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Lieutenant-General Frederick Arthur Montague Browning
Unit : HQ 1st British Airborne Corps, and HQ 1st Allied Airborne Army
Army No. : 22588
Awards : Knight Commander of the British Empire, Companion of the Bath, Distinguished Service Order, Mentioned in Despatches, Legion of Merit, Croix de Guerre
Frederick "Boy" Browning was very much the father of the British Airborne movement, having raised the 1st Airborne Division and laid the foundations for what was to follow. The forty-seven year old Lieutenant-General began his military career with the Grenadier Guards in the First World War, during which he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order and the Croix de Guerre. In 1916, he had the honour of meeting Winston Churchill in his dugout, who, having resigned from the Government in the aftermath of the Gallipoli fiasco, was then a Lieutenant-Colonel in the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers. It was Churchill who, in October 1941, appointed him to command the 1st Airborne Division.
Having previously commanded the 24th Guards Brigade, Browning was the ideal candidate to raise this new formation. The British Airborne movement was an entirely new concept and, with the Army in desperate need of excellent soldiers and the RAF's Bomber Command in equal need of aircraft that could otherwise be used for parachute training, it was far from easy to convince the old school of the benefits of such troops, as yet untried in battle. Browning, a protégé of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, was an excellent administrator, however, and he used his considerable political skills and influence to manipulate the British military establishment to obtain whatever the Division required. This included ensuring that the Parachute Regiment sourced a particularly high number of Sergeants from the Guards Regiments, as he felt that only they could achieve the high standards of discipline that were required.
He also intervened on more mundane matters. In 1941, while inspecting the 2nd Battalion's " C" Company, who had experienced a number of difficulties in obtaining replacements for their heavily worn clothing, Browning took his time and talked with almost every man on parade, but when he had finished he turned to the then Major John Frost and said "I think you've got a good lot of men but I have never seen such a dirty company in all my life!". A shipment of fresh clothing was delivered soon after.
Browning, a fully qualified glider pilot, did much to create the image of the British Airborne Forces, having decided in the summer of 1942 that they ought to possess their own distinctive headwear, as opposed to the tradition of men wearing the berets of their former units. According to legend, his wife, the author Daphne du Maurier, chose the famous maroon colour, however this is now believed to be incorrect and the decision was in fact made elsewhere. Browning, however, did assign the artist, Major Edward Seago, to design an emblem for the Airborne Forces. The result was the famous insignia, taken from Ancient Greek myth, of the warrior Bellerophon riding Pegasus, the winged horse. Ever devoted to the care and attention of the men under his command, Browning was liked and admired by them, though few were allowed to form a close connection.
The maroon beret on his head was the only indication about Browning's person to confirm that he was an Airborne officer. He had designed his own uniform, made of barathea with a false Uhlan-style front, incorporating a zip opening at the neck to reveal regulation shirt and tie, worn with medal ribbons, collar patches, and rank badges, capped off with grey kid gloves, and a highly polished Guards 'Sam Browne' belt and swagger stick. He wore this uniform during Operation Market Garden and, as was his raison d'etre, he was always immaculately turned out, regardless of the time or occasion.
Browning never had the opportunity to lead the 1st Airborne Division into battle. In April 1943, shortly before they left for North Africa for the operations in the Mediterranean, Browning was appointed Airborne Advisor to Supreme Commander Eisenhower, and it was at this post that he oversaw the planning of the Airborne assault on Sicily. In December 1943, Browning was promoted to Lieutenant-General and given command of Headquarters Airborne Troops, under the wing of Field Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group. This was later renamed the 1st British Airborne Corps, consisting of the 1st and 6th Airborne Divisions, an SAS unit, and later the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade Group. It also came to incorporate the 52nd (Lowland) Division, although these air-transportable troops were not officially a part of the Corps.
Shortly after the Normandy landings it became clear to SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) that a centralised command encompassing all Airborne Forces, be they British or American, might be desirable in the future. General Eisenhower gave his approval to the establishment of the 1st Allied Airborne Army, but naturally there was disagreement over who should command it. The British favoured Browning as he was their most senior airborne officer, but the responsibility was instead handed to Lieutenant-General Brereton, an American who, though older and more experienced than Browning, had a marginally junior commission to his and had never before commanded Airborne troops. As was the custom with Inter-Allied structures of this nature, however, an American commander was given a British deputy, in this instance Browning, who was also allowed to retain control of the 1st British Airborne Corps. Browning was not trusted, and indeed was disliked by a number of high-ranking American officers, who regarded him as a "supercilious English aristocrat". His demeanour was often mistook for arrogance, though he could often rub people up the wrong way by virtue of the fact that his friends were both high and numerous and he was not afraid to seek their influence to get his own way.
His relationship with Brereton had severely deteriorated shortly before Market Garden. The speed of the Allied advance throughout August 1944 had been so rapid that many planned Airborne operations had to be abandoned, largely because ground forces had already reached and passed the intended objectives before the proposed D-Day. The Americans were determined to deploy all three currently available divisions of the 1st Allied Airborne Army in an action, indeed any action, and this desire inadvertently provoked tension between them and the British. One operation, codenamed Linnet, involved a drop near Lille and Courtrai on the 2nd September, with the 2nd British Army, who had halted their advance to accommodate the plan, acting as their relieving force. At the last moment the operation was cancelled because the 1st US Army had deliberately altered their course and taken the area from under the noses of the British. Brereton proposed a similar operation, Linnet 2, to be launched two days later, but Browning issued a strong protest as the planning phase had been woefully inadequate and the Army would have been thrown into battle without either proper maps or briefings for those at Company level and below. Brereton ignored his objection, which so angered Browning that he threatened to resign, and in so doing forced Brereton to back down. Due to differences in military culture, the Americans were taken aback by the threat and were furious at Browning's stance, regarding it as tantamount to disobeying an order. Matters were made worse when Brereton discovered that Browning, already displeased at the American attitude during the first Linnet, had gone behind his back and used his authority as commander of the 1st British Airborne Corps to commit the 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Brigade to Operation Comet. As a consequence, when Market Garden was launched, Brereton's relations with both Browning and the 2nd British Army were exceptionally poor.
Another of Browning's rapidly disintegrating relationships was with the commander of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade Group, Major-General Sosabowski. The Brigade had been formed with the sole intention of it parachuting into Poland to assist with the liberation of their homeland, however as the war grew older the practicalities of this ever taking place became increasingly unrealistic, and with the Allied invasion of Europe looming, there was a great deal of pressure for the Brigade to become a part of the 1st British Airborne Corps. Sosabowski did much to resist this and in the process took offence at Browning's persistent interference, whilst Browning himself did not take kindly to the Pole's defiance. The two men had originally been on good terms, but by the time of Market Garden, Sosabowski, still loyal to the original purpose of his Brigade, was becoming increasingly difficult for Browning to tolerate. Sosabowski's sound judgment had had a hand in the cancellation of Operation Comet, yet relations were surely soured when he became so concerned over the task assigned to his Brigade that he insisted on receiving his orders in writing.
On the 10th September 1944, Montgomery personally briefed Browning for the part that the 1st Allied Airborne Army was to play in Market Garden. Upon enquiring how long the 1st Airborne would have to hold Arnhem, Montgomery said two days, to which Browning replied that they could hold it for four but, uneasy about the huge task being placed upon his Corps, he famously added that Arnhem might be "a bridge too far", though it is unlikely that he ever used that particular phrase.
It is unclear whether permission came from either Montgomery or Brereton, but it was agreed that Browning would lead the previously untried tactical headquarters into battle, instead of the much more experienced American commander, Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway, who had commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Normandy. The choice was perhaps not so mysterious; Ridgway had only recently returned from Normandy whilst Browning, his equal in rank, had so far not had the opportunity to command any troops in battle during the War, and so was due his chance. What is certainly questionable is the need for Corps HQ to have set foot outside of England at all, because the three divisions involved were fighting independent actions at great distance from each other, and so had no need of a higher command structure to coordinate their actions on the battlefield. It has been suggested that this decision was made simply because Browning wished to get into action. Without doubt he wanted to get involved, but since Normandy there had been a growing desire to test this new command structure in action alongside multiple airborne divisions, and so it would seem far more likely that Market Garden, no matter how unsuitable, was merely seized upon as an opportunity. The addition of Corps HQ to the airlift robbed the 1st Airborne Division of thirty-eight gliders on the first day. Due to the limited numbers of men and equipment that an airborne unit can take into battle, glider loads are finely calculated and nothing is taken which will not be required. The anomaly of Corps HQ, therefore, was perhaps a product of the over-optimistic Market Garden plan, based upon the belief that German resistance would be minimal and so these gliders would not be too badly missed.
On the 15th September, Major Brian Urquhart, Browning's Intelligence Officer, approached the General on several occasions with reports of the sudden presence of the 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer Divisions in the Market Garden area. Initially these reports had come from vague and mistrusted sources, of which the Dutch Resistance was one, but now Urquhart had heard from the 21st Army Group that these two divisions were likely in and around Arnhem. He had also obtained reconnaissance photographs of a small number of modern tanks only ten miles from the town. Browning was in a most awkward position. Faced with this vague information, he decided not to cancel the operation, and in so doing risk a further breakdown of morale within the 1st Airborne Division, but instead chose to pay little heed to Major Urquhart's evidence and brushed off the tanks as likely being barely serviceable. Browning was, however, clearly concerned at the possibility of his Intelligence Officer stirring up trouble because he ordered his senior medical officer, Colonel Austin Eagger, to send Urquhart away on sick leave due to "nervous strain and exhaustion". Much criticism has been placed on Browning's shoulders for ignoring the possible presence of tanks at Arnhem, but it should be remembered that the evidence placed before him was far from conclusive and that few at the time imagined that the Germans could possibly react in the way that they did to the Operation. If Browning was at fault then it is because he made no effort to mention the possibility of this threat to the 1st Airborne Division. If they had known then they would certainly have taken extra anti-tank equipment with them and adopted tactics better suited to dealing with heavy opposition.
Browning insisted to Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, that his priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, second the bridge at Grave, then three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told him that he was not to make any attempt to take any of the bridges until the high ground had been secured. Gavin agreed with this, though he later felt that he had enough confidence in his divisional plan to spare one battalion to head for the bridge in Nijmegen immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights dominated the entire area, and there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when it arrived, would have been severely handicapped were this area to remain in enemy hands. Even so the priorities of any airborne formation is the capture of ultimate objectives, in this instance the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Nijmegen Bridge in particular was of paramount importance because if it was not captured intact then the 1st Airborne Division would certainly have been cut off behind two very large rivers and thirteen miles of hostile territory. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a terrible mistake. If the bridge had been taken in strength and with all speed, then it is possible that British tanks would have reached Arnhem Bridge before John Frost's defence finally collapsed. The 82nd Airborne Division certainly does not deserve any particular criticism for this as their priorities appear to be a further product of the blind optimism that dogged the Operation, of which everyone involved was guilty. At Nijmegen, as with everywhere else, the assumption was that resistance would be light and so the main concern of the airborne units was to make the advance of the ground forces as rapid and as uncomplicated as possible, instead of devoting all their attention to primary objectives.
On Sunday 17th September, Lieutenant-General Browning's glider landed on the Groesbeek Heights, one hundred yards west of the Reichswald Forest. His descent was not without incident as one of the glider's front wheels was torn off when it struck an electricity cable, however the craft landed safely and came to a halt in a cabbage patch. Browning immediately ran over to the woods and returned several minutes later, explaining to his Chief of Staff, Brigadier Gordon Walch, "I wanted to be the first British officer to pee in Germany". A few German shells began to explode in the vicinity, prompting Colonel George Chatterton, Browning's pilot and commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment, to throw himself into a ditch to seek cover. Completely unperturbed, Browning stood over him and asked "George, whatever in the world are you doing down there?".
Corps HQ suffered particularly dire problems with communications throughout the battle. Browning later blamed this failure on his signals section, an inexperienced and ill-equipped unit that had only been formed on the 2nd September. For the next forty-eight hours, Browning had no contact with either the troops at Arnhem or the 101st Airborne Division at Eindhoven, and as such his ability to command the Corps vanished completely. If nothing else, Market Garden demonstrated how futile the decision was to commit the Headquarters to the battle, because as XXX Corps advanced and linked up with the airborne units, they then came under the command of his old friend, Lieutenant-General Horrocks. When the British arrived at Nijmegen in strength, however, Horrocks allowed Browning to keep the 82nd Airborne Division under his command, though due to their static defence of the area as well as the co-ordinated assaults around Nijmegen with the Guards Armoured Division, he was only able to exercise any real authority over the 1st Airborne Division; a pity then that his contact with them was minimal, even during the final phases of the Operation.
The frustration of his handicapped position took its toll on him, and for once Browning lost control of his temper and threw a bottle of ink at a picture of a German general that was hanging on a wall in his Headquarters. It wasn't until Saturday 23rd September, when he met Major-General Urquhart's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, that Browning began to appreciate the Division's difficulties. Even then, because it was common for a messenger's bad news to not be taken too literally, Charles Mackenzie left Browning thinking that he had not been able to fully convince him of the seriousness of the situation.
With Nijmegen Bridge still in enemy hands and the looming threat of a concentrated attack of German tanks causing desperate problems amongst the 82nd Airborne Division's far-flung units, the arrival of XXX Corps was much anticipated. On Tuesday 19th September, Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin waited at Grave Bridge to welcome the leading elements into the 82nd's area. Browning was not pleased with the pace at which events were progressing, as according to the timetable the leading tanks should have been in Arnhem by this stage, but he did have the pleasure of welcoming the leading unit, the Grenadier Guards, his former Regiment. He gave them orders to help the 2nd Battalion the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment to clear Nijmegen of enemy troops, whilst the Coldstream Guards, following on behind, were attached to the 82nd Airborne Division to respond to any crisis that may develop.
On Wednesday 20th, the air-transportable 52nd (Lowland) Division, who were to reinforce the 1st Airborne after Arnhem had been reached and secured by the ground forces, offered to fly one of their brigades to Arnhem immediately, however Browning declined this generous yet highly risky offer by replying "Thanks for your message, but offer not - repeat not - required as situation better than you think." Due to the lack of communications, Browning did not know how serious a position the 1st Airborne was in at this time, and so it is not surprising that he refused permission. By Sunday 24th, however, Browning fully appreciated the danger and was quite keen to see the Division employed in this manner, but both Montgomery and General Dempsey refused to sanction it. How successful such a lift may have been, if indeed it was at all feasible, is entirely open to speculation. Glider troops are extremely vulnerable when landing on unfriendly, heavily defended zones, but if they had been fortunate in this regard then it is certain that a brigade of fresh and formed-up infantry could have transformed the situation at Oosterbeek. By this stage the Market Garden plan was clearly on the brink of defeat, and so a wild gamble with one of Britain's few remaining reserves of infantry was hardly sensible.
On that same day, Sunday 24th September, the principal commanders in the battle assembled for the Valburg Conference, at which orders were given by Lieutenant-General Horrocks for an assault on the northern bank of the river that night. The British commanders were by now quite frustrated by the attitude of Major-General Sosabowski, and they proceeded to humiliate him and undermine his authority. Browning said nothing in his defence. Sosabowski attributed the pessimistic attitude on that final day to Browning who, he felt, as Deputy Commander of the 1st Allied Airborne Army and still in overall command of the 1st Airborne, should have used his power to persuade Montgomery, Dempsey and Horrocks to have one final and determined attempt to secure the north bank. Sosabowski believed that victory was still possible at this stage, and he felt that it was "incredible" that Browning did not persist. Indeed, it appears that he did everything to encourage a withdrawal. This was for the best, however, as Market Garden and the subsequent plans to cut Holland in two and encircle the Ruhr were only possible if German resistance had collapsed. It had not, and so, with XXX Corps standing precariously at the tip of a sixty-four mile advance into enemy territory, and with their rear threatened by counterattacks, the prize of gaining a bridgehead over the final River between the Allies and Germany began to lose its urgent appeal.
When the orders to withdraw were handed to Major-General Urquhart, he also received a letter from Browning stating the following:
You can rest assured that XXX Corps are doing their maximum under the most appalling difficulties to relieve you... the road has been cut between us and the main body for 24 hours, which does not help matters much. It is now through again, and the Army is pouring to your assistance but, as you will appreciate better than I, very late in the day...
I naturally feel, not so tired and frustrated as you do, but probably almost worse about the whole thing than you do...
It may amuse you to know that my front faces in all directions, but I am only in close contact with the enemy for about 8000 yards to the south-east, which is quite enough in present circumstances.
Repeating the same message in his book about Operation Market Garden, "The Devil's Birthday", Geoffrey Powell commented "The ever-reticent General Urquhart has not revealed the extent of his amusement."
On September 27th, Browning addressed the survivors of the 1st Airborne Division at their billets in Nijmegen. He had confessed to a member of his staff that he did not feel that he could face them, but he did, and he did the only thing that he could do in such circumstances and told the men exactly what they wanted to hear.
After the battle, there was a deliberate attempt to make the Polish Brigade a scapegoat for the failure to get through to Arnhem, and Sosabowski in particular was victimised. Browning's part in this took the form of a detailed letter to Lt-General Sir Ronald Weeks, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff:
Sir,
I have the honour to bring the following facts to your notice with regard to Major-General St. Sosabowski, Commander 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group during operation "MARKET."
During the weeks previous to operation "MARKET," a period which entailed detailed planning for three other possible operations, the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group formed part of the force envisaged.
Both during this period and, in fact, ever since the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group was mobilised in July, Major-General Sosabowski proved himself to be extremely difficult to work with. The "difficulty" was apparent not only to commanders under whom he was planning but also to staff officers of the other airborne formations concerned.
During this period he gave me the very distinct impression that he was raising objections and causing difficulties as he did not feel that his brigade was fully ready for battle. When the brigade was first mobilised I made it absolutely clear to this officer, and in no uncertain terms, that I was the sole judge of the efficiency of his brigade and it was merely his duty to get them ready and train them with all the determination of which he was capable.
It became apparent during this training period that, capable soldier as this officer undoubtedly is, he was unable to adapt himself to the level of a parachute brigade commander, which requires intimate and direct command of his battalions. He left too much to his Chief of Staff and attempted to treat his parachute brigade as if it were a much higher and bigger formation.
During operation "MARKET" the brigade was unfortunate in being dropped in parts owing to the weather. However, during this period of operation "MARKET" great difficulties were being overcome hourly by all formations of the Second Army in their efforts to reach the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. This officer proved himself to be quite incapable of appreciating the urgent nature of the operation, and continually showed himself to be both argumentative and loathe to play his full part in the operation unless everything was done for him and his brigade.
Subsequently, when the 1st Airborne Division had been withdrawn, and the Polish Parachute Brigade Group reverted to my command South of the R. Waal, this officer worried both me and my staff (who were at that time fighting a very difficult battle to keep the corridor open from inclusive Nijmegen to Eindhoven) about such things as two or three lorries to supplement his transport. I was forced finally to be extremely curt to this officer, and ordered him to carry out his orders from then on without query or obstruction.
Both Commander 30 Corps and Commander 43 Division will bear out my criticism of the attitude of this officer throughout the operation.
Major-General Sosabowski has undoubtedly, during the three years in which I have been connected with him, done a very great amount for the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group under disappointing circumstances. He was mainly responsible for the whole of the raising, organisation and training of the brigade. However, this good record cannot be allowed to interfere with the present and future efficiency of the brigade.
I am forced, therefore, to recommend that General Sosabowski be employed elsewhere, and that a younger, more flexibly minded and cooperative officer be made available to succeed him.
There are, to my knowledge, two possible candidates now serving with the brigade. The first is Lieut-Col. S. Jachnik, who is at present Deputy Commander. This officer has had practically no opportunity to display his powers owing to the somewhat overbearing nature of General Sosabowski's personality. The appointment of this officer would, in my opinion, be essentially in the nature of an experiment.
The second candidate is Major M. Tonn, who commands 1 Parachute Battalion. This officer has trained his battalion well and, in my opinion and in the opinion of the G.S.O.1. Liaison (Airborne) Lieut-Col. Stevens, he possesses the requisite drive and administrative ability to fulfill the appointment.
However, this appointment must remain largely a matter for the Polish Army to make, and it will probably be better in the long run if new blood be brought in.
Finally, I wish to emphasise again that I consider Major-General Sosabowski is a knowledgeable and efficient soldier and up to the average of his rank, but owing to his outlook, temperament and inability to cooperate he should be given a change of employment.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd) F. A. M. Browning
Commander Airborne Corps.
It could be argued that there was merit in some of these allegations, certainly that Sosabowski was difficult to work with and that he may have been unable to accept the risk that is inherent with parachute operations. The claim that "This officer proved himself to be quite incapable of appreciating the urgent nature of the operation, and continually showed himself to be both argumentative and loathe to play his full part in the operation unless everything was done for him and his brigade", is, however, complete nonsense. Major-General Sosabowski was relieved of his command, in favour of Lieutenant-Colonel Jachnik, on the 9th December 1944.
Field Marshal Montgomery did not lose any confidence in the ability of Browning to command, indeed he wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and stated that he would like to have him as a Corps commander if ever there was a vacancy. Lieutenant-General Browning, however, received no further promotion throughout the duration of his military career. A few months after Arnhem he departed from the airborne scene and became the Chief of Staff at South-East Asia Command. On the 1st March 1945, he was appointed Colonel of the Indian Parachute Regiment, and was later made Comptroller of the Royal Household. One of the barracks in Aldershot belonging to the Parachute Regiment was named Browning Barracks.
See also: 1st Para Brigade, 21st Independent Parachute Company, Maj-Gen Urquhart, Maj Hibbert, Maj Wilson.