National Archives catalogue reference WO 171/1243
16th September, 1200 hrs
Junior Liaison Officer
Medium Machine Gun
Right / Radio Telephony (if upper case)
Starting Point / Support (if lower case)
Month and year: September 1944
Commanding Officer : Lt.Col. K.B.I. Smyth
1st to 3rd September 1944
Planning of operation in Belgium. Operation cancelled at last moment.
5th to 8th September 1944
Planning of operation in Holland, but operation again cancelled at last moment.
15th to 17th September 1944
Planning of operation in Holland.
18th September 1944
Bn emplaned for operations in N.W. Europe.
30th September 1944
Survivors of Arnhem return to Somerby with part of 1st Seaborne Party.
10 Para Bn O.O. No.1
16 Sept 44.
Ref Maps: HOLLAND 1/25,000 Sheets 388 6 NW.
1. Enemy See Appx A.
2. Own Tps Under comd
G tp A.Tk. Bty.
L Sec 133 Fd Amb.
3. 10 Bn will seize and hold def posn NORTH of ARNHEM.
Phase I. Reorganisation on ground and move to def sector.
Phase II. Occupation of def sector.
5. Air Plan
(a) Adv Gp Will drop with 1 Para Bde at H+57 mins on D day with tasks:
(i) Mark DZ RV for main para gp arriving on D+1.
(ii) Est wireless comn between DZ RV and Bde HQ.
(iii) Collect all available infm regarding the progress of the op up to arrival of Bn.
(b) Main Gp
No of A/C or Gliders.
Time of Drop
For DZ and LZ see trace "P".
6. DZ RV
(a) Wood 623842.
(b) Marked by Aldis lamp, green smoke and if necessary green Verey lights.
(a) Protect rear of Bde from EAST by def posn area of RV.
(b) When ordered withdraw to main posn.
8. Protective posn. See Sketch A.
9. S Coy
One Sec NW corner of wood. Centre of arc - EAST. Secondary arc - centre NE.
One Sec SE corner of wood. Centre of arc - SW. Secondary arc - centre NE.
(b) Mortars Pl area 626842.
Task 1 Corner of Wood 628847.
Task 2 Rd 633839.
Task 3 Rd embankment 614843.
Task 4 Rd junc 624848.
(c) PIATS Two sub secs in support each Coy area.
10. A.Tk guns One at each corner of wood.
11. Patrolling Standing patrols.
B Coy - GR GINKEL 625846.
D Coy - Corner of wood 629843.
(a) S.P. rd junc 627841.
(b) Route. See trace "P".
(c) Order of March:
Adv gd to move 400 yds ahead. D Coy with under comd:- 2 A.Tk. guns. One sec MMG. Two dets Mortars. Two sub secs PIATs.
Main body. R Gp. B Coy. Bn HQ. S Coy. L Sec 133 Fd Amb.
Rear gd. A Coy with under comd:- Two A.Tk. guns. One sec MMG. Two dets mortars. Two sub secs PIATs.
13. Report Lines See trace "P".
14. Glider Gp Dis Pt X rds 676819. Move when released by 11 Bn up main rd EAST to rejoin bn.
15. Detached Coy A Coy with under Comd two A.Tk. guns, one sec MMG, two dets mortars, two sub secs PIATs will occupy part of sector of fmn on RIGHT as shown in Trace "Q". When this fmn arrives on D+2, A Coy will come in Bde Res area 743796. Att weapons will revert to Bn.
16. Def posn See trace "Q".
17. Support Coy
(a) MMG One sec area 745803. Rt of arc - rd junc 749805. Left of arc - X rds 743804.
(b) Mortars Pl less two dets area 746799.
Task 1. Rd junc 749805.
Task 2. Cemetery 752804.
Task 3. Wood 750799.
Task 4. Wood 743795.
Task 5. X rds 743804.
Task 6. Buildings 746808.
(c) PIATS One sub sec - B Coy area. Two sub secs - D Coy area. One sub sec in res area X rds 746800.
18. Fwd Def One pl B Coy on right. One pl D Coy on left. For line of fwd def, patrol line and inter-coy boundary see trace "P".
19. A.Tk One 6 pdr area 745803. One 6 pdr area X rds 746801.
20. Demolitions NO brs will be destroyed or prepared for demolition. NO demolitions of any kind will be carried out except temporary minor rail cuts effected for local def purposes.
(a) Mines will only be laid under RE supervision.
(b) Own and enemy minefds will be reported to Bn HQ by quickest possibly means. Enemy minefds will also be reported at once to the nearest RE unit.
(c) 75 grenades may be laid by Coys but will invariably be guarded and will be removed when the unit leaves the area.
22. Air Sp Direct Air sp will be provided by RAF and possibly by USAAF at a later date.
23. Bomb line
(a) Until 6 hrs after arrival of 4 Para Bde. 785855 - 768852 - 750846 - 737845 - 730844 - 715845 - 708851 - 695852 - 676853 - 659853 - 639853 - 628853 - 613855.
(b) From 6 hrs after arrival of 4 Para Bde. 629852 - 629842 - 630821 - 628807 - 623788 - 616772 - 614759.
24. Anti-gas Respirators WILL be carried.
25. See App "B".
26. Bn HQ
PHASE I - 627842.
PHASE II - area HQ X rds 747801.
(a) RT : Wireless comn will be est as soon as possible after drop.
(b) Line : Line comn will be est as soon as possible after arrival in main def posn (Phase II).
(c) No enemy comns, except German Fd Cable, may be destroyed.
28. LOs JLO will report to Bde HQ report centre at 635838 by D+45 mins.
(a) Ground to Air Yellow smoke, flares, yellow celanese triangles and yellow fluorescent panels, if available. Fwd tps ONLY will indicate their posns thus, unless for some special reason such as imminent attack by own aircraft. All other tps will make their posns known to our a/c by any other means available.
(b) Ground to Ground Yellow celanese triangles.
(c) Civilians Friendly Dutch civilians properly enrolled for labour
through the Civil Affairs Mission will be issued with blue and white
30. Light Signals
(a) Standard Bde Success Signal: RED WHITE RED
(b) Standard Div SOS/DF Signal: RED GREEN RED
(a) Bde numerical code:
D Day refers to Div D day.
(b) Units will use the following codewords until further orders:-
A tk guns
DEELEN AIRFD 7487
Rd ARNHEM-APELDOORN 7804
Rd ARNHEM-ZUTPHEN 9208
32. Pass Words.
H hr until 2359 hrs D day
2359 hrs D day until 2359 hrs D+1
2359 hrs D+1 until 2359 hrs D+2
2359 hrs D+2 until 2359 hrs D+3
2359 hrs D+3 until 2359 hrs D+4
2359 hrs D+4 until 2359 hrs D+5
33. Synchronization of watches: BBC Time Signal before take-off.
34. ACK on AF A16 attd.
[Signed N.B. Hanmer] Captain
Adjutant 10 Bn The Parachute Regt
Time of Signature 161200B
App "A" to 10 Para Bn O.O. No.1 dtd 16 Sep 44.
OPERATION - "MARKET".
10 Para Bn Intelligence Summary No.1.
1. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS.
The main factor, is that every able bodied man in uniform who can be armed is in the battle. The Barrack areas in EDE and ARNHEM are unlikely to contain fighting troops, except those in transit to battle area.
Since the plan for operation "MARKET" provides for a break through by 30 Corps from approx the present line, at the same time that the airborne attack develops, it is unlikely that there will be any battling in progress or retreating Germans, North of the Rhine. In any case, the Germans are so thin on the ground that those who escape from 30 Corps would not be strong enough to fight their way through two American Airborne Divs in GRAVE and NIJMEGEN.
The Germans, however, often pull out of a position before the main attack arrives, and therefore, if they do this, they will defend the bridges at ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN, realizing full well their importance.
Rather fragmentary Dutch reports confirm that there are 2000 german troops East of IJSSEL in the HENGELO - BOCHOLT - CLEVE area. It is also reported that defences are being prepared along the line of the IJSSEL.
NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM come to the fore again as the pivot on which the MAAS-WAAL line and the line of the IJSSEL hinge, as a continuation of the SIEGFRIED line. There is obviously reason to suppose that the German withdrawal from the ALBERT CANAL will be North-East through NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM.
The defensive measures taken by the Germans are very wise for they realize full well the difficulty we will have of supply in this area, and so the newly formed formations are being sent down to the South to watch over the American thrust while all available Flak is concentrated around ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN to discourage the launching of the much heralded Airborne Armada.
It is odd this heavy concentration and build up of Flak to protect bridges which are as important to us as the enemy. They cannot suppose we shall bomb the bridges to cut off the enemy's remaining troops, thereby holding ourselves up for three weeks. Perhaps the Germans have misappreciated our intentions and they really do think we wish to destroy the bridges which we photograph but do not bomb or they realise it is a suitable airborne target. Due to the appalling breaches in security over the last prospected operation it is very likely that the enemy has some information of impending airborne operations.
To sum up, the enemy at present in the ARNHEM area has light and heavy Flak guns and it is to be noted that the Flak is very concentrated round the bridges and airfield and that the Div DZ and LZ are outside the range of the present sites of all the light Flak and beyond the capacity of the Heavy, and a garrison of about 2000 men on the airfields at DEELEN. However, one thing is certain - German reactions to a successful landing airborne landing in the ARNHEM area will be immediate. It is here that he is favourably placed to produce troops from the East, North or West and major reactions including tanks to the airborne Army's intrusion must be borne by 1st Airborne Division.
(a) The line marked "under construction" running East-West at the bottom of the ARNHEM and EDE map sheets is an autobahn, which is not yet ready to take traffic.
(b) The Railway in the same area is double track, electrified, with the electric cables overhead; it runs in a cutting for a considerable part of its length.
(c) The large building South of EDE at 5882 is the ENKA artificial silk factory.
(d) In the proposed landing area, which lies on the sand and gravel beds to the North of the RHINE, the soil is dark east and peat and cross-country movement for all vehicles is easy; this heath country, with a military training area in the middle of it (East of EDE), is comparable with the ALDERSHOT training area at LAFFIN's PLAIN and LONG VALLEY.
ENEMY opposition to the development of resistance has been strong in HOLLAND as a result of the situation of the country. It has been impossible to develop a widespread network of resistance in HOLLAND with W/T communications working to the U.K. There are, however, throughout HOLLAND a number of Resistance organizations with which contact has recently been established. It is believed that there are representative groups of Resistance organizations in most districts. The principal organizations are:-
(a) RAAD VAN VERZET, known as R.V.V. This has contacts throughout HOLLAND, is regarded as sound from the security point of view, and to have a strength of several thousands. The controlling body of this organization claims to have contact with most of the other groups in HOLLAND and to be in a position to influence their action. The R.V.V. has recently shown itself capable of providing valuable military intelligence and has been demanding supplies of arms for its personnel.
(b) KNOKPLOEGEN. This organization consists of some 550 active resistants, spread throughout the country.
(c) ORDE DIENST (Order of service). This organization has two main functions:-
(i) The provision of intelligence.
(ii) The development of plans for the maintenance of administrative services and civil order of liberation of HOLLAND.
The DUTCH authorities consider that this body should be capable of rendering considerable assistance to ALLIED troops in HOLLAND owing to its wide representation and the contacts which it has with local authorities. The organization has, however, been in existence for a considerable time and is thought to have been penetrated by the GERMANS, but there are likely to be many sections in it which will support the ALLIES loyally.
(d) LANDELIJKE: This organization has been responsible for providing identity and ration cards for persons living underground.
There is at present no W/T Communication with the resistants in the MARKET area. It is, however, likely that troops operating in the MARKET area will make contact with representatives of all the organizations referred to above.
It is hoped to be able to establish W/T contact with Resistance in the area round APELDOORN to the NORTH of the MARKET area shortly. Even if this cannot be done, instructions issued to Resistance organizations from LONDON will be passed to Groups in the MARKET area from these areas outside where direct W/T contact exists.