Page 1, Page 2

National Archives catalogue number WO 171/1233.

Abbreviation

52 LI A AA a/c Adm ADS Adv Airldg Amb Armd Arr Arty A/Tk Bde Bdy Bldg Bn Br Bty CCP CD Civ Cmd Comd Comn Conc Concr Coy CRE Cst DAQMG Def Deg Det Div DMA DZ Embktn En Engnr Eqpt ETA Evac Excl FBE Fd Fm Fmn FOO Fwd GAF Gen GOC Gp H HMG How i/c Incl Ind Inf Instr Int Intercomn Junc LAA Ladg Grad Ldg Lt LZ MDS Med MG Mob Mot MT O OC Offr O i/c Op Org P Pdr Ph Pl Posn Proj Pt Pz RASC Rd RE Ref Regt Reinfcd Res Rfts Rly Rt RUR RV Sec Senr Sigs SL Sp Sqdn SS Stas Str Strg Tac TAF Tk Topo Tp Tpt Trg u/c Veh Yeo WT

52nd (Regiment of Foot) Light Infantry (2nd Ox and Bucks) Army Anti-Aircraft Aircraft Administration Advanced Dressing Station Advance Airlanding Ambulance Armoured Arrival Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade Boundary Building Battalion Bridge Battery Casualty Collection Point Coastal Defence Civilian Command Command Communication Concentration Concrete Company Commander Royal Engineers Coast Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General Defensive Degree Detachment Division Divisional Maintenance Area Drop Zone Embarkation Enemy Engineer Equipment Estimated Time of Arrival Evacuate Excluding Folding Boat Equipment Field Farm Formation Forward Observation Officer Forward German Air Force General General Officer Commanding Group / Glider Pilot (if upper case) Hussars Heavy Machine Gun Howitzer In-Command Including Independent Infantry / Information Instruction Intelligence Intercommunication Junction Light Anti-Aircraft Landing Gradient Landing Light / Left Landing Zone Main Dressing Station Medium Machine Gun Mobile Motorised Motor Transport Order Officer Commanding Officer Officer in command Operation Organisation Pilot Pounder Photograph Platoon Position Projector Point Panzer Royal Army Service Corps Road Royal Engineers Reference Regiment Reinforced Reserve Reinforcements Railway Right Royal Ulster Rifles Rendezvous Section Senior Signals Start Line / Searchlight Support / Self-Propelled (if upper case) Squadron Special Service Stations Strength Strong Tactical Tactical Air Force Tank Topography Troop Transport Training Undercarriage Vehicle Yeomanry Wireless Telegraphy

Appendix

APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION

Operations 'TONGA' & 'MALLARD'

by Col. G.J.S. CHATTERTON DSO

OPERATION 'TONGA'

        1. OBJECT  To land 6 gliders in two landing zones, X & Y, without ground aids.

        2. FACTORS  The timing of this operation is primarily dependent on the military requirement and is expressed in the Air Plan.  Courses may be slightly altered by avoiding action taken either on tow or in free flight.  The distance of the track and release point from the landing zone will depend on the type of approach to be made.  THEREFORE, the possibility of failure to reach landing zone at the correct time will increase with increasing height and distance of track from landing zone.

        3. There are excellent landmarks on both sides of the proposed track - Rt - Canal de CAEN, and river ORNE; Lt - distinctive woods, roads.  There are no major obstructions in the approach to either landing zone.  The landing zones themselves are distinctive although small.  Landing zone X is a triangular field of some 400 yds in length with a base of 300 yds.  There are high trees on the left, and a bank on the rt.  A pond midway down the left hand boundary provides a distinctive landmark.  Landing zone Y is the second of the two small fields, divided by a thin hedge.  The approach must be made over trees some 20 ft high, but apart from the hedge, not considered thick enough to damage a glider seriously, the only obstructions are two small trees on the western side, and one on the eastern side at the far end.  The coastline should provide an excellent release point for a remote release.  THEREFORE, glider pilots should have no difficulty in distinguishing the landing areas.  There is no fear of striking an obstacle in the final approach.  The only limiting factor is the size of the field.

        4. Apart from the normal weather considerations, the chief weather factor to be taken into account in this operation is the height of the cloud base.  Patches of cloud or thin layers will render the operation more difficult but not impossible.  Thick layer clouds with a base of less than 6000 ft will preclude the possibility of a remote release.  THEREFORE, a remote release which will preserve the desire element of surprise, will depend entirely with the weather.  It is unlikely, however, that the attack will be launched in weather conditions which limit the ceiling to such an extent.

        5. COURSES  Three types of release may be considered for this operation, - Remote, medium or low.

                (a) A low release at night is impracticable.

                (b) A medium (1500 ft) release:- i. gives a practical certainty of arrival over the L.Z.  ii. destroys the element of surprise.

                (c) A remote (6000 ft) release:- i. admits the possibility of failure to arrive over the L.Z.  ii. preserves the element of surprise to the last moment.

        FACTORS

                i. Surprise is vital, THEREFORE, a remote release must be employed.

                ii. To obtain the height necessary for this type of release, a powerful tug must be used.  THEREFORE - HALIFAX aircraft which give the best performance should be employed.

                iii. the longest run afforded by these landing zones is approx North to South in L.Z. 'X', or south to north in L.Z. 'Y'.  THEREFORE, the tracks and timing after release must be so calculated that the glider pilots have sufficient height for these approaches plus a reserve for evasive action or the swift loss of height on the final approach.

        6. PLAN  Glider Crews must be specially trained for this operation, with selected tug crews.  The tug aircraft will continue on a bombing run after the release of gliders+.  Gliders will release at 6000 ft at a distance of 6 miles from the target area.  The release point will be in the vicinity of the coast, and therefore clearly defined.  The three gliders landing in LZ 'X' will fly courses designed to give them a 180 deg turn and a landing of south to north irrespective of wind.  The remaining three gliders will fly a timed course, giving them an 'S' turn and a final approach and landing of North to South irrespective of wind.  There will be no ground aids available for either party.

                + Calculated to distract the ground forces.  This should enable the gliders to fly in unobserved until the last few hundred feet.

                Note  These crews have been training in the type of release required for this operation since 16 Apr 44, both by day and night.  It is considered that the operation is extremely difficult but devices may be available to reduce any possibility of failure.

LANDING ZONE 'V'

        1. OBJECT  To land 11 gliders on to one L.Z. by moonlight.

        2. FACTOR  The timing of this operation primarily depends on the military requirements, and is expressed in the Air Plan.  Courses may be slightly altered by the necessity of taking evasive action.  THEREFORE, any alteration in timing will effect both parties both paratp & glider and the necessity for surprise is not vital.

        3. The area in which these gliders are to land is almost totally prepared for obstruction.  Careful study of photographs has revealed only one suitable area, which is some 1000 yds from the D.Z.  This area is reasonably simple to identify, since it is roughly circular, with a thick rectangular wood to the North.  The total length is nearly 1000 yds and its width 500 yds.  THEREFORE, pilots should be able to identify the area and to land into it provided that it remains unobstructed.

        4. Only normal weather considerations need to be taken into account for this operation.

        5. The complete force must be assembled on the ground as quickly as possible.  THEREFORE, the glider aircraft must fly in simultaneously with the parachute a/c, and as little time as possible should be spent in free flight.

        6. COURSES  Two types of release may be considered for the operation, low and medium.

                (a) Low release.

                        A. (i) renders navigation extremely difficult.  (ii) renders combinations more vulnerable to light flak.  (iii) gives the glider pilots less chance of landing in the right area.

                        B. (i) Conceals the release point until the last moment.

                (b) Medium release.

                        (a) i. a release observed by the enemy will indicate the L.Z.  ii. gives a practical certainty of the arrival over the L.Z.

        7. PLAN  Glider crews will be specially selected.  They will release at 1500 ft and make a rt hand turn to approach the L.Z. from east to west irrespective of wind.  All gliders will land as far into the L.Z. as possible.

BATTERY PARTY

        1. OBJECT  To capture bty point 155756.

        2. FACTORS  The timing of this operation is dependent on the military requirements and is expressed in the Air Plan.  Courses may be altered by necessity for taking evasive action.  THEREFORE, definite times of arrival cannot be stated, and communication between ground and air must be by pre-arranged signal.

        3. There are excellent landmarks in the area concerned.  The target area itself stands out from its surroundings, and will do so even more after bombing.  The landing area is extremely small and will be cratered and full of rubble.  THEREFORE, glider pilots should have no difficulty in distinguishing the target area, but landings will be very difficulty.  The undercarriage must be retained to take the shock before the fuselage.

        4. Apart from normal weather considerations, thin layers or patches of low cloud will render the operation more difficult.  The limiting factor is the height of the cloud base.  The type of release will be governed by the height of cloud base.  It is unlikely that the operation will be launched with low ceiling.  Surprise is vital to the operation, because the gliders are landing directly on to an area of flak defence.  THEREFORE, a remote release must be employed.

        6. The best landing area will appear to be in the western sector of the bty posn.  THEREFORE, the approach track and turning after release should be calculated to give a wide turn and an approach from west to east.

        7. COURSE  The three normal types of release could be considered for this operation.

                a. a low release - considered impracticable.

                b. a medium release (1500 ft).  i. will give a practical certainty of arriving over L.Z.  ii. will destroy the element of surprise.  iii. will draw fire from ground defences.

                c. a remote release (6000 ft).  i. preserves the element of surprise.  ii. decreases the risk of attracting fire from the ground defences.  iii. increases the chance of failure, i.e. missing the target area.

        8. PLAN  Glider crews will be selected volunteers, who will undergo special training.  They will be released in the vicinity of the coast, at 5000 ft or at the maximum height below that figure that can be achieved with an ALBEMARLE - HORSA combination.  They will fly in a wide sweep South of the bty and approach it from the west.  At a height of 500 ft they will flash the pre-arranged signal on their landing light.  The target area will then be illuminated by the ground forces attacking the position, who will, from this time on cease firing.  Glider pilots cannot be briefed to land in a particular area, but will choose their spot when the illuminations are fired.

                NOTE  The glider crews have had specialised training, and have proved proficient in landing in a similar target area.  They have been on attachment to the troops they are to carry, and have seen and have flown over the 'mock-up' of the bty position both by day and night, when a full scale rehearsal was planned.  This operation is considered extremely hazardous but every effort has been made to equip the pilots who have undertaken it.

L.Z. 'N'

        1. OBJECT  To land 68 gliders on to a L.Z. with the aid of ground lights.

        2. FACTORS  Timing of this operation is dependent on the military requirement and is expressed in the Air Plan.  Courses may be altered or streams split by the necessity of taking evasive action.  THEREFORE, the E.T.A. may not be correct and gliders may arrive behind or in front of their briefed positions.

        3. The area contains some excellent landmarks but the ground is totally prepared for obstruction.  THEREFORE, the glider pilots should have no difficulty in striking the L.Z. but landing lanes must be cleared for them to land into.

        4. Troops will already have been on the ground for some time before the arrival of the gliders.  THEREFORE, the enemy will be aware of the movement of our troops into the area concerned.

        5. Surprise has already been achieved by previous troops.  THEREFORE, the remote release is not required and the normal weather conditions only now apply.

        6. The direction in which the poles have been erected leaves lanes running approx from North to South.  THEREFORE, the tracks must be so constructed as to give a landing direction of either North to South, or South to North.

        7. COURSES  Only one type of release need be considered for this operation:- Medium release, (a) gives practical certainty of arrival over L.Z.  (b) gives time for pilots to make calculated approach.  (c) reveals L.Z. to enemy observers.

        8. PLAN  Glider crews will be specially selected to land into two strips, to be prepared by R.Es.  They will approach L.Z. in two streams, release at 1500 ft.  They will normally make a 180 deg turn to the rt, the landing direction being therefore, South to North.  The corners of the prepared strip will be marked by red obstruction lights, and a 'T' of Hollophane lights will guide them in.  A single flashing light, at a distance of 100 yds from the base of the 'T' will indicate the number of the strip.  Each strip will be approx 1000 yds long by 60 yds in breadth, and is designed to accommodate up to 40 gliders.  The poles may be slung clear of the landing zone.  For a distance of 120 yds to be measured from the first pole to be removed, the obstruction will be flattened to give an approach 'Funnel'.  Glider pilots may use their landing lights momentarily in their approach, but will not leave their navigation lights burning after they come to a rest unless their glider forms an obstruction to the remainder of the stream; i.e. the pilot undershoots and fails to run clear.

                NOTE  The glider crews have practiced landings on to strips of these dimensions on airfields.  They have also seen demonstrations of strip clearing, and liaised with the troops that they will carry.  Some have seen the lighting from the air.  Provided that the landing strips can be cleared, this operation is considered to have a good chance of success.

OPERATION "MALLARD"

        1. OBJECT  To land 220 HORSAS and 30 HAMILCAR gliders by day.

        2. FACTORS  The timing of the operation is primarily on the military requirement and is expressed in the Air Plan.  This landing will be made behind the perimeter and streams will not encounter heavy flak opposition.  THEREFORE the E.T.A. should be accurate.

        3. The areas in which these gliders are to land is totally prepared for obstruction, with the exception of the strips previously prepared and used in operation 'TONGA'.  The landmarks in both areas are distinctive.  Therefore - Glider crews should have no difficulty in identifying the landing areas; landing strips must be prepared on both L.Zs. to accommodate the necessary number of a/c.

        4. It is necessary to cross the coast at a height of 800 ft.  It is not possible to gain height rapidly from the coast to the L.Z.  Therefore - the release height cannot be greater than 1000 ft.

        5. This op may have to go forward under arduous conditions, but apart from normal weather conditions, only the height of the cloud base can affect it.  Therefore - the op can be successful with a cloud base of less than 1000 ft.

        6. The tracks to be flown are regulated by the Air Plan.  THEREFORE, Downwind landings will have to be accepted up to 20 mph.  Winds above this speed will assist gliders to make a complete turn and approach to wind.

        7. Surprise is no longer an essential factor.  THEREFORE, Normal releases can be carried out.

        8. Air cover cannot be guaranteed at heights in excess of 1000 ft.  THEREFORE, this height must be the release height.

        9. Since only a limited number of crews have been held in the glider pilot Wings (560), other crews whose training has not been so concentrated must also be employed.  This operation should be the simplest undertaken.  THEREFORE, A number of crews of code 'Green' should be employed.

        10. COURSES  The type of release is entirely governed by the above factors.

        11. PLAN  The a/c will approach the landing areas in two streams.  The left stream will land on L.Z. 'N' and the rt stream will land on L.Z. 'W'.  Three landing strips on L.Z. 'N' filled during the previous night will be cleared and one additional strip provided.  The additional strip will be 1000 yds by 90 yds.  The strips will be numbered 1 to 4, from West to East.  The strips on L.Z. 'W' will be numbered 5 and 6 from North to South.  On L.Z. 'N' the HORSA gliders will land in strips 1, 2 and 3.  Strip 4 is entirely allotted to the HAMILCAR gliders.  The tracks are so calculated to give the left hand stream a 90 deg turn.  This plan will be adhered to until wind conditions giving a downwind landing, with a wind speed of more than 20 mph are in force.  The gliders will then land into wind.

                NOTE  The HORSA crews have had a great deal of practice in this type of landing.  The operation is in daylight, and it is considered that it has every chance of success.  The Hamilcar crews are well trained, but their landing area is restricted.  A certain percentage of losses must be expected in this aspect of the operation.

HAMILCAR LANDING

        1. OBJECT  To land 4 Hamilcars into a prepared landing strip 1000 yds x 60 yds.

        2. FACTORS  The timing of this sortie is primarily dependent on the Military requirement and is expressed in the Air Plan.  The courses may be altered by the necessity of taking evasive action.  THEREFORE, the E.T.A. may not be correct.

        3. The area contains some excellent landmarks but the ground is totally prepared for obstruction.  THEREFORE, glider pilots have no difficulty in locating the L.Z. but landing lanes must be prepared.

        4. The element of surprise will already be lost.  THEREFORE, no remote release will be required and only normal weather conditions will apply.

        5. The direction in which the obstructions have been prepared is approximately NORTH - SOUTH.  THEREFORE, the track made good must allow for the two landing directions, i.e. N - S or S - N.

        6. COURSES  Only one type of release need be considered for this operation.  Medium release:- (a) gives practical certain of arrival over L.Z.  (b) gives time for pilot to make calculated approach.

        7. PLAN  The HAMILCARS will land into the most westerly strip (of 1000 yds x 60 yds) which will not be used by any HORSA gliders.  This strip will not have the demolished poles recovered from the centre of the strip because of the time limitations.  The approach will be made at 1500 ft and the lighting and other considerations of flattened poles to find an approach funnel will be as laid down for the remaining strips.

                Note.  The Hamilcar crews have been specially trained for landing into areas of these dimensions and it is considered that this operation has a good chance of success.

GENERAL NOTE

        Considerable study has been made of each landing area.  Before the work of obstruction commenced, it was considered that all phases of the operation had every chance of success.  When obstructions appeared a close liaison with other arms concerned evolved, after much experiment, a method of clearing landing lanes of the required length and breadth.  The main glider landings on zone 'N' will therefore depend to a great extent on the ability of the paratps and pathfinder forces to clear and mark the strips.  The glider pilots concerned have been trained for some time in this type of landing, and I have every confidence in their ability.

        The other phases of the operation, namely the landings on D.Zs V and K, the Coup de Main party, and the Bty party, will not have the advantages of cleared lanes and pathfinder force ground markings, to aid them.  I consider them hazardous operations in that the glider pilots may not be able to bring their loads intact to the correct L.Zs.

        The gliders landing on the Bty are to be flown by volunteer crews.  They will of necessity make a remote release and apart from the difficulty of detection the landing area will be deeply cratered and impossible to land into without damage to the aircraft.  I have already stated my views in writing, but after a conference with the Air Staff and the GOC 6 Airborne Div, I consider that the importance of the operation warrants the risks.  There can, however, be no guarantee of success.

        The task of the Coup de Main party has now been made infinitely more difficult by the erection of poles in LZ X.  I consider it unlikely that the gliders landing here will be able to reach the area of the triangular field where their objective lies.  In L.Z. 'Y' this should not prove so difficult but once again I have expressed my opinion and have agreed that the task is vital.

        For the eleven gliders landing in L.Z. 'V' a large unobstructed field was chosen after work on obstruction of the previous selected L.Z. had commenced.  This field was not acceptable to the GOC 6 Airborne Div owing to the distance some thousand yards from the parachute D.Z.  A similar difficulty arose in the case of L.Z. 'K' where no suitable area free from the preparation of obstruction could be found North of a line already enumerated in my letter HQ A Tps/2865/11/GP/11 dated 24 May 44.  After study of the latest air cover from which it would appear that the poles were not at that time - 28 May 44 - actually erected, and a conference with the GOC 6 Airborne Div in which the necessity for quick support by the glider loads of 6-pdr guns was stressed, I have agreed that the landings shall remain as originally planned.  I have made 6 Airborne Div aware however that I consider these phases of the operation have only a limited chance of success dependent almost entirely on the existing state of the obstruction.

The Air and Military Briefing of the Glider Pilots

The Glider Pilots  briefing has been carried out in the following manner.

WING COMMANDERS  The Comds of Nos. 1 and 2 Wings, Glider P. Regt were briefed by the Comd Glider Pilots, personally, on 15 May 44.  Operation and Intelligence officers were also briefed by the Chief Intelligence Officer on 24 May 44.  All offrs down to Sqn Comds were also briefed from this date.

SQUADRON COMMANDERS  The Commander Glider Pilots briefed his Sqn Comds personally on May 31, as a final check.  The Sqn Comds attended a briefing of all 38 Group, Sqn R.A.F. Comds, on Thurs, 1 Jun 44.

FLIGHT COMMANDERS  The Flight Comds were briefed by the Sqn Comds on 25 May 44.  Thus, by this date, all controlling officers had been put into the picture.  This was to enable them to prepare the brief for the junior pilots.

THE GLIDER PILOTS  The Glider Pilots were briefed with their RAF air crews and by Glider Pilot Sqn Comds on 2 Jun 44.  All Sqns should have had a complete set up of briefing material by this time and, the nature of the flight being comparatively simple, all glider pilots should have been thoroughly conversant with the Flight Plan.  The briefing material supplied by the Commander Glider Pilots was as follows:-

        Maps: 1:50,000 FRANCE (each pilot) issued on D-3.  1:250,000 FRANCE (each Wing).

        Photographs (issued 25 May 44): enlargements LZ 'X' and 'Y' to each Sqn.  LZ 'V' and 'K' to A and F Sqns.  LZ 'W' vertical to A, D and G Sqns.  LZ 'W' oblique to A, D and G Sqns.  LZ 'N' vertical to each Sqn.  LZ 'N' oblique to each Sqn.

        Stereo pairs: full set of stereo pairs covering all LZs from Air Cover prior to 20 May 44.  27 May 44.  To each Sqn.  Full set LZ 'N' Air Cover 2 Jun to each Sqn 30 Jun 44.

        Photographs: LZ to each pilot issued 3 Jun 44.

        Models: At each Wing HQ.

        Diagrams: At each Wing HQ.

Briefing by RAF  Sqn Comds, incl Film show, 1 Jun 44.  Flight Comds, 2 Jun 44.  All crews, 3 Jun 44.

MILITARY PLAN

        A lecture was given to the Regt by the Comd Glider Pilots, and the organisation down to sections laid down.  On May 27/28, exercise CANDID was carried out on a selected area whose dimensions were precisely the same as the operational area.  The Regt was put through a complete rehearsal of its operational role on the ground.  A conference was held by all Comds at HQ Comd Glider Pilots on 31 May 44, and the most important points were discussed and all the matters were finally fixed up.  The Comd G.Ps. visited all Sqns on 2/3 Jun and 3/4 Jun 44 and spoke personally to each individual pilot and addressed the Sqns after his parade.  The Sqn Comds were checked for any final queries, and were found to be completely confident.  The morale of the Glider Pilots was excellent, and each man expressed the opinion that all pilots were fully confident of the successful outcome of the operations.  All the officers expressed their confidence and complete faith in their men. The Comd Glider Pilots is convinced that:-

                a. The operation was well prepared, and everything was done that was humanly possible to enable the pilots to carry out their operation to the best of their ability.  The Intelligence information was very good.  There is no doubt that the detailed briefing must be the responsibility of the Sqn Comds.  No 2 Wing was definitely better than No 1 Wing in this respect.  E and F Sqns had excellent briefing rooms.  B Sqn was not clear of its intentions until somewhat late in the day, Wing HQ had not given this Sqn all that aid that it might have done.  G Sqn was quite good but not up to the standard of E and F Sqns.  D Sqn acted well and showed considerable initiative.  C Sqn was confident and the pilots were well informed.

                b. The Regt has been equipped very well and the Wings have nothing to complain of in any way.  If anything, the average 'complaint' was that they had 'too much' kit to carry.  There is little doubt that from a military point of view, the regt is as well set up as possible.

        The military operation has been rehearsed and after the flow of battle, the military plan is purely a matter of 'battle drill'.  The movement back to U.K. after the operation has been arranged by the Comd Glider Pilots, and the collection, debriefing, and re-equipping of the crews, has been organised at the Glider Pilot Depot, Fargo Camp, LARKHILL.

Ref Map: FRANCE 1:50,000 sheets 7E/5, 7E/6, 7F/1, 7F/2.

RV Areas: 113735 codename 'JOHN'.  098775 codename 'IAN'.

1. OBJECT

To appreciate the action taken by glider pilots after landing, and their retrieval to the U.K.

2. FACTORS

Ground  The Canal de CAEN and R.ORNE are the main features affecting the operation of glider pilots after landing on East and West side of this obstacle.  THEREFORE, two RV areas will be fixed, one East and one West of R.ORNE.

3. The character of the operation

The landing will be carried on in two different areas.  The troops after landing will be engaged in executing their tasks and will move off from the L.Z.  THEREFORE,

        (a) Glider pilots landing on LZ 'N' must RV in the vicinity of this LZ to form a body of sufficient strength to take up defensive positions during the night, and be ready to assist the R.Es. in clearing landing strips by dawn next day.  NOTE: 6 Airborne Div Op Instrs (para 13) glider pilots will remain during the night with sub units and units; at first light they will concentrate in area wood 113735, come under comd CRE, and assist in clearing landing strips, and establish alarm posts North of the wood, 113735.

        (b) Glider pilots landing on LZ 'W' will be nearer to the beaches, but elements of 6 Airlanding Bde will move off to the S.E., leaving the glider pilots on the LZ.  Therefore they must RV as soon as unloading is completed, and take up def posns, waiting for the information that the routes to the beaches are clear from enemy troops and obstacles.

4. TIME AND SPACE

        (a) The distance from LZ 'N' to the RV area 'IAN' is approx 4½ mls.  (the shortest route if the bridges across the Canal de CAEN and the River ORNE are intact and enemy troops cleared out.)  THEREFORE, the detachment from LZ 'N' should be able to move off from Le Bas de RANVILLE by first light on D+1 day, and arrive at area 'IAN' in two hours.

        (b) The detachment on LZ 'W' takes up def posns in the vicinity of the LZ.  THEREFORE, it should be at the def posns area wood, 098775, by 1 hr after the landing is completed (evening D Day), and should wait at this posn until the contact with the beaches is established, and the detachment from LZ 'N' arrives.

        (c) The distance from 'IAN' RV area to the beaches is approximately 2½ miles.  THEREFORE, the distance should be covered in 1½ hours.

        (d) Under the best conditions (bridges intact, enemy opposition annihilated, routes cleared of obstacles,) the whole body of glider pilots should be on the beaches by noon D+1 day.

COURSES open to Detachments of Glider Pilots

The comd of the det 'JOHN', after the landing of both lifts (last by Z+20 evening D Day), has two courses open to him:-

        i. to move by night to the RV area 'IAN'

        ii. to wait on def posns and move by first light D+1 day.

The Comd of the det 'IAN' has two courses open to him:-

        i. to move from RV area 'IAN' to the beaches as soon as the route is clear, and the contact with the beaches established (evening D Day).

        ii. to wait for the det 'JOHN' and then move the whole body of glider pilots to the beaches (approx morning D+1 day).

GENERAL PLAN

As the retrieval of the greatest number of glider pilots in the shortest possible time is essential, I had decided to adopt the second course for both detachments, which will delay their arrival to the beaches but:-

        i. the movement will be executed by day, and after the routes of withdrawal are cleared of enemy troops and obstacles, and loss of small detachments will be avoided.

        ii. The detachments will move in strength, enabling them to defend themselves against enemy action, (infiltration, remaining troops not annihilated etc).

        iii. During retrieval the bulk of glider pilots will be under comd of their senior officer.

[Signed Chatterton]

Col,

Commander Glider Pilots,

HQ Airborne Troops (REAR)

A.P.O. ENGLAND.

5 Jun 44.

APPENDIX 'A'

ACTION OF GLIDER PILOTS AFTER LANDING

Appendix

OGP CREW LIST No.1.

No.2 Wing

DEAD STICK.  (D-1).  LZ "X" and "Y".

"C" Squadron.

TONGA.  (D-1).

"C" Squadron

"E" Squadron.

"F" Squadron.

MALLARD.  (D Day).

"C" Squadron.

"E" Squadron.

"F" Squadron

No.1 Wing

BATTERY (D-1)

"B" Squadron

"TONGA"  (D-1)  LZ 'N'

Wing H.Q.

"A" Squadron

"B" Squadron

"D" Squadron

"TONGA"  (D-1)  LZ 'V'

[A Squadron]

"MALLARD"  (D DAY)  LZ 'N'

B Squadron

"MALLARD"  (D DAY)  LZ 'W'

A Squadron.

"D" Squadron

"G" Squadron

Appendix

REPORT ON OPERATIONS AND PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS

OPERATION 'TONGA - L.Z. BATTERY'

A. AIR

Plan.

        Three gliders numbered 27, 28 and 28A, carrying tps of 9 Para Bn to land inside the perimeter defences of the Battery.  Gliders to be fitted with Rebecca, to home on Eureka after release at 5000 feet, ground aids to be set up by 22 Ind Para Coy.  The landing area to be illuminated by star shells fired by ground forces already in position at the times of landing.

Training

        Three glider crews were selected from volunteers from B Sqn, The Glider Pilot Regt.  These crews, and a fourth reserve, were trained to land into an area of the approximate shape and size of the Battery perimeter which was marked on their Base airfield.  Training was concentrated mainly on remote release from 4/5000 feet but continued also on releases from various positions and heights down to 1000 feet.  A 'mock up' of the position was constructed by 9 Para Bn. with whom crews spent several days on attachment.  A full-scale rehearsal was held, witnessed by glider pilots from the air, in order that they would be able to envisage the situation on arrival over the landing area.  The decision was later taken to employ Rebecca/Eureka, and the co-pilots were therefore attached to Netheravon for training, being eventually tested and passed as efficient by the C.S.O. 38 Gp.

Execution

        Three combinations took off from TARRANT RUSHTON, at 0230 hours, 6 June.  Weather conditions were unfavourable, and glider chalk no.28A forced landed in the U.K. owing to a broken tow rope.  Combinations were continually weaving to avoid cloud, and bumpiness gave the pilots considerable trouble.  The weather cleared at the English coast, and conditions eased.  The combinations of Albemarle N(Bar) P.O. Garnett, made a 360° turn at WORTHING to lose time before making the coast crossing.  This combination made a similar turn before commencing the next leg.

        The arrester parachute gear on glider no.28 streamed in midchannel immediately after the pilot had passed through the slip stream into the low-tow position.  The combination was stalled and lost considerable height.  The jettison gear was operated immediately, but it was later found that the tail assembly had been strained - controls were sloppy - and that the starboard u/c had been carried away.

        The French Coast was crossed by both trains at 0424 hours, their height approx 1000 ft, and position East of CABOUR.  Conditions here had worsened to ten-tenths cloud at 1000 ft with poor visibility and a light wind from WNW.  From the coast to the L.Z. flak was encountered from the direction of the north of the river ORNE and from positions North of, and in general area of the Battery (type - 20mm and small arms).

        Considerable damage to mainplanes and fuselage was suffered by both gliders, and in glider no.27 four passengers were wounded.  No ground activity was observed, except for a large fire in the direction of CHERBOURG believed to have been caused by bombing.

        On arrival over the area, neither crews could distinguish the ground features of the Bty.  In both cases four circuits were made in an attempt to obtain a pin-point.  The Eureka was not in position and no ground fire or illuminations were observed.  The crew of glider 27 did, however, see a triangle of green lights and a red light coding "A" at approx 0433.

        Glider 28 released at 1800 ft and circled the area.  A heavily bombed village was mistaken for the Bty (apparently MERVILLE), but at a height of 500 ft the crew realised their error and turned away.  A successful landing was made in a field, although they were not aware of their position with regard to the Bty.  They found next day that the landing had been made approx 600-800 yards from the objective.

        Glider 27 released at 1200 ft, the crew being aware of their position.  On their final approach the pilot realised that he would not be able to land according to plan, and in order to avoid landing in the minefield, streamed the parachutes and crash landed into an orchard - some 50 yards from the perimeter of the Bty.

General Note

        Glider crews state that the flying conditions were very bad, and cloud flying was almost continuous.  They have the highest regard for the tug crews who circled the Bty in heavy flak, in an effort to obtain a pin point, and who gave every assistance throughout the trip.

B. MILITARY

1.  Composition

        (a) Three HORSA gliders numbers 27, 28 and 28A, from B Sqn at Brize Norton, towed by three ALBEMARLES from 297 Sqn, Brize Norton.

        (b) Glider Crews - Owing to the extreme risk of this operation, Col. G.J.S. Chatterton DSO, Comd Glider Pilots, called for volunteers making it clear that it was a very dangerous mission.  The following glider pilots took part in the operation:-

        (c) Troops carried.  Assault party from 9 Para Bn (3 Para Bde).

2.  Task

        To land inside the perimeter of a minefield, and barbed wire, and annihilate the four gun coastal bty, with support from 9 Para Bn. previously dropped outside the perimeter.

3.  Execution (see Appx "A" att).

        i. All three tug/glider combinations took off from Brize Norton at 2245 hrs on 5 Jun 44 (D - 1 day) according to plan.  Glider No28A released over England, owing to technical difficulties, and landed at FORD at 2300 hrs.  Glider No.28 crash landed 600 - 800 yds outside the objective.  Time in unloading 15 mins.

        ii. Enemy opposition consisted of light flak on the coast, MG and mortar fire during landing and unloading directed against the gliders.  The Bty, whose crews were inside concrete casemates and shelters were attacked by 9 Para Bn party, and were silenced by 0445 hrs.

4.  Evacuation

        The four glider pilots who took part in the assault escorted prisoners taken to 9 Para Bn H.Q. and made their way to the RV area.  On their way they encountered two enemy patrols, and took some prisoners after ambushing a section.  They were then held by what they considered was mortar fire but later turned out to be two enemy tanks.  S/Sgt Bone went for reinforcements and returned with 12 Canadian Paratps armed with three piats.  But as they were still unable to get through to their RV area, the pilots returned to 9 Para Bn and PWs, and this time were successful in reaching RV 'JOHN' and 6 Air Div HQ at RANVILLE, at 1800 hrs, 6 Jun.  The next morning they moved with the whole detachment of glider pilots, and reached the beachhead at OUISTREHAM without casualties and embarked for the UK at 1315 hrs, 8 Jun 44.

5.  Conclusions

        This operation did not succeed owing to bad weather and the fact that the ground signals were not available.  Nevertheless the glider pilots put up an extremely gallant attempt, taking on an operation which they knew to be hazardous.

OPERATION "TONGA - L.Z. 'V'"

A.  AIR

Plan

        To land 11 gliders carrying close support weapons on to a parachute D.Z. without ground aids, prior to the landing of paratps.

Training

        The 11 crews were selected from 'E' Sqn, The Glider Pilot Regiment.  Although training was concentrated as far as possible on night flying, no special or additional flying training could be made available for this operation.

Execution

        7 combinations took off from DOWN AMPNEY and 4 from HARWELL between 2230 hrs and 2300 hrs on 5 Jun 44; of these 11 glider crews, 5 only have so far returned and it is only possible therefore to draw an incomplete picture of this phase of the operation.  Weather conditions were unfavourable and all crews experienced difficulty at times in remaining on tow, owing to patches of low cloud and bumpy conditions.  At 1500 ft over the French coast these conditions were still met, with very limited visibility.  Combinations then ran into thick dust and smoke clouds obviously emanating from the Bty area, which had been heavily bombed some minutes previously.  The landing area itself and its surrounding features were therefore totally obscured, not even being visible from 1200 ft.  One glider released in the haze in an endeavour to find the correct area, but this proved to be impossible, and as lights then appeared on L.Z. 'N' the pilots endeavoured to reach them.  A successful landing was made within a mile of the areas.  The remaining gliders arrived as these lights were appearing on L.Z. 'N' and being unable to find their own area landed on L.Z. 'N'.  One glider from HARWELL, however, did land in the vicinity of L.Z. 'V'.

B.  MILITARY

Composition

        (a) 4 HORSA glider from A Sqn at HARWELL.

        (b) 7 HORSA gliders from E Sqn at DOWN AMPNEY.  Glider crews: Capt C.B. Dodwell and 21 S/Sgts and Sgt.

        (c) Troops carried: HQ 3 Para Bde, 9 Para Bn, 1 Cdn Para Bn, 224 Para Fd Amb, 4 A/Ldg A/Tk Bty.

Task

        To land on L.Z. 'V', assist unloading, remain under command 3 Para Bde until routes to RV 'JOHN' cleared.

Execution (See Appx "A" att)

        Owing to extremely bad visibility, 5 out of 11 gliders landed according to plan, on a LZ prepared for obstructions and partially obstructed by holes and poles.  The unloading of gliders took a considerable time (1 - 3 hours), the tail unit bolts being jammed on crash landing.  3 Para Bde elements which should have been dropped in the vicinity were not contacted until dawn.  Enemy patrols were extremely active, and intermittent sniping was met the whole time.  Owing to the dispersal of Para Bdes, and presence of numerous enemy patrols in the area, glider pilots could not concentrate according to plan until morning 6 Jun.  Some of them made their way individually to RV 'JOHN' joining different patrols of 3 Para Bde or Cdn Para Bde.

Evacuation

        9 pilots (incl Capt Dodwell) reached RV 'JOHN', joined the main body of glider pilots and embarked at approx 1300 hrs, 7 Jun according to plan.  2 wounded, evac to UK.  12 missing.

Conclusions

        This operation was always considered extremely difficult.  A landing zone had to be found without markers in difficult country.  It is considered that the original field chosen would have been easier as it was dark and distinctive.

OPERATION "TONGA L.Z. 'K'"

A.  AIR

Plan

        To land 6 gliders carrying close support weapons on to a para. DZ without ground aids, prior to the landing of paratps.

Training

        These crews were selected from F Sqn, The Glider Pilot Regt.  Although training was concentrated as far as possible on night flying, no special or additional flying training could be made available for this operation.

Execution

        The six combinations took off from Blakehill Farm at 2250 hrs on 5 Jun.  The weather was unfavourable with low cloud and bumpy conditions, giving considerable trouble to glider crews.  The weather cleared over the Channel and visibility improved until a bank of low cloud and heavy smoke clouds from the bombed Bty as were encountered at the French coast.  Light and medium flak was observed along this coastal area, particularly from Le HAVRE, but it does not appear to have been directed at the combinations, only one of which was hit.  The coast was crossed between 0035 and 0046 hrs, 5 combinations being on track with one three miles to the East, an error which was corrected after the landfall was made.  Considerable difficulty was caused to the crews of every combination by the heavy clouds of smoke drifting across their track, which prevented accurate map reading on the approach.  It would also seem that some trouble was experienced with REBECCA/EUREKA since three of the glider-tug combinations arrived directly over LZ 'N' and signalled to their gliders to release.  The remaining 2 reached LZ 'K' and found it clearly recognisable with the visibility much improved.  They released at a height of 1300 ft at 0046 hrs and landed satisfactorily.  The inter-communication of one combination failed after take off, but visual signalling appears to have been entirely satisfactory.  Neither of the crews which arrived at the LZ saw the Para Coy, but EUREKA was working at this LZ.  Over the LZ light flak was encountered in the CAEN area, but there were no casualties to passengers through flak.  Searchlights were seen from Le HAVRE and OUISTREHAM.

B.  MILITARY

Composition

        (a) 6 HORSA gliders from 'F' Sqn at Blakehill Farm.

        (b) Glider Crews : Comd, Lieut A.E. Pickwoad and 11 S/Sgts and Sgt from F Sqn.

        (c) Tps carried  8 Para Bn (3 Para Bde) 224 Para Fd Amb.

Task

        To land on LZ 'K' assist in unloading of gliders, remain under comd 8 Para Bn, until such a time as the area between SANNERVILLE 1368 and RANVILLE clear, thence join the main body of glider pilots at RV JOHN where orders for evacuation would be given by Maj. J.P. ROYLE, Glider P Regt.

Execution (see Appx 'A' att).

        Owing to very bad visibility and then smoke after heavy bombardment of enemy coastal bty, three gliders landed on LZ 'N' instead of LZ 'K'.  Of 6 gliders taking part in the operation:- 2 landed according to plan on LZ 'K'.  3 landed on LZ 'N'.  1 missing.  Enemy patrols and snipers very active all the time, and an attack supported by mortars was carried out but repulsed by 8 Para Bn and Cdn Para Bn.  Owing to this, gliders pilots could not RV as ordered and therefore joined different units of 8 Para Bn and Cdn Para Bn.  2 of them joined HQ 3 Para Bde, assisted in unloading a crashed glider, and escorted prisoners to 6 Air Div at RANVILLE, fighting their way against enemy patrols and snipers.

Evacuation

        By approx 1200 hrs 7 Jun, Lt A.E. Pickwoad and 8 S/Sgts and Sgts reached RV area JOHN, came under comd of Maj J.P. ROYLE and proceeded for embarkation according to plan.  3 are missing.

Conclusion

        Here again is an example of a difficult operation, where no clear marker was visible.  Hampered by smoke and cloud the gliders put up a fine show.  It proved that small quantities of gliders can land whatever the conditions, but without markers it is extremely difficult to guarantee accuracy.

OPERATION "TONGA - COUP DE MAIN - LZs X and Y"

A.  AIR

Plan.

        6 gliders, carrying tps of 52 L.I., fitted with para arresting gear, to land in two fields running up to Bridge over CANAL DE CAEN and RIVER ORNE.  Remote release from 6000 ft. to be employed to ensure surprise.

Training

        8 crews commenced in Apr, with areas marked on NETHERAVON airfield simulating the fields on which they would be required to land.  ALBEMARLE aircraft from BRIZE NORTON were found to be unable to reach the required ceiling, and training was transferred to TARRANT RUSHTON where HALIFAX aircraft were made available.  F/Lt. Grant took charge of the glider training which continued at both NETHERAVON and TARRANT RUSHTON until all the crews could accurately navigate by stop-watch and GDI to their LZs.  It was found that the great difficulty was to avoid overshooting.  Gliders were therefore fitted with para arresting gear, but owing to the possibility of straining tail assembly no training was carried out using this device.  Directives and lectures were given by Flt/Lt. Grant

Execution

        6 combinations took off from TARRANT RUSHTON between 2256 and 2302 hrs on 5 Jun.  Patchy cloud was encountered between 4/5000 ft but otherwise the weather conditions were good.  The French Coast was crossed at heights varying from 4500/6000 ft between 0009 and 0020 hrs, 6 Jun, 5 combinations being directly on track.  Releases were checked with tug navigators and glider crews were fully aware of their positions.  The courses given to them proved entirely satisfactory and the LZs were clearly recognised from the description given during the briefing.  Release heights again ranged from 4500 to 6000 ft, the times corresponding approx to the times of the coast crossing.  The wind velocity given to the glider crews, seemed to vary, but the wind was mainly in the south.  Red and green flares were observed during free flight and considerable flak from BLAINVILLE and CAEN.  No flak was actually encountered and it would appear that the gliders were unseen until over the LZ.

        The three glider crews detailed to LZ 'X', the triangular field to the west, made successful landings at the apex of the triangle.  Of the two remaining gliders of the three for LZ 'Y', one reached the LZ satisfactorily and one landed some 50 yds short.  The sixth combination made a landfall some 9 miles to the east of the DIVES area, and it was only after release that the glider crew were able to ascertain that they were not in the correct area.  A successful landing onto another bridge was made by the party at    .

        Separate reports on the streaming of parachutes are being made, but it is believed that the special equpmt fitted to the gliders for this phase was successful.

B.  MILITARY

Composition

        (a) 6 HORSA gliders from C Sqn, Glider P Regt, TARRANT RUSHTON, towed by 6 HALIFAX aircraft from      Sqn R.A.F.

        (b) Glider Crews : Owing to the importance of this mission and its difficulty, crews were selected from different Sqns and trained during Apr and May 1944.  The following crews took part in the Operation:-

        (c) Troops carried: assault parties from 2 Oxf Bucks.

Tasks

        (i) Glider Nos 91 and 92 and 93 to land in a triangular field near the Western bridge and as close to it as possible.  Glider crews to take part in the assault immediately after landing.

        (ii) Gliders Nos. 94, 95 and 96 to land on rectangular field near the bridge with the same tasks as in (i).

Execution (See Appx "A" attached).

        1. LZ 'X' :  Glider Nos 91, 92 and 93 took off and landed according to plan, the nearest glider being 30 yds from the bridgehead.  Troops deployed immediately, and after silencing enemy tps holding the bridgehead, returned to unload gliders.  All six glider pilots took part in the assault, two S/Sgts being slightly wounded.

        2. LZ 'Y' : Glider Nos 94, 95 and 96 took off according to plan.  Glider No.94 landed off the LZ due to a mistake by tug navigator in identifying a bridge on the DIVES as the briefed bridge, and after pin pointing their position on the map returned to their RV.  Glider No.95 landed according to plan and after unloading the glider took part in the assault on the bridge.  Glider No.96 landed approx 400 yds from the briefed LZ east of the river ORNE, but reached the bridge in time for the assault, returning after the action to unload the glider.

Evacuation

        The twelve glider pilots reached RV JOHN by approx noon, 7 Jun, came under comd Maj Royle, and were evacuated according to plan reaching UK during the afternoon of 8 Jun.

Conclusion

        This operation was a great success mainly due to two points.  i. Sufficient and good training.  ii. The splendid spirit and determination of the pilots concerned.  It is an excellent example of what can be carried out if sufficient training is given, and a proper technique is applied.  It is not too much to say that it was extremely difficult and the fact that it was successful is all the more remarkable.

OPERATION "TONGA LZ 'N'"

A.  AIR

Plan

        To land 68 HORSA and 4 HAMILCAR gliders carrying close support weapons and equpmt, on one landing area with minimum ground aids.  Three strips to be cleared of obstructions by RE Sqns, and lights set out by 22 Ind Para Coy.  HORSA gliders to land on strips I and II leaving strip III entirely for HAMILCAR aircraft.

Training

        Training of the selected crews and reserves commenced immediately the approx dimensions of the strips were known.  Areas of 1000 yds by 60 yds, and 1000 yds by 90 yds, were marked out on airfields, and all glider crews practiced landing in their allotted area.  Experiments were carried out with forms of ground lighting until a satisfactory scheme was evolved.  The senior officers concerned viewed the lighting from the air on an actual strip, and final training was carried out upon it.  The glider crews all viewed the practice strip at BUIFORD, and saw the lights on the ground.  A small number of gliders actually landed onto it as a final test of capacity.

Execution

        The Combinations took off from 38 and 46 Group stas during the early morning of the 6th June.  No major difficulties were experienced on take off, but weather conditions over the UK were such that five gliders forced landed before reaching the coast.  Low cloud and rain were experienced by practically every combination.  These conditions moderated over the Channel and continued to improve until reaching the French Coast.  At this coast patches of low cloud and some smoke were again met.  The navigation was excellent apart from two combinations which made landfall at HOULGATE 9 miles east of track, other combinations made landfalls which were slightly off track but flew along the coast to their correct point of entry before turning in.  Heavy flak was observed by all pilots from coastal positions, especially the LE HAVRE flak belts.  Searchlights were seen at LE HAVRE, OUISTREHAM and CAEN.  These searchlights were not directed on the glider trains.  The only evidence of enemy air activity is an unsubstantiated report of one night fighter believed to be an M.E. 109 in the coastal area.  Considerable 20mm and other light AA fire was experienced.  In spite of the fact that some 25 gliders were hit, only one report is so far available of any glider being affected to such an extent that a release was necessary.  Although the majority of the strikes were in the fuselage no injuries were sustained by passengers or crews.  Apart from the topography of the ground the crews of every glider which reached LZ N saw the lights on the strips, and as usual the flashing hollophanes were the first indications observed.  Apart from the light flak within the area mostly from the south west corner of the LZ and from the Canal banks, only sporadic rifle and mortar fire was encountered.

        The only defects encountered during this operation was the inability to drop the tail plane, although this appears to be due to lack of experience of air tps.  The intercomn appeared to be entirely satisfactory, and where necessary tug crews showed lights to assist glider pilots flying through cloud.  For various reasons the cable angle indicator does not seem to be particularly successful.  The glider landings were made in a considerable cross-wind, and since the red clusters of A.S.R. torches marking the upwind corners of the strips were invisible, strong drift after flying over the 'T' was unchecked; this resulted in a considerable number of collisions with obstacles and other gliders.  Although glider pilots have complained of difficulty in controlling their a/c on tow, the distribution of loads was satisfactory.  A summary of the information so far available shows that one glider returned to base after take off, four landed in the UK, two gliders ditched, whilst five ran into trouble at the French coast in low cloud, causing premature release by breaking of the ropes.

B.  MILITARY

Composition

        (a) 68 HORSAS and 4 HAMILCAR gliders:-

        (b) Crews : Comd Maj J.P. ROYLE and 143 glider pilots.

Task

        i. Assist in unloading the gliders after landing.

        ii. Concentrate in RV JOHN area Wood 113735.

        iii. Prepare a def posn.

        iv. Assist RE 6 Airborne Div in clearing additional landing strips.

        v. Occupy def posns.

        vi. Wait for the landing of the second lift (MALLARD LZ 'N') 14 of the crews of D Sqn (trained previously for this task) detached to man A/Tk guns until such a time as relieved by original crews landed by the evening D day.

Execution (See Appx 'B' att).

        Of 72 gliders which took part:- 49 (incl 2 HAMLCRS) landed according to plan.  5 (incl 1 HAMLCR) forced landed in UK.  3 did not reach the French Coast.  14 (incl 1 HAMLCR) are missing.  Maj J.P. ROYLE forced landed 4 mls east of LZ 'N' on a minefield and moved towards LZ 'N' encountering enemy patrols and snipers on his way, and reached RV JOHN at approx 0930 hrs, 6 Jun 44.  By this time 52 glider pilots under Maj S.C. Griffiths were taking up defensive posns according to plan and fighting enemy patrols and snipers (3 men wounded - one fatally).  A number of glider pilots joined RV JOHN during the day, arriving from LZs 'K' and 'V'.  By 2100 hrs the second lift started to land under enemy mortar and arty fire, which was directed against LZ 'N' and 'W' but shells were falling short of the LZ.

        By the evening the force JOHN consisted of 93 glider pilots (see para 5 below) well dug in, and fighting against infiltration from SW.  A very brilliant action was carried on by A/Tk glider pilot gun crews, during the day 6 Jun.  Out of four 6 pdr guns, two landed according to plan, one glider forced landed in the UK and another is missing, believed ditched.

        Capt. B. Murdock of D Squadron, The Glider Pilot Regiment, with previously detailed glider pilot crews took part in a def. action against enemy attack supported by Mk IV tanks, between 1230 - 1800 hrs.  After Sgt. Guest, R.A. (4 A.Tk A/L Regt) was killed, Capt Murdock who was acting as loader at the time, took over firing the gun.  During this action 4 out of 5 enemy tanks were destroyed.

        By the evening 6 June prior to the second lift landing, (Mallard), the glider pilots accomplished all the ordered tasks, and fought an intermittent battle against enemy snipers infiltrating into 6 Airborne Division positions, and two major enemy counter attacks supported by tanks, mortars and artillery.

Evacuation (See Operation Neptune-Mallard).

        Of this force (144 glider pilots) - See Appx B:- 93 returned to the U.K.  9 returned to the U.K. wounded.  4 killed.  38 missing.

Conclusion

        The best conditions did not prevail in this operation, owing to the moon being obscured.  However, it proves that a large quantity of gliders can be landed in poor conditions, and that if glider pilots are given good training, the most difficult conditions can be coped with.  There is little doubt that the Air-Sea rescue light is no good, and that the "T" marker must be greater in length.

Operation - MALLARD - "N" and "W"

A.  AIR

Plan.

        To land the 6th Air Landing Bde and attached units, and Armoured Recce Regt., on to two L.Zs by day in 255 gliders.  L.Z. "N" to consist of four lanes running N and S - three for Horsa gliders and one for Hamilcar gliders.  The Horsa aircraft in "W" to land in two lanes running E and W.

Training.

        The obstruction of the landing areas rendered it necessary to clear lanes for the glider landings.  Training was therefore based on the dimensions of these lanes marked on base airfields.  In view of the comparative simplicity of the operation, no additional training was considered necessary.

Execution.

        This operation proceeded satisfactorily, weather conditions being good over the entire course, with from 5/10 to 7/10 cloud at 2500 ft to 3000 ft, and a light wind from the N.W.  The left hand stream to L.Z. "N" crossed the coastline near the estuary of the ORNE at an average height of 1000 ft.  The stream to L.Z. "W" was less compact, and combinations crossed the coast between the mouth of the ORNE and two miles West of OUISTREHAM at heights ranging from 600 ft to 1200 ft.

        The landing areas were both clearly visible, and it is apparent that the briefing was entirely satisfactory.  The later trains were able to follow down gliders already landing.

        Apart from one which was released to the East of L.Z. "N", the gliders of this stream released on track to the West and S.W. of the area.  The landing strips and Roman numerals were unobserved by the majority of the pilots, but that they had been laid out is clear from other reports.  The number of aircraft already on the ground served as indications of the separate areas.  Landing lanes had not been cleared but the poles did not form any serious obstruction, particularly to the Hamilcar aircraft.  Only two Hamilcar loads were damaged on landing.

        Little damage was sustained from flak which was observed from East of the river mouth, between the Canal and the River, South of the bridges and to the S.W. of the L.Z.  No serious damage and no casualties were suffered.  An unsubstantiated report has been made of one JU 88 observed in the coastal area East of FRANCEVILLE.

        Apart from the anticipated mortar fire on the L.Z. little ground activity was observed.

        On L.Z. "W" the one strip constructed was not marked, and some confusion was caused by the direction in which it appears to have been made.  The timing of this stream was inaccurate, and the resulting concentration of aircraft over the area led in one case to a formation of six trains in line abreast.  There are many reports on the difficulty of keeping in correct relationship to the remainder of the stream.

        Very light flak was encountered on the coast and whilst in free flight from South of the L.Z. in the area between the R.ORNE and the CAEN Canal, but no serious damage or casualties were suffered.  A considerable number of gliders were badly damaged on landing, the ground being rougher than anticipated, and the majority of the poles still in position.

        For the overall operation the intercomn was generally satisfactory and in cases of failure the visual signals were fully understood.  In the right hand stream especially, there was much slipstream trouble, and the tugs do not appear to have flown at their correct height or intervals.

        Two gliders forced landed in the U.K., and one failed to reach the French Coast.

B.  MILITARY

Composition.

        (a) 114 Horsas and 30 Hamilcars from B, C, E, and F Squadrons.

        (b) Crews:- Commander, Major B.H.P. Jackson.

Tasks.

        (i) To land on L.Z. "N".

        (ii) Assist in unloading the gliders.

        (iii) Concentrate at RV "John".

        (iv) Occupy a def. posn prepared previously by the first lift.

        (v) Move to RV area "Ian" as soon as the route between RANVILLE and RV cleared of enemy troops.

Execution.  (See Appx C and D attached).

        of 114 Horsas and 30 Hamilcars which took off:- 112 landed according to plan.  2 forced landed in U.K.  The whole force of 283 glider pilots (one killed by mortar fire, four forced landed in UK) after unloading the gliders concentrated at R.V. "John" according to plan, and came under command of Major Royle.  They occupied the def. posns, carrying on offensive patrolling during the night 6/7 June, and fighting snipers and enemy infiltrating into 6th Airborne Division posns.

Evacuation.

        By 1100 hrs 7th June contact with RV "John" (Lt. Col Murray) and O.i/c 101 Beach Sub-area was established, and Major Royle received permission from G.O.C. 6th Airborne Division to evacuate the glider pilots.  The evacuation was carried out according to plan without difficulty, except intermittent sniping and occasional mortaring and shelling.  There were no casualties during evacuation.

Conclusion.

        There is no more to add to this than in L.Z. "W".  It shows what can be achieved, and has thoroughly proved the organisation and training that has been carried out to date.

Appendix "A"

Operation NEPTUNE - TONGA

Battery 5-6 June 1944

Coup de Main LZ "X" and "Y"

L.Z. "V"

L.Z. "K"

Appendix "B"

Operation Neptune - Tonga

L.Z. "N" 6 June 44

Appendix "C"

Operation Neptune - Mallard

L.Z. "N" 6 June 1944

Appendix "D"

Operation Neptune - Mallard

L.Z. "W" 6 June 1944