National Archives catalogue number WO 171/1242.
Note: The War Diary for August 1944, excluding the 9th Battalion Residue in England, is missing.
Abbreviation
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145735 2 ic AA AAC A/C Adm AFHU Airlg Amb Amn Arty A/Tk Att Bde BLA Bn Bty BW Cdn C in C CO Comd Coy CRE Det Div DZ Fd FDL FOO FUP Fwd GB Force Gen Hosp Gp GSW H HE i/c Incl Inf ITC Junc LMG MG MMG MO MT Oboe OC Offr O Group Op OR Oxs and Bucks Paratp Pdr Pl Posn RA RAP Rd RE Regt Rfts RUR RV SP SS Str T/Capt TOS Tp Tpt |
Map Reference Second-in-Command Anti-Aircraft Army Air Corps Aircraft Administrative Airborne Forces Holding Unit Airlanding Ambulance Ammunition Artillery Anti-Tank Attached Brigade British Liberation Army Battalion Battery Black Watch Canadian Commander-in-Chief Commanding Officer Commander Company Commander Royal Engineers Detachment Division / Divisional Drop Zone Field Forward Defended Locality Forward Observation Officer Forming Up Place Forward Glider coup-de-main force - led by Captain "Gordon-Brown" General Hospital Group Gunshot Wound Highland High Explosive In-Command Including Infantry Junction Light Machine Gun Machine Gun Medium Machine Gun Medical Officer Motor Transport Bomber Command navigation system Officer Commanding Officer Orders Group Operation Other Ranks Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Paratroop Pounder Platoon Position Royal Artillery Regimental Aid Post Road Royal Engineers Regiment Reinforcements Royal Ulster Rifles Rendezvous Self-Propelled Special Service Strength Temporary Captain Taken on Strength Troop Transport |
Month and year: June 1944
Commanding Officer : Lt. Col. T.H.B. Otway
1st June 1944
Place: Broadwell
0900 - C.O. briefed Battalion on forthcoming operation in R.A.F. Sgts Mess. Remainder of day spent in sub-unit briefing.
2nd June 1944
Place: Broadwell
All D. sub-unit briefing.
1130 - Air Chief Marshall LEIGH-MALLORY, C in C Allied Air Forces spoke to G.B. Force.
3rd June 1944
Place: Broadwell
0900 - Tps were taken to Airfield by M.T., where a/c were inspected, containers loaded, parachutes drawn and fitted. Tps returned to transit camp by M.T.
4th June 1944
Place: Broadwell
0830 - Word was received that Op had been postponed for 24 hrs. The day was spent in further briefing of sub-units. A final Drum Head Church Service was held in the open. Earlier in the morning the Camp Commandant and staff presented the Bn with a maroon flag having on it a Blue Silk "Bellerophon" as in the Airborne sign. This flag was made by the W.V.S. of Oxford for the transit camp and the men's wives gave up some of their coupons for it. When the flag was hoisted on the camp flag pole a deputation of the Camp Administrative staff asked the Camp Commandant, Capt. P. YOUNG, to present the flag to 9 Para Bn to take into action. This was done and the flag was dedicated by the padre, the Rev. T. GWINNETT C.F. at the last Church service.
5th June 1944
Place: Broadwell
0800 - Word received that the operation was definitely on. Morale rose to 100%. In the afternoon compulsory rest was ordered.
2000 - Glider parties (Adm jeeps & 6 pdr A/Tk guns) left for HARWELL Airfield. Recce party consisting of Major Smith, Major Parry, CSMI's Miller and Harold, Sgt's Knight, Easlea, Pinkus and Lukins and Ptes Adsett and Mason, left also for HARWELL.
2115 - Main body of Bn left transit camp for BROADWELL Airfield, collected parachutes and emplaned at 2245 hrs.
Place: Harwell
2310 - Path-finder A/C took off.
2312 - Adm and A/Tk gun gliders took off.
Place: Broadwell
2312 - Main body took off.
6th June 1944
Place: Normandy
0020 - TROWBRIDGE (Recce) party dropped on DZ accurately and proceeded to carry out appointed tasks. There was no losses from this A/C.
0030 - OBOE of 100 Lancasters bombed DZ area. Some of Recce party were caught in this OBOE but suffered no casualties.
0050 - Main body of the Bn dropped over a wide area.
0235 - 110 All ranks had reported at the RV by this time.
0250 - Strength of Bn now approximately 150 all ranks. Bn Commenced march to first objective.
0400 - C.O. summoned "O" Group and issued orders for the assault on the Battery.
0415 - Assault commenced - immediately previous to which one glider was seen to circle the Battery position and crash land in an orchard in the area of the firm base. Casualties 1 Officers killed. 2 Coy Comds, Adjutant & one other officer wounded. Success signal put up. Bn commences withdrawal. Appx A. Appx B.
0600 - Bn reorganised prior to move to LE PLEIN. Strength now approximately 80 all ranks. Battery shelled by enemy.
0730 - Bn commenced move to LE PLEIN and was caught in bombing of hostile targets. Appx C.
0930 - Bn arrived at LE PLEIN, took up positions in the area CHATEAU D'AMFREVILLE and engaged the enemy. Heavy Mortaring throughout the day. Lt. Halliburton wounded and subsequently died.
7th June 1944
Place: Le Plein
Bn attacked by the enemy. Considerable sniping which caused some casualties. C.O. visited Brigadier Lord Lovatt Commanding ISS Bde.
2130 - Bn relieved by 1 SS Bde and proceeded to LE MESNIL where temporary positions were taken up. In this area the Bn reverted to Brigade control and were given orders to hold the high ground SOUTH of ST Côme.
8th June 1944
Place: St Come
1200 - Attack by enemy infantry developed on the right flank and was repulsed. Further enemy attacks launched during the latter part of the day. Ground held.
9th June 1944
Place: St Come
During the night 8/9 June two 3" mortars were received also 3 Vickers MGs. Up to this time the Bn's sole heavy weapon had been one Vickers MG. In the early morning a determined enemy attack was launched following a heavy mortar concentration. This attack and others that followed were repulsed with very heavy losses to the enemy. During the afternoon a counter attack was launched against an enemy force which had infiltrated into the Bn area. The Counter attack force suffered the loss of the 2 ic and one Pl Comd and 5 ORs killed and a further five wounded.
10th June 1944
Place: St Come
Numerous attacks made by the enemy during the day and previous night. All were repulsed. The Bn increased in strength by the arrival of stragglers to approximately 170 all ranks. One missing Coy Comd who had been commanding a scratch force at Bde HQ arrived.
1200 - An enemy force, half a company strong, appeared & commenced digging in. As a result of our fire the force was almost completely wiped out.
1400 - A further enemy attack was launched and repulsed.
1900 - An attack by one and a half enemy Coys launched and again repulsed with heavy losses. C.O. 21st Bn 857 Regt captured. Reported that his Unit had been wiped out.
2300 - "C" Coy detailed to seize and hold the Chateau ST COME. It did so and was attacked all through the night.
11th June 1944
Place: St Come
During the night 5 Black Watch arrived in the area and launched an unsuccessful attack later in the day on BREVILLE. C Coy relieved in the Chateau by one Coy 5 Black Watch.
12th June 1944
Place: St Come
Attacks launched during the night continued during the day when hostile tanks were reported in the vicinity.
1500 - An intense Arty and Mortar bombardment began on the two Battalion positions and lasted three quarters of an hour. Casualties - only two slightly wounded. Bombardment followed by a determined infantry attack supported by six Mk IV or French tanks and a number of SP guns. Fairly heavy casualties were inflicted in the Bn until the situation quietened down at about 2000 hrs.
2100 - Arty concentration commenced and lasted for ten minutes but was not followed by an infantry assault.
13th June 1944
Place: St Come
Bn relieved by 2 Oxs and Bucks. Strength 11 Officers and 218 O.Rs. Bn proceeded to LE MESNIL where a quiet morning was spent. Later Air Activity which caused some concern in the Bn but no Casualties. R.A.F. Typhoons inadvertently strafed Bn positions.
14th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Quiet night but considerable air activity. Patrol under RSM despatched 2330 and returned 0330. B Coy rejoined Bn at Brickworks.
15th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Little activity except in the air. Counter attack roles rehearsed.
16th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Heavy mortaring from first light was continued spasmodically throughout the day. Much air activity. Quiet night.
17th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Continual enemy mortar fire.
1900 - Bn returned to RANVILLE.
18th June 1944
Place: Ranville
Intermittent shelling, otherwise quiet.
19th June 1944
Place: Ranville
Heavy rain. Arty & smoke put down by the enemy.
20th June 1944
Place: Ranville
Moved to rest area at ECARDE.
21st June 1944
Place: Ecarde
Bn in rest area.
22nd June 1944
Place: Ecarde
Bn in rest area. CO received a letter from General Gale acknowledging a letter sent by CO on behalf of Bn congratulating the DIV Comd on the award of the LEGION OF MERIT.
23rd June 1944
Place: Ecarde
Bn in rest area. Entertainment by ENSA accompanied by the echo of gunfire.
24th June 1944
Place: Ecarde
Bn in rest area. One officer Major Parry rejoined Unit from U.K. L/Cpl. Green returned to Unit after passing through enemy lines. Appx E.
25th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Bn returned to the line and took over from 13 Para Bn in the area LE MESNIL cross roads. Work started immediately on the improvement of trenches and the command post was reconstructed. On approaching the area from the East the Bn came under fairly heavy shellfire.
26th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Owing to the manpower situation the CO decided to reorganise the Bn into two Coys each of two platoons to take effect from the 27 June. Canadians shelled at point blank range by a 75 mm gun mounted on a cart. The gun position was too close to the Canadians to be shelled by us so fire was brought to bear about three hundred yards to its left. The gun crew withdrew but returned when the shelling had ceased. CSM Beckwith took out a patrol after dark to obtain an identification at 145735. No Identification was, however, obtained. Enemy patrol sighted by our standing patrol at 143734.
27th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Wiring of B & C Coys front commenced. Patrol under Lieut. JONES sent out to obtain an Identification at 144734 but failed to do so. Returned with information that this position was occupied by a Coy HQ in the area 147735 and that an S.P. gun was well camouflaged and sighted in the hedge at 143733. Average mortar and shell fire. Snipers sent out. Routine inter-coy reliefs carried out. Capt Greenway evacuated.
28th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Bn visited by Col. DAVIS C.I.A. who inquired into the suitabilities of weapons.
2200 - Mock attack carried out by 8 PARA bn on our right to force the enemy to divulge his defensive fire tasks. Patrol under CSM BECKWITH due to go out at 2330 was postponed until 0030 on account of 8 Para Bn's attack. Object was to obtain an Identification, it failed to do so.
29th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Unusually heavy mortaring during the evening which caused casualties to four officers of Bde HQ and three civilians. Arrived in the Bn position of A Coy 1 RUR. During the night there was intermittent shelling during which Lt. Slade's trench received a direct hit. Lt. Slade who was in the trench at the time was unhurt.
30th June 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
After considerable efforts the 2 ic and his batman commenced and completed, at the expense of the M.Os blast wall, the officers mess blast wall. Patrol sent out under Sgt. WOODCRAFT to ascertain whether or not point 501 at 144735 was occupied. If it was unoccupied a Pl of A Coy was to take possession of it. The patrol reported that the position was in fact occupied. It returned without either Sgt. WOODCRAFT or Cpl. SIMPSON and reported that both had been wounded and left where they fell. Shortly afterwards, however, Sgt Woodcraft returned unwounded and confirmed that Cpl. Simpson was still lying wounded. This NCO was later evacuated by 12 Devons.
9th Parachute Battalion (Residue)
Month and year: June 1944
Commanding Officer : Capt F.H. Tavener
5th June 1944
Place: Field
2320 - Bn took off for op "OVERLORD". 3 Sjts 3 Cpls posted from 1 AFHU.
6th June 1944
Place: Oxford
0645 - L/C HULL 6465258 died in 107 Gen Hosp OXFORD as a result of GSW in spine.
7th June 1944
Place: Field
1500 - Transit Camp BROADWELL evacuated.
8th June 1944
Place: Field
Bn Residues formed under Comd of Capt F.H. TAVENER 153312, consisting of Home Details, 1st Reinforcements and WE Residues.
9th June 1944
Place: Field
Six drivers and 3 - 3-tonners moved to Figsbury to form part of Div Tpt Pool.
12th June 1944
Place: Field
2000 - 1 Sjt, 1 Cpl and 6 privates posted to Airborne Forces Depot.
20th June 1944
Place: Field
0800 - 10 Privates posted to 1 AFHU.
23rd June 1944
Place: Field
2000 - 20 Privates posted from 1 AFHU and TOS 1st Rfts.
24th June 1944
Place: Field
2300 - Lt A.R. JEFFERSON 197048 rejoined Residues from Theatre of Operations.
28th June 1944
Place: Field
2300 - Lt H.C. POND 255225 rejoined Residues from Theatre of Operations.
29th June 1944
Place: Field
1000 - Brig R.G. Parker 17679 Comd CAE lectured to all officers re France.
Month and year: July 1944
Commanding Officer : Lt. Col. T.H.B. Otway
1st July 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Normal mortaring and shelling snipers active but no kills. It was now becoming apparent that all ranks in the Bn were suffering from severe mental fatigue. This was inevitably caused by heavy duties falling upon the same men. Sections were now down to an average of three men. CO interviewed Sgts of all Coys to ascertain the situation. Up till now the Bn had been out of the line for four days since D Day and the effect of continuous fighting on the men now was most pronounced. CO made representations to Bde Comdr who appreciated the situation sympathetically and informed the Divisional Commander. CO informed the latter that he would like the Bn relieved in 48 hrs. Patrol under CSM Beckwith was sent out but had to return at the request of the 1st Canadian Para Bn who were suffering Casualties during their construction of MG pits as our patrol was operating whilst digging was in progress.
1200 - Visit to Bn of Lt. Gen. Browning and Major Gens. Gale, Crawford and Domas. Digging at point 501 continued in the heavy rain. Normal mortar & shell fire.
3rd July 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Command Post completed.
4th July 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
Construction of new positions at 501 almost completed. Representatives of
13 Para Bn made recce of Bn area preparatory to taking over the following
day. Owing to our strength it was no longer possible to maintain 3 rifle
coys. A, B, and C Coys were therefore formed into two Coys known as No.1
Coy & No.2 Coy. No.1 Coy (Major G.E. Smith)
occupied point 501. Men now on their last legs.
5th July 1944
Place: Le Mesnil
1000 - Bn relieved by 13 para bn. Strength of the Bn was now 11 Offs (Padre & MO incl) and 177 ORs. 3 Para Bde moved back to the rest area at ECARDE in heavy rain. A majority of the men were able to reoccupy their original dugouts after much baling out.
6th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
Day spent in cleaning up, reclothing and rest. CO decided to move Bn HQ and HQ Coy to another field where new dugouts were to be constructed. In the evening the Bn was reinforced by 2 Offs and 70 ORs from the OXF & BUCKS L.I. 9 ORs from the BUCKS Regt. and 27 ORs from the South Lancs Regt. 1 Off from the Essex Regt and 1 from the Monmouthshire Regt, total 4 Offs and 106 ORs. With these additions it was possible to reorganise into 3 Coys. The strength of the Bn was now 16 Offs and 287 ORs.
7th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
Rest and reorganisation continued. In the afternoon the Bde Comdr addressed all Offs of the Bde at Bde HQ.
9th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
Bn Church Parade in the open; the 2nd since leaving the U.K.
10th to 19th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
The period 10 to 19 July was spent in Individual Training. NCO [?] courses and recreation. A number of men were sent to the 1 Corps rest camp for a period of 2 days in batches of ten. Many excursions were made to cinemas etc on the west side of the ORNE. All ranks derived a great benefit from going into the interior of the bridgehead.
16th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
1200 - The C in C visited the Div and presented ribbons to Offs and ORs who were the recipients of awards. No awards were made on this occasion to 3 Para Bde but the Bn was represented at the Parade by LT Col. OTWAY and RSM. REES.
17th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
1400 - Div Comdr addressed all Offs of the Bde at Bde HQ. After giving an account of the activities of the Div up to this date he gave an account of the battles in other sectors of the bridgehead and outlined his policy for the future.
18th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
0600 - Large numbers of heavy bombers from the U.K. passed over head on their way to bomb CAEN; the prelude of the battle; The Bn turned out to watch the air battle which was a sight to gladden every body's heart. The procession of aircraft continued without stop for 4 hrs. During the day armoured formations having crossed the ORNE, passed through the camp in an endless stream. Cpl. Mills and Lt. Slade nearly met their doom when a Bull dozer almost removed the Officers Latrine in which they were ensconced.
19th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
1730 - CO attended Bde conference and returned with the news that the Bn was to go up the line next morning. Coy Comds accompanied the CO on a recce of the new area at present occupied by 12 Devons. Recce carried out in drenching rain. Orders issued for move.
20th July 1944
Place: Ecarde
Bn left ECARDE for to take over a sector immediately west of the "Triangle". Very heavy rain during which several attempts were made to dig in. Reported by 12 Devons that this was a very quiet piece of the front. No bombs or shells fell in the Bn area during the day.
21st July 1944
Place: Triangle
Continued heavy rains during the night and most of the day. Work commenced on new Command post. This was to be a real luxury affair with two tables and chairs and ample space. RE asked for advice on construction. First bombs in Bn area which increased in number as the day passed.
2300 - German recce aircraft flew overhead. Considerable British flak.
22nd July 1944
Place: Triangle
Patrols from B Coy out during the day. A certain amount of enemy movement reported. Increased Mortar fire. Bde had now in support 150 Fd Regt RA, who did great work in retaliation. Evening "Stonk" to which the enemy replied but little.
23rd July 1944
Place: Triangle
Patrols and snipers active. Fairly quiet during the morning but renewed activity during the afternoon. Our own Mortars particularly active. Interchange of Coy posns, A Coy now in rear position, B Coy forward, C Coy intermediate positions.
24th July 1944
Place: Triangle
CRE visited Bn area accompanied by Lt. Shand. Whilst inspecting two derelict enemy tanks it appears Lt. Shand stood on a necklace of 75 grenades and was killed - CRE seriously wounded. Considerable mortar activity to which our guns replied with zest. CO visited a General Hospital in BAYEUX. Likely to leave the Bn tomorrow.
25th July 1944
Place: Triangle
Lt. Col. OTWAY evacuated. A Coy patrols out both day and night, two prisoners taken during the evening. Normal activity by both sides. Visit by Div Comdr.
Commanding Officer: Major A.J.M. Parry
26th July 1944
Place: Triangle
Coys change over. Enemy patrol bumped into C Coy FDLs exchange of fire in which a number of enemy were hit at very close range. One seriously wounded captured. Remainder fled. Patrols and snipers out but nothing to report. Fairly heavy mortar and artillery fire. A few casualties suffered.
27th July 1944
Place: Triangle
Normal activity but night more active than usual. Enemy aircraft came overhead at about midnight and dropped five bombs in B Coy area. One scored a direct hit in a dugout and killed both occupants. These were the first bombs we had had. Medical Officer (Capt. Watts) left the Bn for a period at the Bde rest house which had recently been established at HERMANVILLE. MO relieved by Capt. Atkinson (224 Para Fd Amb).
28th July 1944
Place: Triangle
Grand stonk laid on by Bde Comd. Fd and Medium Arty to put down heavy concentrations. Stonk later cancelled by 1 Corps. Much disappointment. During the day a Polish deserter came in with a severe arm wound. He proved a very useful prisoner and gave us much information. Appx A. During the evening a capture Panzerwurffer was borrowed from 3 Div to amuse us and to annoy the enemy. A number of rockets were fired in quick succession after which the party broke up.
29th July 1944
Place: Triangle
Bde Comd visited a neighbouring Bde to recce a new area which the Bde was to take over. Bde "O" Group during the evening. Enemy activity on a reduced scale as a result of our own retaliation. Patrols out but nothing to report.
30th July 1944
Place: Bois de Bavent
0900 - CO contacted OC 1 BW with a view to carrying out a recce of the new area. Bn to take over from sub units of three different Bns of 51 Div. A very hot day. Two mortar bombs landed very close to the Command post, the roof of which had just been removed by 1 BW. Day extremely quiet. Nothing known about the enemy in this sector.
1300 - Bn moved in. A & B Coys forward, C Coy in reserve. Positions already dug so little work apart from maintenance required. Bn in high spirits. Work commenced immediately on the construction of a bigger and better Comd Post.
31st July 1944
Place: Bois de Bavent
Bde Comd recce'd Bn area with CO. At A Coy's forward position one 5cm mortar bomb fell very close; evident that party was being observed. Bde Comd was surprised as it was thought that enemy was further in the woods. Visited A Coys rear pl, followed all the way by mortar fire. Bde Comdr, CO and OC A Coy took refuge in a narrow slit trench around which five mortar bombs fell in quick succession. Direct hit scored on trench five yds away in which a Cdn soldier was killed. Bde Comd very annoyed, returned to his HQ and ordered a STONK on the forward edge of BOIS DE BAVENT. Very considerable mortar activity during the day.
9th Parachute Battalion (Residue)
Month and year: July 1944
Commanding Officer : Capt F.H. Tavener
4th July 1944
Place: Field
2300 to 0600 - 1st Rft Night Exercise - Pl in Attack. South Staffs cease to be attached for rations and accommodation.
6th July 1944
Place: Field
109081 T/Capt TEA ROBINSON joined Bn from Theatre of Operations.
7th July 1944
Place: Field
79893 Lt AG BARLOW posted to Bn from No 1 AFHU. 9 ORs joined from Theatre of operations. 6 Posted from No 1 AFHU.
5th July 1944
Place: Field
6 ORs joined from Theatre of Operations.
1[5?]th July 1944
Place: Field
T/Capt ROBINSON TEA (109081) visited 3" Mortar Wing S.A.S. Netheravon. 4 ORs posted from No 1 AFHU. 4 ORs posted to Airborne Forces Depot.
17th July 1944
Place: Field
262161 Lieut C.J. JONES proceeded to Chester on MMG course.
18th July 1944
Place: Field
3 ORs joined from Theatre of Operations.
19th July 1944
Place: Field
5 ORs joined from Theatre of Operations.
21st July 1944
Place: Field
4 ORs joined from Theatre of Operations.
22nd July 1944
Place: Field
153843 T/Capt C.P. GREENWAY joined Bn from Theatre of Operations.
26th July 1944
Place: Field
75399 Lt M.N. Glen, 274729 Lt D.A. Harpley, 320043 2/Lt D.D. Graham and 31 ORs posted from No 1 AFHU. 6 ORs posted from Theatre of Operations.
29th July 1944
Place: Field
8 ORs joined from Theatre of Operations.
9th Parachute Battalion (Residue)
Month and year: August 1944
Commanding Officer: Lieut. A.R. Jefferson.
1st August 1944
34 O.R's from No.1 Airborne Forces Holding Unit. and CDN/484 Lieut. G. Lee.
2nd August 1944
6 O.R's from Depot and School Airborne Forces. (Ex B.L.A.)
4th August 1944
2 C/Sgt's from Depot and School Airborne Forces. (Ex B.L.A.).
5th August 1944
21 O.R's from No.1 Airborne Forces Holding Unit. and 71193 Lieut. E. Ferro.
6th August 1944
R.S.M. Miller and 49 O.R's to B.L.A.
8th August 1944
2 Stirling A/C dropped 40 men on Divisional D.Z. Captain A.D. Chilton and Lieut J. Jones and 15 men to B.L.A.
9th August 1944
2 Stirling A/C dropped 40 men on Divisional D.Z. 1 Cpl. and 4 Ptes from Depot & School Airborne Forces. (Ex B.L.A.).
14th August 1944
Lieut Pavey and 2/Lieut. Graham commenced Divisional Platoon Weapons Course. Duration 3 weeks. 1 N.C.O. and 12 men to CHESTER on MMG course.
15th August 1944
274720 Lieut. D. Harpley, 71193 Lieut E. Ferro, CDN/484 Lieut. E. Lee, 79893 Lieut. A. Barlow. and 70 men leave for B.L.A.
16th August 1944
3 O.R's report from B.L.A.
17th August 1944
Lieut. Abbott proceeded on R.S.I. Course at CATTERICK.
18th August 1944
179124 Lieut. R.O. Blair, 321580 2/Lieut. J.A. Don, 323015 2/Lieut. T.W. McGuffie, 323565 2/Lieut. R.H. Jones. and 32 O.R's joined from Clay Cross.
19th August 1944
4 O.R's report from B.L.A.
21st August 1944
Lieut. R.O. Blair to Platoon Commanders Course, School of Infantry. 2/Lieut. J.A. Don and 2/Lieut. R.H. Jones proceed on Divisional R.E. Course. 5 days.
22nd August 1944
Lieut. M. Glen proceeds to 'I' Course at MATLOCK. Rifle Course 'C' Range.
23rd August 1944
Lieut. A.R. Jefferson assumes command of Residues.
24th August 1944
Captain F.H. Tavener proceeded on Company Commanders Course at Barnard Castle. 5 C47 A/C dropped 46 men on Divisional D.Z. Lieut. A. Bagnall seriously injured and taken to Tadworth Military Hospital. Advance Party under C/Sgt. Brook of 6 O.R's proceeded to DUNSTER. 3 O.R's reported. (Ex B.L.A.).
27th August 1944
2/Lieut. Don and 2/Lieut. H.W. Jones rejoin from Div. RE Course.
28th August 1944
Lieut. B.R. Browne reported himself by telephone as alive.
Month and year: August 1944
Commanding Officer : Lt. Col. N. Crookenden
1st September 1944
Place: Beuzeville
Major A.J.M. Parry went to the area of MERVILLE and discovered the remains of 23 bodies belonging to this unit. An impromptu sing song and Concert was held in the local Hall and was a huge success. The Brigadier came to dinner in the Officers Mess.
Place: APO England.
43 OR's joined from AAC ITC.
2nd September 1944
Place: Beuzeville
Burial party sent to MERVILLE BTY under C.O.
3rd September 1944
Place: Beuzeville
Bn resting at BEUZEVILLE and waiting for return to ENGLAND.
4th September 1944
Bn marched approx: 3 miles, waited for transport, was picked up & taken to Transit Camp.
5th September 1944
Awaiting to embark.
6th September 1944
Place: APO England
Lieut. McGuffie selected for M.M.G. Course SAS Netheravon.
Embarked, sailed for Southampton where Bn arrived at approx 2100 hrs. dropped anchor and stayed aboard over night.
7th September 1944
Place: Southampton
Disembarked Bn was taken by train to BULFORD arrived at 1300 hrs.
8th September 1944
Place: APO England
Kit inspection and sorted out to Coys.
9th September 1944
Place: APO England
Issue of kit.
10th September 1944
Place: APO England
Bn granted 10 days leave.
12th September 1944
Place: APO England
Bn granted a further 4 days extension.
13th September 1944
Place: APO England
8 ORs ex BLA joined from Depot.
16th September 1944
Place: APO England
Commencing of Mobilization. Orders issued. Lt.Col. Crookenden assumed command of Unit.
Capture of Coastal Bty Position at 155775 by 9 Para Bn 6 Jun 44
1. PROBLEMS ENVOLVED
This Bty was thought to consist of four 150 mm guns in concrete emplacements. Therefore it was of utmost importance that it should be eliminated before it could interfere with landing on the beaches.
The guns were known to be sited in concrete emplacements 12 feet high 5 feet deep. Thickness of concrete 2 metres with a covering of 4 metres of earth; steel doors in front, wooden doors behind. Therefore special equipment needed to destroy emplacements.
Defences - one 20 mm dual purpose gun and several MGs. How many MGs unknown but many alternative positions visible. Str of Garrison - 180 to 200 all ranks.
The bty position was surrounded by a cattle fence enclosing a minefield of an approximate average depth of 100 yds, the inner border of which consisted of a Dannart wire fence 15 ft thick and 5 ft high. In places this inner fence was doubled, and within it the bty position itself was intersected by cross wire.
On one side of the bty position there was an A tk ditch 15 ft wide and 10 ft deep.
Outside the bty position isolated minefields were laid across the open approaches and MGs were sited to cover all approaches.
Therefore it was necessary to carry special equipment to overcome obstacles. Since this equipment was heavier than could be carried by parachutists, it would be necessary for a glider element.
The time factor was vital.
The bty had to be destroyed by 0450 hrs.
Owing to naval and air commitments no one could be dropped before 0020 hrs.
The nearest suitable DZ was 2400 yds from the bty positions.
2. PRELIMINARY ORGANISATION
(a). In order to disorganise the defences, damage obstacles and possibly clear a route through the minefields it was decided to drop an Oboe of 4000 lbs bombs from 100 Lancasters on the bty position between 0030 and 0400 hrs.
(b). One aircraft to drop a party of parachutists at 0020 hrs consisting of:-
(i). A bn RV Organisation Party to organise the Bn RV on the DZ.
(ii). A bty Recce Party to recce route forward and defences.
(c). A first glider element of 5 gliders loads containing special heavy equipment, this included two 6-pr A tk guns. 3 RASC jeeps and trailers containing ammunition, special store etc. Special stores included:-
(i). 24 lengths of scaling ladder for A tk ditch.
(ii). 60 lengths of lightweight Bangalore Torpedo.
(ii). 12 specially constructed duralumin foot bridges to be used if possible to cross the A tk ditch, thereby avoiding mines in it.
Note. A further 120 lengths of Bangalore Torpedo, and 48 lengths of scaling ladder to drop with parachutists. This glider element to land as close as possible to the Bn RV at 0035 hrs.
(d). The bn was to drop at 0050 hrs, re-organise at the RV which had to be cleared by NOT later than 0235 hrs.
(e). A taping party of 1 Off and 8 ORs to travel with CO in first aircraft, also duplicate RV organisation and bty recce parties in case the original parties had gone astray. Taping party to proceed immediately to bty position and to lay tapes as directed by Recce Party to most suitable points for gapping the inner wire defences. This party [to be] dropped with Polish mine detectors.
(f). OC Recce Party to meet CO during approach march, to confirm or otherwise layout of enemy defences, and to lead the Bn to their FUP.
(g). The assault party was to go in from the South East. The assault plan was based upon blowing 3 gaps through the inner wire defences. A "Firm base" to be established about 300 yds outside the Perimeter from which the taping party was to clear lanes 4 ft wide through the minefields to each intended gap.
(h). The Bn to be organised as follows:-
(i). Breaching Coy - One pl to each gap.
(ii). Assault Coy.
(iii). Glider Assault Party - 3 Offrs and 47 Inf, 1 Offr and 7 RE.
(iv). Reserve - One Coy (less glider assault party)
(v). 2 sniping parties (each 3 Bren grps, 3 snipers, 3 A tk rifles).
(vi). Diversion Gp (5 PIATS and 2 bren - incl 2 GERMAN speakers).
(vii). "Firm Base" party (rest of Bn under 2 i/c).
(viii). Mortars in posn 500 yds behind "Firm Base".
3. ORGANISATION ON ARRIVAL
(a). Head of Bn to reach "Firm Base" between 0410 and 0420 hrs.
(b). On reaching Dis P, Breaching Party to divide into 3 Breaching Pls and move to wire on orders of CO and lay Bangalore Torpedoes.
(c). Assault Coy to move to first cross tape behind Breaching Coy.
(d). Reserve to move to second cross tape behind Assault Coy.
(e). Sniping Parties 150 yds to each flank.
(f). Two 6-pr guns to posn 150 yds west of Bty.
(g). Diversion Party to Main Gate north of Bty.
4. ASSAULT PLAN
Movement of Breaching Coy silent if possible; if surprise lost bugle to sound "CHARGE" on which fire to be opened by all supporting arms.
0424 hrs - Glider Assault Det released by tugs at 6000 ft - three gliders. To land in the bty posn. Armed with Sten, grenades and Gen Wades charges for blowing casemates.
0424½ hrs - tug aircraft to signal letter 'M' to Bn HQ after releasing.
0425½ hrs - "Reveille" sounded on bugle - one mortar to switch to star shells to give Glider pilots their targets. No smoke to be used till gliders landed.
0428 hrs - "Fall-in" on bugle - all fire to cease except for Diversionary Party to enable gliders to land.
0430 hrs - 1st glider to touch down. "Lights Out" on bugle - star shells cease.
As soon as dark Bangalore Torpedoes to be blown, and successful gaps indicated by light signals.
Assault Coy pass through gaps - reorganise inside into 4 parties and immediately rush to four gun positions followed by Tp RE.
Bn Comd Post move behind Assault Coy and establish inside wire. Reserve Party move up under hand of Bn Comd. Sniping parties join reserve.
Note. Gliders on landing to rush the two centre gun positions and destroy. Diversionary party to break through at Main Gate as Assault Coy goes in. Recognition signals arranged between all parties involved.
5. EXECUTION
Moderate flak was encountered crossing the coast. But the Bn was dropped over an enormous area. One stick being dropped 30 miles EAST of Bty Position.
The RV organisation party and Recce party were correctly dropped, and got away according to plan.
Half the Taping party got away fairly easily, but without tape, as the party was dropped in a marsh and the tape lost.
The CO's aircraft and parties were dropped close to the DZ, but immediately on top of a GERMAN HQ, which resulted in a short melee before they got away.
By 0235 hrs only 110 ranks had collected at the Bn RV with only 10 lengths of Bangalore Torpedo and no scaling ladders.
There was no sign of the five gliders carrying stores and vehicles to the RV.
The CO thereupon decided to wait for a further 16 minutes before starting.
By 0250 hrs the Bn had grown to 150 strong with an additional 10 lengths of Bangalore Torpedo. Each Coy was about 30 strong. Enough signals to carry on - no 3" Mortars - One MG - one half of one Sniping party - No 6-pr guns - No Jeeps or trailers, or any glider stores - No sappers - No Fd Amb, but 6 unit medical orderlies. No mine detectors - One Coy Comd missing.
The CO decided to advance immediately.
The OC Recce Party met the Bn during the approach march. This party had cut the outer cattle fence, penetrated the minefield to the inner wire where they had waited for half an hour observing and pin pointing the enemy posts by the sound of conversations. They were there joined by the Taping Party, who marked the approach routes by digging their heels in the dust. It is an amazing fact that these two parties accomplished what they did without mine detectors, and without a single casualty. Several trip wires were encountered and neutralised as they felt their way forward with their hands.
As a result of OC Recce Party's report the CO decided to make two gaps only, detailing 15 men to each gap from the Breaching Coy.
The remaining two Coys he amalgamated into one assault Coy - divided into 4 parties 1 per gun - two parties through each gap.
During the approach march the Bn was heavily shelled, and narrowly evaded a hostile patrol 20 strong.
On reaching the 'firm base', fire was opened by 6 enemy MGs from positions outside the wire, 3 on each flank, and by 4 MGs from positions inside the wire.
The CO then despatched his one MG to silence the MGs on the left flank - it did.
He sent the Diversionary Party (now only 1 Sgt and 6 men) via the right flank enroute - they did.
About this time the CO saw two gliders circling the Bty; both being shot at and hit by flak. Having no mortars he could not illuminate the bty posn. One glider appeared to be about to land on the bty, but it subsequently grounded between 4 and 5 miles away. The other crashed landed in an orchard behind the bn. Here the OC attacked a German pl attempting to approach the Bn from the rear. This glider party although far [smaller?] in numbers, held off the German attack for 4 hrs.
As soon as the gaps were blown the Assault Party went in for the guns - [despite?] all flank opposition their speed and determination took them through.
The Diversionary Party forced an entrance at the Main Gate at the same time.
The CO then drew in his Breaching Parties with any oddments as a reserve, and sent them through to mop up the ground between his Comd Post and the guns.
It was a disappointment to the bn to find that the guns were of 75 mm only, and these were destroyed by Gammon bombs. It does not detract however from a magnificent feat of arms, and a display of absolute determination to overcome all handicaps.
As soon as the bty had been captured the Germans began to shell the position accurately and fast from FRANCEVILLE PLAGE.
The bn strength at the finish was 80.
Casualties - 1 Officer killed and 4 wounded, 65 ORs killed, wounded and missing. This does not include severe casualties.
The success signal was fired at 0445 hrs, and a carrier pigeon dispatched to ENGLAND in confirmation.
Personnel missing from the drop continued to arrive for days, and more may do so still. But during subsequent continuous fighting the Bn strength has not since exceeded 15 officers and 278 ORs.
6. PRELIMINARY TRAINING
Before the operation the Bn went out to Camp by itself for a fortnight accompanied by RE and Fd Amb dets.
It there constructed on the ground an exact full scale model of the Bty position including the A Tk ditch.
Every man was detailed to the special task he would be required to do in the operation, and practiced continuously at the task.
5 days and 4 night rehearsals were carried out. After the initial day rehearsals each day rehearsal was followed by a night one.
The rehearsal included an approach march over a slightly longer distance than was anticipated on the operation. All rehearsals were carried out with live ammunition.
The crossing of various types of obstacles with heavy equipment and weapons was practice. As also was assault over the most difficult obstacles which might be expected. It included cattle fence, minefield, outer Dannart, A tk ditch mined and inner Dannart wire.
Re-organisation at the Bn RV was also rehearsed.
Note. The bombing attack had missed the Bty completely. It had in fact almost eliminated the Recce Party.
Report on Assault on "Salemmelles Bty" 6 June 44
On receipt of COs orders given at about 0415 hrs for the assault [due to?] reduced numbers I organised the composite Coy into four parties each consisting of about twelve men. Parties were detailed to respective casemates. On penetrating the perimeter wire in which two gaps were blown, I reorganised the assault parties. During this reorganisation three Machine guns opened fire from our right. One bren gun was detailed to reply with fire. I believe that one of the enemy guns was neutralised by this LMG. The remainder of the Coy proceeded towards the casemates firing as it moved. Progress was slow on account of the cratered condition of the ground. Minefields were crossed during the passage of which two men were I believed killed.
Approximately 50 yds inside the wire I myself sustained a wound in my leg. It was not, however, of a particularly serious nature and I was able to proceed towards the guns. On reaching the gun positions we fired into the casemates and inflicted a number of casualties. I ordered fire to cease and some thirty to forty Bosches came out of the casemates and surrendered. One hundred yards before reaching the casemates we came under moderate shell fire and a few more casualties were sustained.
I supervised the destruction of Nos 1 and 2 guns. Various methods were attempted and after placing two shells, nose to nose, in number 2 gun and firing it, I was satisfied that it would be out of action sufficiently long enough to enable the seaborne force to land unmolested. No 1 gun which was outside the casemate and facing south was neutralised by the removal of various parts of the breach block.
I visited number three gun after the party responsible for its destruction had withdrawn. Lt. Halliburton went to inspect No 4 gun and reported to me that he considered it had been successfully neutralised. Whilst marshalling the prisoners prior to withdrawing Lt. Slade came along and informed me that the position was due to be shelled in a very few minutes by ARETHUSA. I ordered Lt. Halliburton to lead Nos 1 and 2 parties back to the Bn. At this stage I was feeling weak from a considerable loss of blood and followed the Company out of the Battery. Throughout the period of the withdrawal enemy shelling continued and a few more casualties were sustained. On reaching the main body of the Bn I proceeded to the ADS and received medical attention.
Field
27.6.44.
(Sgd) A.J.M. PARRY. MAJOR.
9 Bn The Parachute Regiment.
Report on Operations of 9 Para Bn 6 - 12 June 1944
The primary task of 9 Para Bn in the initial landing was the destruction of the Coastal Battery at 155775. A separate report on this action has already been submitted. It is necessary however to recapitulate somewhat in order to describe the state of the Bn on completion of its primary task.
The parachute drop at 0050 hrs had been widely scattered. Consequently only 150 all ranks had been available for the primary task. This task, which was successfully accomplished, involved heavy casualties to the already small force.
The secondary task allotted to 9 Para Bn was to seize and hold the LE PLEIN feature until relieved by No 1 SS Bde.
The Bn strength was now reduced to 80 all ranks, one MG, no mortars, no Fd Amb, no sappers, a few unit medical orderlies. The CO further had 22 prisoners on his hands, and his wounded personnel to consider. Amongst his prisoners he found a German Medical Officer and two medical orderlies. He therefore left his wounded with these medical personnel and two of his own medical orderlies, at a neighbouring chateau. His numbers were now augmented by the crew of a glider who had been fighting a German Pl in the neighbourhood. This brought the Bn strength up to just 100.
The move to LE PLEIN across country was begun at once - it was uneventful. Shortly after the start a formation of Allied aircraft came over, and presumably mistaking them for enemy troops, released two sticks of heavy bombs. These sticks fell on either side of the column and parallel to their line of advance. By extreme good fortune no casualties ensued.
On approaching the village of HAUGER on the north slopes of LE PLEIN the column was warned by a frenchman that the village was occupied by 200 Russians, impressed into the Germany Army after capture on the Eastern Front.
At 0900 hrs the column was fired on from the front and left flank as it approach rd junc 133757. As the advance continued the enemy 30-40 strong withdrew to the cross rds on the eastern outskirts of the village. The leading elements of the column thereupon put in a straight forward attack down the line of the road. This dislodged the enemy who fell back on the rd junc in the centre of the village leaving 15 dead behind them.
The enemy now held a position of some strength with MGs posted on both flanks. The CO therefore occupied the houses at the eastern end of the village.
The enemy now attempted to counter attack by a right flanking move through the orchards. As this attack came in it was met by the Vickers MG at 20 yds range, the attack immediately dissolved, leaving a further dozen dead behind.
It became apparent that the strength of the enemy's position lay in one particular house. The CO therefore decided to send a party of 30 right flanking to take this house in the rear. This attack failed, however, as the house had been properly prepared for defence and loop-holes all round. Furthermore it was surrounded by a 6 ft wall with MGs firing on fixed lines along the edge of the wall.
It was apparent that this force was not strong enough to evict the enemy from the village, and the CO therefore decided to consolidate. He occupied a chateau on the outskirts of the village with his main force, leaving one section at the rd junc.
The position then became one of stalemate. The enemy, though in greatly superior numbers made no further attempts to attack. He did, however, make a very great use of snipers who were most skilfully sited and concealed. Their standard of shooting varied however. In one instance they appeared incapable of learning any lessons from the fate of their comrades. They persistently sniped from the church tower although one man after another was killed in doing so. Subsequently, six dead snipers were found in the tower. The most effective way of dealing with the sniping proved to be the "set a thief to catch a thief" method. Our own snipers by carefully watching located enemy snipers and eliminated them in turn.
This situation lasted for almost 24 hrs, until the afternoon of 7 June when 1 SS Bde (Commandos) arrived, cleared the village and relieved the Bn of responsibility for the LE PLEIN feature.
[Thereafter?] reverted to bde control, and during the night 7/8 Jun moved to the woods south at ST COME 1373, where they were ordered to hold the high ground about 135736. The whole area was heavily wooded and intersected with high thick hedges. At only three points where orchards adjoined the position was there any field of view.
At midday on 8 Jun an attack on the right flank of the position by the enemy infantry developed which was repulsed with comparative ease. It subsequently transpired that this attack was made by troops of the 857 Regt.
During the afternoon and evening several more thrusts from the NE were made in single company strength. None of these attacks were supported by covering fire.
During the night 8/9 Jun, Bde sent up to the Bn two 3" Mortars and 3 Vickers MGs. This enabled the CO to organise a mortar section and a strong MG Pl of 4 MGs, one of which were mobile on a jeep.
At first light on 9 Jun a very heavy Mortar concentration was put down on the Bn area, and a determined infantry attack developed from the NE. In view of the close nature of the country the enemy advanced to within 50 yds before fire was opened - 2" and 3" mortars joined in repelling this attack as the risk of causing casualties amongst our own troops and they did cause a few. The defensive fire inflicted appalling casualties to the enemy who broke and fled. Another attack developed an hour later with the same results. Later in the morning information reached the CO that a serious situation was developing immediately to the south of his Bn area, where an enemy attack was developing on Bde HQ.
The CO immediately organised a force of 30 men and 2 MGs which he led himself, attacking the enemy in the rear. The line of attack was down the main road. The two MGs were placed firing down the road, while the force attacked left flanking, clearing house by house. By degrees the enemy position was outflanked, and the enemy withdrew into a very thick stretch of woodland running parallel to the road.
The MG positions were now altered and one was sited to fire down each side of the strip of woodland thus sealing the enemy within it.
An interesting method was then adopted for clearing the wood from end to end. The party advanced through the wood in two waves. Leading wave armed with stens, second wave armed with 36 grenades.
The second wave would throw a volley of grenades over the heads of the leading wave into the undergrowth beyond. Immediately the grenades exploded the leading wave rose and rushed forward ten yards firing from their stens. The process was repeated until the wood was cleared and resulted in killing 19 Germans and capturing one.
After clearing the wood the party returned to the Bn Area.
During the afternoon an enemy attack by one and a half Coys developed from the EAST. It succeeded in infiltrating through the woods, and the situation became serious. A counter attack, one pl strong led by the 2 i/c was therefore launched. It was partially successful. It stopped the enemy, but failed to drive him back. The counter attack pl was caught in the flank by two MGs which split it in two, killing two officers and 5 ORs and wounding another 5. The pl then withdrew.
The CO was of the opinion that these losses were due to two tactical errors (a) the pl tried to cross a clearing in the woods without first ensuring that its flanks were protected by covering fire. (b) some men rushed a bank, behind which they knew enemy to be without grenading it first.
9/10 Jun. Stragglers from the parachute drop had been drifting in since 6 Jun, and during the night a further 40 had reached Bde and sent up. This included a missing Coy Comd, and brought the Bn strength up to approx: 240. The first task of the reinforcements was to get in the wounded. Then work on perimeter defences.
Night attacks by the enemy were continuous, and these were countered by pushing posts well outside the perimeter, to prevent enemy getting within grenade throwing range. Firing, except at point blank range was strictly forbidden. This policy paid, as PW captured in [?] had no idea of the Bn dispositions.
10 Jun - an attack, preceded by heavy mortaring, developed on the right flank of the Bn positions at about 1100 hrs - it was repulsed.
During the morning a further 30 men arrived from Bde, and enables the CO to re-organise the bn into three Coys of approx: 70 each. Re-organisation of the defences were also carried out - two MGs being sited to fire down the main rd, and one pl pushed across the main rd up to a deep ditch NE of the Bn posn. These dispositions paid a very early dividend.
At about noon half a Coy of enemy debouched from the woods and began to dip in along the main rd in full view of the MGs. Fire was held until all sub-units were hard at work digging. When it did open fire it was devastating, practically the whole enemy half Coy being wiped out.
An enemy party then advanced unawares on the Pl position concealed in the ditch. Fire was held until 10 yds. Some of the enemy dead actually falling into the ditch. The remnants broke and fled.
At 1400 hrs a further attack developed on the bn positions down the line of the track from the NE. Mortar amn was by this time running short, and it was suggested by the NCO i/c PIAT that these weapons should be pointed in the air and used as mortars. This was tried, and proved most effective, even though the effect was largely morale. Attempts at infiltration continued during the afternoon, and at one point an enemy SP gun ambled forward. A Vickers MG opened on the gun which promptly blew up. Presumably some amn was hit.
At 1900 hrs a very determined attack by one and a half Coys developed from the NORTH on the left flank of the bn position in the direction of BREVILLE. Many of these were shot and a few taken prisoner. It subsequently transpired that these were the fleeing survivors of a disastrous attack by the enemy of 5 Bde positions at RANVILLE. At 2000 hrs an enemy attempt was made to influence the battle by cutting in our Bde RT set. The bn was ordered to send men out carrying yellow triangles to meet 'your friends on the left flank'. The order was not complied with.
Conditions quietened down by 2300 hrs and one coy was dispatched to seize and hold the chateau at ST COME. - it did so, and was attacked all through the night. The bn was left in peace.
During the night 10/11 Jun 5 BW arrived in the area preparatory to an attack they were launching on the village of BREVILLE the following morning. One coy 5 BW took over the chateau from the 9 Para Bn.
The attack on BREVILLE by 5 BW on the morning of 11 Jun failed, and the Bn withdrew into the 9 Para Bn area to re-organise, having suffered heavy casualties. In the afternoon 5 BW moved entirely into the Chateau area.
During the night 11/12 Jun sporadic attacks against the chateau and 9 Para Bn areas were maintained, and continued on morning 12 Jun when enemy tanks were reported in the vicinity. OC 5 BW kindly placed two of his A tk guns under command 9 Para Bn and these were sited in area cross rds 136737.
At 1500 hrs an intense arty and mortar bombardment on the two bn positions began and lasted for three quarters of an hour.
[The?] 9 Para Bn well dug in in their slit trenches, only two slight wounds resulted from [this?] intense bombardment.
It was immediately followed by a determined infantry assault on the chateau supported by six Mk IV or french tks and a number of SP guns.
The BW suffered heavily from the tks and SP guns. All their carriers were knocked out, as were the crews of their 6 pr guns which were thereby rendered ineffective.
At this juncture the bde comd 3 Para bde personally led a coy of 1 Cdn Para Bn to counter attack. The chateau position held, and the enemy switched his attack on to 9 para bn.
One enemy tank succeeded in penetrating to within forty yds of the 9 Para Bn posn and infantry to within 20 yds. Both were repelled. The tk was hit twice on the nose by PIATS without any effect a third PIAT bomb then hit in the flank and burst right through it, whereupon the tk hastily withdrew.
By 2000 hrs the situation had quietened down, but at 2100 hrs a concentration of very heavy shell fire (probably 120mm) came down on the bn posn - it lasted for ten minutes, but no infantry attack developed.
On the morning of 13 Jun the 9 Para Bn was relieved by the 2 OXF & BUCKS from 6 Airlg Bde.
It had been almost continuously in action since its paratp drop at 0050 hrs on 6 Jun and its strength on relief was 11 Officers and 218 ORs.
Contents of Diary by No.7448426. Pte. Jepp. T. 9th Para Bn
Tuesday - 6th June 44
Dropped in wrong place in 4ft of water, 3.5 Km NE of DZ. Contacted Duce, Penstone and L/c Green. Under fire from LMG post, attacked - forced to withdraw. Made for high ground to WEST but turned back by swamps and MMGs. Getting light so made for shelter of trees to the NORTH. Found empty farm house - flooded - and lay low until dark. Passing patrol did not investigate house, did not stop. At dusk struck out for village 8-1200 yds to EAST, but turned back after progressing only 2-300 yds in ¾ hour.
Wednesday - 7th June 44
At 1500 hrs struck out again, decided to make for more isolated cover than village - and arrived 1800 hrs - 1830 hrs. Enemy patrol halted within 20 yds - moved off 1850 hrs.
Thursday - 8th June 44
Reconnaissance discovered 75 mm cannon about 3-400 yds away, all routes covered or patrolled by enemy.
Friday - 9th June 44
News of other isolated bands nearby.
Saturday - 10th June 44
Established contact with others, arranged consolidation.
Sunday - 11th June 44
All isolated groups consolidated.
Monday - 12th June 44
0515 - 0540 hrs intense naval bombardment of nearby battery, with counter fire. Results not yet determined. News divulged that bombardment was by "Warspite" and Yankee "Arizona". Target - D.M. Result excellent. SALLANELLES dive-bombed about 1030, followed by 30 minutes of battle in that area. 2330 - 2400 hrs heavy bombing of roads, guns in this area. Some guns were knocked out.
Tuesday - 13th June 44
Reveille at 0500 hrs - heavy bombardment of local positions. At 0600 - 0630 hrs Naval bombardment of VARAVILLE, using air burst shells. Fighting along road CAEN - DIVES, Bombing in immediate area about midnight.
Wednesday - 14th June 44
Quiet morning. In afternoon decided to make a break at earliest opportunity - in parties of 4. 2 parties left just after 1300 hrs, - returned about 0300 hrs on THURS.
Thursday - 15th June 44
Northern - North Western route impassable because of deep water - 12 feet. Received news that our presence was known to civilians in local town. D and C dive bombed. Another addition to our party. Now 17 in all. Much talk of departure.
Friday - 16th June 44
Decided to save food and depart on Monday night. Nothing of interest.
Saturday - 17th June 44
NIL.
Sunday - 18th June 44
3 more comrades joined us. 1 Cdn infantry man, another Canadian and a Roland Cracknell of the 224, both medical orderlies. Now 20 in all. Two men were leaving decided not to from seeing parachutes descending over Oustreham.
Monday - 19th June 44
Awakened by news that Boche was retiring from VARAVILLE, FRANCEVILLE and CABOURG. Great excitement among civilians. Later found positions much as before. After a [?] Penstone and I decided - against opposition - to leave at dusk. Were eventually joined by 7 others making 9 in all. Set off 2330 hrs covered about 3.5 Kms by dawn.
Tuesday - 20th June 44
Lay up for the day in good cover. Moved off 2330 hrs - now right in amongst enemy artillery, covered about 3 Kms then lay up for night till dawn.
Wednesday - 21st June 44
Shelling from nearby positions during day. Now appear to be about 600 yds in front of the guns - possibly mobile 88s.
Appendix "F"
Statement by No.109081 Capt. T.E. Robinson. For Inclusion in War Diary
On crossing the French coast our aircraft was engaged by enemy AA defences and the pilot had to take evasive action. We were eventually dropped at 183776 Sheet No 40/16 NW. Two O.Rs were wounded by the enemy on landing and were conveyed to a small farm near this point, made comfortable, and left in the care of the farmer. I contacted four men of my stick and also Brigadier Hill with about 20 Brigade Staff.
This area had been flooded and we spent the night wading and swimming about 9 dykes, arriving at VARRAVILLE at dawn. Here "C" Coy of the 1st Canadian Bn were engaging an enemy post. We linked up with Lieuts. Peters and Catlin and a number of "A" Coy and Mortar Pl. The approximate strength of our party was 35.
A Frenchman volunteered to guide our party under the Command of the Brigadier to attack a field gun sited near GANNEVILLE-SUR-MERVILLE. At point 165762 we were bombed by what were alleged to be American aircraft and although I went the whole length of the column I found only 6 men and myself alive. The others were dead *, buried or too disfigured for recognition.
I guided the survivors back to the Canadian RAP at VARRAVILLE with a view to joining the Canadians fight or making my way back to the Battalion. I was dazed and sat down to enlighten myself on the photograph when I found the muzzle of an MG 34 about 6" from my nose. The Germans had infiltrated round the Canadians and the whole of the RAP were put in the bag.
The German force was a fighting patrol of about 40 men and they marched us to a point south of TROARN where they expected to meet transport to take them back to their unit. At about 1600 hrs they lay up in a field and sent out a small recce force. The remainder relaxed and became less vigilant. I took the opportunity of bursting through a hedge and making a dash. They fired after me but missed and I followed the bed of a stream for about 400 yds and lay doggo.
I had however seen an elderly French civilian who came over and talked to me. I was quite frank and told him my position and asked whether TROARN was occupied by the Germans and the best way of making a circuit of the town.
He advised me to hide in a dyke and went off to recconnoitre. Half an hour later he reappeared and signalled me to follow him at a distance which I did. He guided me to a farm on the SE edge of the town where I was given a breakfast of milk and some bread. A number of civilians gathered and escorted me into the town. I was apparently the first Englishman to arrive in the town and the reception they gave me was both overwhelming and embarrassing. All the girls persisted in kissing me on both cheeks and the male population wrung me by the hand. I kissed innumerable young children and babies. I was handed a bouquet of roses and bottles of wine and cognac appeared. They even gave me some half ripe strawberries and coarse granulated sugar. We were all having a grand celebration when a very agitated civilian rushed up with the news that the Germans had re entered the town.
The crowd simply dissolved and I was told to hide in the Church. I streaked over the church wall and made towards the porch. The latch clicked, the door opened and I was pulled inside and guided down into the crypt where I slept for about 3 hrs.
At dawn another Frenchman came to the church and guided me around the eastern edge of the town. I then did a compass march by night through the BOIS DE BAVAN and the BOIS DE BURIS arriving at the 8th Bn's position at 139706 at about 2359 hrs. The following morning I proceeded to LE MESNIL 1372 where I rejoined part of the Bn under the command of Major. Dyer.
* Their bodies were discovered in Sept and were buried by the Bn on the spot.
Statement by a Polish Deserter from 346 Arty Regt Att 858 Regt. 28/29 July 1944
1. 9 Coy 111/858 are along front of wood 144704, strength 30 approx. with 5 more at Coy HQ which is much further to the rear.
2. 11 Coy is S.E. from 9 Coy - from rd 145703 to bend in wood 144703. They are about 20 yds on the inside of the wood. Strength unknown but approx. the same.
3. The mortars are inside the wood about 400 yds NE of 144703. One French Stokes (1917) and the remainder 8-1's which sometimes fire British bombs.
4. Heavy MG positions at hedge and wood junction 144705 and at corner of wood 144703. LMGs SW of SW corner of wood. (South of 9 Coy).
5. Mortar Bomb dump along stone wall running west from above corner. Rd SE - NW is not known to be mined but is covered by 5 Tps of A/tk each armed with 1 OFENROHR and 2 FAUSTPATRONE.
6. Bty. positions of 4 guns at Copse 213731 - 75's with calibre of 76. One gun is 200 - 300 yds west of copse to divert the attention of a/c from the remainder of the guns which are well concealed and camouflaged.
7. H.Q. for 4 Btys in courtyard at 211724.
8. The fwd tps and were equipped with discharger cups.
9. Coys are very much under strength and can not expect reinforcements other than Russians.
10. All men are battle weary.
11. Food and certain supplies are brought up by one and a half Coy. between 0630 and 0830 DST from 163702. They march to and from this position in small groups. The food is not hot.
12. All Poles have been withdrawn from the front line in this Div. (The Deserter was an Arty FOO from 1/346 Arty Regt).
13. The front line is thinly held with slight reserves less than a 1000 yds back.
14. On the night 28/29 July 44 a patrol of Sappers were to clear a British Minefield West of Chateau 145703 and relay in field in front of 11 Coy and along hedge in front of 9 Coy. (Action was to be taken by 51 (H) Div.)
A standing joke amongst the Germans after the attempt on Hitler's life was:- "Our poor Feuhrer - What a pity he didn't die."
Appendix "B"
FROM: Lieutenant-Colonel C.N. Thomson D.S.O.,
Commanding,
5th Battalion The Black Watch. (R.H.R.)
--------------------------------------------------
Headquarters,
5th Bn The Black Watch, (R.H.R.),
BRITISH LIBERATION ARMY.
24th July 1944.
Dear General Gale,
Since D Day this Battalion has come into contact with various Battalions of your Division, particularly the 9th Para Battalion, whose Medical Officer and Staff have been extremely helpful to us when we have had considerable numbers of wounded fighting alongside of them. Their Padre too, has buried a great number of dead. We have had more kindness and consideration from 52 Oxf & Bucks Light Infantry and also from the 12 Devons and 12 Para Battalions.
I should like on behalf of all ranks of this Battalion to thank all the above for helping us out at some difficult times, and for the great kindness received at their hands.
I hope you will not think it impertinent of me to say what a very high opinion we have formed of the 6 Airborne Division, and how proud we are to have served along side of them.
yours Sincerely,
(Sgd). C.N. Thomson.
To:- Commander,
6th Airborne Division,
British Liberation Army.
Appendix "C"
Report on Wireless Set No 38 Mk II
1. No.38 sets have been netted by wavemeter prior to being dropped and yet when tested on the ground immediately after the drop they have been found to be off net. This has been a continual fault even though great care has been taken to ensure that the tuning dial has been tightly clamped. At the start of parachuting sets, this was thought to be caused by the shock of the container or kitbag hitting the ground, but trial by dropping the set on the man has proved that even the slightest shock sends the set off net. On most operations it will be necessary for a complete wireless silence from the time of the drop and it will be impossible for sets to be renetted until they are immediately required for use.
2. In general the complete set is bulky, awkward to carry and composed of too many parts. It appears to be built on a chasis which allows movement between the component parts of the set, this may account for the sets going off net after a jar. The aerials are issued as four separate rods, three of which are normally used, the set becomes top heavy and pulls away from the wearer causing discomfort. If the equipment is adjusted to counteract this the wearer is made doubly uncomfortable by the tightness of the equipment. A further point of discomfort is that the threat microphone after being worn for some time causes the wearer to perspire and this in turn causes discomfort through chafing. If the microphone is lessened for comfort, no signals are transmitted. If the set is carried as advised, it causes difficulty in breathing to the wearer. It also prevents him from getting on the ground from shell fire, unless he removes the aerial he cannot double or move along any covered approach (hedgerow). If he removes the aerial he cannot hold his [?]pon ready for use.
3. Even with the modification this lead often breaks internally when the set is operated on the move. A number of sets received during the campaign have not had the lead modification carried out. The four pin plug is of a very weak manufacture and invariably at the slightest provocation, breaks internally or becomes unserviceable.
4. The four screws holding the set in position are awkwardly placed and require a screw driver to remove them, therefore there is a delay in set repairs which are often necessary in the field.
5. The supply of 72 hours battery life is required on the ground during the initial stage of an operation. This means that approximately 9 batteries per set have to be dropped and carried by already heavily laden troops.
Lessons Learned from the Recent Campaign
I enumerate the following as being, in my opinion, the lessons learned in the recent Campaign in France:-
1. Weapons (General).
The many hours spent during the previous twelve months on the smaller points of weapon training were fully rewarded. All ranks took the very greatest care of their weapons & kept them always in a clean & serviceable condition under very difficult circumstances.
2. Patrolling.
This much discussed operation of war taught everybody a great deal. Whilst we are by no means perfect much was learned by officers & NCOs who are thus in a position to pass on to others the knowledge they acquired as a result of their experiences. No one can fail to have appreciated the inestimable value of the compass when moving through thick woods etc. Some more attention should be paid in instructing all ranks in its uses. The essential characteristic of alertness was frequently brought out as was also the difficulty in maintaining control. Quite obviously, the smaller a patrol the better - particularly with inexperienced troops. There is no limit to the amount of training that should be carried out in teaching men direction finding.
3. Fieldcraft.
Whilst there was little opportunity to make the fullest use of men's skill in fieldcraft, the value of having a 'look out' up trees was emphasised time and again. It was obvious that the Germans made much use of trees for observation for their mortars.
4. Sniping.
All numbers of a section must be capable of carrying out the duties of a sniper. With only a limited and small number the duties are likely to fall upon the few too frequently. It was emphasised that telescopic sights were not indispensable. [Much?] sniping was done with the No IV Rifle.
5. Mortar.
Far more practice should be carried out in the firing, by all ORs, of the 2" mortar. On a number of occasions good opportunities were lost in putting down smoke because of the inexperience of the firer. Experience has also taught us that the HE bomb has many uses.
6. Grenades.
Continual practice is required in throwing grenades from such places as the trunks of trees and also from ground level into the enemy's slit trenches. During previous training much was done in practicing men in throwing grenades through windows. I know of two cases in which the thrower has succeeded only in wounding himself because the grenade struck the far window frame and bounced back. Everybody has learned the great value of a 36 grenade. Little, if any, experience was had with any other type.
7. Defence of Isolated Buildings.
In the first two weeks of the campaign the Bn, or parts of it, was required to make use of farm buildings etc. During training in England we had always been warned against entering buildings, particularly isolated ones, and we were initially handicapped as a result of this misguided training. Buildings can be of great value to a determined defence and instruction is required in the best way of fighting from houses and putting them in a state of defence.
8. Discipline.
In spite of considerable efforts in the maintenance of discipline whilst the Bn was fighting a prolonged defensive battle, it was most noticeable that NCOs in a number of cases failed in their duty when the move forward began. There were many instances of such breaches as smoking on the march and falling out to drink by the wayside. Such conduct would never be tolerated in this country: i.e. is evident that NCOs need continual instruction in their responsibilities in the field.
27 Sept 44
Major
A Coy, 9 Para Bn.
