was experienced in the case of personnel of the other Services in other Camps.

                The Camp Leader censored all out-going letters which contained code messages in order to ensure that the phraseology was not stilted. This was most desirable and is worthy of note.

CHAPTER V

CODE-LETTER MAIL.

1. INTRODUCTION.

        The incorporation of code messages in letters were introduced to this Compound by the organisation which had performed this function in the Centre Compound, STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) prior to the transfer of the majority of the N.C.O.'s to this Compound in June 1943.

2. ORGANISATION.

        (a) Sources of information.

                Military information for transmission to the U.K. in code messages was obtained from the following sources:-

                        (i) New arrivals. All new arrivals in the Compound, whether new P's/W from DULAG LUFT (OBERURSEL) or older P's/W from other Camps, were interrogated as soon as possible by the Camp Leader and his assistant:-

                                580114 W.O. DEANS, J.A.G., R.A.F.

                                744979 W.O. MOGG, R.P.L., R.A.F.

                                        The interrogation was similar to that done on R.A.F. Stations after an operational sortie.

                        (ii) P's/W on journeys outside the Camp. All P's/W who went on journeys outside the Camp to Hospitals, the Railway Station, Post Office, on walks, etc., were requested by the Compound Leader to keep their eyes and ears open and to give him details of what they had learned when they returned to the Compound. The most useful personnel in this connection were:-

                                        518168 W.O. LIGGETT, H., R.A.F.

                                        R 59280 W.O. MENZIES, W., R.C.A.F.

                                        1200275 W.O. PRYOR, S.J., R.A.F.

                                The most important single source of military information was

                                        631689 W.O. GRIMSON, G.J.W., R.A.F.

                                After his escape from the Camp on about 21st January, 1944, he collected military information of all kinds which he conveyed to the Escape Committee in written reports, and in letters written in German which contained code messages. He continued this activity until 13th April, 1944, when the last report was received from him.

                                During this period of three months he was travelling extensively in EAST PRUSSIA and had established an organisation amongst Poles in DANZIG and elsewhere. He could best be described as an untrained, unofficial secret agent.

                        (iii) Recaptured escapers. All recaptured escapers were interrogated, upon their return to the Compound, by the Escape Committee. Any information of military value was passed to the Camp Leader.

                        (iv) Contacts. The most important source of military information was from Germans, etc., through the "Trading" Organisation which is described in Chapter II, Section 10, sub-Section (a). All "traders" were briefed at frequent intervals to seek information on a particular subject. The ensuing reports were made to

                                        912301 W.O. BUNCE, J.B.L., R.A.F.,

                                who had been appointed by the Camp Leader. He maintained contact with all "traders" and requested individuals to endeavour to cross-check information which he had received from other "traders". He personally maintained contact with a number of Germans with this object, as he was given the "duty" of supervising the removal of Camp rubbish, etc., so that he could engage drivers of vehicles, etc., in conversation. He was a German speaker. After BUNCE had checked all reports to the best of his ability, he passed the information to the Camp Leader.

        (b) Collation.

                The information obtained from the above mentioned sources was collated by the Camp Leader, who compiled the messages for transmission to the U.K.

        (c) Coding staff.

                The coding of messages was done by the same organisation which had been in operation in the Centre Compound, STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) prior to June 1943. Certain changes of personnel were made, and additional code users were taught and registered by the two Team Leaders:-

                        564838 W.O. HALL, E.L.G., R.A.F.

                        740910 W.O. HOLLIDOE, R.L., R.A.F.

                From June 1943 onwards the Camp Leader incorporated a few messages in his own letters, but passed most of them to HALL and HOLLIDOE. They either incorporated them in their own letters, or passed them to members of their teams for encoding and incorporation in their own letters.

                All messages which were received from the U.K. were decoded by the individual code user to whom the letters were addressed and passed to their Team Leaders. They in turn passed them to the Camp Leader.

                When "K" Compound was opened in October 1943, the Camp Leader appointed one of the code users as a Team Leader, with instructions to form a team of code users in that Compound. He was transferred from "A" Compound to "K" Compound as a member of the P/W Administrative Staff and in this guise was able to attend weekly conferences with the Camp Leader, when he was given messages for transmission to the U.K. and passed on messages which had been received by himself and his team. He was:-

                        976383 W.O. McMULLAN, F., R.A.F.

                From October 1943 onwards he performed the same functions as HALL and HOLLIDOE.

                The following were the registered code users in this Camp, from whom messages were received by I.S.9:-

                        920728 W.O. ADAMS,                 M.E.,     R.A.F.

                        748073 W.O. ALEXANDER,        R.W.P., R.A.F.

                        922923 W.O. BAILEY,                  J.N.D.,  R.A.F.

                        1376598 W.O. BLISS,                   E.J.,      R.A.F.

                        904086   W.O. CAMPBELL,         R.M.,    R.A.F.

                        965676   W.O. DAWSON,            A.R.,     R.A.F.

                        580114   W.O. DEANS,                 J.A.G.,  R.A.F.

                        1063332 W.O. DIXON,                 E.,         R.A.F.

                        562081   W.O. DIXON,                 G.,         R.A.F.

                        580404   W.O. EDEN,                   W.H.,     R.A.F.

                        566980   W.O. GURNELL,            P.,          R.A.F.

                        564838   W.O. HALL,                    S.L.G.,  R.A.F.

                        999075   W.O. HALL,                    W.W.,   R.A.F.

                        745404   W.O. HIND,                     S.N.,     R.A.F.

                        740910   W.O. HOLLIDOE,           R.L.,      R.A.F.

                        742616   W.O. MARTIN,               E.,          R.A.F.

                        976383   W.O. MCMULLAN,        F.,         R.A.F.

                        648520   W.O. MOUNT,                R.,         R.A.F.

                        745094   W.O. PAUL,                     D.J.,      R.A.F.

                        552082   W.O. PETERS,                 D.E.,     R.A.F.

                        620735   W.O. PRENDERGRAST, J.N.,      R.A.F.

                        900332   W.O. REED,                     P.M.,     R.A.F.

                        754584   W.O. ROBSON,               P.C.,     R.A.F.

                        759350   W.O. SCOTT,                   T.,         R.A.F.

                        748628   W.O. SKUSE,                   R.J.,      R.A.F.

                        746728   W.O. SUTTON,                J.M.,     R.A.F.

                        1100637 W.O. WAGSTAFF.,         R.D.,     R.A.F.

                        741584   W.O. WILLIAMS,            J.F.,      R.A.F.

                        749510   W.O. WOOD,                  W.,        R.A.F.

                        748748   W.O. YARDLEY,             A.,        R.A.F.

                Certain other personnel wrote coded messages, but they were not received by I.S.9.

        (d) Despatch of messages.

                After the messages had been encoded by the code users, and incorporated in the contents of their out-going letters and postcards, they were handed to the Team Leaders, who passed them to the Camp Leader for scrutiny.

                The object of this examination was to ensure that these letters and postcards did not contain any remark which might be deleted by the German censorship; also to check that the phraseology was not stilted and unnatural.

                The Team Leaders kept copies of all messages which were despatched to the U.K. These were encoded and incorporated in notes until an acknowledgement was received from I.S.9.

3. SECURITY.

        It was generally known amongst the P's/W that some means of secret communication existed between the Camp and the U.K., but the method was known only to a very few, apart from the code users. Very few of the code users knew the names of other code users. Only the Team Leaders knew the names of all the members of their teams, and they did not know the members of each other's teams. Only the Camp Leader knew the names of all the code users.

        No special arrangements were made for providing watchers to give warning when code users were at work. As a rule the messages were encoded and decoded by the individuals in their own barrack rooms, and although accommodation was very crowded the other occupants were unaware of their activities. It was a general practice in the Camp for the P's/W to shout 'Huns up' whenever a German entered a barrack room. This gave ample warning to the code users.

        The code users were instructed that all workings of messages should be destroyed by fire as soon as the work was completed, or in the event of imminent discovery through the approach of a German. The actual messages to be encoded, and decoded messages from the U.K., were always written on cigarette papers and were carried on the person of the individual. The object of this was to enable it to be swallowed without difficulty in the event of an attempt being made by the Germans to conduct a personal search.

        No code user was ever discovered at work and the code was not compromised at any time.

4. DURATION OF EACH CODE USER'S ACTIVITIES

        The number of messages received by I.S.9. and the period during which they were received, are shown on the Appendix 'A' for each code user.

        Some of the code users listed in Section 2, sub-Section (c) of this Chapter, were not often employed for the despatch of messages as their work was not up to the required standard.

5. COMMENT

        The arrangements which were made for the collection and despatch of military information were satisfactory in most respects, but new code writers should not have been used for despatching messages until an acknowledgement of their registrations had been received from I.S.9. Because this was not done, a number of messages, which may have contained important information, were not received by I.S.9.

CHAPTER VI

RADIO

1. INTRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION.

        The radio receiver which had been operated in the Centre Compound, STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) prior to June 1943 was brought to this Compound when the transfer of the N.C.O.'s was effected during that month. The set was dismantled for the journey and the parts were concealed in tins containing food, etc. These passed through the searches on departure from SAGAN and arrival at HEYDEKRUG, without anything being discovered. All work connected with the radio receiver, including the transfer of the parts to this Camp, was done by:-

                902601 W.O. BRISTOW, J.F.H., R.A.F.

                580468 W.O. STUBBS,    P.,       R.A.F.

                903307 W.O. YOUNG,    D.G.,   R.A.F.

        Immediately after the arrival in this Compound of the above named, they re-assembled the receiver and built it into the motor compartment of a gramophone. They did not interfere with the use of the gramophone for playing and there was no outward indication that it concealed a radio. The gramophone was kept in the room occupied by the Camp Leader and his assistant:-

                580114 W.O. DEANS, J.A.G., R.A.F.

                744979 W.O. MOGG,  R.P.L., R.A.F.

        This room was situated at the rear of the Camp Office, which was in a wooden barrack isolated from other barracks occupied by P's/W (see Appendix "B").

2. OPERATION.

        The set was operated daily by DEANS, from June 1943 until July 1944, when the Camp was evacuated, for the purpose of receiving the B.B.C. news broadcasts. Very occasionally the set was not operated due to technical faults, or German searches.

3. MAINTENANCE.

        All maintenance work was done by BRISTOW assisted by YOUNG. They made certain spare parts, but the majority were supplied through the "Trading" Organisation.

4. SECURITY.

        As a general rule the set was operated to receive the 1800 hours (British time) broadcast, as the Germans were not often in the Compound at that time. The Camp office was locked from the inside about half-an-hour before that time and the key was left in the lock. Admittance to the room occupied by DEANS and MOGG could only be gained through this door so that it would have been impossible for a German to enter the room whilst the set was being used. In the event of a German hammering on the door to gain admittance, all wires, etc., were hidden in a few seconds before the door was opened.

        The Camp Leaders room was exempt from searches by the Abwehr Department. This was not by agreement, but it would appear that the Camp Leader was above suspicion. However, a record was always in place on the gramophone turntable and the gramophone was played frequently when Germans entered the room.

        Spare radio parts were kept in a specially, but inconspicuously marked cigarette carton in the cigarette store attached to the Camp Leader's office. This store contained thousands of parcels of cigarettes which belonged to the P's/W and which were kept there to reduce pilfering by the Germans conducting searches of the barrack rooms. This store is also referred to in Chapter II, Section 3.

5. EXAMINATION OF NEWS.

        The B.B.C. news broadcasts were taken down in shorthand by:-

                986897 W.O. AYNSLEY, C.S.,    R.A.F.

                744979 W.O. MOGG,       R.P.L., R.A.F.

        These bulletins were typed on typewriters in the Camp office by AYNSLEY, MOGG and:-

                755839 W.O. BRISTOW, D.E.     R.A.F.

                741658 W.O. HEAP,         J.S.H., R.A.F.

        From June... [page missing]

        ... construction, modification, and maintenance of the set were obtained from Germans through the 'Trading' Organisation, criticism has been made of the lack of response to requests to the U.K. by means of code messages for the supply of certain specified essentials.

7. W/T COMMUNICATIONS - INTRODUCTION

        About February, 1944 the Camp Leader received a code message, in three parts, from the U.K. which had been passed on to him by the Coding Organisation. This message gave the call-sign, frequency, and times of transmission of a radio station which would broadcast messages in code. Six code words were also given.

8. ORGANISATION - RECEIPT OF MESSAGES

        The radio receiver which was being used for the reception of the B.B.C. news broadcasts was modified to receive this Station. The work was done by BRISTOW, assisted by

                908879 W.O. GIBBS E.A. R.A.F.

        DEANS operated the set at the stated times and the messages were taken down by BRIMMS. After a short time the messages were taken down by:-

                564839 W.O. HANCOCK R.C.S. R.A.F.

        who continued to do this work until the evacuation of the Camp in July, 1944.

        DEANS passed the messages to the coding staff, who attempted to decode the groups of letters by means of the key-words which had been supplied. All broadcast code messages were received, but it was not possible to decode them although all the key-words were used for each message.

9. VALUE AND REMARKS

        The radio code messages had no value as it was not possible to decode them. DEANS, the Camp Leader, has made the following statement:-

                "It would appear that the full details of the radio code were not despatched from the U.K., or if they were, these were not duplicated."

10. TRANSMITTERS.

        No radio transmitter was constructed in this Compound.

CHAPTER VII

1. INTRODUCTION

        As far as can be ascertained no news letters were received in the Camp, but a few handkerchiefs on which messages were printed in invisible ink were received from I.S.9. The printing was rendered visible with a chemical supplied from the same source.

2. OPINIONS

        Some of the messages were considered to contain useful information. Messages from the Prime Minister and Chief of Staff were appreciated.

CHAPTER VIII

INTELLIGENCE

1. MILITARY INFORMATION

        (a) Methods of collection

                The various means by which military information was collected are described in Chapter V, Section 2, sub-Section (a).

        (b) Best targets for this type of Camp

                (i) Details of troop movements

                (ii) Details of bomb damage, etc.

                (iii) Details of military targets

                (iv) Information about enemy morale

                (v) Particulars of enemy reaction to certain types of warfare, etc.

                (vi) Details of the reaction of enemy troops to Allied methods of attack, strategy, new weapons, etc.

        (c) Value of direction from I.S.9.

                More detailed instructions would have been invaluable. Much of the direction received from I.S.9 was vague and capable of misconstruction.

        (d) Adherence to direction

                All messages which were received from I.S.9 were passed to the Camp Leader who took whatever action was necessary to comply with instructions.

2. INTERNAL SECURITY

        (a) Organisations

                All new arrivals in the Camp were interviewed by the Compound Leader as related in Chapter V, Section 2, sub-Section (a) (i). Each individual was required to give sufficient details of his Service career to enable his bone fides to be checked with other P's/W. Only selected P's/W were allowed to converse with Germans.

        (b) Peculiarities of Camp

                Nil

        (c) Subsequent use to M.I.5.

                This subject is dealt with in the History of STALAG LUFT III (SAGAN) Part I, Chapter VIII, Section 2, sub-Section (c).

CHAPTER IX

ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA.

1. INTRODUCTION AND METHOD.

        During the period from June 1943 until September 1943, a certain amount of insidious propaganda was disseminated amongst the Germans by the "Trading" Section, but this was not organised and the individual "traders" merely passed on "information" which they considered would lower the German morale.

        When the "Trading" Section was re-organised in September 1943 GRIMSON and MORRIS briefed the "traders" about what the Germans should be told in order to obtain the desired results.

2. RESULTS.

        The results obtained before September 1943 were negligible, probably due to uncoordinated effort and a too obvious attempt to condemn the German war effort. From that date onwards better results were obtained as each "trader" was instructed to convey a small amount of "information" on a particular subject and this was only passed on after many promises of secrecy had been obtained. In addition the Germans to whom certain types of "information" was given, were specially selected and no two Germans were given the same story.

        There is no doubt that the propaganda which was disseminated in this way had a considerable effect on German morale in the Camp. The noticeable increase in the supply of forbidden items by Germans of all types is proof of this.

        After some months it became apparent that "information" which was being given to the Germans was being passed on amongst themselves, so that in due course a garbled version of it was being related to other "traders" by other Germans who appeared to believe that it was genuine information. To some extent this interfered with the collection of military information for transmission to the U.K.