OFLAG IX A/Z.

ROTENBURG.

SITUATION AND CONDITIONS.

        Oflag IX A/Z was situated on the outskirts of the small town of ROTENBURG, in the HESSE region of GERMANY. The town was about 25 miles South East of KASSEL and about 80 miles North-East of FRANKFURT. The town of ROTENBURG was built on the banks of the river FULDA, the surrounding country was wooded and agricultural.

        The camp was a small one, situated in which was once a girls' school, it was made of stone built around three sides of a rectangle, and the area covered by the camp was approx. 2,160 sq. yds. Four watch towers had been erected at thee corners of the perimeter, inside which, apart from the actual building, was a playground, bordered on two sides by trees. Unfortunately it was not large enough for proper sports.

        The numbers in the camp varied considerably, thus affecting the conditions. In Sep 42 there were only 277 Ps/W in the camp, this number included 29 Australians, 1 American and 40 Indian officers. British and Dominion officers first arrived in August 42, the camp having previously housed French and Belgian Ps/W. By November of 42 numbers had increased to 516 including 123 O.Rs. and in Apr 43 there were 566, the new arrivals being 154 American officers taken prisoner in North Africa. The number of O.Rs., however, had been reduced to 68.

        The maximum number of Ps/W the camp could accommodate with adequate comfort was between 300-350, but due to the excessive overcrowding almost every necessity was in short supply. Two tier bunks were crowded into the main hall, classrooms and cubicles used in the past by resident students. There was a shortage of bedding, and washing facilities were quite insufficient.

        Most officers possessed two uniforms and shoes were on the whole in good condition, but there was a shortage of underclothing. Food was quite well cooked, but the S.B.O. was not permitted to know the amount of Red X stock in the camp, and as the U.S. officers had no food parcels sent during their stay, all extra provisions, though willingly shared, were in very short supply. Canteen supplies were very limited, but improved later. Mail at first was very irregular, due probably to the fact that so many Ps/W were constantly arriving and leaving the camp. This situation improved by Mar 43. Throughout this time morale was very high.

        The Commandant of the camp, Major BORRMANN was an elderly man, a former principal of the school. He endeavoured to improve conditions for Ps/W and towards the end of 42 the gymnasium was being fitted up as a library and theatre, a ping-pong table was installed, and the washing facilities were being extended and refitted.

        The building was centrally heated and the infirmary with 27 beds was fairly well equipped. A plan to build a chapel was anticipated though there is no report of this materialising.

        The age of the officers at Oflag IX A/Z was above average until Aug 43 when a batch of younger men arrived from Oflag VII B. The guards were strengthened on account of this but discipline was good and morale remained high.

        By Mar 43, 139 officers and 8 O.Rs. had been passed for repatriation. Towards the end of the war much concern was felt by the S.B.O. for the mental state of the younger Ps/W who were showing signs, after 4½ - 5 years of captivity of serious mental breakdowns. Apparently very little was being done for them by the German authorities and the S.B.O. considered that something should be done as quickly as possible to prevent them from losing their reason.

ESCAPE ORGANISATION.

        The Escape Committee at OFLAG IX A/Z was very highly organised and all attempts to escape were controlled exclusively by the Committee, the members of which varied, owing to transfers to other camps, and repatriation.

        Some of the chief organisers during the camp's existence were:-

                Col. RONEY-DOUGLAS.

                Maj. BESSEL-BROWNE.

                   "    BRUSH.

                   "    MacNAB.

                   "    PONSONBY.

                   "    UPTON.

                Capt. CAMPBELL.

                   "     SHACKLETON.

                   "     WESTLEY.

                Lieut. SCOTT.

        The committee was divided into sub-sections, members specialising in different jobs. For example, Major BRUSH held the position of officer in charge of Security and Code, Major BESSEL-BROWNE, officer i/c Tunnelling, Captain WESTLEY, tunnelling upstairs; Lieut. SCOTT, tunnelling below ground; Capt. SHACKLETON, officer i/c wireless. Other members collected and safeguarded all escape equipment, made maps and forged foreign workers passes and identity cards.

        When Brigadier CLIFTON was S.B.O. plans of would-be escapes were submitted first to the Committee, who discussed their possibilities, and if accepted were given to the Brigadier for final approval. Many plans were turned down. The committee handled all escapes as a "military operation", plans without a good chance to succeed were dismissed.

        The Committee themselves suggested and built up schemes, usually involving a considerable number of Ps/W and chose men to take part from those who had worked hardest for the Committee in the past. The general impression, especially amongst the Dominion Ps/W in the camp was that the plans were too grandiose, involving too many men, and that the system which so often rejected attempts by one or two men was over organised.

        Tunnelling was the main method of attempted escape favoured in the camp. It was carried out under exceptionally difficult circumstances, but apart from cutting the boundary wire at night, which was attempted a few times, never successfully. There was no other plausible means of exit.

        One other attempt nearly succeeded, and was called the Sydney Harbour Bridge. It was most ingeniously thought out, and a very unusual attempt. The Ps/W dismantled a disused lift and connected the angle irons to make a boom about 80 feet long. When the time for the breakout arrived, the boom was swung out of a second floor window, suspended by ropes from the third floor, the idea being that an escaper should hang on to the boom and be pushed out until the end was over the wire outside, then it would be lowered and the P/W would drop off. Unfortunately a guard saw the suspension ropes and gave the alarm.

        The result of this attempt was not as disastrous as might be imagined owing to the inefficiency of a guard who misinterpreted his order, which was to see that no one left the rooms where the boom had been seen. As it was he allowed 18 out of the thirty men involved in the attempt to walk away, so only twelve were sent to the cells.

        In the case of tunnelling, conditions were exceptionally difficult. The building was of stone with concrete foundations, deep in the ground, many of the floors were cemented and the immediately surrounding ground outside the building was asphalted. One tunnel dug between Nov 42 and Jun 43 was 150 yds long and was discovered within 12 feet of completion.

        Attempts were made to dig down inside the walls to below foundation level, then dig away from the building. All waste had to be deposited on the roof. It was a very length process but safer, as any disturbance in the concrete was immediately spotted by the guards.

        The only successful escape from Oflag IX A/Z was made by two Indian officers who reached SWITZERLAND in early 43.

        The route most favoured where an escape was being planned was North West through GERMANY to HOLLAND, there to make contacts and endeavour to cross the channel. Two Ps/W asked for routes to YUGOSLAVIA to join the partisans and others planned to do like the Indian officers and go South East to SWITZERLAND, but the only P/W to get outside the camp in disguise, hid in a refuse cart and was discovered less than a mile from the gate.

        The Germans constructed two small buildings just outside the camp, which were believed to house listening devices for underground activity. But apparently the general belief of the German camp authorities was that digging only went on during the dark hours, as no guard was ever seen entering of leaving the hut during the day.

ESCAPE MATERIAL.

        Special parcels from I.S.9. started to arrive at IX A/Z towards the end of Nov. They were invaluable to the Ps/W as all materials to facilitate escape originated from them.

        All materials to do with tunnelling were most in demand - wire cutters, hacksaws, files, chisels, and torches, and for the second phase of the escape, compasses, materials for forging German papers, German and Belgian money, and blankets and dyes for making civilian clothing.

        Wireless valves were always needed also maps of the Dutch and Belgian frontiers. All W.O. maps were copied for escapers, who were never allowed an original, they never left the camp.

        The stealing of parcels from the parcel store was carried out by Major HAROLD, the British postal officer and his staff of P/W orderlies, who collected all parcels from the station and post office, bringing them back to the camp to be opened under the examination of German guards.

        When information had been received warning the Committee of the arrival of an "All Contraband" parcel, word was passed to Major HAROLD and all efforts would be made to ensure the parcel reached the right hands. It was comparatively easy to smuggle such parcels away before they reached the parcel room. Ps/W soon learnt to recognise a 100% phoney, and also seemingly innocent games and articles concealing gadgets from I.S.9.

        Tobacco and food tins were the safest means of concealing gadgets as they were very rarely opened usually being put in the central store until required. Pepper was a commodity always confiscated because it could be used to put on corners to prevent dogs from sniffing at tunnel foundations. However, interested persons could always steal it from the kitchens.

        The prison authorities took no action against a man to whom a discovered I.S.9 parcel was addressed, apart from checking more thoroughly all future ones directed to him. In some cases too many were sent to one individual at the same time, and the Local Ladies Comfort Fund began to arouse suspicion by sending too much too often.

        On the whole, very little was discovered by the Germans, due to warnings being received in time and constant vigilance on the part of the parcel staff. [Document ends]