The Dutch Resistance During Operation Market Garden

by Stewart W. Bentley


The Dutch Resistance During Operation MARKET-GARDEN Military historians have a tendency to use information that becomes available following an event to criticize a commander's actions. MARKET-GARDEN suffers from this tendency. Historians have bashed Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery specifically and British character (aloofness, arrogance) in general for both the failure to use the Resistance and the failure to account for German combat power in and around Arnhem. In the standard literature on MARKET-GARDEN, particularly according to Cornelius Ryan, the British, because they distrusted the Resistance, did not plan to use the Dutch Underground. The facts contradict this conventional wisdom, repeated in other books on the operation. While Montgomery did tell Crown Prince Bernhard, "I don't think your resistance forces can be of any help to us.", this may have been merely the arrogance which professional soldiers sometimes display towards civilians.


The remark, while impolitic, was also inaccurate; the Resistance had already provided enormous amounts of information and had been smuggling downed airmen out of Holland since the beginning of the war. As recounted to Cornelius Ryan about his meeting with the British Field Marshal, Prince Bernhard said that Montgomery was unimpressed with Resistance reports and doubtful about their accuracy. When Montgomery told the Prince in vague terms about MARKET-GARDEN, Bernhard immediately wondered why he and his staff were not consulted about the plan, especially about possible drop zones and objectives.


As recounted in A Bridge Too Far, according to Dutch Naval Lt. Commander Arnoldus Wolters, attached to the British airborne division, with this information, he and Lt. Colonel Barlow, the British Civil Affairs officer could "screen the groups and use them in their various capabilities: intelligence, sabotage, combat and the like. Barlow was the only other man who knew what our mission really was."(1)


According to Ryan, the information concerning the Resistance was so highly compartmented that the divisional staff had no idea what Wolter's function was. Further, the staff believed he was either a civil affairs or intelligence officer. While Barlow trusted Wolters, the other British officers did not.(2)


This piece of conventional wisdom, however, is belied by the plan. It seems impossible that Wolters was not accepted by the division staff, the very officers who had written the order. In the operations order, Wolters was specifically named and his duties were laid out. One of Ryan's most glaring omissions is with respect to any mention of the Jedburgh teams which were attached from the Airborne Corps Headquarters down to each airborne division. Captain Arie Bestebreurjte, the Jedburgh team leader assigned to to the 82d Airborne Division is only mentioned as a Dutch liaison officer.


Even if Montgomery's attitude indicated a distrust of the Resistance, it was evidently not shared at the lower echelons, by the men who had to put their soldiers in harm's way.



Initial Dutch Resistance Operations


By operating covertly, and passively, without overt hostile actions, the Dutch Resistance was able to function without attracting too much attention from their German occupiers. This allowed them to efficiently organize their cells, gauge the level of the German counter-intelligence threat, and establish their information networks. Their primary means of communications with each other was by telephone and then by only using nicknames. Often, even face to face meetings were done wearing masks and using nicknames to ensure security.


The Dutch Resistance command and control hierarchy defies a sound description, largely because of its decentralized and compartmented nature. Additionally, the creation of small groups by individual Dutchmen with no outside links was widespread. Some of these groups' activities will never be known, as many were captured and executed by the Germans. Initial attempts to reach out and contact other groups, enlist new members and raise money was through the distribution of leaflets and underground newspapers.



Slow But Steady Growth


The growth of the Dutch Resistance developed slowly for several reasons. First, because of Holland's geographic proximity and cultural ties with Germany, many Dutch were sympathetic with the ideas of German nationalism. This sympathy extended beyond collaboration; there was also a significant portion of the population who actively supported the Germans by joining the Dutch Nazi party and even the Wehrmacht. Even more assiduously, there were also Dutch civilians who actively informed on their neighbors to the Nazis.


The swift German victory, combined with Queen Wilhelmina's seeming abandonment of the Dutch population, disillusioned and embittered much of Holland. Many of those who collaborated really believed that the Germans represented the future and felt that the Nazis success was inevitable. For these citizens, occupation by the Germans was something merely to be accepted. Harsh German countermeasures towards any anti-Nazi activity further discouraged active Resistance. As the occupation grew more harsh, a backlash against the Germans grew, fanned by the establishment of and encouragement by the Dutch Government In Exile (G.I.E.).


The G.I.E. made its presence known through the use of BBC broadcasts, listened to covertly by the Dutch population. The use of radio broadcasts allowed the Dutch G.I.E. to establish and maintain at least a psychological presence in Holland.


Another reason for the slow growth of the Resistance was the factor of geography. The lack of mountainous and forested terrain prevented the establishment of hiding areas for large groups of maquis as occurred in France and Yugoslavia. Additionally, the flat terrain, interdicted by many bodies of water, large and small, restricted movement to the established railroads, road networks and bridges. These were easily occupied by the Germans, who established checkpoints to prevent complete freedom of movement by the Dutch inhabitants. As gasoline was a precious commodity, many Dutch used their ubiquitous bicycles for transportation, sometimes riding on the rims because of a shortage of rubber for tires.


Adding to the Germans' headaches was the incessant sabotage of telephone lines and railroad demolition. However, not all of these operations were organized and orchestrated by the Dutch G.I.E. Many underground groups developed of their own accord, with different political ideologies, sympathies and leadership.



Major Dutch Resistance Organizations


There were four major Resistance organizations in Holland by the middle of 1944. These groups had survived the growing pains of the early years of the occupation and Nazi counterintelligence operations. They operated in an extremely decentralized manner and did not coordinate their activities unless another group's help was absolutely necessary. Two points should be made about the following organizations. First, most of these groups did not answer to a central headquarters. They conducted their operations as they saw fit. Second, members of these groups often did not realize to which group they belonged. Veterans often did not realize to which group they belonged to until after the war. The following names are really more categories defined by the type of mission which its members performed. As such as the war progressed and especially after the 6 June landings in France, many groups transitioned into a more active, aggressive Resistance role. For example, an L.O. group, deciding to conduct hostile attacks on the Germans became a K.P. group by default.


    The L.O.

The Landelijke Organisatie Voor Hulp Aan Onderduikers (L.O.)(Central Government Organizations For Help To People In Hiding) was characterized as the most important of the organizations in Holland. The L.O.'s primary goal was the protection and exfiltration of onderduikers. Their concerns went beyond hiding the onderduikers. Food coupons were used by the Germans and the Dutch Nazi government to ration food and keep tabs on the population. Procurement of the life sustaining coupons was done by several methods. First, the L.O. could counterfeit them. Second, loyal Dutch citizens in the employ of the Dutch Nazis funneled authentic coupons to the L.O. For example, the Leegsma family at the Hague was able to use their position in the police force to occasionally tip off the L.O. before the impending arrest of an onkerduiker would occur. They were also able to funnel genuine food coupons to the L.O. Third, other groups such as the Knokploegen (see below) conducted raids and robberies to steal authentic coupons from government agencies. Finally, Dutch civilians gave up their own coupons to the L.O. In addition to keeping an eye on Dutch collaborators, local L.O. groups engaged in whatever resistance they could without endangering themselves.


    The K.P.


While the L.O. maintained a low profile, the Landelijke Knok Ploeg (L.K.P.)(Central Government Fighting Group) or Knokploegen (K.P.), engaged at the local level in sabotage operations against the occupiers. Their strength was estimated at 550 members nationally, but this figure is probably on the low side. Because of the nature of the occupation, their exact dispositions remain unknown. Without central direction, the K.P. engaged targets of opportunity in and around the hometowns. Sometimes this included the assassination of individual German soldiers and Dutch collaborators. This however was dangerous for two reasons. First, the Germans would crack down on the local population where the murder occurred; sometimes exacting a tit for tat retribution. Second, the Germans would step up their counterintelligence efforts in the area in an attempt to eradicate any Underground cells. Direct action, for these reasons was not the preferred method for Resistance groups to use. More often than not, the Resistance targets were railroad tracks and telegraph or telephone lines, German supply points and motor pools.


    The R.V.V.


The Raad Van Verzet (R.V.V.)(Council of Resistance) was a third organization which engaged in both communications sabotage and protection of onderduikers. Allied planners regarded this group as "sound from the security point of view." With several thousand members, the R.V.V. was in radio contact with the Bureau Inlichtingen(3) and had demanded arms and ammunition. Their principal role during MARKET-GARDEN was to execute a railway strike on orders from London.


    The O.D.


A fourth organization, the Orde Dienst (Order of Service) (O.D.) had the primary mission of preparing for the return of a Dutch government following Holland's liberation. The O.D. was made up primarily of former Dutch officers and government officials who found themselves supplanted by the Nazis and Dutch collaborators.(4) Their two main missions were to collect intelligence and develop "plans for the maintenance of administrative services and civil order on the liberation of Holland." Though the O.D. was thought to have been penetrated, Allied intelligence estimated that most O.D. cells were still loyal and could be depended on to provide assistance during the liberation of Holland.


A sub-group of the O.D. was the Geheim Dienst Nederland (G.D.N.) (Dutch Secret Service) which functioned as an intelligence agency for the O.D. There were also some twenty other intelligence agencies in wartime Holland.(5) Most groups conducted some level of intelligence operations, even if it was only counterintelligence for security purposes. When these groups were organized at the national level, they were divided into regional, geographic areas of administration. At the national level, the Nationaal Steunfonds (N.S.V.) was an umbrella financial organization which both received money from the Dutch G.I.E. and conducted covert fund raising to finance both K.P. and L.O. operations.(6) It is important to note that there was some overlap in the personal responsibilities among member of both the local and regional groups. For example, in the Nijmegen district, the commander of the L.O., Frans von Burken, was also the chief of staff of the district O.D. (7)


Primarily because of geographical considerations, resistance groups used their own hometown populations for camouflage, making it easier to conceal their activities. It is important to note that almost every town of any size had one or more of the above types of groups. Also, it was possible for one person to belong to more than one group. Finally, some Resistance members were unaware of the overall name of their organization until after the war. In some groups, members simply were referred to by nicknames and their true identities will never be known. Many simply were named after their group's leader, for example the Group Sander and the Group Poelen.



Resistance Organizations in the MAREKT-GARDEN A.O.


There were also other groups, established locally by individual Dutchmen operating with no formal, structured links to other groups. In Eindhoven, for example there was a group known as the Partisan Action Nederlands (P.A.N.) which functioned following the lines of the K.P., although they did not consider themselves part of the K.P.(8) Sometimes, resistance amounted to simply not collaborating with the Nazis, or informing on one's neighbors who were in the Underground. For purposes of this work, the focus will be on the resistance groups in the MARKET-GARDEN Area of Operations (AO).



    The Eindhoven Underground


There were several Resistance groups in the Eindhoven area, with a total of several hundred members. The local G.D.N. was led by Arie Tromp, a director for the Phillips electrical firm office in Eindhoven. Tromp's nom de guerre was "Harry." By placing their headquarters in the Eindhoven Museum, G.D.N. members were able to come and go, in a public place, without arousing German suspicions. The G.D.N. began receiving taskings and orders from the Bureau Inlichtingen (BI) following its establishment in November 1942. Arie Tromp and his agents used the underground electrical cables in the Philips factory, which also had telephone lines, as their primary means of communications.(9)


When the war began, Hoynck van Papendrecht was a student attending the Technical University in Delft studying engineering until 1943. That April, the Germans closed the Dutch universities and began forcibly relocating the Dutch students to Germany, both as a manpower and professional talent pool. van Papendrecht went into hiding rather than go to Germany. Hidden by the L.O. in Valkenswaard, south of Eindhoven, he eventually returned to his hometown and established his own Underground group, which he named the Partisan Action Nederland.


The P.A.N. reached its full strength of 80-100 members, young men and women, in June 1944. The P.A.N. had several small cells operating in the small towns around Eindhoven, including the Group Sander, named after its leader, headquartered in nearby Eersel.


There was also a P.A.N. group in the town of Son, to the north of Eindhoven, the site of a key bridge across the Dommel River. Their activities were similar to those of the K.P. The P.A.N. conducted sabotage operations such as putting salt in gas and oil tanks of German vehicles, sugar being to precious a commodity in wartime Holland. They also blew up railroad tracks using explosives provided by mining engineers in Heerlen smuggled into Eindhoven by their female members, who passed through German checkpoints far easier than did Dutch males.(10) These female couriers also smuggled small arms and ammunition from Amsterdam and from across the border in Belgium.


To the east of Eindhoven, in the town of Helmond, there was a K.P. Resistance group led by Johan Raaymaerkers, a former Dutch artillery captain who was a technical engineer and owned his own factory. One of his members was Hans Bertels, who began distributing an underground newspaper in 1941 in the Helmond area. Bertels' contact was a man named Knaapen, who provided him with the newspapers and occasional operations orders.


South of Eindhoven, along XXX Corps' avenue of approach, in the town of Roermond, was a small L.O. group consisting of only fifteen members who were so concerned about security that they only knew each other by their nicknames. Their headquarters was located in a vault in the Roermond cemetery. Anya van Lyssens, later awarded the Military Order of William for her actions in the Resistance, was a member of this group. They had a radio with which they maintained contact with a Belgian Resistance group and smuggled downed Allied airmen over the border. Their group is credited with saving the lives of 29 airmen prior to MARKET-GARDEN.


    The Nijmegen Underground


There were several Underground groups in the Nijmegen area. In the city itself, part of the Resistance activities apparently were centered around the Saint Canisius College on BergenDalseweg. Jules Jansen was an engineering professor at the College and one of the leaders of the local K.P. Not only had he set up a laboratory in his house for the manufacture of explosives; he also set up an indoor firing range in his basement to teach K.P. members the basics of marksmanship. The Nijmegen O.D. was headquartered in a cafe in the downtown area.


Yet another group was a combination of the K.P. and L.O. Group Poelen was organized by a K.P. leader from Amsterdam, Theo Dobbe, in June 1943. Under Dolf Poelen's leadership, the cell had approximately 50 members. Leo Heinsman belonged to this group, providing authentic food coupons and papers for onderduikers. His job at the Nijmegen unemployment office gave him the access required for obtaining these valued items. Heinsman was also friendly with many local policemen, having been a census taker before the war. Henri Dekker was responsible for setting up K.P. cells in neighboring towns.(11) In neighboring Groesbeek, ten kilometers south of Nijmegen, Anton Melchers was a Dutch customs officer. His job provided him with the necessary cover and papers to move freely in the Groesbeek area. His O.D. group was headquartered in Groesbeek.


Also in the Nijmegen area, in the village of Grave, was an L.O. group, to which Gerard Peijnenburg belonged. He was aware of five or six other members, but there were probably more. His main job in the L.O., in addition to his newspaper, was the procurement of food coupons for onderduikers.


    The Arnhem- Oosterbeek Underground


As in most other Dutch cities, Arnhem had L.O., K.P., R.V.V. and O.D. groups operating in the area. Pieter Kruijff(12) was the thirty-five year old Arnhem regional resistance chief of the K.P. Kruijff had managed to procure some wood burning automobiles, probably trucks, occasionally using them on supply missions and to shuttle onderduikers. The K.P. in the Arnhem area was sub-divided into six smaller operational groups with different areas of responsibility.(13) The sabotage unit was led by Toon van Daalen and Bert Deus. As with most other sabotage operations conducted throughout occupied Holland, this group attacked targets of opportunity. The K.P.'s transportation needs were handled by Menno Liefsting, whose primary responsibility was the couriering of arms, ammunition and supplies from another Resistance group in nearby Appledoorn.


The Arnhem Resistance had gotten off to a shaky start following the occupation of Holland. As was typical of other groups, the groups in the Arnhem area did not cooperate often or coordinate their activities. This was probably due as much to jealousy and rivalry as it was due to security considerations. At the beginning of the war, the various small groups, including the K.P. received information taskings and some sabotage orders from Jan van Bijnen, a.k.a. "Frank." One Arnhem group was infiltrated in 1940, with fatal consequences for its leader and several members. In spite of the Gestapo's best efforts, the Resistance remained active. Although the Boy Scouts had been outlawed, they continued to meet in secret in the woods outside Arnhem. Some members joined the Red Cross or the local volunteer fire department in order to maintain their freedom of movement and gather information. The Scouts would later fight side by side the British paratroopers at the Lower Rhine bridge.


In 1943, a small resistance group, probably an O.D. cell, was organized in Oosterbeek, meeting at a nursing home. Their activities were limited to gathering information and disseminating underground newspapers. Unfortunately, in the summer of 1944, the group's leader, Nico Boven and most of its members were arrested. The rest of the group went into hiding.(14) No active Resistance was in Oosterbeek prior to the arrival of British paratroopers on 17 September 1944.


On 5 September 1944, a meeting was held between all of the Arnhem Resistance groups. The leader of the regional O.D. (Gewestelijke), reserve Captain G.C. Wunderink wanted all of the groups to cooperate under the O.D.'s leadership on orders from the G.I.E. in London. The K.P. and R.V.V. opposed this idea, because their leaders distrusted the O.D.'s motives. Their feeling was that the O.D. would take the credit and reap the rewards in post-war Holland for the activities of the other two groups.(15)



Implications for MARKET-GARDEN


In the three major cities in the MARKET-GARDEN AO, Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem, as well as the small towns outside each of these cities, there were active, well organized Resistance groups in September of 1944. The Allied invasion in France encouraged more of these groups to come out of hiding with the promise of imminent liberation. Some of them had established communications with the Dutch G.I.E. and were under the nominal control of Dutch authorities in London. There was not a great deal of coordination between these groups, mostly for security reasons, but also because of rivalry between the leadership cadres. However, these groups had survived the Dutch and German Nazi regimes and were only waiting impatiently for the Allies' arrival to rise up and assist in the liberation of their homeland.





The Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) was determined to ensure the success of the plan, by recruiting, training, and arming the Dutch. S.O.E. formed multi-national (American, British, French, and/or Dutch) JEDBURGH teams to assist the Resistance. The teams were responsible for training and advising the Underground. They also provided intelligence derived from the Resistance to the Allied Special Forces Headquarters (S.F.HQ.). S.F.HQ. was the joint headquarters for all such operations. S.O.E. and O.S.S. both provided personnel to the teams. Even with the creation of these unconventional warfare teams, both organizations still ran their own operations, often without coordination between them. Ultimately, the purpose of the JEDBURGH teams was to pave the way for the liberation of occupied Europe.


S.O.E.'s primary concerns were to infiltrate trained agents into Holland with radio transmitters to establish communications with the various Resistance groups. Contact with the O.D. was apparently considered most important, largely from a security standpoint. Because the O.D. consisted of former government officials and military officers, they were deemed trustworthy. Even though bureaucratic infighting hampered S.O.E. operations, many Resistance groups continued to operate on their own, with little or no direction from the Dutch G.I.E. S.O.E. intended to lay the foundations for Allied success by exploiting existing Resistance cells throughout Holland. By infiltrating JEDBURGH teams and establishing contact with the Resistance, the S.O.E. hoped to provide intelligence back to S.F.HQ. for follow on operations. Further, when the time was right, S.O.E. hoped to provide Allied conventional units with Dutch combat teams to assist in the liberation. To this end, they planned to airdrop weapons and ammunition to their deployed JEDBURGH teams to facilitate weapons distribution training and familiarization. Despite the S.O.E.'s plan for using the Dutch Underground, the Germans assigned to counter-intelligence operations worked hard to thwart any such organization and resistance operations. The success of the German operations would taint British perceptions of the Dutch Resistance throughout the remainder of the war. (16)



The Situation: September 1944


The Resistance would also be used for intelligence purposes, and if possible, they would have also conducted combat patrols and harassing actions against German units around the airhead.(17)


Even at this stage, plans were made to use the Dutch Resistance both strategically and tactically to assist Allied combat units. At the tactical level, SFHQ again planned to use JEDBURGH teams to organize, coordinate and manage the actions of the available Resistance. Two JEDBURGH sub-missions, under the overall control of Team EDWARD, were assigned to the units participating in COMET, as 'liaison teams.' Team EDWARD was attached to the Airborne Force headquarters. Team CLAUDE was attached to the 1st Airborne Division (UK), Team CLARENCE was attached to the 52d Lowland Infantry Division (UK).(18) Utilization of the Dutch Resistance was also factored into the Allies' plan.


    The S.O.E. Role


S.O.E. planned to use JEDBURGH teams attached to conventional airborne units to provide liaison with the Resistance and redundant communications with higher headquarters. S.O.E. had planned using long range objectives, and based their initial deployment of the first team to deploy in Holland in accordance with the original LINNET plan, one of the two precursor plans to the final MARKET-GARDEN plan; the second being COMET.



Plans for the use of the Resistance


The S.H.A.E.F. staff placed a high value on the activities of the Underground movements in occupied Europe. The plans for using the Resistance and attached JEDBURGH teams to organize them were changed as necessary during the planning for the LINNET operations, COMET, and finally, MARKET-GARDEN. While the Allied combat units and their missions changed, the concept for use of the Resistance did not. One of the paragraphs in the two page S.H.A.E.F. Daily Summary was devoted to summarizing Resistance activities. There is no doubt that General Eisenhower and his staff fully appreciated the potential of the Dutch Resistance in aiding the upcoming operation. This is apparent in S.H.A.E.F.'s Daily Summary No. 97, dated 110800 September 1944, which stated that "railway sabotage is being carried out in accordance with orders received by the Resistance Groups."(19) In a message from EXFOR Main to S.H.A.E.F. Forward dated 13 September 1944 and reiterated two days later in a message to S.F.HQ. from S.H.A.E.F. Fwd, signed by General Eisenhower, read in part: "Consider most important that resistance movement in HOLLAND be instructed to remain underground except in southern districts which will be affected by the operation concerned. Subsequent instructions will be issued for raising the other districts of HOLLAND as the advance inland progresses."(20)


On 16 September 1944 at 0900 hours, Major-General Floyd Parks, the F.A.A.A. Chief of Staff, received the message regarding the limiting of the raising of the Resistance to those areas directly affected by MARKET.(21) Specific instructions issued to S.F.HQ. from S.H.A.E.F. Fwd on 12 September 1944 stated that the raising of the Resistance was to be done in two phases. "First phase to begin on day that Airborne Operation commences NOT before 13th September, and incitement should be for Southern areas of HOLLAND only (viz South of River WAAL). Second phase to be at later date to cover remainder of the Country."(22) It is apparent that the planners, while optimistic, did not want the entire country rising in open rebellion against the Germans while the liberation was still in doubt. In addition to these instructions, the Dutch Resistance was also ordered to conduct a railway strike timed to coincide with the beginning of the operation. This railway strike was designed to prevent the Germans from using the Dutch rail system to reinforce the threatened areas in the Allied A.O.


The airborne staffs also made plans for civil administration of the liberated areas following the successful conclusion of the operation. These plans are reflected in the 1st British Airborne Division's Resistance, Civil Affairs and Counterintelligence Annex to the division's operations order. At the Corps level, British Colonel Thorne-Thorne and Dutch Colonel Boddington were assigned the Civil Affairs role. The Corps Counterintelligence officer was a Captain Bryden. An American Lieutenant-Colonel Harris was placed in charge of coordinating civilian labor operations. This role would be crucial. The repair of roads, bridges and the construction of airfields would be vital to ensure that needed logistics could be moved in to support the combat forces. The Civil Affairs mission was to assist the operation through the use of the Dutch population other than the Resistance. They were also responsible for controlling refugees and restoring proper Dutch authority to the liberated areas. In order to assist the Allied airborne units in overcoming the language barrier with the civilian population, twenty-seven Dutch commandos were assigned to the airborne divisions. It is obvious that Allied commanders realized that critical use could be made of both the Dutch population as well as the Resistance in providing information to the paratroopers and glidermen.


The Counterintelligence mission was to screen counterintelligence targets, arresting black list(23) personalities and contacting white list persons. The Counterintelligence sections at both corps and division level were instructed to coordinate their activities with the attached JEDBURGH teams. These would be provided to the 1st Airborne Corps by S.F.HQ. Each airborne division made its own plans regarding these operations.


    1st Airborne Division


Within the 1st Airborne Division, overall responsibility for Civil Affairs, Resistance and Counterintelligence operations was given to Colonel Barlow. As the Deputy Commander of the 1st Airlanding Brigade, his headquarters was supposed to be collocated with the brigade's and inside Arnhem. The Civil Affairs responsibility was assigned to Lieutenant-Commander Arnoldus Wolters, a Dutch naval officer, who was designated as an "official representative of Dutch government with full powers."(24) The eleven Dutch commandos assigned to the British were also attached down to the brigade level to operate as interpreters. Four were assigned to the 1st Airlanding Brigade. The Polish Brigade, 1st and 4th Parachute Brigade, the Reconnaissance Squadron, the C.R.E., Division Headquarters and the Signals section were each assigned one interpreter. Captain Killick was the Division Counterintelligence officer with a small section assigned to him. The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade's Counterintelligence officer was a Lieutenant Brzeg. He also had a small intelligence staff.


The annex also indicated knowledge of additional special operations forces in the A.O., specifically an S.F.HQ. unit (probably Team CLAUDE) and a four man Belgian Special Air Service (S.A.S.) unit. The orders made it clear that these units, if they entered the Division's area, were to be escorted immediately to Division headquarters.


1st Airborne Division's plans were well explained and the missions and responsibilities of subordinate units were clearly defined. The Dutch population was estimated as being 99 percent friendly and reliable. The distribution of this Top Secret document was the same as that for the Intelligence Summaries, so it did reach the brigade level.


    82d Airborne Division


In addition to the JEDBURGH team codenamed CLARENCE, there were fourteen Royal Dutch commandos assigned throughout the Division to provide interpreter support down to the battalion level.


    101st Airborne Division


The Screaming Eagles had JEDBURGH team DANIEL II assigned to them, as well as five Royal Dutch commandos attached for linguist support.





S.F.HQ. assigned one JEDBURGH team to General Browning for use during MARKET. Team EDWARD had three sub-missions; one assigned to each airborne division. The team was billeted at Moor Park and conducted all of their mission planning and briefings there. Their primary concern was to gather pertinent geographical knowledge and intelligence concerning the enemy situation. They were also responsible for recruiting and coordinating the activities of Resistance groups in the MARKET-GARDEN A.O. The team's specific tasks were:


"1. Further the success of the operation through employment in the military field of local Dutch resistance forces as required by the local commander. 2. Provide intelligence on various levels from local resistance groups inside the air head and from resistance groups infiltrating into the air head from outside. 3. Assist in vetting(25) of resistance members who were to be used as guides, guards, patrols and in any other field of military activity. 4. Provide labor from resistance sources for all work of a military nature, e. g: landing strips." (26) The JEDBURGH team's codename was EDWARD. Team EDWARD had three sub-missions attached to it, each with their own codename.


    Team EDWARD


Team EDWARD was the fourth JEDBURGH team deployed to the Netherlands from England. The team, with sixteen members, consisted of the headquarters element (EDWARD) and the three sub-missions. Team EDWARD consisted of Dutch Captain J. Staal, American liaison Captain McCord Sollenberger, British liaison Captain R. Mills, and two radio operators: British Second Lieutenant L. Willmott and American Technical Sergeant J. Billingsley. EDWARD, as the headquarters element, was attached to Browning's Airborne Corps Headquarters. The team's mission was overall coordination with the three sub-missions and liaison between the Corps and the local underground. The team took two JEDBURGH W/T(27) radios and 10,500 Dutch guilders.(28)


There were three sub-missions under the control of EDWARD. Each airborne division in the MARKET phase was assigned one JEDBURGH team. Their mission was to provide liaison between the Resistance and the airborne divisions, providing tactical intelligence and exploiting the knowledge and experience of the Resistance organizations in the respective operational areas.




CLARENCE was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division. The team was commanded by Captain Arie J. Bestebreurjte, Royal Netherlands Army, with two Americans, Lieutenant George Verhaeghe, and radio operator Technical Sergeant Beynon. Lieutenant Verhaeghe, tall and blond, was of Dutch descent and spoke the language fluently. Arie "Harry" Bestebreurtje had spent a lot of time in pre-war Nijmegen. He not only had family living in the area, he had also participated in several of the annual Nijmegen marches, which basically are hiking tours south of Nijmegen. However, he probably did not visit Nijmegen during the war years as an S.O.E. agent, as one source says.(29) Still, his first-hand knowledge of the terrain and the population would be of immense help to the 82d Airborne's success.


    Team CLAUDE


Sub-mission CLAUDE was assigned to the 1st British Airborne Division. This team consisted of Royal Netherlands Army officers Captain Jacobus Groenewoud (Commander), Lieutenant Knottenbelt; and Americans Lieutenant Harvey Allen Todd, and Technical Sergeant Carl Alden Scott (W/T operator). The JEDBURGH mission was responsible "for furthering the military operations with all resources available from resistance units (original emphasis), and for advising F.S.O. as to the reliability of these units."(30) CLAUDE was also responsible for recruiting Dutch citizens for work within the Division airhead.


    Team DANIEL II


Sub-mission DANIEL II was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division, and consisted of two Dutch soldiers and two British soldiers. Major Wilson, the commander, and Sergeant Mason, the radio operator, made up the British half. Lieutenant Dubois and Sergeant Fokker made up the Dutch half.(31) The latters' chief qualification for inclusion on the team was that they spoke Dutch, while Major Wilson and Sergeant Mason only spoke French (in addition to English).


In addition to the S.O.E. role, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) had its own role in the operation. The O.S.S. mission code-named MELANIE, was such an action.(32)



The Resistance Intelligence


Both the Dutch liaison officers in England and Dempsey's G2 were reporting a build up of German strength in the A.O. and specifying the existence of the 9th and 10th SS in the Arnhem area. These intelligence reports were based on first hand accounts provided by Resistance intelligence operatives throughout Holland. On 14 September, the Group Kees sent a telegraphy report to the B.I. which read in part: "SS Division Hohenstaufl (sic) along Ijsell (River), parts of this seen from Arnhem to Zutphen and along road from Zutphen-Apeldoorn. Staff could possibly be in Eefde. Along Ijssell they are building fieldstrengths (fortifications)."(33) A Dutch Resistance member named Wouter van de Kraats was able to confirm that a German army group commander had established his headquarters in Oosterbeek's Tafelberg Hotel. He bluffed his way by German sentries and was able to get a look at the German staff cars parked outside the hotel.(34)


By Thursday afternoon on 14 September, Henri Knap, Arnhem's Resistance intelligence chief, had collected enough information to enable him to report via the Dutch telephone system to the Albrecht Group on the presence of the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen north of Arnhem, between the city and the town of Apeldoorn. Based on van de Kraats' description of the insignia on the German staff cars parked at the Tafelberg, Knap also reported that Field Marshal Model's headquarters had been established in neighboring Oosterbeek.(35) Later that same day, the Albrecht Group sent a report to the B.I. providing the exact positions of the German reinforcements in the Arnhem area, in part based on Knap's reports.



Tactical Use of the Resistance During MARKET-GARDEN


Overall, the local Dutchmen provided tactical intelligence and served as knowledgeable guides in the urban areas. They also guarded prisoners, served as litter bearers and manned fighting positions with paratroopers. Following the termination of MARKET-GARDEN, the underground provided a means of hiding and exfiltrating Allied soldiers and airmen out of the Arnhem area.



Utilization of the Resistance

Another reason for the tactical failure of the operation, especially at Arnhem, was the inability, because of the combat situation, not because of prejudice, to completely utilize the Dutch Resistance in the Arnhem area. Apparently the airborne planners focused entirely on getting the forces on the ground and assigning the many objectives to subordinate units.


The responsibility for coordination and use of the Resistance was laid almost entirely on the JEDBURGH teams. As noted, Dutch Army officers assigned to each S.O.E. team were supplied with Resistance intelligence from the B.I. In turn, these officers then briefed their division commander and his staff (and anyone else willing to listen) on the situation as reported by the Resistance in their particular A.O. Such information was not limited to enemy O.B.; information about the terrain and the condition of the bridges were also Essential Elements of Friendly Information (E.E.F.I.).


The Dutch were aware of German supply depots scattered throughout the countryside, which housed maps, food, telephone wire and ammunition. This information was provided to Allied soldiers, in some case allowing them to provision themselves from enemy stocks.(36) In addition to serving as intelligence collectors, Resistance members also served in a variety of roles. They served as guides, translators, first aid and litter bearers, prisoner of war guards and as combatants. They also worked as road and construction crews. In the small towns where "Hell's Highway" made sharp turns, the British armored vehicles tended to tear up the pavement and cobblestones along the streets. Resistance workers and civilians of their own volition immediately repaired the damaged areas, allowing the tanks and armored personnel carriers of XXX Corps a smoother ride. Following the American's capture of the Grave bridge, Resistance workers immediately began repairing the damage done to the span during a B-17 raid on the area.(37)


Once the Allies were on the ground, the use of the Resistance at the tactical level took on an ad hoc nature. The 1st Airborne Corps A.A.R. notes that the opportunity was lost to fully utilize the available Dutch in the area of operations. If an intelligence section had been attached to the Corps for the purpose of establishing a network of agents, it would have been "invaluable" in determining the enemy situation, especially after the front had stabilized.(38) The A.A.R. also notes that not enough CI personnel were available to accomplish all of the vital CI operations which normally would have been conducted. Further, it seems that the best CI informants were Roman Catholic priests, doctors and captured SS and Gestapo agents "who seemed only too willing to implicate their associates."


It is obvious that the Allies had good reason to exercise prejudice and caution in using the Resistance. The process of verifying the trust and reliability was slow and prone to miscalculation. While the decentralized nature of the Resistance organizations helped ensure their survival against the zealous threat posed by the Gestapo and SS, it prevented coordinated control by the B.I. and Dutch G.I.E. in England. Further, the SHAEF personality lists were out of date and inaccurate. One black listed Dutchman was in fact one of the most reliable residents of Nijmegen.(39) The railroad strike which coincided with MARKET-GARDEN represents the only full scale coordinated action orchestrated by the Dutch G.I.E. Dissemination of instructions from the G.I.E. to underground organizations was as difficult as passing information to the B.I. Since communication with the BI was done by wireless/telegraphy, this made the organizations vulnerable to the DF(40) operations conducted by the Germans. Larger underground groups were also more vulnerable to penetration by "V" men. Smaller groups, while more secure, did not possess the resources of larger ones and were not able to accomplish as much.


Still, despite all of this, the actions of the Resistance were not entirely given short shrift. A memorandum from LTG F.E. Morgan, SHAEF Deputy Chief of Staff to MG J.K. Edwards, the Chief of the SHAEF Mission to the Netherlands noted that by conducting "...useful sabotage of communications and industrial targets, Dutch Resistance played a large part in carrying out a railway strike in HOLLAND and gave notable assistance to Operation 'MARKET II' (sic)." General Morgan also noted that "the Germans have recently been carrying out an intensive drive against resistance in the NETHERLANDS, which has had the effect of lowering the number of armed resistants available but has failed to destroy the SF network of organisers and reception groups."(41)


The degree to which Prince Bernhard and other knowledgeable Dutchmen were included in the Allies' strategic planning also probably fell short of what could be considered optimal. As the Crown Prince related to Cornelius Ryan: "For example if we had known in time about the choice of drop zones and the distance between them and the Arnhem bridge…(42)


    The 1st Airborne Division


The British 1st Airborne Division had planned to use the available Resistance in the Arnhem area. Their operations plans reflect a great deal of forethought and recognition of the possible contributions the Resistance could make. The British had planned on using the Resistance during COMET, LINNET and LINNET II. Their plan was hamstrung during its execution for two reasons.


First, Team CLAUDE was split in three parts on the first day. Sergeant Scott spent the first two days searching for his radio. Captain Groenewoud and Lieutenant Todd, accompanying Frost's battalion, were caught up immediately in the battle at the northern end of the bridge.


Secondly, after the Germans effectively bottled up the 1st Battalion in their perimeter, contact with the Dutch population was severed. Groenewoud and Todd were caught in the fight and participated heroically. However, they were unable to accomplish their mission. Lieutenant Knottenbelt turned out to be CLAUDE's saving grace. His efforts, greatly assisted by Pieter Kruijff, were the driving force for recruiting and using those Resistance members who were able to join the British in their airhead. If Knottenbelt's role and Team CLAUDE's mission were as well known as they seem to have been, then Lt. Commander Wolters' role was equally clear. Even though Colonel Barlow was killed on the first day, this should not have completely hamstrung the division plan. This incident was merely symptomatic of the 1st Airborne's fate at Arnhem. While the JEDBURGH team continued to operate as a one man show, Wolters was left to his own devices. It is also unclear how much coordination Captain Groenewoud and Lt. Commander Wolters conducted prior to the operation. It is almost unimaginable that some coordination did not take place however. Both men were Dutch, therefore language and culture should not have been a barrier to effective communication. Also unclear is what coordination was made between Wolters and Knottenbelt after the operation began. Again, both men were Dutch and there should have been no communications problems. It is almost a certainty that Lieutenant Knottenbelt and Lt. Commander Wolters cooperated to some degree during the battle, even if this coordination was ad hoc in nature. In retrospect, Team CLAUDE might have been better served if Wolters had been placed on the team, if not in command, then at least given a firmer role.


Major-General Urquhart had the highest praise for the Resistance. He praised the "wonderful support we had been given by the Resistance men and women" to Queen Wilhelmina following his return to England.(43) He also noted that a "number of Resistance men who were making determined and daring journeys in order to feed us with information, especially about the disposition of tanks and other armour."(44) The Division's intelligence after action report noted: "Information from friendly civilians was generally found to be fairly reliable after allowance had been made for the personality of the bearer, and after he had been vetted by the Dutch liaison party. The population was co-operative. Initially a large number of young men rallied to the cause, but disappeared in proportion as the shelling and mortaring grew. Several rendered excellent service, and the highest praise is do to those few who helped our wounded throughout and stayed with us to the last."(45) The report termed the actions of Commander (sic) Wolters and Lieutenant Knottenbelt's commandos as "First class." It credited them with recruiting and vetting Dutch recruits and coordinating their actions. Lieutenant Knottenbelt, in his after action report noted that his greatest difficulty was a lack of prior information regarding the Arnhem Resistance. He had no names or addresses of trustworthy Dutchmen, hence he could only rely on his instinct to verify individual reliability.


Again, there appears to be a discrepancy in the record and historical accounts. According to Cornelius Ryan, Wolters had lists of trustworthy citizens, but when he produced them, they were viewed with suspicion.(46) This discrepancy is irreconcilable. It seems unbelievable that the JEDBURGH team assigned to the British airborne division would not have had the information required to conduct their mission, yet Lt. Commander Wolters did. Further, it seems incredible that Wolters did not share the information with Team CLAUDE. It appears that only because Pieter Kruijff made the effort to seek out and contact him was Knottenbelt able to accomplish as much as he did.


Of the 50 men the lieutenant recruited, only six claimed to belong to an organized Resistance group. Knottenbelt also observed that the "principle as laid down in the briefing that the Mission Claude was to act in only an advisory capacity to the Divisional Staff with regard to the recruitment of civilians was not applied in practice as understandably enough the British Staff Officers preferred to place the whole responsibility for the vetting and the organization onto the Dutch personnel available." The British failure to use the Arnhem telephone system after their own wireless communications broke down is a valid criticism. It is ironic that even as British paratroopers occupied their homes, the Dutch residents were telephoning friends and relatives, informing them about the situation.


While the telephone system was occasionally used by Lieutenants Todd and Knottenbelt, for the most part it was not used by the British as a whole. This criticism is mitigated in part because the British were concerned, with good reason, whether or not it was secure. After all, telephone wires can be tapped into, although there is no indication that the Germans were in fact listening in. Apart from other problems, the main obstacle to using the Resistance as guides was the tactical situation. From 17 September 1944 until the Division withdrew across the Lower Rhine, German attacks placed severe pressure on the airhead, restricting British mobility and room to maneuver. Unable to maintain an open corridor between the drop zones and the objective, the British were forced into two ever contracting perimeters until their virtual annihilation.


    The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade


Even though the Poles had been told not to trust the Dutch Underground(47), the British sent a Counterintelligence officer into Driel with the Brigade. This suggests that the British adopted an attitude of not trusting anyone, until they had been verified as loyal Dutchmen and were not collaborators or German agents. The verification process was the Counterintelligence officer's job.


Once the Poles had established themselves in Driel, the village became a magnet for Resistance cells in the vicinity of Arnhem. Unable to move into Arnhem because of the German noose tightening around the British, at least one Resistance group moved around to the south, bypassing the Germans and into Driel.


    The 82d Airborne Division


Utilization of the Resistance in Nijmegen is an almost perfect model for future similar operations. Good planning and prompt execution by Team CLAUDE was the primary reason for success. Unlike at Arnhem, the tactical situation at Nijmegen remained fluid. The Germans were unable to close off a perimeter around the 82d's airhead and seal the porous front line. Played to advantage, this allowed the Dutch to cross into German lines and collect information. During active American patrolling, Dutch knowledge of the terrain was also used to advantage. Even as the front lines solidified, the 82d troopers came to trust and rely increasingly on the Resistance for many uses. In addition to use as guides, interpreters and fighters, Resistance members arrested collaborators, screened and vetted Dutch civilians and helped control the civil population. The result was that there was no widespread refugee problem clogging the roads and hindering Allied operations.


The Resistance was used down to the infantry squad and platoon level. Battalion commanders such as Lt. Colonel Louis Mendez relied on the knowledge provided by Agardus Leegsma and Gerard Peijnenburg to plan his battalion's combat operations. The 504th Regimental S2 Non-Commissioned Officer, Sergeant Bachenheimer, a German Jew, recruited several hundred Resistance members from Grave and the Nederasselt and Overasselt areas to work with infantry platoons and provide information on the 504th Regimental A.O.(48) Several hundred Dutch nurses and doctors in Nijmegen area hospitals also cared for wounded British and American soldiers, sometimes on the battlefield as well as in hospitals. Father Hoek, Groesbeek's Roman Catholic priest, travelled throughout the Division's airhead, conducting religous services and providing the last rites to mortally wounded soldiers.


Again, Team CLARENCE and Captain Arie Bestebreurtje had General Gavin's confidence and trust. This point cannot be emphasized enough. Not only was the Division commander cognizant of his JEDBURGH team's mission, he also realized the Resistance's potential as a combat multiplier. Use of the Resistance in non-combat roles was more suitable than using them as combatants. Although many Dutchmen took on this role and fought beside Allied paratroopers in foxholes, they were untrained for this. With weapons in their hands, untrained Resistance members were the equivalent of an armed, motivated mob. Many lost their lives during the fierce fighting. Jan Reinders, working as a scout for Captain Bestebreurtje, was killed on 18 September while on an intelligence collecting mission for the JEDBURGH team leader.(50) The concepts of fire and maneuver, command and control, combat discipline, etc. were all foreign ones. Distributing volunteer Dutchmen between the Regiments, as the 82d Airborne Division did, was judicious and efficient. Placing the Dutchmen in uniform, largely a symbolic gesture, was not only a morale booster, it also probably saved a lot of Dutch lives following their capture. For his part, General Gavin had this to say about the Nijmegen Resistance: ""Its conduct was exemplary. I knew it quite well and its members fought well beside us..."(51) At the trooper level, Donald Pearsall of E Company, 2/508th PIR had this to say: "...those brave civilians with orange bands on their arms, they were everywhere,...they informed us of German movements time and again. Many of us are alive today, because of these brave men....Those fighting Dutchmen in Orange I will never forget, they were some of the bravest men I had ever met." (52)


    The 101st Airborne Division


The linchpin to tactical utilization of the Resistance in Eindhoven was Team DANIEL II. The 101st Airborne Division commander and his staff were more concerned with deploying and fighting their units. As in the 82d and 1st Airborne Divisions, planning responsibility and operational control of the Resistance was left in the hands of the JEDBURGH teams.


Team DANIEL II's contributions to the overall operation were minimal. Coordination with and recruitment of the Resistance in Eindhoven was negligible. Although Arie Tromp's organization was secure and trustworthy, it was largely co-opted by the MELANIE mission. As MELANIE did not provide any tactical level intelligence to or coordination with the 101st or XXX Corps, the established Resistance intelligence network had no impact or contribution on the tactical intelligence level. Tromp, for his part, may not have been able to differentiate between the O.S.S. operatives and the 101st. As is so often true in the civilian world, a man in uniform is no different from someone else in uniform. To the Dutch, they knew what Germans in uniform looked like and one American in uniform was like all Americans. Tromp may have assumed that information he and his comrades passed to MELANIE would be passed on to everyone who needed it. This was not the case.


On an ad hoc level, use of the Eindhoven Resistance followed the same pattern as at Nijmegen and Arnhem. Approximately 200 individual Dutch citizens, both civilians and formal Resistance members, attached themselves to American airborne units. A photograph taken during the battle shows two P.A.N. members consulting a map with Colonel Howard R. Johnson, the 501st Parachute Infantry Regimental commander.(53) The Dutch were used as interpreters, guides and in the counter-intelligence role of identifying collaborators. The Screaming Eagles ran into the same problems as other airborne units did; mainly, the inability to establish the bonafides of the Dutch volunteers. Strict security measures regarding dissemination of information regarding Resistance rosters led to no dissemination at all. Information which was available was withheld from the soldiers and commanders who could have used it the most.


While the fog of war and the restrictive combat situation in Arnhem restricted Resistance operations there; in Eindhoven, friction prevented effective use of the Resistance. To be fair, Team DANIEL II was probably unaware of the presence of the O.S.S. team "MELANIE". The operations security restrictions placed on MELANIE prevented them from conducting coordination measures with MARKET-GARDEN forces. It is also apparent that while the O.S.S. team knew Aire Tromp's name, address and position in the Eindhoven Resistance, Team DANIEL II did not. Still, DANIEL II's lack of initiative and failure to overcome the obstacles in their way is not entirely expiated.




1. Despite the lack of Allied coordination and crosstalk regarding utilization of the Resistance, the Dutch still made a valuable contribution at the tactical level. The FAAA after action report credits the Nijmegen and Arnhem Resistance with establishing communications via telephone and providing an information link after the radios were unable to do so.(54) Possibly of even greater significance were the contributions the Dutch Resistance made following the battle. Some 2,000 Allied airmen were unaccounted for during the operation and immediately afterwards. The various Resistance groups still in occupied Holland were able to smuggle many of them out of the German occupied territory and repatriate them.(55) Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 444.


2. Ibid., 444.


3. The Dutch GIE's intelligence service. Andre Ausems, "The 'Bureau Inlichtingen' (Intelligence Service) of the Netherlands Government in London, November 1942- May 1945: An Overview of its mission, agents and Undercover radio traffic." Military Affairs, Vol. 45, no. 3 (October 1981): 127.


4. Hoynck van Papendrecht, P.A.N. founder and Stoottrophen veteran, interview by author, Eindhoven, Holland, 14 June 1996. John W. Hackett, I Was a Stranger, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), 53. Sjors De Kruijff, "We had spread a bed for the Allies." Unpublished monograph, obtained from the Hartenstein Airborne Museum, Arnhem, Holland, 1996. De Kruijff's monograph details resistance activities in the Arnhem area before and during MARKET-GARDEN. Much of his material is drawn from first hand veterans accounts on file at the State Archives in Arnhem.


5. Gerard H.J.M. Peijnenburg, Dutch Secretary of the Army and L.O. member, interview by author, Wassenaar, Holland, 18 June 1996.


6. Leo Heinsman, L.O. member, interview by author, Beek-Ubbergen, Holland, 18 June 1996.


7. Gerard H.J.M. Peijnenburg, Dutch Secretary of the Army and L.O. member, interview by author, Wassenaar, Holland, 18 June 1996.


8. Hoynck van Papendrecht, P.A.N. founder and Stoottrophen veteran interview by author, Eindhoven, Holland on 14 June 1996.


9. Jan Laverge, Captain, U.S.Army (Retired.), O.S.S. veteran, interview by author in Richmond, VA on 2 November 1995.


10. Margarethe Kelder-Groom, author interview, 14-15 June 1996, Eindhoven, Holland,.


11. Leo Heinsman, Resistance veteran, author interview, 18 June 1996, Beek Ubbergen, Holland.


12. In A Bridge Too Far, his last name is Anglicized as Kruyff. This work will use the Dutch spelling when known.


13. Sjors De Kruijff, "We had spread a bed for the Allies." Unpublished monograph, obtained from the Hartenstein Airborne Museum, Oosterbeek, Holland, 1996, 6.


14. Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 57-58.


15. Sjors De Kruijff, "We had spread a bed for the Allies." Unpublished monograph, obtained from the Hartenstein Airborne Museum, Oosterbeek, Holland, 1996, 8.


16. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 445 fn.


17. MAJ Robert A. Gutjahr, U.S. Army, The Role of Jedburgh Teams in Operation Market-Garden, MMAS Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, 3 June 1990), 79.


18. Ibid. 81.


19. SHAEF Daily Summary No. 97, dtd. 110800 September 1944. On file at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA.


20. NARA RG 331, Entry 1, Box #75, Folder 381.


21. Floyd Lavinius Parks, MG, British Army, CofS, FAAA, Daily Diary. On file at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA.


22. NARA RG 331, Entry 1, Box #75, Folder 381.


23. Black list persons referred to known collaborators and German agents. White list persons referred to trusted Dutch Resistance operatives and other Dutch civilians.


24. 1st Airborne Division (British Army) Annex entitled Resistance, Civil Affairs and C.I. Instructions (Top Secret), dated 14 September 1944. On file at the 82d Airborne Division Museum archives, Ft. Bragg, NC.


25. A process which would establish the bona fides and reliability of a person.


26. NARA Record Group 226, Entry no. 128, Box 11, Folder 102. Cited hereafter as Team EDWARD report


27. Wireless/Telegraphy


28. Team EDWARD report.


29. Father Thuring, Curator, Liberation Museum, Groesbeek, Holland, author interview, 12 June 1996.


30. 1st Airborne Division (British) orders on Operation MARKET, Annex entitled Resistance, Civil Affairs and C.I. Instructions (Top Secret), dated 14 September 1944. On file at the 82d Airborne Division Museum archives, Fort Bragg, NC.


31. Team EDWARD report.


32. P.R.A. van Iddekinge, Arnhem 44/45, (Holland: De Gelderse Boekhandel and Gouda Quint, 1981) as cited in Sjors De Kruijff's unpublished monograph We had spread a bed for the Allies. On file at the Hartenstein Airborne Museum, Oosterbeek, Holland.




34. As Cornelius Ryan recounts the story, van de Kraats told German sentries that he had to go work at a garage down the street and when they let him by, he quickly looked into the Tafelberg's parking lot. Today, the garage is still operational and the Tafelberg is a private home.


35. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 146-7.


36. Father Thuring, Curator, Liberation Museum, Groesbeek, Holland, author interview, 12 June 1996.


37. Father Thuring, Curator, Liberation Museum, Groesbeek, Holland, author interview, 12 June 1996.


38. NARA RG 331, Entry # 1, Box 75. 1st Airborne Corps After Action Report subject: Allied Airborne Operations in Holland, Sept.- Oct. 1944, dated 12 February 1945.


39. NARA RG 331, Entry # 1, Box 75. 1st Airborne Corps After Action report, Subject: Allied Airborne Operations in Holland, Sept.- Oct. 1944, dated 12 February 1945.


40. Direction Finding of radio emissions.


41. NARA RG 331, Entry # 2, Box 118. Memorandum for LTG F.E. Morgan, SHAEF Deputy Chief of Staff to MG J.K. Edwards, the Chief of the SHAEF Mission to the Netherlands, undated.


42. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 508.


43. Major-General Robert E. Urquhart, British Army, Arnhem, (London: Cassell & Co. 1954), 190.


44. Ibid. p.96


45. Headquarters, 1st Airborne Division (British) After Action Report on Operation MARKET, undated. Obtained from Mr. Roger King, Arlesy, Beds. United Kingdom.


46. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 444.


47. George Cholewczynski, Poles Apart, (New York: Sarpedon, 1993), 143.


48. Father Thuring, Curator, Liberation Museum, Groesbeek, Holland, author interview, 12 June 1996.


49. Father Thuring, Curator, Liberation Museum, Groesbeek, Holland, author interview, 12 June 1996.


50. Team EDWARD report.


51. James M. Gavin, LTG, U.S. Army, letter to General Williams dated 17 January 1954. On file at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA.


52. Pearsall, Doanld J. as recounted to Don Jakeway in Paratroopers Do or Die!! Privately published, undated.


53. Geoffrey Powell, The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944, (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985).


54. FAAA After Action Report.


55. Father Thuring, Curator, Liberation Museum, Groesbeek, Holland, author interview, 12 June 1996.