Report on the events prior to the relief of Marlag und Milag Nord by the Guards Armoured Corps

About 2,000 R.A.F. officers arrived at Marlag on 5th February, 1945, who have been evacuated from Sagan Camp by march and rail. In order to accommodate them in "Marlag M" about 700 Naval ratings, and all the British Internees, were transferred to the Merchant Navy Camp at Milag, while 250 P.Os were sent to the R.N. Officers camp "Marlag O".

On 9th April at 1600 I was informed by the Kommandant, Frigatten Kapitan Schmid, that all Prisoners of War C.O. Service personnel were to evacuate on foot to Lubeck, and be prepared to start that evening. I protested strongly owing to the dangers of the road through action by the Tactical Air Force. Schmid replied that he quite agreed with me, but he had received orders that morning from the General Commanding all Prison Camps, saying we were to shift Camp. Finally he agreed to leave behind those officers and men considered by Stabarst Trautmann to be unfit to march. After delaying the start as long as possible, the Naval Contingent left the camp in good heart at 1415 on 10th April, under Captain E.H.B. Baker, D.S.O., R.N. as Senior British Officer.

The next day all remaining R.N. and R.A.F. officers and men, including 41 escapers, shifted up to Milag; and subsequently "Marlag O" was occupied by 1800 U.S. and a few British prisoners, while "Marlag M" was filled with 1940 French, Poles and Roumanians. These men had been marched from Sandbostel and were in a very poor physical state through insufficient food.

At Milag I found that out of 670 ratings who should have gone on the march, only 187 had actually left, the remainder having been hidden up by the Merchant Navy in their big camp. Korvetten Kapitan Rogge told me that he had taken over commander with two officers and 10 guards, and had orders to surrender to the British on their arrival. He added that he had no intention of sending anyone else on the march, and agreed to allow escapers from the column to enter Milag without hindrance.

Information was received on 14th April that Lieutenant Commander (S) C.W. Linton R.N.V.R. and three others, who had been wounded by air attack on the march to Lubeck, were in hospital at Zeven, and Ober Leutnant Heuken volunteered to drive Commander J.W. Crossdaile, RNR to that town with clothes, blankets etc. and try to bring them back. They returned uninjured, but reported that the wounded officers were still unfit to travel, but well cared for.

By April 19th it became clear that the German control of the camp was fading out, due to the complete indifference of the guards to their orders or duties. The situation was somewhat serious as the surrounding country was occupied by S.S. and 1st Line Troops, who would have welcome an excuse to clean up the camp. A Royal Marine guard, therefore, was called up and they maintained a continuous patrol, unarmed, inside the wire, to prevent anyone from leaving the camp. A Royal Naval Officer of the Watch and two Quartermasters were also stationed at the maingate of Milag. I visited Major Harcourt, the S.B.O. of 275 newly captured British soldiers in "Dulag" camp, and Sergeant Major Ehalt of the U.S. Army, in charge at "Marlag O", and gave orders for a similar inside patrol to be set. At "Marlag M" I appointed Flt. Lieut. Schaffner R.A.F. to be in command of the French section, and Lieutenant Ciencials to take charge of the Poles and Roumanians, and gave the same orders. That night two bombers were dropped on "Marlag M", due to a Pole lighting a paper flare in the heads, contrary to orders. Six were killed and four wounded.

Owing to the unforeseen arrival of these 4,000 new prisoners the feeding of the camp caused considerable anxiety; but, owing to the brave action of Captain Simpson of the Danish Red Cross, and also Dr. Stein and Captain Foskett of the International R.C. in risking the dangers of the road and bringing a stock of R.C. parcels from Lubeck in their vans, this difficulty was overcome.

During the next week gunfire continued to the South and South East of the Camp, while nearby roads and lanes were constantly attacked by the Tactical Air Force. At 1130 on 26th April, Captain Notman and I, accompanied by Kapitan Rogge, were taken to General Rodt's headquarters in the Westertimke, which were about 400 yards from the Camp. We were informed by his Staff Officer that in order to comply with the Geneva Convention, they intended to send an envoy to the British General to propose that a truce should be declared from 1500, for 24 hours if necessary, so that all prisoners could be evacuated and marched five miles to Bahnstadt, and there turned over to the British. As this was an obvious excuse to gain time to fortify positions and reform their troops I refused to have anything to do with it, and told the Staff Captain that they should evacuate Westertimke; a remark that was not well received. Eventually, rather against their will, Kapitan Rogge and Ober Leutnant Heuken got into a motor bicycle and sidecar and drove off towards the British lines carrying a white flag. They did not return and Ober Leutnant Wessel assumed the nominal command of the Camp.

The British attack began in the forenoon of April 27th, and at 1630 the village of Kirchtimke, lying about 3 k.m. to the N.E. of the camp was stormed after a heavy bombardment. This was followed by fierce fighting with tanks and infantry in the wood around the German guards' barracks in Westertimke, and the village was not cleared of the Germans until midnight. Some splinters and .303 bullets fell in the camp, but caused no casualties.

At 0045 on April 28th I met Lieut. Macgregor of the Scots Guards at the Main Gate of Milag, who told me that he had come to round up our German guards and that we were free.

In the forenoon I called upon Major General Adais [Adair] and Brigadier Johnston of the Guards Armoured Corps to thank them for our release and the care that [?] been taken of the camp during the attack. I then turned over the charge of the camps to Lt.Col. Appleby of the "P.W.X." Department.

Ober Leutnant Wessel behaved correctly during the action, and the camp guards took no part in the fighting.

I would particularly commend the services of Lieut. D.B. Taylor, R.M. and the Marine Guard. They performed their tedious patrol duties with tact and efficiency, and later, when the camp had been relieved, they formed armed riot squads, which checked looting and prevented panzerfaust, arms and drink from being brought into the camp. Their good discipline was an example to all. Taylor was ably supported by Lt. O.V. Smith R.M. and Regimental Sergeant Major Hawkins, R.M.

CAPTAIN

late Senior British Officer

Marlag and Milag Nord.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.

Whitehall, S.W.1.

At.... and before para. commencing "I would" insert:-

Throughout these proceedings I received the most cordial co-operation from Capt. R.F. Notman and the officers of the Merchant Navy in their well organised camp. Lt.Cdr. Jackson, R.N. acted as my staff officer, and his sound judgment and attention to detail was a great help.