Note: The 2nd Parachute Battalion war diary for the period 17th - 25th September 1944 was lost when the Battalion was overrun at Arnhem Bridge. As such this diary contains few details about the Battalion's role at Arnhem, however the accompanying account compiled by Major Tatham-Warter provides an overview of events.
Abbreviations
|
A.A A/C A/Tk Bde BHQ Bn C of E Coy Div DZ IO LZ O Gp OR Pdr PT RC RV SP Tps |
Anti-Aircraft Aircraft Airfield Anti-Tank Brigade Battalion Headquarters Battalion Church of England Company Divisional Drop Zone Intelligence Officer Landing Zone Orders Group Other Ranks Pounder Physical Training Rendezvous Self-Propelled Troops |
Month and year: September 1944
Commanding Officer : Lt.Col. J.D. Frost DSO MC
1st September 1944
Place: Grantham
0900 - A, B, C, S, and H.Q. Coys do training under own Coy arrangements.
1430 - Lt. Col JD Frost DSO MC and all HQ Officers and Coy Commanders are briefed for Operation "LINNET".
2nd September 1944
Place: Grantham
Battalion briefing at the following times
0800 - H.Q. Coy and B.H.Q. 50%
0930 - C Coy 50%
1030 - B Coy 50%
1130 - A Coy 50%
1500 - H.Q. Coy and B.H.Q.
1600 - C Coy
1700 - B Coy
1800 - A Coy
2100 - I.O. called to Bde HQ.
2200 - Operation "LINNET" cancelled.
3rd September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - Ban lifted Troops allowed out.
1100 - "O" Gp warned that there would be a briefing at Bde H.Q. later on during the day.
2000 - Briefing of "O" Gp at Bde H.Q. for Operation "MAASTERICHT"
2130 - Operation "MAASTERICHT" cancelled.
2359 - All troops confined to Camp Area.
4th September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - Battalion on 24 hrs Stand by
P.M. - Troops allowed out from 1630 hrs to 2359 hrs.
5th September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - A, B, C, S and H.Q. Coys do training under own Coy Training programmes.
6th September 1944
Place: Grantham
0705 - All Coys on P.T.
0900 - A, B, C, S and H.Q. Coys do training under own Coy Training programmes.
1030 - Bn on picture show at "State" Grantham.
1630 - Warning Order for Operation "FIFTEEN".
2000 - "O" Gp Briefing Sand model made in Briefing Room.
7th September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - All troops confined to billets.
Coys briefed at following times:
0900 - C Coy,
0930 - B.H.Q. and H.Q. Coy
1000 - B Coy
1100 - A Coy
Operation "FIFTEEN" now changed to Operation "COMET".
2330 - Operation "COMET" cancelled for 24 hrs owing to bad weather.
8th September 1944
Place: Grantham
1030 - Film show at "The Picture House", Grantham.
2100 - Operation "COMET" cancelled for 24 hrs.
9th September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - Coys on Recreational Training.
P.M. - Operation "COMET" cancelled for 48 hrs.
10th September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - Church Parades for all Coys. R.C. and C of E Church Parades held at Stoke Rochford Hall.
1700 - Operation "COMET" cancelled. Troops allowed out.
11th September 1944
Place: Grantham
0900 - All Coys on training under own Coy Training Programmes. "A" Coy on Run and Walk, "HQ" Coy on Route March.
12th September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - All Coys do training under own Coy Training Programmes.
1100 - "O" Gp at Bde H.Q.
13th September 1944
Place: Grantham
0900 - A, B, C, S and H.Q Coys do training under own Coy Training Programmes which include Route Marches and Road Walk and Runs.
14th September 1944
Place: Grantham
0705 - All Coys on P.T.
0900 - A, B, C, S and H.Q. Coys do training under own Coy Training Programmes. Warning Order for Operation "MARKET".
15th September 1944
Place: Grantham
A.M. - A, B, C, S and H.Q. Coys do training under own Coy Training Programmes.
16th September 1944
Place: Grantham
0900 - Officers briefed for Operation "MARKET". 1000 hrs A/C taken over. Coys briefed at following times:-
1300 - B.H.Q. and H.Q. Coy
1400 - A Coy
1445 - B Coy
1600 - C Coy
17th September 1944
Place: Grantham
0630 - Reveille.
0900 - Tps start for Airfield.
0930 - Arrival at A/Fd.
1030 (approx) - Emplaning commences.
1126 - 31 Officers and 478 O.R.s take off.
No definite information has been received from the Parachute element since this time. Only 6 O.R.s who dropped "wide" have returned.
17th September 1944
Place: Keevil
1055 - 1st Glider Lift takes off - No other information concerning this lift.
18th September 1944
Place: Fairford
1116 - 2nd Glider Lift takes off.
1515 - 2nd Glider Lift lands on LZ and connects with Div HQ. Heavy shelling and mortaring experienced. From this party 12 O.R.s returned.
26th September 1944
1800 - Orders to prepare to withdraw given.
2000 - 2nd Glider element withdrawn to ferry across R. RHINE and then taken by transport to reception centre set up at NIJMEGEN.
27th September 1944
0400 - Personnel arrived at reception centre after this time. Hot meal and rum were issued and then personnel were shown to beds. Day spent in washing and cleaning and general re-equipping.
28th September 1944
During the night of 27th and early morning of 28th German Fighter Bombers caused damage to civilian property adjoining the Reception Centre.
P.M. - Personnel join remainder of 1st Seaborne Lift at LOUVEIN in BELGIUM.
29th September 1944
Resting and further equipping.
30th September 1944
1030 - Party emplanes for England.
Account of the 2nd Battalion's Operations
at Arnhem 17th September 1944
The task given to the 2nd Battalion was:-
(1) To seize the three Bridges over the RHINE at ARNHEM.
(2) Later to establish the Western half of the Brigade sector forming a bridgehead North of the main road Bridge, to allow the advanced units of the 2nd Army free passage, and deny use of it to the enemy.
The plan for carrying out those tasks was as follows. The Battalion would advance with all possible speed, with A Company leading, seize the Main Road Bridge West of the town, C Company were to seize the North end, and pass one Platoon to the South bank with the task of linking up, from the South, with A Company on the Main Bridge. C Company were then to establish their part of the Battalion sector for Phase 11.
On reaching the Boat Bridge, B Company were to seize the Bridge, and hold it as the left flank of the Battalion sector in Phase 11.
We were in possession of detailed information of enemy defences and concentrations, and did not expect anything except hurriedly organised resistance in Phase 1. It was clear, however, that the enemy would react strongly, and we expected to withstand heavy counter-attack, with the likelihood of tanks, until the arrival of the 2nd Army who were scheduled to reach us after 48 hours.
The Battalion was dropped at 1445 hours on D. day 17th September, with perfect accuracy on the D.Z. 7 miles West of ARNHEM. There was no opposition on the D.Z. and except for a motor patrol captured by A Company at the R.V. , no opposition was met until we had moved two miles towards the town. Here A Company bumped what proved to be the Southern flank of a strong enemy position, and after a spirited assault by one Platoon, were able to continue the advance. They met no more opposition until the railway West of the town. From then on Armoured cars and hastily organised defences caused only minor delay in the falling light, until A Company reached and seized the North end of the Main Bridge at 8 p.m. . They had taken some 50 prisoners during the advance.
Meanwhile C Company had taken the North end of the Railway Bridges only to see it blown as they began to cross. Similarly the Boat Bridge, which B Company reached after overcoming considerable resistance, was burnt before they could use it. An assault by A Company, across the Main Bridge, was met by devastating fire from tanks and light A.A. on the Bridge, and the attempt was abandoned. Efforts were then made to secure boats for an assault on the South end of the Bridge, but thorough reconnaissance revealed that all boats had been removed from the North bank. In spite of these reverses we were more than satisfied with the course of events. By first light on Monday the position was as follows:-
(1) We had captured our objective with comparatively few casualties.
(2) We were holding a small but strong bridgehead North of the Bridge. The force now consisted of the 2nd Battalion less C Company and one Platoon of B Company with the addition of Brigade Headquarters and attached troops, who had followed us in. We also had four 6 Pdr. A/TK guns. The force was commanded by Lt. Col Frost, D.S.O M.C.
(3) A strong counterattack from the South had been repelled during the night.
(4) We had lost contact with C Company after their episode at the Railway Bridge, and although patrols were sent out to contact them, nothing more was heard of them during the battle. We heard afterwards that they had reached their objective, but owing to the failure of the Brigade to establish the original sector, they were isolated, surrounded and eventually suffered much the same fate as ourselves.
Throughout Monday we were attacked with increasing vigour from the East, and subjected to continuous mortar fire and shelling. A number of tanks and S.P. guns supported the attack, and several attempts were made to bring armoured cars and tanks over the Bridge. Heavy toll was taken by both 6 Pdrs, and P.I.A.Ts. and nothing crossed the Bridge during the three days we held it.
During Monday night another counterattack from the South was repelled with heavy losses. The position East of the Bridge where A Company and part of the Brigade H.Q. force had borne the brunt of the attack, was strengthened by the addition of one Platoon of B Company.
Until Tuesday midday we had no wireless communication with Div. H.Q. or the rest of the Brigade, but we could hear by the noise of the battle that they were having a very sticky time. When contact was finally made, we heard that every effort was being made to reach us. We heard afterwards that they had been unlucky in meeting very heavy opposition soon after leaving the D.Z. and though they fought without a break, they never got more than a footing in the town.
Major Wallis was killed on Monday evening and Major Tatham Warter took over command of the Battalion. Our casualties had been heavy, but were mostly wounded. Tuesday was a repetition of Monday, with no appreciable worsening of the situation, except for an increase in casualties and a growing shortage of ammunition. The most serious deficiency was in P.I.A.T bombs, of which we now had none left, and so had no method of dealing with tanks which shelled our houses at very close range. The 6 Pdrs still kept the Bridge and Western approaches covered, but could not maintain positions East of the Bridge.
By Wednesday midday the situation had worsened considerably. We had been burnt out of all our positions East and immediately West of the Bridge. In spite of the most gallant defence and reported counter attacks by A and B Companies, the remnants of both companies had to be withdrawn to a firm position, still covering the Bridge, but slightly further North, which had previously been held by H.Q. Company. Colonel Frost and Major Crawley M.C. (Commanding B Company) were wounded during the morning, and Capt Frank M.C. (then commanding A Company) had been wounded the previous evening.
It had now become clear that the rest of the Division were very unlikely to reach us but we were cheered by the news that advanced units of the 2nd Army would reach the Bridge by 5 p.m. that evening. This did not happen and by dark the situation had become critical. Soon after dark the few houses still standing were set on fire, and we found ourselves without a position. The wounded were then surrendered, and from reports I received afterwards were well cared for, with our own doctors to look after them.
During the night we tried to re-establish ourselves in other houses, but in doing so suffered heavy casualties and became very split up. By morning we were no longer a fighting force, and the battle was over.
Of the 2nd Battalion approximately 350 had reached the Bridge, of this number 210 were wounded, many of whom had fought on to the end, in spite of their wounds. It is not possible to estimate the number killed, but I know of approximately 100 taken prisoner unwounded.
The Battalion had fought with the utmost gallantry, in inconceivably difficult conditions, and had denied the use of the vital Bridge to the enemy for 80 hours.
Major Tatham Warter Officer Commanding 2nd Parachute Regiment
